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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis considers the challenges of late development in the age of neoliberalism and 
the impact of global economic and political forces on catch-up efforts in Ethiopia and 
Vietnam. It identifies two dominant interpretations of this relationship, which map onto 
the divide between the mainstream and heterodox development literatures. It suggests 
that for all their differences, both approaches adopt too deterministic a reading of the 
relationship between national development and global conditions, and in-so-doing 
misdiagnose obstacles to late development. Instead the thesis advances that the impacts 
of global conditions on late development prospects are the context-specific outcome of 
interactions between a nation’s development strategy and shifts in global capitalism. 
This suggests that historically informed political economy analysis is needed to examine 
prospects for the emergence of forms of developmentalism in the current age. To explore 
such possibilities, the thesis examines the development trajectories of Ethiopia and 
Vietnam, two rapidly growing developing economies with state-led and manufacturing-
oriented development strategies. These two late developers have sought to power 
structural transformation by combining state ownership over the commanding heights 
of the economy with a strong emphasis on public investment, followed by the embrace 
of foreign capital to facilitate participation in global value chains. This represents an 
attempt to selectively appropriate elements of the global order to serve the domestic 
political and economic ends of their respective ruling parties. Their experiences provide 
a forceful reminder that forms of developmentalism endure under neoliberalism and 
expose the variegated nature of late development constraints (and opportunities).  
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Note on names, language and dates 
 
 
 
Names  
 
It is Ethiopian custom for authors to be referenced by their first names. Where 
individuals are referred to in the text this custom is followed where their full name and 
title has already been mentioned. However, in line with Western academic convention, 
in the in-text citations and bibliography both Ethiopian and Vietnamese authors are 
referred to by their last name.  
 
 
Language 
 
Non-English words in either Amharic or Vietnamese are in italics in the text (except 
where proper nouns). Given the limited usage of such words, Vietnamese diacritics have 
been omitted. Transliteration from Amharic to English commonly results in competing 
spellings for the same word or name (Derg versus Dergue, for instance). The thesis 
adopts a common (and where possible, dominant) spelling for all Amharic and Amharic-
derived words.  
 
 
Dates  
 
Official government data in Ethiopia is often provided according to the fiscal year, 
which runs from 8 July-7 July.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
This thesis is concerned with possibilities for applying national development strategies 
directed at structural transformation, employment creation and improved living 
standards in poor countries since the neoliberal transition. It seeks to understand what 
opportunities remain for – and what openings can be created by – late developers 
seeking to achieve sustained and rapid growth. The neoliberal turn in development 
theory, economic policy and patterns of global accumulation since the 1980s profoundly 
disrupted progress toward catch-up evident in many developing countries in the period 
after the end of World War II, with the exception of some stellar performers such as 
China (Reinert et al., 2016). This signals the importance of studies examining the impact 
of global political and economic forces on national development prospects. The recent 
revival of academic and policy interest in industrial policy (UNCTAD, 2016) has 
undoubtedly only been narrowly incorporated into the work of leading financial 
institutions such as the World Bank (Wade, 2012; Fine and Van Waeyenberge, 2013). 
Nonetheless, together with the ruptures associated with the global financial crisis (GFC) 
after 2007, policy and academic debate on alternatives to mainstream economic reforms 
is now considerably more open than any other time in the last several decades (Chang 
and Grabel, 2014). In addition, the end of the recent global commodity boom (2003-
2011) has not only underscored the dangers of commodity-export-dependent 
development pathways (UNCTAD and FAO, 2017) but also acted as a forceful reminder 
of the hierarchical nature of the global economy and reinforced the need for 
development strategies directed at structural transformation. Such economic and 
theoretical shifts forcefully demonstrate the value of studies exploring prospects for 
developmentalism in the current global economic and political order. This thesis makes 
both theoretical and empirical contributions to this set of motivating concerns through 
examining the development experiences of Ethiopia and Vietnam.  
 
1.1 Overview 
 
This thesis is concerned with the relationship between national development and global 
conditions. Two broad approaches to conceptualising this relationship are evident in the 
development literature to date, which map onto the divide between mainstream and 
heterodox development theory. Following the end of World War II, with the emergence 
18 
 
of the discipline of development economics, mainstream approaches to development 
theory have persistently suggested that the embrace of global forces (especially trade, 
finance, aid and technology) is critical to development success, and that, as a corollary, 
the chief constraints to development lie in the domestic domain. In other words, 
development is expected to flow from the adoption of the ‘right’ kind of policies, 
anchored around the embrace of foreign trade and capital. Despite shifts in how the 
‘right’ kinds of policies are conceived, mainstream development theory persistently 
treats international political and economic forces as exogenous, given, and having a 
broadly positive influence on processes entailed in catching-up. As a result, the 
relationship between the national economy and global capitalism is marked by a form 
of ‘optimistic determinism’ wherein global conditions are considered, axiomatically, 
enabling of development across countries and contexts.  
  
In contrast, drawing upon its diagnosis of asymmetrical power relations embedded 
within the global political and economic order and (adversely) impacting poorer 
peripheral economies, the heterodox literature highlights obstacles to development 
emanating from global market forces and power structures beyond the control of 
developing economies themselves. Yet despite critical shifts in the post-war era, and 
despite making a number of critically important contributions, dominant heterodox 
approaches also tend to assume that (global) constraints exist independently of the 
contexts and countries in which they operate, meaning that the global order is taken to 
be a fixed and binding hindrance to all late developers. In this sense, the heterodoxy 
emerges as a mirror of the orthodoxy, offering a ‘pessimistic determinism’ to counter 
the mainstream’s opposite number. In this respect, both literatures take the relationship 
between national development prospects and global conditions to be pre-determined and 
subject to only minimal influence by the strategies of specific states at particular 
historical conjunctures.  
 
A contrasting approach is advanced in the thesis, which conceptualises the relationship 
between national economies and global capitalism as systemic, dynamic and co-
constitutive in nature. It is suggested that the modality of a country’s insertion into the 
global division of labour (and therefore the development challenges stemming from this 
global order) is not solely shaped by global political and economic forces. Rather, it is 
also influenced by the domestic balance of forces in a given national context. As a result, 
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it is suggested that a country’s relationship with (and therefore the constraints emanating 
from) the global economy, is not pre-determined (for good or ill), but is instead the 
context-specific product of both a given nation’s development strategy and the shifting 
functioning of the global capitalist system in a specific moment of global accumulation. 
Development constraints, therefore, are likewise the dynamic and relational outcome of 
the interactions between the national and global domains, shaped by the mediating role 
of the state and the social forces acting upon it. The contrasting conceptualisation of the 
relationship between national development and global conditions offered here is 
therefore one that is inherently contingent and variegated, not pre-determined or 
universal. To study the dynamic interactions between global and domestic social, 
political, and economic forces in the context of late development in the neoliberal period, 
it is suggested that historically-rooted political economy analysis is required.  
 
To this research agenda, the thesis contributes two case studies of actually existing 
developmentalism from within the ranks of contemporary rapid late 
developers.  Developmentalism is an approach to economic development that privileges 
the development of manufacturing above other sectors (Reinert, 2010) due to its 
capacity to generate the economic dynamics (potentially) associated with catching-up. 
Scholarship on the role of manufacturing in development has two broad argumentative 
planks. The first are historically-rooted arguments related to the observed relationship 
between economic development and manufacturing growth (Thirlwall, 2006b; Chang, 
2014). Utilising a long-range perspective, of 400 years or more, manufacturing 
development is found to have been ‘invariably the passageway to industrial expansion 
and catch-up’ (Matthews, 2016, p.625).1 Inductive analysis is also used to derive a 
number of general ‘laws’ or propositions regarding industrialisation and growth, 
connected to the idea that manufacturing has distinctive properties as an engine of 
economic development (Whitfield, 2012; Tregenna, 2015; Matthews, 2016). Kaldor’s 
(1967) ‘growth laws’ (generalised from the experiences of transatlantic industrialisation) 
distilled three so-called ‘stylised facts’ about the positive correlations between the 
growth of manufacturing output and three other important economic variables: gross 
                                                   
1 Recent work suggests the enduring importance of manufacturing as a driver of high and sustained growth in 
developing countries over the last 20-25 years, rebuffing the discussions around its (supposedly) waning relevance 
connected with so-called premature deindustrialisation (Haraguchi et al., 2017). Similar arguments are made to make 
the case for industrial policies as a motor of structural transformation. Chang (2002, p.127), for instance, argues that 
all now-industrialised economies used ‘interventionist industrial, trade and technology policies in order to promote 
their infant industries’.  
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domestic product (GDP) growth, labour productivity, and productivity outside the 
manufacturing sector. According to Thirlwall (2006b), Kaldor’s model of the 
relationship between industrial growth and development involves three further 
propositions: first, that the overall GDP growth rate will eventually slow down as labour 
released from diminishing returns activities is exhausted; second that whilst the initial 
driver of manufacturing growth is likely to be demand from the agricultural sector it 
must eventually be driven by demand from exports (since the domestic market lacks the 
size to generate economies of scale and cannot provide foreign exchange to fund 
imports); and third that fast growth of output and demand can together create a virtuous 
circle that other sectors will struggle to emulate (without protection or extremely well 
performing industry).  
 
The second strand of more theoretical work also highlights the role of manufacturing as 
an engine of long-term economic development due to its ‘growth-pulling’ role for the 
economy as a whole (Tregenna, 2015).2 By offering a gateway into more productive 
activities (compared with low productivity agriculture and non-tradable services), 
manufacturing is said to carry the potential for cumulative productivity increases via the 
adoption of technology and advanced production techniques. These activities display 
increasing returns to scale by fostering a ‘virtuous circle of growing demand, 
employment and income’ (UNCTAD, 2017a, p.41). As workers move from lower to 
higher productivity sectors, economy-wide productivity increases also contribute to 
faster job creation and increased wages and living standards. In turn, important forward 
and backward linkages forged through an expanding manufacturing sector can lead to 
growth-enhancing spill-over effects, creating synergies and dynamics of cumulative 
causation (Matthews, 2016). In contrast, primary sectors (such as agriculture, mining 
and fisheries) are subject to the opposite process, with natural endowments posing a 
constraint on productivity increases as resources become eventually exhausted 
(Whitfield, 2012). Due to this capacity to generate increasing returns, even inefficient 
manufacturing sectors are therefore thought to contribute to higher living standards than 
may prevail in contexts where manufacturing is much more limited (Reinert, 2004).  
 
  
                                                   
2 Recent studies have indicated industrial employment may be particularly important as a predictor of later prosperity 
(Felipe et al., 2018). 
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1.2 Comparative analysis, case selection and methods  
 
This area of enquiry is approached methodologically through comparative case study 
analysis. Case studies are useful in illuminating the complexity and contextuality of 
social processes and relationships (Denscombe, 2010). They thus allowing for the 
examination of causal processes. They also provide opportunities for theoretical 
development in areas where knowledge is incomplete or underdeveloped (Ghauri, 2004), 
particularly when comparative work across multiple case studies is undertaken. Due to 
the analytical terrain discussed above, historically-informed case study analysis will be 
used to examine two concerns: how the current architecture of global capitalism has 
affected two cases of actually existing developmentalism (thereby generating insights 
into causal mechanisms), and how best to understand prospects for heterodox 
developmental strategies in the neoliberal period (thus informing a broader theoretical 
problem). 
 
Case selection of Ethiopia and Vietnam has been informed by four concerns. First, there 
are strong commonalities in their development strategies, with both attracting labels 
indicative of their heterodoxy. Notably, they are commonly described as using ‘state-
led’ approaches to development (Beresford, 2004; Vaughan, 2011; Beeson and Pham, 
2012; Malesky and London, 2014; Rahmato, 2014). Due to their emphasis on 
manufacturing and highly interventionist approaches, they are often compared with the 
‘developmental states’ of East Asia (Beeson and Pham, 2012; Fantini, 2013; Le, 2017; 
Clapham, 2018). However, they have both also been similarly differentiated from these 
experiences on account of the considerably larger economic role of state enterprises and 
smaller role for domestic capital (Hai and O’Donnell, 2017; Chang and Hauge, 2019). 
Signalling the extent to which their approaches go against the tide of prevailing 
development advice, their policy-making is also often noted for its strong ‘ownership’ 
in the face of policy pressure from the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and 
donors (Abegaz, 1999; Dijkstra et al., 2003; Nørlund et al., 2003; Prizzon and Rogerson, 
2013). Together these commonalities signal that forms of contemporary 
developmentalism which defy the dominant ideological commitment to the reliance on 
market mechanisms to deliver development may still persist (Fine, 2001). 
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Second, strong parallels can be seen across their economic histories and present-day 
ruling regimes. Despite very different colonial histories, with Vietnam undergoing 
prolonged French colonisation (1887-1954) and Ethiopia only a very brief period of 
Italian annexation (1936-1941), both nation states emerged from ancient imperial orders 
with independent state-building traditions and institutions. Each also attained 
considerable national pride from historically significant victories over important 
imperial powers during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Kolko, 1997; Pankhurst, 
2001). Both also underwent deep economic and social transformations during the 
second half of the twentieth century as a result of the influence of socialist ideas and 
political forces on their respective ruling regimes (Fforde and De Vylder, 1996; 
Beresford and Phong, 2000; Zewde, 2001; Chole, 2004). During this period, each 
country underwent ambitious land reforms and the nationalisation of land, industry and 
property which redistributed land toward an impoverished peasantry and dismantled the 
economic base of imperial and colonial elites. In tandem, efforts to build centrally 
planned command economies (however unevenly operating in practice) included the 
development of state-owned manufacturing sectors and the suppression (if not 
elimination) of domestic capitalists.  
 
In Vietnam, such economic and social transformations occurred from the mid-1950s 
onwards after the formation of the socialist DRV regime in the north of the country 
following a protracted war of national liberation by Vietnamese communists. In 
Ethiopia these changes occurred following the Ethiopian Revolution of 1974, when the 
ancient imperial system was overthrown by a military junta which then implemented an 
economic programme strongly influenced by the country’s Marxist-Leninist student 
movement. Subsequent transitions to market-led economies were also closely timed, 
with Vietnam nominally embarking on its “renovation” (doi moi) reforms first, in 1986, 
with market-oriented reforms really taking off from 1989 onwards. Small steps in the 
transition from command economy in Ethiopia first commenced under the military junta 
at the end of the 1980s, but more comprehensively following its overthrow in 1991. The 
subsequent pathway to market economy has, however, earned both regimes a reputation 
for “pragmatism” and “gradualism” (Van Arkadie and Mallon, 2003; Ohno, 2009b; 
Masina, 2012; Gray, 2012; Geda et al., 2017; Oqubay, 2018). Across these first two 
dimensions, therefore, both Ethiopia and Vietnam offer an opportunity for comparative 
work on developmentalism in the age of neoliberalism. 
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Third, shared socio-economic features mean their transitions occurred in the context of 
considerable fragility. Both experienced several decades of protracted conflict prior to 
constructing market economies, and were the two poorest countries in the world in 1984, 
with Ethiopia’s gross national product (GNP) per capita standing at US$ 110 and 
Vietnam’s US$ 117 (Glewwe et al., 2004, p.358). They thus offer the opportunity to 
examine the impacts of current global political and economic order from the perspective 
of poor and vulnerable economies (although, notably, Vietnam’s health and education 
outcomes were considerably ahead of Ethiopia’s in the late 1980s).3 They are also large 
countries in population terms. In 2017 Ethiopia’s population was 105.0 million and 
Vietnam’s 95.5 million, making them the 12th and 15th most populous countries in the 
world (World Bank, 2018g). As a result, both have a sizable low-wage, low-skill labour 
force and a (potentially) sizeable domestic market. The agricultural sector is also highly 
significant in both, and whilst the share of agriculture in Vietnam’s GDP declined to 
15.3 per cent in 2017, it still accounts for 40.9 per cent of employment. In Ethiopia 
agriculture is 34.1 per cent of GDP and 68.2 per cent of employment (World Bank, 
2018g). Such socio-economic features suggest indicate that similar development 
pathways may be viable in both countries.  
 
Fourth, the exceptional development outcomes registered by Ethiopia and Vietnam are 
of particular salience to the thesis. It very uncommon for countries to grow at 6 per cent 
(or more) for over fifteen years (especially since protracted growth slowdowns tend to 
occur after even a decade) (Wade, 2018). According to the Commission on Growth and 
Development (known as the Growth Commission) (CGD, 2008), there were just thirteen 
cases of high sustained growth averaging seven per cent or more a year in the post-war 
period (with two additional countries set to join this group in 2008).4 Yet, as Figure 1.1 
demonstrates, both Ethiopia and Vietnam are outliers in relation to these trends, 
achieving high levels of economic growth of 6 per cent or higher for a sustained period,5 
which (fluctuations notwithstanding), has been combined with strong performance in 
                                                   
3 For instance, in 1989 Vietnam had literacy levels at 87.6 per cent of the adult population, compared with Ethiopia’s 
of 27.0 per cent in 1994. The gap, though closing, remains large with 93.5 per cent literacy in Vietnam in 2015, and 
49.0 per cent in Ethiopia (UNESCO, 2017). Average life expectancy differed considerably too and was just 47.1 
years in Ethiopia in 1990, whereas in and Vietnam it was 70.4 years. This gap has also now dramatically reduced, 
with life expectancy 64.0 years in Ethiopia in 2014, and 75.6 years in Vietnam (World Bank, 2018g). 
4 Botswana, Brazil, China, Hong Kong, China, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Malta, Oman, 
Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand - with India and Vietnam progressing toward this (CGD, 2008). 
5 During 1990-2017, Vietnam experienced just four years of growth at less than 6 per cent a year, averaging growth 
of 6.8 per cent during this period. In Ethiopia after 2004 growth has averaged considerably above 6 per cent a year, 
at 10.6 per cent a year (World Bank, 2018g). 
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terms of poverty reduction and limited increases in inequality. 6   Notably, whilst 
remaining low and lower-middle income countries respectively, each has sustained 
rapid growth trajectories despite the turbulence following the global financial crisis and 
end of the global commodity boom that have adversely impacted many other developing 
economies.  
 
Figure 1.1 Ethiopia and Vietnam: GDP (annual percentage growth), 1990-2017 
 
Source: World Bank (2018g). 
 
Commonalities in these four dimensions therefore mark out Ethiopia and Vietnam as 
important case studies for examining prospects for developmentalism in the age of 
neoliberalism. To examine these issues, the two case studies explore how, why, and with 
what effects, the global order has impacted the development trajectories of these two 
late developing nations since 1986 and 1991 respectively. 
                                                   
6 Vietnamese poverty reduced at a historically ‘unprecedented speed’ in the 1990s (Beegle et al., 2012, p.154), as the 
national poverty headcount fell from 58.1 per cent to 14.5 per cent during 1993-2008 (Vandemoortele and Bird, 2011). 
During the 2000s, Ethiopia likewise ‘progressed from having one of the lowest levels of human development and 
highest poverty rates in the world to displaying some of the fastest rates of progress across multiple dimensions of 
wellbeing’ (Lenhardt et al., 2015, p.9). Between 1995-1996 and 2015-2016 the national poverty headcount reduced 
from 45.5 per cent to 23.5 per cent (FDRE, 2017). Vietnam’s rapid growth and poverty reduction occurred in the 
context of low but increased inequality, from 0.33 in 1993 to 0.43 in 2008 on the Gini coefficient (Vandemoortele 
and Bird, 2011), falling to 0.35 by 2016 (World Bank, 2018a). Ethiopia has kept a low and stable level of income 
inequality throughout the period of its rapid growth and poverty reduction, with a Gini coefficient of 0.30 in 1995 
and 0.30 in 2011 (Cornia and Martorano, 2017). 
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The methods of data collection used to inform this analysis combine qualitative and 
quantitative information. Qualitative semi-structured interviews are a particularly 
important source of original data, conducted during fieldwork between January and 
April 2016 in Ethiopia, and June and August 2016 in Vietnam. A total of 111 interviews 
were undertaken: 55 in Ethiopia and 56 in Vietnam (see Appendix A for a full 
breakdown). Over half the interviews in each country were carried out with government 
officials due to the focus of the thesis on the impacts of global conditions on 
development policy formulation and implementation. In Ethiopia this included 
interviews in key Ministries such as the Ministry of Industry; Ministry of Trade; 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation; National Planning Commission; 
Ministry of Public Enterprises; Ministry of Agriculture; the Ethiopian Investment 
Commission; National Bank of Ethiopia; Development Bank of Ethiopia; Commercial 
Bank of Ethiopia; and the Industrial Parks Development Corporation. Many of these 
interviews were at State (Deputy) Minister level or above. In Vietnam, government 
officials interviewed were located in the Ministry of Planning and Investment; the 
Ministry of Industry and Trade; Ministry of Labour Invalids and Social Assistance; the 
Central Committee Economic Commission of the Communist Party of Vietnam; Ho Chi 
Minh City (HCMC) Export Processing and Industrial Zones Authority; and with 
representatives of government think tanks such as the Vietnam Academy of Social 
Science (VASS) and Central Institute for Economic Management (CIEM). The 
remainder of the interviewees were representatives from IFIs, UN agencies, and bilateral 
donor governments; foreign manufacturers; domestic manufacturing firms and their 
representative associations; and researchers, academics and other experts.  
 
Fieldwork interview data was used for multiple purposes. The interviews informed the 
interpretations and periodisations offered in the empirical chapters, and provided 
insights into the policy drivers, shifts and constraints to development encountered in 
each context. They were critical sources of contextual information on the policy 
formulation process from the perspective of those devising, seeking to influence and/or 
affected by, the development strategies of both countries. Interview transcripts were 
analysed in order to identify themes and track dominant issues and interpretations 
amongst state officials engaged in development policy formulation, as well as the 
international agencies and foreign and domestic firms seeking to influence government 
policy and impacted by official decisions. To ensure anonymity (in line with the data 
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protection and informed consent procedures followed during fieldwork), interviews are 
referred to by codes (a mix of letters and numbers, as outlined in Appendix A). A critical 
approach was taken to fieldwork material, and qualitative interview data triangulated 
with other sources (below) to determine the extent to which official statements matched 
reform realities.  
 
The other main data sources consulted included official governmental and party reports, 
such as development plans, strategies and legal documents; socio-economic data (from 
official and international sources); newspapers and media discussions; IFI and donor 
reports (both official analytical reports and archive documents, particularly from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) Archive); official reports translated by the United 
States Central Intelligence Agency’s Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS); 
transcripts of speeches by key leaders; and US diplomatic cables released through the 
Wikileaks website. Analysis of data from these sources has been combined with an 
academic literature review encompassing historical and contemporary work tracing the 
economic and political transformations in Ethiopia and Vietnam from the central 
planning period forward. Such historically-rooted political economy analysis has been 
sensitive to the legacies of the centrally planned economy, both in terms of 
transformations to the state and domestic social balance of forces. Due to the limitations 
of economic data availability and its comparability in both cases, quantitative data is 
used to identify and indicate broad trends rather than trace small shifts.   
 
1.3 Contributions and argument 
 
The thesis makes a number of contributions to the development literature. The first are 
theoretical since the thesis offers an analytical framework to examine in concrete terms 
the relationship between national development and global forces, which is understood 
to be at once context-specific and co-constitutive. The utility of this framework is 
illustrated by the thesis’s empirical chapters, since neither the mainstream nor heterodox 
development literature as currently constituted adequately account for the forms of 
developmentalism which have emerged in Ethiopia and Vietnam.  This framework may, 
in turn, be fruitfully be applied in other contexts (including those where developmental 
efforts have had less traction than in Ethiopia and Vietnam). In addition, the thesis 
contributes to the literature on neoliberalism and international political economy, 
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offering two case studies from the global periphery which illustrate clear potential for 
deviation from the hegemonic economic policy approach of the contemporary period. 
The contribution is therefore to highlight the enduring space for heterodox development 
strategies, as well as the variegated nature of developmental constraints under 
neoliberalism. 
 
Second, the thesis contributes a new and substantive comparative study to an under-
examined area of development research. Whilst commonalities between Ethiopia and 
Vietnam are now increasingly noted in passing (Weeks, Geda, et al., 2004; ACET, 2014; 
Guadagno, 2016; Weis, 2016), to date substantive comparative studies have been 
lacking. Similarities in their outcomes have, for instance, garnered attention, including 
high GDP growth rates (Guadagno, 2016, p.7), as well as their policy orientations, since 
they are said to share ‘a government with a fairly heavy hand in the economy’ (ACET, 
2014, p.27). As a result, several recent interventions have been predicated on the idea 
that Vietnam provides a strong model for Ethiopia to emulate. One of the authors of the 
2012 World Bank Light Manufacturing in Africa report noted here that Vietnam offers 
Ethiopia important development lessons, since ‘[the] closest parallel to Ethiopia is to be 
found in Vietnam, East Asia’s star performer … given its similarities with Ethiopia in 
size, economic history, institutions and less-skilled labor pool’ (Chandra, 2013, pp.543, 
545). Yet, this advice for Ethiopia to follow in Vietnam’s footsteps has not so far been 
based on substantive comparative work.  
 
Furthermore, the thesis also offers an alternative basis for comparative work on African 
and Asian development trajectories. Existing work in this area tends to be framed in 
terms of the poor performance of African countries in contrast to their Asian 
contemporaries, and is therefore predicated on divergence not similarity (van Donge et 
al., 2012; Henley, 2015).7  This tends to reinforce biases toward pathologising and 
homogenising treatments of African countries’ development performance, given the 
assumption that no rivals to Asia’s performance may emerge from a continent with an 
extremely diverse range of countries and contemporary approaches to development. 
 
                                                   
7 Comparative work on Vietnam and Tanzania has received more attention (Van Arkadie and Do Duc Dinh, 2004; 
Gray, 2012), but similarly tends to be focused on their divergence (both in policies and performance). 
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Third, and finally, the thesis makes a specific set of contributions to the development 
literatures on each country. The Ethiopian economy remains understudied in general 
(Martins, 2009; Priewe, 2016),8 and whilst there is an important growing body of work 
around its development strategies (Oqubay, 2015; Schäfer, 2016; Weis, 2016; Tesfaye, 
2017), attention tends to chiefly focused around domestic drivers of specific policies 
rather than the impacts of global forces upon them. In Vietnam, the development 
literature has been beset by a form of extreme pessimism regarding its prospects and 
potential (Nghia et al., 2013; Pincus, 2015; Viet Sinh et al., 2016; Masina and Cerimele, 
2018), notably out of synch with its actual performance (Abbott et al., 2009; Weeks, 
2015; Abbott et al., 2017). One reason for this, it is suggested here, is that the impact of 
global forces on the country’s development trajectory has been overlooked.  
 
1.4 Thesis structure 
 
To explore these questions, Chapter 2 examines the theoretical terrain and traces the 
divergence between mainstream and heterodox development approaches to the 
relationship between national development prospects and global market forces from the 
post-war period to the present. Chapters 3 and 4 provide a political economy account of 
the shifting impacts of the neoliberal global order on the evolving developmental 
strategies of Ethiopia following the overthrow of the military Derg regime in 1991. 
Chapters 5 and 6 in turn provide an account of the transformations in Vietnamese 
developmentalism after 1986. Chapter 7 then provides a comparative assessment of the 
evolving nature of Ethiopian and Vietnamese developmentalism, including their 
domestic and global drivers and constraints. The conclusion brings the thesis 
contributions together, and reflects on potential directions for further research. 
                                                   
8 For instance, Martins (2009, p.109) notes Ethiopia has been ‘chronically understudied by economists’ and Priewe 
(2016, p.2) that internationally ‘Ethiopia’s outstanding performance has not yet found the attention it deserves’. One 
important contribution to filling this gap is a forthcoming work on the Ethiopian economy (Cheru et al., 2019). 
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Chapter 2 Global conditions and national development 
 
This chapter reviews dominant conceptualisations of the relationship between national 
development and global conditions in the economic development literature. In so doing 
it builds on Hunt’s (1989) identification of two dominant development paradigms which 
emerged after World War II, divided by whether they locate the chief constraints to 
development within the domestic domain or in the global economy (an approach itself 
which draws heavily on Hirschman (1982)). Yet whilst Hunt (1989) argues that these 
different paradigms should be understood geographically – representing distinct 
Western and Latin American development traditions – this chapter argues that this 
schism represents a broader divide between mainstream and heterodox approaches to 
development theorising which extends to the present. In updating Hunt’s (1989) 
framework, the chapter also traces how material and ideational transformations in global 
capitalism, following the demise of the post-war ‘golden age’ and neoliberal turn in the 
1980s, effectively demarcate each approach into two distinct periods: a post-war and 
neoliberal stage. This periodisation is based on an understanding of neoliberalism as a 
distinct form of global accumulation, underpinned by specific shifts in the modalities of 
global accumulation, chiefly financialisation and the global fragmentation of production 
(Fine and Saad Filho, 2017). However, it also notes that this system of accumulation 
has a counterpart in the realm of development theory and policy, which forms the 
dominant approach to development scholarship (see section 2.1.2).  
 
The chapter argues that for all their differences, both the ‘optimistic determinism’ of the 
mainstream literature, which suggests global conditions will be universally enabling of 
development in all contexts, and the ‘pessimistic determinism’ of the heterodox 
literature, which tends to see the global political economy as uniformly constraining for 
development, misdiagnose the nature of development constraints. Both overlook that 
the modality of a country’s insertion into the global division of labour (and therefore the 
challenges this poses for development pathways) is not simply the product of global 
forces. Instead, the chapter argues that a country’s relationship with (and therefore the 
constraints and opportunities emanating from) the global economy is not pre-determined 
(for good or ill) but is rather the context-specific product of both that nation’s 
development strategy and the shifting functioning of the global capitalist system in a 
specific moment of global accumulation. In light of these concerns, the chapter advances 
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an alternative analytical framework to consider the impact of global conditions on 
national development prospects as the dynamic and relational outcome of the 
interactions between the national and global domains, shaped by the mediating role of 
the state and the domestic social forces acting upon it.  
 
 2.1 Mainstream theory: domestic development constraints 
 
The discipline of development economics first emerged during the 1940s and 1950s 
(Hunt, 1989). Since then, mainstream development theory, here understood as the 
scholarship inspired by neoclassical economics widely utilised in Western academic 
institutions, governments, and powerful global institutions such as the IMF and World 
Bank,9 has undergone profound shifts at the level of methods, end goals and policy focus. 
Nonetheless, mainstream theory retains a persistent stress on the centrality of global 
forces (especially trade, finance, aid and technology) as critical drivers of development 
success. As a corollary, such theorising tends to locate the chief constraints to 
development in the domestic domain. This section traces the evolution of mainstream 
development theory from the post-war period to present through its conceptualisation 
of the relationship between national development and global forces.  
 
2.1.1 Post-war development consensus 
 
The post-war mainstream was premised on two distinct commitments: the 
distinctiveness of developing economies, and the concept of “mutual economic benefit” 
(Hirschman, 1982). The first meant that specific challenges such as rural unemployment 
and late industrialisation made developing countries a “special case” in need of 
distinctive theoretical and methodological approaches (Hirschman, 1982). Since 
economic development was treated as a process of socio-economic transformation, the 
preoccupations of neoclassical economics (such as short-run efficiency, individual 
rationality and gains from trade), were considered ill-suited for studying the complex 
processes and problems of development (Hunt, 1989; Fine, 2007; Fine, 2011). The 
second trait saw relations between developed and developing countries as positive-sum 
in nature (neither inherently conflictual nor hierarchical), with trade, financial transfers 
                                                   
9 The chapter takes Western and mainstream as synonyms.  
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and technical assistance from advanced economies all considered important motors of 
development in poorer economies (Hirschman, 1982, p.379).  
 
Indeed, despite important substantive disagreements (such as over the need for balanced 
or unbalanced growth),10 Western scholars saw deepened contact between countries at 
different levels of development as an aid to overcoming development constraints that 
were conceptualised in chiefly domestic terms. As Hunt (1989) observes, two of the 
most influential figures of the post-war mainstream, W.W. Rostow (a key proponent of 
modernisation theory) and Sir W. Arthur Lewis (who popularised the idea of the dualist 
economic structure of developing economies),11 saw expanded capital formation as the 
defining development problem, and located the chief constraints to its expansion in the 
domestic domain.12  The defining development problem was seen as low levels of 
domestic savings, and, following neoclassical economic reasoning, investment. For both 
Lewis (1954) and Rostow (1956, 1991 [1960]) this was thought to necessitate an 
increase in the income of those seen to have a greater propensity to save (Hunt, 1989). 
Lewis (1954, p.160) advocated for redistributing income toward ‘a group of men who 
think in terms of investing capital productively’ and Rostow (1956, p.38) ‘from those 
who will spend (hoard or lend) less productively to those who will spend (or lend) more 
productively’.13 Similarly, the new growth economics of Harrod-Domar (influential in 
1950s development planning, despite its Keynesian roots in advanced economies), tied 
economic growth to a country’s savings propensity and capital-output ratio, which was 
used to show that both expanded aid and trade could help trigger more rapid growth 
(Hirschman, 1982).  
 
Broader transformations were also seen as important, including to society and culture, 
which were thought to be needed to effect modernisation (Rostow, 1956). State 
intervention, particularly to promote industrialisation, was also afforded a strong role, 
with the development of the manufacturing sector synonymous in Rostow (1991 [1960]) 
with the production of the modern society (and therefore both a means and end of 
                                                   
10 Important Western-based economists of this period included Albert O. Hirschman, Arthur Lewis, Hla Myint, 
Gunnar Myrdal, Ragnar Nurkse, Paul Rosenstein-Rodan and W.W. Rostow (Hunt, 1989; Kattel et al., 2016).  
11 Lewis’s 1954 article (see below) was said to have offered ‘the most heralded explanation of development’ for the 
Anglo-Saxon mainstream (Kapur et al., 1997, p.116). Meanwhile, Rostow’s most famous book, The Stages of 
Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, sold 300,000 copies and went through three editions after first 
publication in 1960 (Fine, 2007).  
12 Hunt (1989) labels this Western take on development ‘the paradigm of the expanding capitalist nucleus’.  
13 Rostow (1956, p.41) says foreign capital may help support the take-off process, but does not consider it necessary 
(since Britain and Japan managed without it).  
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development). For Lewis (1955, p.384), state intervention was to be only ‘piece-meal 
planning’, targeted at issues such as the level of exports, capital formation, 
industrialisation or food production. However, due to the hardships of the Depression 
and two world wars, developing countries extensively deployed import-substitution 
industrialisation (ISI) strategies, focused on satisfying domestic demand for basic 
consumer goods (before moving onto products of increased sophistication later) through 
trade protection, credit and fiscal policy support, direct production through state 
industries, development financing institutions and foreign direct investment (FDI) 
management strategies (Hirschman, 1968).  
 
Such scholarship thereby casts development as a trans-historic problem of low savings 
and investment, and development constraints ‘predominantly internal to the traditional 
society, lying in its class structure and the related savings propensities, its culture and 
institutions’ (Hunt, 1989, p.112). Whilst global forces do appear in Lewis’s (1954) 
discussion of how imperialism in Africa has retarded development (through land grabs, 
forced labour and tax burdens), these forces were contingent rather than integral to his 
model.14 Rostow (1991 [1960], p. 6) suggests take-off may be promoted by ‘some 
external intrusion by more advanced societies’ but sees domestic transformations as 
decisive in shaping whether countries take advantage of these shocks or not. This 
indicates that the global context is considered to be largely exogenous to, rather than 
constitutive of, the problem of development, and offers only contingent not systemic 
barriers to late development. 15  Hirschman (1982) notes that post-war development 
thinking overlooked the coexistence of considerable impoverishment with deep existing 
links between developed and developing countries (which were contrary to its own 
expectations that such relations should yield mutual benefit to all). Instead, more 
systemic questions about the unevenness of the global economy were only asked in 
Latin America by ‘muted tones by a few faraway voices’ (Hirschman, 1982, p.380) (see 
Section 2.2).  
 
At the policy level, such optimism about the positive role of global forces is evident in 
the 1949 inaugural address of US President Harry S. Truman: a speech widely 
                                                   
14 Lewis (1954) thought other factors could also have increased supplies of labour at subsistence levels, such as 
reduced infant mortality levels. 
15 Within the diversity of post-war mainstream scholarship, some did highlight the risk of over-reliance on foreign 
capital, trade and finance (see Kattel et al., (2016)). However, the most influential Western development scholarship 
strongly emphasised the need to take advantage of global economic dynamics.  
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considered to have ushered in the ‘development age’ (Rist, 2014). The speech framed 
the ‘handicap’ for developing countries as their ‘primitive and stagnant’ economies, and 
recommended as a remedy that Western economies should make ‘scientific advances 
and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped 
areas’ (Truman, 1950). Such faith in technicist fixes to economic problems was typical 
of the dawn of the nuclear age and Cold War period. The perceived success of the 
Marshall Plan also enhanced confidence in overseas development assistance (ODA) as 
an engine of recovery and development (Leys, 1996). As Hirschman (1982, p.380) notes, 
Western academia was influenced by a post-war global political climate in which there 
was an ‘overwhelming desire to achieve rapid progress in solving these [development] 
problems with the instruments at hand, or thought to be within reach, such as large-scale 
foreign aid’.  
 
In summary, post-war mainstream development theory and policy saw barriers to 
development in chiefly domestic terms, and the remedies to overcoming them chiefly 
internal (although with a good measure of outside assistance) (Hunt, 1989). The post-
war mainstream thus overlooked international forces impacting late development 
prospects, such as power relations, conflict, and the systemically uneven workings of 
the global economy, as well as the deeply geo-political Cold-War motives underlying 
Western development aid and finance (Fine and Saad Filho, 2014). Crucially, 
development was itself taken for granted and assumed to be ‘smoothly linear, if only 
they [developing countries] adopted the right kind of development programme’ 
(Hirschman, 1982, p.388). In this the post-war mainstream displayed strong 
‘methodological nationalism’, defined as ‘[a] form of explanation, identifying as its 
central feature the isolation and separation of internal and external factors as 
determinants of national economic performance, with primacy being given to the former’ 
(Gore, 1996, p.79).  
 
2.1.2 Neoliberal development agenda 
 
However, the post-war development consensus was progressively undermined by shifts 
at the ideational and material levels. A growing concern about income distribution and 
poverty in the 1970s (Colclough, 1991; Kapur et al., 1997) fragmented development 
economics into ‘a variety of partial objectives’, each of which required narrower and 
more specific expertise (in health, education and housing, for instance) (Hirschman, 
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1982, p.387). Material shifts in the global economy, specifically the disintegration of 
the Bretton Woods system of post-war financial regulation, altered flows of global trade 
and finance. As Leys (1996, p.19) notes, this shifted the political economy foundations 
underpinning the prevailing policy paradigm: 
[The] radical transformation in both the structure and the management of the 
world economy that had begun in the 1960s, and which finally seemed to offer 
the possibility of creating for the first time in history a truly unified global 
capitalist economy – and one regulated, if at all, only by institutions reflecting 
the interests of transnational capital. Neo-liberalism articulated the goals and 
beliefs of the dominant forces that stood to benefit from this process, and pushed 
it forward. 
 
Against this backdrop, a new development orthodoxy that Toye (1993) refers to as the 
neoliberal ‘counter-revolution’ emerged, departing in three key respects from the post-
war development consensus. First, neoliberal development theorists attacked the 
separateness of development economies, arguing that regardless of context, individuals 
respond to changes in relative prices exactly as neoclassical theory would predict (Lal, 
2002).16 Second, the approach repudiated post-war development policy’s emphasis on 
industrialisation due to a theoretical revival of David Ricardo’s (2004 [1817/1821]) 
theory of comparative advantage, through which trade between individuals is treated as 
analogous to that between nations. On this basis it is supposed that exchange equally 
benefits all parties, regardless of what they trade (Shaikh, 2005). This sectorally neutral 
understanding of economic development considers raw materials and manufactures to 
have equal development potential, intensifying the mainstream’s optimism about 
‘mutual gains’ from trade between countries at different levels of development (and 
production structures).  
 
Third, state intervention was staunchly attacked theoretically using the theory of second 
best and focus on so-called ‘rent-seeking’ behaviours (Krueger, 1974). Policies such as 
trade protection were argued to have diverted ‘people's energies and resources from 
                                                   
16 Lal’s The Poverty of Development Economics went through three editions (1983; 1997; and 2002). It garnered 
significant media and policy attention for the neoliberal turn in development thinking (Toye, 1993). 
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economic activity to the political arena’ (Bauer, 1984, p.42).17 Empirical work on rapid 
East Asian development was offered as a support for these arguments, and authors 
suggested recent success stories were characterised by minimal state intervention (see 
Belassa, 1988; Riedel, 1988). Market forces thus emerged as the central engines of 
development, based on an extreme reading of neoclassical economics in which resource 
allocation through purely market means (whereby prices are determined solely through 
freely operating domestic and international markets) was considered necessary and 
(almost) sufficient to bring about long-term growth (Wade, 1992). 18  Economic 
development was now assumed to follow from ‘getting the prices right’, with growth in 
turn treated as if it was ‘a natural or inherent property of capitalist economies’ (Wade, 
1992, p.271). In policy terms, hostility toward state intervention and the revival of 
comparative advantage led to an emphasis on export-oriented industrialisation (EOI), 
predicated on specialisation only in what a country can already most cheaply produce, 
in contrast to what were considered to be the counter-productive effects of ISI efforts 
(Kiely, 1998a). 
 
The new mainstream development agenda which emerged, dubbed the Washington 
Consensus (Williamson, 1990), 19  had three defining policy preoccupations: 
macroeconomic stability (achieved via reduced fiscal deficits and inflation targeting); 
global integration (via trade and capital account liberalisation); and the liberalisation of 
domestic product and factor markets (via deregulation and privatisation) (Gore, 2000). 
The embrace of global forces (especially trade, finance, aid and technology) became as 
a result an almost sufficient condition to bring about development since expanded trade 
and financial flows under globalisation were thought to have created a level playing 
field from which all countries stand to equally benefit (Ohmae, 1994; Friedman, 2007). 
This was reflected in shifts within mainstream development theory’s institutional 
apparatus, and the World Bank came to adopt ‘a particularly optimistic account of the 
relationship between national economies and the global economy’ (Kiely, 1998a, p.78). 
Such intensified faith in global integration to drive development is evidenced in the 
                                                   
17 The theory of the second best was rooted in welfare economics (Toye, 1993), yet despite this theoretical approach 
providing potential justifications for state intervention (Saad Filho, 2005a), the conclusions drawn by neoliberal 
development economists were resoundingly against this. 
18 In contrast, Wade (1992) says less extreme versions of neoclassical economics separate the processes of growth 
and efficient resource allocation, admitting a wider range of variables into the determination of the former.  
19 The term was said to capture shared views within the World Bank, IMF and US Treasury Department in the late 
1980s and early 1990s (Williamson, 1990). 
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Growth Commission report, which exemplifies the neoliberal development consensus 
in arguing that: 
 
Growth of 7 percent a year … is possible only because the world economy is 
now more open and integrated. This allows fast-growing economies to import 
ideas, technologies, and know-how from the rest of the world. One conduit for 
this knowledge is foreign direct investment, which several high-growth 
economies actively courted; another is foreign education, which often creates 
lasting international networks … Sustainable, high growth is catch-up growth. 
And the global economy is the essential resource (CGD, 2008, p.2). 
 
The result of intensified confidence that a ‘right’ set of universal policies can deliver 
development (Rodrik, 2006) has been an intensification in mainstream methodological 
nationalism. Following this logic, Anne Krueger, former World Bank Chief Economist, 
said of the economic hardship experienced by many developing economies in the 1980s 
that: 
 
[There] is no evidence that living standards fell in the now-developing countries 
prior to 1950, a time which many observers associate with a period of laissez-
faire. In many African countries, however, living standards have been falling—
in some cases precipitously— since. The latter period has been one of active 
government intervention, and there is no other obvious reason for the difference 
in performance in the two periods (Krueger, 1990, p.12). 
 
Missing from this squarely domestic framing is the role of rising global turbulence from 
the mid-1970s onwards, encompassing two oil shocks, the collapse of Bretton Woods 
system, growing indebtedness of developing countries, rising US (and therefore global) 
interest rates, and thr resultant debt crisis in the developing world.  
 
And whilst some adjustments to the mainstream policy set have occurred since the late 
1980s, including with the institutional turn of the post-Washington Consensus in the 
1990s (Stiglitz, 1998; World Bank, 1997b), these have left the mainstream’s optimism 
about the capacity for global forces to bolster development success untouched. The 
‘good governance’ agenda of the post-Washington Consensus may have utilised 
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neoclassical arguments to provide a basis for the return to (limited) state intervention 
(Fine, 2001; Fine, 2009), but policies such as fiscal contraction, trade liberalisation, 
privatisation, and the broader deregulation and liberalisation of the economy remained 
unchanged (Saad Filho, 2005a). Instead the focus on institutional transformations 
helped to create expanding to-do lists for developing country policy-makers, 
intensifying their pathologisation, since ‘it is always the advisee who falls short, and 
never the advisor who is proved wrong’ (Rodrik, 2006, p.980).20  
 
A further apparent shift occurred during the 2010s with the ‘new structural economics’ 
of former World Bank Chief Economist Justin Lin (2012) and embrace of the global 
value chain (GVC) approach by mainstream institutions (Neilson, 2014; Ravenhill, 
2014; Werner et al., 2014). Both appeared to signal revived mainstream interest in 
industrial policy and manufacturing-centred development strategies. However, Lin’s 
approach was limited theoretically by its enduring commitment to comparative 
advantage and circumscribed role for state intervention (Fine and Van Waeyenberge, 
2013). The mainstream’s embrace of the GVC agenda has likewise been associated with 
an unchanged commitment to investor-friendly policies, and therefore remains premised 
on core tenets of the post-Washington Consensus (Ravenhill, 2014).21 In the latter’s 
optimism about the role of manufacturing FDI to deliver industrial development, the 
embrace of global integration remains a core piece of mainstream development advice. 
In this present form, through the enduring commitment to individual rationality, the 
mainstream negates all past connection between development trajectories and the  
specificities of time, place and context, and structures larger than the individual (except 
states, conceived of as the aggregate of individual interests). This capacity to shift over 
time, place and issue, has, however, helped to defend the core ideas of the mainstream 
development agenda from considerable criticism (Fine and Saad Filho, 2014), central to 
which is intensified faith in global integration as a motor of economic development.  
 
Thus, despite shifts across specific policy recommendations, mainstream development 
theory has persistently treated international political and economic forces as exogenous, 
                                                   
20 This reached an apogee in the literature which can be grouped together under banner ‘Afro-pessimism’ (Bryceson, 
2000) in which the continent’s growth tragedy from 1980-2000 is attributed solely to domestic political relations of 
neo-patrimonialism, political clientelism and economic rent-seeking. 
21 A recent report produced by the World Bank and other mainstream development actors recommends that to attract 
GVCs countries should embrace trade and investment liberalisation and ‘deep trade and investment agreements’ 
(Dollar, 2017, p.13). 
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given and a broadly positive potential influence on catch-up efforts. The global economy 
is thereby taken to be a straightforwardly enabling force for late development, and 
leaving the relationship between national development prospects and global conditions 
unproblematised. This equates not only to methodological nationalism, but also 
“optimistic determinism”, given the suggestion that global conditions are universally 
enabling of development in all countries and contexts, with the only significant variable 
the willingness of developing country policy-makers to embrace them. 
 
2.2 Heterodox theory: global constraints to development 
 
The heterodox development literature first emerged from Latin American scholarship 
of the late 1940s and early 1950s in parallel with the post-war mainstream (Hunt, 1989). 
Like mainstream development theory, the heterodoxy has undergone profound 
transformations thanks to the material and ideational shifts in global accumulation, 
policy and scholarship since the 1980s. Nonetheless, such scholarship has persistently 
foregrounded systemic global constraints to late development arising from the modality 
of developing countries’ insertion into the international division of labour. This section 
traces the shifts within the heterodox development literature from post-war to present, 
noting intensified pessimism about the development impacts of global asymmetries 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s with the shift from structuralism to dependency theory. 
This gave way to an initially less fatalistic reading of the impact of global forces on 
national development with the emergence of the developmental state literature in the 
late 1980s. However, as the heterodoxy has grappled with the profound alterations to 
global capitalism in the neoliberal period, the systemically uneven workings of the 
global political economy have once again assumed renewed significance.  
 
2.2.1 Post-war heterodoxy: from structuralism to dependency theory 
 
Latin American structuralists shared the post-war mainstream’s scepticism about the 
relevance of neoclassical economics for the study of development but fundamentally 
diverged in their conceptualisation of development constraints, particularly the impact 
of global forces on national development prospects. They emphasised the lack of 
inducements to invest, rather than simply a lack of saving (and thus capital) (Hunt, 1989), 
but saw foreign exchange shortages – which impacted the capacity to import capital 
goods – as the most binding development constraint of all (Kay, 1989). This insight was 
39 
 
founded on seminal contributions by Raúl Prebisch (1950) and Hans Singer (1950) 
which together formed the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis (PSH).22 The PSH began from 
an understanding of the structure of developing economies, which tended to export raw 
materials and import manufactured and capital goods. The hypothesis argued that in the 
long-run developing economies would be subject to declining terms of trade since the 
relative price of developing country imports would increase, either producing trade 
deficits or forcing countries to export more to sustain stable import levels (Saad Filho, 
2005b).   
 
Using this emphasis on the trade structure of developing countries, structuralists also 
shared the post-war mainstream’s emphasis on the need for manufacturing development. 
Singer (1950, p.476) argued manufacturing industries are ‘universally desired by 
underdeveloped countries’ because ‘they provide the growing points for increased 
technical knowledge, urban education, the dynamism and resilience that goes with urban 
civilization, as well as direct Marshallian external economies’. Yet structuralism added 
a unified global analysis to their conceptualisation of the challenges facing those late 
developers seeking to undertake manufacturing development. National development 
prospects were thus framed in terms of the movements of the wider capitalist system, 
anchored around centre (or core)-periphery metaphors and which pointed to potentially 
broader ‘systemic and possibly insurmountable differences between rich and poor 
countries’ (Saad Filho, 2005b, p.128) not present in the mainstream tradition.23 This 
embodies quite a particular definition of structuralism, therefore. Whilst some scholars 
define structuralism by its emphasis on the importance of economic structures in 
shaping long-term development prospects (for example see Colclough (1991, p. 2)), this 
broad definition lumps together the very different areas of post-war development 
thought discussed here. As Hunt (1989) notes, Latin American scholars (unlike their 
Western counterparts) identified both the economic structure of developing economies 
and their (adverse) incorporation into the international economic system as the defining 
development challenges.  
                                                   
22 Raúl Prebisch’s home country of Argentina experienced balance of payments problems during the 1930s and 1940s 
due to declining export prices for primary products, debt repayment difficulties, war-time disruptions to trade 
(including shortages of manufactured imports), and foreign exchange shortages. This informed his rejection of 
neoclassical insights for understanding development challenges (Hunt, 1989; Toye and Toye, 2003; Love, 2010). His 
1950 paper has been called has been called ‘the founding document of Latin American structuralism’ (Saad Filho, 
2005b, p.132). 
23 Singer (1950), for instance, argued that global asymmetries were reinventing the colonial era’s political subjugation 
of developing economies via hierarchical economic relations between states (Toye and Toye, 2003). 
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As a result of this dual analysis, structuralism’s policy proposals were likewise two-fold: 
first, to undertake manufacturing development to shift away from primary production 
(with a more nuanced advocacy of ISI than is often attributed to it),24 and second, to 
pursue changes to global trading rules to both improve conditions for primary exporters 
and the manufactured exports of developing economies (Hunt, 1989).25 Institutionally, 
these ideas gained extensive policy influence through two United Nations (UN) 
institutions: the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA or Cepal in 
Spanish and Portuguese), and the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), which was connected to the formation of the Group of 77 
(G77) developing states. Prebisch headed ECLA between 1950-1963 and became 
founding Secretary General of UNCTAD in 1964. With the World Bank representing 
the post-war mainstream, UNCTAD was the heterodoxy’s counterpart, influencing 
policy-making in developing countries during the 1960s and 1970s and agitating for 
changes to the global trade system to compensate for its inequities (Toye and Toye, 
2003; Saad Filho and Tomkinson, 2017). The latter culminated in calls in the early 1970s 
for a new international economic order (NIEO) to better reflect the needs of developing 
economies, characterised by ‘a heavy emphasis upon the importance of the international 
context and class structure and the relative neglect of national policy issues’ (Evans, 
1991, p.52). 
 
However, despite this influence, confidence in structuralist thought was ultimately 
shaken by faltering growth rates across the developing world. This eroded faith in the 
power of ISI to overcome the challenges of late development, whilst the emergence of 
military dictatorships in Latin America helped to facilitate more radical critiques of the 
global system’s role in distorting internal structures of developing countries (Saad Filho, 
2005b). Dependency theory, which emerged in the space vacated by structuralism, 
focused on the divide between core and peripheral economies, and had two dominant 
theoretical influences: reformulated structuralism and Marxist theorising about 
capitalist development and imperialism (Palma, 1978; Seers, 1981).26 The first shifted 
                                                   
24 See Saad Filho (2005b). 
25 This included commodity agreements, as well as the General System of Preferences (GSP), which introduced lower, 
non-reciprocal tariffs for selected products (including new industrial exports) of developing economies (Love, 2010). 
26 As Brewer (1990) notes, Marxist theories of imperialism focus on how the emergence and spread of capitalism is 
inherently uneven, with some areas developing at the expense of others. In contrast to other approaches to imperialism 
(which may focus on military, political or cultural domination), Marxist theories are rooted in the relations and 
structures of production, and how they shape relations of domination and subjugation (with politics and culture 
subordinate to economic relations) (Palma, 1978).  
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away from a narrow focus on terms of trade, making broader use of Prebisch’s centre-
periphery metaphor to capture the ‘new and possibly more dangerous forms of 
dependency’ (Seers, 1981, p.14) resulting from ISI policies, which were seen to have in 
fact intensified dependence on foreign technology and capital. Marxian-inspired work, 
meanwhile, emphasised global capitalism’s exploitative tendencies and mechanisms of 
surplus transfer between central and peripheral economies (Hunt, 1989).  
 
Key scholarship in this tradition included Samir Amin (1974), Paul Baran (1957), 
Arghiri Emmanuel (1972), Andre Gunder Frank (1966; 1969; 1979) and Walter Rodney 
(1972), and often started from the historical processes by which developing economies 
were incorporated into global capitalism (most often through colonialism). 27 
Consideration was then given to how colonial relations shaped national class structures 
and their international linkages in ways that prevented development. Focus for instance, 
was placed on the role of a ‘comprador bourgeoisie’ (Baran, 1957), a local class of 
mercantile interests closely aligned with the interest of foreign capital, and which 
therefore had limited interest in sustained manufacturing-based development in the 
periphery (Hunt, 1989). Through mechanisms such as surplus transfer, unequal 
exchange and unequal specialisation, so-called dependentistas considered the 
functioning of the whole global capitalist system to rely on the production and 
reproduction of two categories of countries: the developed and the underdeveloped, 
where the latter was produced by the mechanisms that led the former to prosper (Brewer, 
1990).  
 
Dependency theory thereby strongly rejected modernisation theory’s depiction of 
impoverishment as some sort of original condition to be eliminated by ‘development’. 
Instead Rodney (1972, p.21) notes that underdevelopment is the product of a 
‘relationship of exploitation which allowed capitalist parasites to grow fat and 
impoverished the dependencies’. A related approach to understanding capitalism as a 
global system into which developing countries were adversely incorporated was offered 
by world systems theorists such as Wallerstein (1976), which was often based on less 
rigid divisions into binary core and periphery categories (Kiely, 2010). For most 
scholars in the dependentista school, however, the global capitalist system was so 
                                                   
27 Walter Rodney brought the analysis of racial domination and slavery into his dependency analysis, arguing that 
neither African societies or cultures were responsible for the continent’s lack of development (Sidaway, 2006). 
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inimical to development in the periphery that, quoting Frank (1966, p.18) ‘economic 
development can now occur only independently of most of these relations of diffusion’. 
The need to delink from the global capitalist system was therefore a common corollary 
to dependency analysis of capitalism’s systemic properties. Schis the opposite 
conclusion to the post-war mainstream, which proposed the weakening, rather than 
strengthening, of the ties between developing and developed capitalist economies. And 
in contrast to structuralism’s emphasis on global institutional reform, dependentistas 
thus went one step further and argued ‘against full participation in the international 
division of labour by developing countries on the grounds that such exchange relations 
are unequal and exploitative’ (Evans, 1991, p.52).  
 
However, despite considerable policy and academic influence in developing countries 
in the 1960s and 1970s (Watts, 2006), dependency theory was weakened theoretically 
by Marxist scholarship which highlighted shortcomings in its conceptualisation of 
capitalism as a system of exchange (rather than a system of production) (Brenner, 1977). 
Empirical work also highlighted the limited significance of trade to developing countries 
in total European output, undermining the idea that the source of industrial economies’ 
wealth was surplus extracted from the periphery and instead turning attention to the 
domestic origins of capitalism (Kay, 1989). Dependency theory also proved unable to 
account for the trajectories of East Asia’s newly-industrialised countries (NICs) such as 
Korea and Taiwan in the 1960s and 1970s (Brewer, 1990), which exposed the gulf 
between its historical, dynamic and interdisciplinary analysis and ahistorical and static 
conclusions (Bienefeld, 1981). The school’s view of agency was similarly problematic, 
at once denying developing countries any impact on their own development trajectories 
due to the heavily structural-functional nature of the analysis (making delinking 
necessary), but then proposing that countries adopt autonomous (socialist) development 
paths (Saad Filho, 2005b). 
 
In summary, post-war heterodox scholarship persistently emphasised systemic 
disadvantages facing late developers due to the political and economic structures of the 
global economy, in marked contrast to a post-war mainstream focused on ‘mutual 
benefit’. Late developers were thought to be doubly disadvantaged: both adversely 
affected by historical modalities of global incorporation, and systematically 
disadvantaged in the present, due to the functioning of global trade, finance and 
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institutions. However, both structuralism and dependency theory tended to assume the 
structures (and the constraints) stemming from the global arena existed beyond the 
contexts in which they are reproduced, taking the global domain as a steady and 
consistent constraint and hindrance to late development (just differing in how binding 
this constraint was taken to be).  
 
2.2.2 Heterodox theory under neoliberalism: from developmental state to ‘policy 
space’  
 
With the disintegration of the dependency tradition occurring in parallel with the 
neoliberal turn, the centre of gravity in the heterodox literature during the late 1980s and 
early 1990s shifted away from global-level development constraints and toward 
refutations of the empirical and theoretical pillars of the neoliberal counter-revolution. 
The most prominent of the new heterodox approachs, the developmental state literature, 
retained the commitment to industrialisation which had fallen out of favour in 
mainstream development theorising (Öniş, 1991) and offered an alternative account of 
the East Asian newly industrialised country (NIC) trajectories, challenging the idea that 
their experiences vindicated the new development orthodoxy. Analysis by heterodox 
scholars such as Alice Amsden (1989), Peter Evans (1995) and Robert Wade (1990), 
building on earlier work of Chalmers Johnson (1982), stressed the centrality of state 
intervention and industrial policy instruments to creating patterns of productive 
development capable of powering catch-up (rather than the wholesale embrace of 
(global) market forces). Such contributions thereby seemed to strike a more hopeful tone 
regarding global constraints than was hitherto evident in the heterodoxy, given the 
implicit suggestion that obstacles to late development could be offset with the right 
interventions, based on the experience of East Asia’s NICs. As Pempel (1999, p.142) 
notes, one of the developmental state scholarship’s most important contributions was its 
suggestion that ‘far more options exist for industrializing countries than is implied by 
the pessimistic predictions of culturally based modernization theory, dependency theory, 
or world systems theory’.28 
 
                                                   
28 The cultural analyses of development under the modernisation framework tended toward pessimism due to the 
suggestion that intrinsic properties of some cultures made them less able to accommodate  profit-oriented activities 
(Pempel, 1999, pp.142–143).  
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This new strand of the heterodox development literature29 was strongly influenced by 
institutionalist approaches to economics, and sought a middle ground between 
structuralism’s neglect of market mechanisms and neoliberal development scholarship’s 
free market dogmatism, instead striving for a framework capable of accommodating a 
strategy of state-directed market development (Öniş, 1991). As Ben Fine (2013) notes, 
the literature included both an economic and a political school, which respectively 
emphasised the policy interventions and regime characteristics thought necessary to 
power catch-up. In economic policy terms, the literature focused on instruments such as 
export subsidies, domestic-content requirements, import-export linkages, patent and 
copyright infringements, restrictions on capital flows (including direct foreign 
investment) and directed credit (Rodrik, 2007), advocating strategic approaches to trade, 
capital flows and FDI rather than the blanket openness advocated in neoliberal 
development scholarship (Akyüz et al., 1998, p.29). Wade (1990) refers to such state 
interventions as imparting ‘directional thrust’ on the trajectory of economic 
development via a process he refers to as ‘governing the market’.   
 
In the political arena, Amsden (1989, pp.8–9) emphasises that the state (intervening to 
distort relative prices to stimulate economic activity) and the ‘modern industrial 
enterprise’ are the central players in catch-up. Connecting the two she elsewhere 
suggests the need for ‘reciprocal control mechanisms’ (Amsden, 2001) to ensure the two 
work together in ways effective for development. This echoes the focus on ‘embedded 
autonomy’ found in Evans (1995) which suggests states need to be close enough to 
powerful domestic business interests to design effective interventions, but autonomous 
enough to avoid capture and discipline capital. The guiding hand of a meritocratic and 
highly competent bureaucracy (Evans, 1989) is also highlighted, countering neoliberal 
depictions of developing states as somehow inherently rent-seeking and predatory. In 
the background of this literature were motivating concerns such as external security 
threats (Öniş, 1991) and an associated ‘developmental mindset’ (Thurbon, 2016) which 
were said to have shaped the emergence of forms of nationalism focused around the 
imperative to grow rapidly.  
 
                                                   
29 As Radice (2008, p.1153) says ‘[g]iven the marginalisation of dependency theory and of Marxism more broadly in 
the past twenty years, the DS [developmental state] became by about 1990 the major ideological rallying point for 
those who wish to contest the appropriateness of neoliberalism … as a framework for effective governance and 
economic development in the global South’. However, whilst it sits between the orthodoxy and more radical versions 
of the heterodoxy, it is notably recognised by neither (Fine, 2013).  
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Yet, as Pempel (1999, p.146) notes, ‘despite an agenda that concentrates on international 
catch-up, the developmental state is assessed largely in terms of its domestic context’. 
Cold War dynamics and US support were incorporated either as support for, or 
existential threats to, the South Korean regime, for instance, but were treated as 
contingent and discrete geo-political factors. The result was the neglect of systemic 
forces such as the restructuring of the global economy in the late 1960s which intensified 
competitive pressures and prompted transnational corporations (TNCs) in industrial 
economies to strive to cut costs. This worked to the advantage of ‘a few, politically 
reliable and economically relatively advanced cheap labour economies’ (Bienefeld, 
1981, p.92), a factor missing from developmental state analysis. In this regard, the 
developmental state literature inadvertently mirrors the neoliberal mainstream’s 
methodological nationalism, as global forces are only incorporated as one factor among 
many (Fine, 2013). Explaining development success (and implicitly failure) in terms of 
national policies, the global context is therefore assumed to be a given and equally 
enabling for all, so long as the right strategies are adopted (even if the strategies 
themselves markedly differ from the mainstream).  
 
However, by the early 2000s the heterodox literature (including many of the 
developmental state’s key scholars), 30  recovered the former stress on global 
asymmetries and their adverse development impacts.31 Work increasingly focused on 
the deterioration in outcomes which had accompanied the neoliberal turn, with average 
per capita income growth in developing countries falling from 3.0 per cent in 1960-1980 
to 1.5 per cent between 1980-1999 (Chang, 2003). These worsening outcomes were 
                                                   
30 Gallagher’s volume (2005 p.2) brings together Amsden, Chang and Wade to address transformations to the global 
trade and financial architecture, warning, despite the nuanced chapters, that ‘existing and proposed rules for the global 
economy are restricting policy spaces for development in the nations that need development most’. 
31 Despite this turn toward more global-level concerns, the developmental state literature and associated approaches 
also display notable resilience. The recent revival of interest in the term is embodied in its application to contexts as 
diverse as China (Knight, 2014); Israel (Maman and Rosenhek, 2012); and the United States (Block, 2008). In the 
context of Latin America, much recent scholarship has focused on the emergence of neo-developmentalism in the 
continent, a supposed hybrid approach combining neoliberal macroeconomic policies (such as contractionary fiscal 
and monetary policies and inflation targeting, floating exchange rates open capital accounts) with more interventionist 
growth and equity-oriented policies (Bresser-Pereira, 2016; Fritz et al., 2017). Other variants include the ‘petro 
developmental state’ in Nigeria and Angola (Ovadia, 2016); the ‘extractive developmental state’ in Zambia and 
Zimbabwe (Saunders and Caramento, 2018); and ‘neoliberal developmental state’ (Behuria, 2017), ‘emergent 
developmental state’ (Mann and Berry, 2016) and ‘neo-developmental state’ (Goodfellow, 2017) in Rwanda. This 
proliferation of uses across contexts with little obvious in common, either in their development strategies, levels of 
development, or economic structures, indicates the developmental state’s appeal over more mainstream analytical 
approaches, but also signals its plasticity and ambiguity.  
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explained with reference to now narrower ‘policy space’32 (and variants thereof),33 
which was used by many scholars associated with the developmental state school as 
short-hand for new forms of global-level development constraints (see Chang, 2006; 
Gallagher, 2005; Wade, 2003). Early uses of the term centred around the formation of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995,34 specifically the ‘extent to which the 
multilateral trading rules may foreclose policy options that were part of the successful 
development strategies in the NICs as well as in many developed countries’ (UNCTAD, 
2002c, x).35 This framing reflected the use of the developmental state paradigm not only 
to explain East Asia’s success, but also as a generalizable model for emulation (Fine, 
2013). Global forces thereby enter the picture as constraints affecting possibilities for 
emulation.    
 
Together with the expanded use of policy conditionalities by the IFIs, the new trade 
regime became associated with the argument that even if late development was once 
achievable, it was now all-but impossible given changes within the global political 
economy since the 1980s.36 Here Amsden (2007, v–vi) makes a distinction between two 
so-called ‘American empires’: the first in which ‘developing countries were allowed to 
follow their own development paths’, and the second, in which Washington ‘determined 
what developing countries could and couldn’t do’ (to their detriment). Thus, developing 
economies came to be depicted as helpless in the face of an overpowering global order: 
 
[For] most LICs [low-income countries] there is very little leeway in practice. 
They may lack the necessary resources, not have enough leverage when 
                                                   
32 As well as its appeal as a more specific and concrete take on development constraints emanating from global-level 
transformations (compared with more all-encompassing theories such as imperialism and fuzzy terms such as 
globalisation), the term has also been championed by developing country policy-makers themselves. For instance, 
the G77 asked UNCTAD to assist in operationalising the term ‘policy space’ in 2005 (Hamwey, 2005).   
33 Wade (2003, p.621) uses ‘developmental space’, arguing that in making illegal many policies deployed by East 
Asia’s developmental states the Uruguay Round may ‘lock in the position of Western countries at the top of the world 
hierarchy of wealth’. 
34 Interesting shifts in UNCTAD’s take on these constraints are reflected in the TDR. For instance, the TDR 1996 
took a much less pessimistic reading of lost opportunities to replicate the East Asian experience, arguing against 
exaggerated claims regarding either opportunities or limitations, concluding that ‘in many areas critical to the East 
Asian experience, such as investment and savings, research and development, and regional policies, there remains 
ample room for active policy measures that needs to be fully utilized’ (UNCTAD, 1996, x). From 2002 however, the 
emphasis is much more squarely placed on what has been lost (not what remained), with the WTO’s Doha 
Development Round (Fischer, 2015) perhaps particularly significant in this shift.  
35 The term also appeared in UNCTAD documents from 2002 in the context of international investment agreements, 
reflecting that this was becoming an organising idea for concern over multiple global-level rule changes on 
development strategies (UNCTAD, 2002b). 
36 Ironically, given the discussion of the post-war heterodoxy’s critique of the global economy, this has led to the 
reinvention of the post-war period as something of a ‘golden age’ for development. Ha-Joon Chang (2006, p.629) 
says ‘between the end of the second world war and the second oil shock … developing countries were allowed quite 
a large policy space … And this is when the developing countries did the best economically’.  
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negotiating with MNCs [Multinational Corporations], or lack the knowledge, 
technical, and negotiating skills to take advantage of the leverage they do have. 
Also, even the existing policy space is threatened by the powerful aid and trade 
leverage of HICs [high-income-countries] and the policy leverage mediated 
through International Financial Institutions (Khan, 2011, p.265). 
 
Echoes of structuralism are evident in the emphasis on manufacturing-oriented 
strategies as the solution to overcoming development constraints, yet the policy space 
literature shares more in common with dependency theory’s pessimism about 
development prospects, since the remedy such scholars propose (industrial policies) are 
considered to be now dramatically curtailed by recent shifts in global capitalism. This 
pessimism is thereby inductively derived from a specific recipe for development success, 
used to determine whether “room” to develop has been lost or not. This risks reducing 
the development challenge to emulation, and by noting global-level changes which 
make this impossible, effectively suggesting development itself is at risk.  
 
Similar pessimism about the hierarchies of the contemporary global capitalist system is 
evident in other strands of contemporary critical and heterodox scholarship. Within the 
field of international political economy (IPE), capital mobility and rising TNC power in 
the post-Bretton Woods period is said to have given rise to a ‘competition state’  (Cerny, 
1990; Cerny, 1997; Soederberg et al., 2005; Cerny, 2010), which, through the 
requirement to remain attractive in an era of increasingly footloose capital has reoriented 
national policymaking toward efforts to ‘prise open the nation-state to a globalising 
world’ (Cerny, 2010, p.6). Changes to the rules governing the global economy, 
including trade and investment agreements and IFI loan conditionalities, are also said to 
have given rise to a ‘new constitutionalism’: a supranational institutional architecture 
which effectively acts as a way of ‘locking in’ neoliberal policies in support of TNCs 
and investor freedoms (Gill, 1998, p.25). Even where heterogeneity is acknowledged, 
developing countries are thought to be especially vulnerable to such global shifts, for 
instance: ‘[i]n the developing world, there appear to be greater pressures for policy 
convergence’ (Mosley, 2005, p.358). In addition, the fragmentation of global production 
with the emergence of global value chains is cast as a ‘neoliberal device’, locking 
developing countries into a subordinate position in the global division of labour in line 
with the interests of transnational capital (Fernández, 2015, p.210). Such shifts have also 
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prompted the revival of Marxist work on imperialism (Leys and Panitch, 2003; Leys 
and Panitch, 2004; Smith, 2016). Meanwhile, growing focus on the dangers of growth-
revivals based on commodity dependence, particularly in Africa, has sparked the recent 
revival of dependency theorising (Bush, 2013; Sylla, 2014; Taylor, 2016). 
  
Due to its foundational analysis on global economic and political asymmetries, therefore, 
the heterodoxy has consistently foregrounded global-level forces and constraints to 
development. Important transformations from post-war to present have shifted attention 
from trans-historic exchange relations between commodities and modalities of surplus 
extraction between central or peripheral economies, toward a focus on the rules and 
modalities of accumulation currently governing global capitalism. Yet despite these 
important shifts, dominant heterodox approaches tend to assume the structures (and 
constraints) identified exist independently of the contexts and countries in which they 
operate, meaning that the global domain is taken as something ‘out there’, which either 
cannot be changed (and thus decoupling from the global system altogether is required), 
or must be reformed at the global level (as the GSP, NIEO and calls to reform the IFIs 
and World Bank all attest to).  As a result, the global order is persistently taken to have 
a fixed and settled bearing on national development prospects, and the heterodoxy 
emerges as a mirror image of the orthodoxy, with the latter taking the global political 
economy to be uniformly enabling – and the former uniformly constraining – for 
development trajectories. The heterodoxy thereby offers a ‘pessimistic determinism’ (of 
varied intensity) to counter the mainstream’s opposite number. 
 
2.3 Challenges of the existing approaches  
 
The heterodox literature offers a forceful rebuttal of the faith in ‘mutual benefit’ 
embedded within the mainstream development scholarship. Importantly, it also 
highlights the considerable hierarchies that impact late development prospects. 
Nonetheless, it also shares the mainstream’s tendency to conceive of the relationship 
between national development prospects and global conditions to be pre-determined and 
subject to only minimal influence (either a positive or negative depending on the 
approach) by developing states, and in doing so makes a similar misdiagnosis of the 
nature of development constraints. This commonality is reflected in their shared use of 
the metaphor of ‘locking in’. For those championing the rules regime of the WTO this 
is a strong benefit since it offers ‘the opportunity for new members to lock in present, 
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relatively liberal trade regimes’ (Michalopoulos, 2002, p.61). This echoes Thomas L. 
Friedman’s (2000) enthusiasm for the ‘golden straightjacket’ of economic globalisation. 
For those opposed to these changes, however, ‘locking in’ takes on an inverse double 
meaning: the ‘locking in’ of a certain set of (mainstream) policies (and ‘locking out’ of 
alternative approaches); and a resultant process through which developing states are 
‘locked into’ a subordinate position in the global economy and hierarchy of states (as 
discussed in Section 2.2.2). 
 
Yet this shared analysis is problematic on three grounds. First, it neglects the empirical 
variegation in how countries respond to this global order, and the considerable 
heterogeneity in terms of their responses to the WTO, bilateral investment treaties, IFIs 
and global production networks, which undermines the idea of any sort of determinist 
locking in. Within the WTO, for instance, the remaining scope for state intervention 
includes 'permissible' subsidies (such as for exports in least developed countries, or 
LDCs), balance-of-payment clauses, and non-trade-related policy measures such as 
targeted infrastructure investments, utilisation of state enterprises to develop infant 
industries, and government procurement as a mechanism to develop strategic industries 
(Akyüz et al., 1998; Chang et al., 2016). Countries have also managed to carve out very 
different developmental approaches under the same rules regime. For instance, Brazil 
more effectively promotes national firms domestically and overseas than Mexico 
(Santos, 2012), and Malaysia provides more supportive industrial policies for the 
automobile sector than Thailand (Natsuda and Thoburn, 2014). Ecuador, Bolivia, 
Venezuela, India and South Africa have all recently cancelled previously signed 
bilateral investment treaties due to domestic concern over rising corporate power and 
lost domestic policy space (Calvert, 2018). Such variation indicates the rules-based 
regime of global trade and investment does not proceed in a unidirectional manner, even 
amongst late developers  
 
The IMF’s influence also fluctuates, and its power is not evenly distributed across all 
countries. After the East Asian Financial Crisis (1997-1999) many emerging economies 
chose to stock-pile foreign currency to reduce future risks of crisis-induced IMF lending 
(Grabel, 2011). As a result, during 2003-2007, the IMF’s loan portfolio declined from 
US$ 105 billion to less than US$ 10 billion (Chang and Grabel, 2014), and alternative 
financing sources such as China have weakened the hegemony not only of neoliberal 
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institutions but also mainstream ideas about development (Grabel, 2011, p. 806).37 Such 
factors mean that the number of IMF loans and cumulative conditions varies greatly 
(Kentikelenis et al., 2016) and cannot be determined outside of a specific context, 
notwithstanding its increased surveillance and lending power to LICs in particular 
following the global crisis (Van Waeyenberge et al., 2013). Where GVCs are concerned, 
the gains and costs remain ‘an open empirical question’ (UNCTAD, 2014, p.104) since 
the relationship between GVC participation and structural transformation is mixed, and 
stronger in Asia than other regions (UNCTAD, 2016) and broader state-TNC relations 
are ‘contested terrain and dynamic in nature’ (Davis et al., 2018, p.43).  
 
Second, development outcomes are variegated with considerable divergence amongst 
developing countries on a range of socio-economic indicators. Ocampo and Parra (2006, 
p.4) note that between 1980 and 2005 there have been ‘strikingly different growth 
experiences among developing countries’. Since 1990, a number of countries have made 
the transition from low to middle income (Horner and Hulme, 2017). Whilst China’s 
rapid development is often said to have ‘worldwide significance’ (Lo and Zhang, 2011, 
p.33), the broader rapid growth of several Asian economies, most notably, India, 
Thailand and Vietnam has also seen them earn the label ‘Asian drivers of global change’ 
(Kaplinsky and Messner, 2008). In Africa, a continent often noted for its poor 
comparative economic and social performance, a small sub-set of economies – six of 
the world’s fastest growing between 2001 and 2010 – have been labelled ‘African Lions’, 
namely: Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nigeria and Rwanda (Tarp and Bhorat, 
2016). Furthermore, several LDCs have also emerged as ‘among the world’s most 
dynamic economies’ (UNCTAD, 2018b, p.4), namely Bangladesh, Djibouti, Ethiopia, 
Myanmar and Nepal.38  
 
In structural transformation terms, whilst Van Donge et al. (2012) show Southeast Asia 
and sub-Saharan Africa have markedly diverged, in sub-Saharan Africa the 
manufacturing sector grew at 3.5 per cent annually in real terms between 2005 and 2014, 
faster than the global growth rate (Balchin et al., 2016). Several countries have also done 
considerably better than the average, increasing real manufacturing value added by more 
than 7.0 per cent annually between 2005-2015, and as a result, Ethiopia, Rwanda and 
                                                   
37 Grabel (2011) calls these shifts ‘productive incoherence’.  
38 These five LDCs achieved the global Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 8.1 target of 7.0 per cent GDP 
growth in 2017 (UNCTAD, 2018b). 
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Tanzania are cited as bright spots of potential structural transformation on the continent 
(te Velde et al., 2018, 1,13). Where living standards are concerned, Bangladesh, Brazil, 
China, Ethiopia and Vietnam have all been singled out as examples of rapid growth 
combined with robust levels of poverty reduction (World Bank, 2016d). Trends in the 
Human Development Index (HDI) in 135 countries between 1970–2010, identified 
some notable (and surprising) ‘top HDI movers’ (countries that had made the greatest 
progress in HDI terms), including Oman, China, Nepal, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Lao 
PDR, Tunisia, South Korea, Algeria, Morocco and Ethiopia (UNDP, 2010, p.2010). 
 
Third, development strategies remain heterogeneous. Proactive macroeconomic and 
industrial policies, both economy-wide and sector specific, are found to have 
contributed to economic diversification in Australia, China, Chile, Finland, Ireland, 
Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Vietnam during the 2000s (Cornia and 
Martorano, 2012, p.33). Ocampo and Parra (2006, p.21) find policy choices (particularly 
pro-cyclical macroeconomic policies) and economic structures (particularly 
specialisation in higher technology exports) played important role in mediating the 
impacts of global-level forces on tendencies toward growth collapses between 1950-
2005, noting ‘country specific factors still play a role, explaining why a country does 
not experience rapid growth during periods of growth success in the developing world 
as a whole, or why it can better manage vulnerabilities during downswings of the global 
development cycle’. The existence of such differences alone suggests the enduring 
space for heterodox policy choices, as well as such policies’ potential worth.  
 
In conclusion, variegated responses to global forces, as well as divergent development 
outcomes and economic policies within a single framework of global accumulation, 
indicates that the development impacts of global conditions derive, at least in part, from 
how particular states respond to these conditions. These responses are in turn shaped by 
the way developing economies have been historically articulated with global financial 
markets, rules regimes and production networks. Such factors have deeply historical 
roots and are (at least partly) impacted by past and present development strategies, rather 
than being merely given by (an exogenous) ‘global context’. This suggests that beyond 
a certain point, the extent to which international trade, production and finance will 
constrain development, even in a low-income context, can only be assessed by reference 
to the context-specific and historically shaped modality of a country’s insertion into the 
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global economy and the strategies adopted to respond to this. As a result, the interaction 
between global conditions and the domestic political economy must be a core feature of 
attempts to understand the nature of development constraints at any conjuncture.  
 
2.4 Developmentalism in the age of neoliberalism  
 
The diversity of outcomes, policies, and strategies for engaging with the global order 
outlined above signals the necessity of considering the relationship between national 
development prospects and global economic and political forces in a dynamic rather 
than determinist way. Analysis of the developmental prospects of any given state, must 
not, therefore, assume that all countries face the same global disadvantages or 
advantages (Pempel, 1999). Rather these need to be examined in practice as the context-
specific product of national dynamics and the shifting and contingent functioning of the 
global capitalist system at a given moment in time. This signals the importance of 
examining the domestic balance of social forces and the material and ideational 
structures in which local economic and political elites are embedded in specific national 
contexts in order to understand precisely how national development strategies are 
impacted (and to what degree) by global economic and political forces – rather than 
taking this influence for granted. In elaborating an alternative analytical framework for 
incorporating this relational terrain, this section first considers the salience of examining 
the domestic political economy, and then how best to relate this to a reformulated 
understanding of the present global political and economic order of neoliberalism.  
 
2.4.1 Actually existing developmentalism 
 
A vitally important consideration in understanding the trajectory of a particular 
country’s development strategy is the nature of the domestic political economy. As the 
existence of so-called ‘autonomous liberalisation’ (Chang et al., 2016, p.117) (whereby 
countries liberalise to a much greater degree than is strictly necessary according to any 
external pressure) illustrates, it is domestic not global drivers that may ultimately propel 
countries to embrace their existing comparative advantage and eschew manufacturing 
development (and thus embrace a pauperising form of global integration). Work on the 
transnational capitalist class (Robinson, 2001; Sklair, 2001) (even if the notion itself 
attributes too much coherence to this social formation) usefully highlights that shifts in 
global capitalism also reconstitute the material interests of nationally embedded political 
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and economic elites. Indeed, powerful domestic interests may push for the embrace of 
neoliberal policy measures for a number of reasons, including bankers advocating 
central bank independence, deficit rules and inflation targeting to “lock-in” so-called 
“prudent” macroeconomic policies; wealthy elites pushing to end capital controls to ease 
the movement of money out of the country; and exporters pushing for deeper trade 
integration to further their access to foreign markets (Chang, 2006). Socialisation 
through education and professional association membership between elites in developed 
and developing economies frames worldviews in which other options come to be seen 
as undesirable or unviable, which may also contribute to the ideological alignment of 
domestic elites in developing countries with neoliberal policy norms (Gathii, 2011). 
Thus even without direct external compulsion or pressure, national social forces, in light 
of their shifting international articulation, incentives, and linkages, may use their power 
and influence to facilitate deep forms of integration into the global economy (Robinson, 
2005, p.5). 
 
Importantly, such forces also hold the possibility to understand the space which remains 
for alternative developmental strategies. Indeed, the (potentially) significant role played 
by domestic elites in articulating economic strategies, suggests the need to examine the 
balance of social forces, including material and ideational structures in which local 
economic and political elites are embedded, in order to understand the relationship 
between domestic and global economies. As Haggard (1986) argues, a country’s 
relationship to the international economy is shaped by decisions taken within that 
context (and their outcomes) such as: the balance between the import-substitution 
oriented and export-oriented aspects of the development strategy which help to shape 
trade relations; the production structure and patterns of foreign investment; the degree 
of dependence on foreign borrowing; and broader balance of payments dynamics.39 All 
of these factors can play a central role in determining the impact of global capitalism on 
late development.  
 
Instead of a determinist relationship, therefore, the national and global should be 
considered co-constitutive in the sense that the global economy is also itself dynamically 
                                                   
39  It is for this reason that Haggard (1986, p.346) argues that ‘[d]ependency is too frequently portrayed as a 
determinant international structure rather than as a set of shifting constraints within which states seek to manoeuvre’. 
Whilst global conditions may be broadly similar country-by-country, the very existence of divergent outcomes, 
suggests the necessity of attention to how states respond to these circumstances, and therefore demands attention to 
domestic policies and political processes.  
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produced through the strategies adopted in different spaces and times. Indeed, the 
broader system of global capitalism itself impacts the modality of integration of all 
economies within the international division of labour (not only by the decisions and 
interests of super-powers and hegemons), wherein development strategies of even 
peripheral economies help to constitute the global ‘whole’. The fallacy of composition 
argument (UNCTAD, 1996; UNCTAD, 2002c) cautions that if all countries were to 
simultaneously adopt the same strategies, doing so will impact the prospect for success 
of each of them. This means, contra mainstream analysis, that not all countries can 
simultaneously adopt EOI light manufacturing strategies since doing so would intensify 
competition in such a way as to undermine the possibility of success.  It also means, 
contra the heterodox strands of the literature which emphasise the importance of 
emulating the strategies of those that came before, and deriving catch-up prospects from 
the ability to replicate past strategies, that this takes the global context to be too fixed 
and settled to provide a useful guide to development prospects. Not only does the global 
context change over time, but policies which may be feasible in one place may not be 
in another, due to differences in their political economies (Selwyn, 2011; Fine, 2013). 
Whilst small and marginal economies undoubtedly exert considerably less influence on 
the global context than advanced economies, channels of influence nonetheless flow 
both ways since the global context is transformed by the integration and development 
strategies (of groups of) developing states. 
 
Together this suggests that the way a country’s development strategy is shaped, 
constrained, and/or enabled by the global economy will be shaped by its development 
strategy and the social forces that go into producing such a strategy, and therefore cannot 
be read-off from the global economy in the abstract, nor the architecture of political and 
economic realities stemming from it. Methodologically, in order to understand the links 
between the domestic and global economies and how they interact to shape specific 
economic development strategies and constraints, particular attention to the state is 
required. As Bienefeld (1982, p.25) argues, to understand how the international and 
national spheres are linked – and through which mechanisms – it is necessary to study 
the nation state ‘because it has the capacity, albeit a variable and limited one, to define 
those links’. Indeed, it is this ‘bridging’ role between domestic social forces and the 
global capitalist system that makes the state the major countervailing force against the 
unequalising tendencies of the global economy (Kiely, 1998a). Furthermore, given the 
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larger distance to the technological frontier between first and later developers, the later 
the development occurs, the larger the state’s role is likely to need to be, particularly in 
mobilising financial resources for the development of capital-intensive industries 
characteristic of developed economies (Gerschenkron, 1962). Mainstream approaches 
offer no guide to understanding these dynamics, as without automatic convergence, 
‘outcomes [will] depend on circumstances, domestic policies and global constraints’ 
(Saad Filho, 2014, p.579). Thus the mediation between national development and the 
global capitalist system is thereby fundamentally shaped by historical processes of state 
formation and class relations within a given context (Kiely, 1994), which in turn can 
only be understood methodologically from the study of this context. 
 
The implication of this analysis is that instead of the dominant mainstream and 
heterodox approaches, the relationship between national development and global 
economic and political conditions, following Kiely (1994), needs to be considered to be 
both dynamic and contingent, and the product of (undoubtedly) powerful tendencies, as 
well as context-specific counter-tendencies. Rather than a set of predetermined “rules” 
of the system, global forces should instead be seen as “laws”, which are subject to a 
multitude of countervailing forces, mediated – amongst others – through the state and 
which ‘influence, but do not completely determine, the industrial (and wider 
development) strategy of peripheral capitalist countries’ (Kiely, 1994, p.147).40 Notably, 
these laws should not be understood as immutable abstract tendencies of the capitalist 
system, but are specific to the particular configuration of global capitalism at a particular 
historical conjuncture. These tendencies should thus be considered to emanate from a 
global-level system of accumulation which is a historically specific configuration of 
capitalism associated with a set of specific constraints to growth. This approach shares 
an understanding with some strands of the dependency literature, which treated this as 
a flexible methodological approach rather than dogmatic theoretical framework, and 
called for what Palma (1978) dubs the examination of ‘concrete situations of 
dependency’ (see also Kay, 1989; Kiely, 2010; Leys, 1996).   
 
However, instead of presupposing and then demonstrating dependency, the framework 
utilised in this thesis instead seeks to explore the relationship between national 
                                                   
40 As Kiely (1994, p. 153) points out: ‘[t]he specific effect of these tendencies on a particular country (or group of 
countries) in the world economy will depend on how that nation, and its institutions (especially the state) and social 
actors respond to these “laws”’. 
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development and global conditions through case studies of “actually existing 
developmentalism”.41 The motivation for doing so is to explore concrete strategies 
directed at structural transformation under current global conditions (strategies which 
seek to push against the powerful tendencies of the current global political and economic 
order), in order to understand just how constraining the global economic and political 
forces are for efforts directed at contemporary late development. Such case studies, it is 
suggested, can reveal the extent to which alternative development trajectories are 
possible by exploring – rather than taking for granted – the links between the global and 
national domains (and their development implications).  
 
Whilst direct replication of past experiences is not a helpful way to construct the 
development challenge for the reasons discussed above, the past offers some guide to 
the sorts of strategies which might prove effective in triggering structural transformation 
potentially capable of generating catch-up. A useful sketch of the domains of state-led 
intervention in support of developmental trajectories conducive to stable, sustainable 
and equitable growth is offered by Chang and Grabel (2004b; 2014). This work suggests 
that transformative strategies capable of powering the transformations needed for late 
development are likely to involve policies located in five broad economic domains: 
trade and industry; privatisation and intellectual property; international private capital 
flows; domestic financial regulation; macroeconomic policies and institutions.  
 
According to this framework, heterodox trade and industrial policies should broadly 
seek to eschew free trade. Instead protection and selective industrial promotion (mixing 
infant industry protection of domestic industries and export promotion) should be 
deployed, attached to appropriate performance requirements. Privatisation, meanwhile, 
should be resisted for its own sake in order to utilise state enterprises for development 
objectives (including in natural monopolies and large industries). Innovation and 
technological adoption should be promoted over the protection of intellectual property 
rights. International private capital flows should be carefully managed, through the use 
of capital controls, ceilings on foreign loans, careful management of portfolio inflows 
                                                   
41 This usage is inspired by the approach to examining cases of ‘actually existing development’ deployed by Kiely 
(1998b, p.37), which, as he points out, draws on a lineage coming from the idea of ‘actually existing socialism’ used 
by Bahro (1978) and adapted by Sutcliffe (1984) into ‘actually existing industrialisation’. In the context of debates 
about neo-developmentalism in Latin America the term ‘really existing developmentalism’ has been recently 
deployed to distinguish between theoretical and empirical uses of the term, although these uses are broader than that 
here, since it is used to characterise the more general process through which capitalism develops in concrete times 
and places (Bresser-Pereira, 2016). 
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and FDI management strategies, all targeted at employment creation, living standard 
improvements and knowledge transfer. Domestic financial regulation should seek to 
provide credit at appropriate prices for investments likely to yield stable, sustainable 
and equitable investment. Financial liberalisation should therefore be secondary to these 
more important goals. Finally, macroeconomic policies and institutions may entail 
restricted currency convertibility, adjustable exchange rate pegs, central banks 
integrated with the wider development strategy, growth-enhancing rather than inflation-
targeting oriented monetary policies, and growth-promoting public investment 
underpinned by expanded tax revenues.   
 
Yet whilst these policies are likely to be important to any contemporary late 
development effort the global economy also throws up some challenges for their 
implementation. The heterodox literature highlights two categories of shifts which 
demand attention in any study of contemporary late development: the neoliberal 
architecture of global rules and institutions (the IFIs and WTO and broader trade and 
investment regime); and shifts in patterns of global accumulation (specifically effecting 
global production and finance). Each of these “laws” is briefly examined to understand 
the specific mechanisms by which each typically impacts late development trajectories 
by constraining (although not eliminating) the scope to apply alternative economic 
policies of the kind discussed above. Such specificity is critical to framing the empirical 
enquiry which follows, allowing the analysis of global economic and political forces to 
be incorporated into the case study analysis in a way that eschews the risk of 
“pessimistic determinism”.  
 
2.4.2 International Financial Institutions  
 
The close alignment between the lending practices and policy advice of the IFIs and 
mainstream development scholarship, due to the financial and intellectual muscle of the 
World Bank in particular, suggests the need to examine the ways these institutions have 
persistently helped to champion, cajole and (at times) coerce states to adopt the 
neoliberal development policies. Indeed, Chang (2006, p.627) credits the IFIs with 
starting what he refers to as the ‘current phase of shrinkage in policy space’ through the 
expansion of structural adjustment loans (SALs) after the debt crisis which engulfed the 
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developing world in the 1980s.42 Such policy conditionalities are aligned with classic 
Washington Consensus policy norms, and include measures to liberalise, stabilise and 
privatise economies in return for concessional and non-concessional financing (Chang, 
2006; Khan, 2007; Akyüz, 2009). In addition, the Bank is also a powerful development 
policy agenda setter (Van Waeyenberge and Fine (2011), and this combination of 
intellectual and material influence, has earned the IFIs the label of ‘agents of 
neoliberalism’ (Babb and Kentikelenis, 2018). 
 
In terms of the specific constraints to the application of developmental alternatives 
emanating from IFI conditionalities, trade liberalisation (a common loan conditionality 
since the mid-1980s) (UNCTAD, 2006) has damaged nascent manufacturing capacity 
in many poorer developing economies, threatening industrial employment and 
increasing reliance on primary goods. This makes nurturing future infant industries 
harder, whilst lost tariff revenues adversely impact the scarce tax base that could be used 
to increase developmentally beneficial public investment (Chang, 2006; Jomo K.S., 
2007). Stabilisation measures (another common IFI policy staple), such as restrictions 
on government deficits, both curb fiscal space and put a particular (mainstream) 
conception of macroeconomic stability ahead of demand management, capacity creation, 
and increased employment and wages, which instead requires greater scope to expand 
public budgets and some flexibility regarding deficits (Mayer, 2009).  
 
Privatisation, meanwhile, often fails to raise hoped-for revenues, imposing important 
social, political and distributional costs, as well as neglecting multiple instances where 
state-owned enterprise (SOEs) have proved compatible with economic success (Chang 
and Grabel, 2014).43 Indeed, state enterprises can aid with the social control of natural 
monopolies (such as railways, water and electricity), where the profit-orientation of 
private firms is incompatible with equitable service provision (for example providing 
poor, rural communities with postal services, public transport, basic education and 
water), and help to power investment in sectors where private investors are unlikely to 
put forward capital (either in capital-intensive risky high technology sectors such as 
                                                   
42 Early warnings about the way IFI lending under SALs might threaten industrialisation efforts can be found in 
Hellenier (1983) and Kaplinsky (1984). 
43 For instance, here they cite Taiwan, Singapore, Austria, France, Norway, and West Germany (Chang and Grabel, 
2014). 
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steel and aircraft, or where private investors are not interested but which are strategically 
important, such as basic input industries like chemicals or steel) (Chang, 2007).  
 
With the transition to the post-Washington Consensus, additional barriers to structural 
transformation from the global development financing architecture have emerged. The 
turn toward the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) modality of lending support, 
despite the supposed softening of the structural adjustment agenda, has been much-
criticised for simply reinventing the mechanisms by which neoliberal reforms are 
transferred to developing countries (Soederberg, 2005a; McKinley, 2009). In addition, 
the turn toward performance-based lending (or ‘selectivity’), through which aid 
allocation decisions are informed by evaluations of the prior implementation of targeted 
reforms, and consolidated through the Bank’s country policy and institutional 
assessment (CPIA) framework, acts as a ‘strong disciplinary role with regard to a 
recipient country’s policy space’ (Van Waeyenberge, 2009, p.806). The criteria for 
determining the quality of a country’s development regime are universalistic, with high 
thresholds for achieving top scores (such as a virtually free trade regime in the trade 
liberalisation metric) (Wade, 2014). The emergence of the good governance paradigm, 
meanwhile, has also added multiple aspects of governance to the IFI policy recipe, 
across a broad spectrum of economic, political and social reform such that ‘there is 
virtually no area on which the Bank and the Fund do not have (often very strong) 
influence - democracy, judicial reform, corporate governance, health, education’ (Chang, 
2006, p.627). Such expanded influence has also served to undermine domestic policy-
making capacity, eroded independent development thinking, and distorted the incentives 
of policy-makers toward IFI priorities rather than those that might in some sense be 
domestically or socially determined (Harrison, 2004; Oya and Pons-Vignon, 2010). Aid 
dependence can also exacerbate such tendencies, as local ownership decreases as 
foreign experts and donors take over many crucial functions of governments, impacting 
both democratic decision-making and incentives for domestic tax collection (Bräutigam, 
2000). Any examination of ‘actually existing developmentalism’ in the neoliberal period 
therefore needs to be sensitive to this complex array of dynamic forces.  
 
2.4.3 Global trade and investment regime 
 
Whilst the formation of the WTO in 1995 enhanced the security and stability in terms 
of market access of developing countries (Akyüz et al., 1998), as well as introducing 
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new special and differential treatment (S&DT) provisions (Kumar, 2005),44 it also went 
far beyond the previous General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) regime to 
encompass a wide range of “trade-related-activities” (including services and 
investment-related laws). This had the effect of extending WTO oversight over a much 
broader range of domestic legislation (UNCTAD, 2014), as well as mandating tariff cuts 
for industrial products in developing countries, impacting sectors often hitherto well-
protected from international competition (UNCTAD, 2006).  
 
In addition, despite claiming to provide a single set of rules for all countries through the 
“single undertaking” (compared with GATT’s more optional regime), later entrants 
(often developing economies) ultimately face steeper accession terms due to the power 
differentials at work in bilateral entry negotiations (Wade, 2005, p.87). Steep legal costs 
and vulnerability to reprisals also pose major challenges to developing countries through 
the WTO’s dispute resolution mechanism (Wade, 2005). Rules related to foreign 
investment regulation and subsidies, meanwhile, particularly benefit advanced 
economies (UNCTAD, 2006). The costs imposed by the WTO also weigh particularly 
heavily on late developers, which regulates against many tools used by developed 
economies to close the technological gap (Singh, 1996; UNCTAD, 2006). This includes 
some important performance requirements on FDI, such as local content requirements, 
export performance targets and trade balancing measures (such as foreign exchange 
restrictions or other trade restrictions) (Singh, 1996; Wade, 2005; UNCTAD, 2006). 
Domestic value addition and backward integration of strategic industries, which are a 
particular challenge in GVC integration (Kumar, 2005; UNCTAD, 2006) (see section 
2.4.4), are substantially complicated by such prohibitions. Strict copyright, trademark, 
industrial design and patent restrictions further constrain the scope for reverse 
engineering and imitation (UNCTAD, 2014), increasing the costs of patentable 
knowledge and copyright, raising barriers to technology acquisition and therefore to 
innovation, productivity increases and wage increases (Khan, 2007). 45  In reducing 
policy in these respects the WTO thereby reduces developing countries’ ‘autonomy to 
                                                   
44 In contrast with the GATT regime, special treatment now means a longer transition period for comprehensive 
implementation (not non-reciprocity designed to help to level the playing field between countries) (UNCTAD, 2006). 
However, this period is widely considered to be too short to be able to fundamentally alter the gap between developed 
and developing economies (Kumar, 2005; Wade, 2005). 
45 By increasing financial flows to advanced economies from developing economies (Wade, 2005), TRIPS has 
earned the status of ‘the most unequal WTO agreement’ (Akyüz, 2008, p.9). 
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experiment with institutional innovations that diverge from orthodoxy’ (Rodrik, 2007, 
p.225). 
 
Whilst some important flexibilities remain in the WTO system (Akyüz et al., 1998; 
Amsden, 2005; UNCTAD, 2014), steadily proliferating Preferential Trade Agreements 
(PTAs) 46  and bilateral investment treaties (BITs) now stray into important 
developmental policy areas typically left out of the multilateral trade arena (UNCTAD, 
2006; Akyüz, 2008; Thrasher and Gallagher, 2008; UNCTAD, 2014). 47  So-called 
WTO-plus provisions (more stringent than those included in the multilateral arena) and 
WTO-extra provisions (going beyond what is included in the WTO) (Horn et al., 2010) 
have brought government procurement, capital flows, trade in services, and 
environmental and labour issues into the global trade and investment regime (UNCTAD, 
2014). In particular  PTAs have been said to promote “deep integration”, encompassing: 
liberalisation of behind-the-border trade rules; safeguards over the interests of foreign 
firms and investors; 48  and harmonisation of domestic legislation and regulations 
governing international production and trade between signatories (Kim, 2015). They 
may be more accurately described, therefore, as ‘comprehensive economic integration 
treaties’ (UNCTAD, 2014, pp.82, 69) targeted at eliminating all remaining barriers to 
trade and capital flows, open new areas to corporate profit through privatisation, and 
push through deregulation and flexibility in labour markets. Even more than the 
multilateral trade regime, such bilateral and regional agreements thus pose a sizeable 
challenge for the contemporary developmental strategies.  
 
2.4.4 Global value chains (GVCs) 
 
Intensified competition, combined with widespread trade liberalisation, increased 
capital mobility, transformations in global information, technology and logistics and 
changing corporate strategies (which now prioritise flexibility, cost-savings and the 
maximisation of share-holder value), all contributed to the disintegration of post-war 
Fordist production structures (UNCTAD, 2016). As a result, since the 1970s, lead firms 
(often headquartered in advanced economies) in sectors such as apparel, electronics, 
                                                   
46 Also known as Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). 
47 Between 1990-2015, the number of trade agreements increased from 50 to 279 and the number of BITs from 238 
to 2239 (UNCTAD, 2018c). 
48 Such as through investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms which grant foreign investors the power to sue 
governments that implement legislation directly or indirectly affecting corporate profits or the interests of foreign 
investors (UNCTAD, 2014). 
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agro-processing and automotives have increasingly relocated, outsourced, or sub-
contracted core aspects of the production process, whilst themselves concentrating on 
design, branding, R&D and marketing activities (UNCTAD, 2016). The modality of 
developing economy incorporation into such structures has altered the international 
division of labour inherited from the colonial period, through which developed 
economies dominated the production and export of manufactured goods, and developing 
economies concentrated on commodity production (Kiely, 2014). Global trade has 
markedly expanded since the 1980s (UNCTAD, 2014; UNCTAD, 2016), whilst 
developing countries’ share of global trade in manufactured goods has risen from 10 per 
cent in 1980 to nearly 45 per cent by 2014 (UNCTAD, 2016). Some 80 per cent of global 
trade (measured in terms of gross exports) now occurs through these fragmented 
production networks (UNCTAD, 2013).  
 
The development implications of these shifts, as Bair (2005) notes, are highlighted in 
the heterodox literatures organised around the rubric of  global commodity chains 
(GCCs) and global value chains (GVCs),49 and are four-fold. First, the GVC analysis 
highlights that participation in vertically integrated production networks may be 
systemically unequalising – reproducing rather than eliminating global hierarchies – 
given the adverse terms on which developing countries and firms typically participate 
(Kaplinsky, 2000). Dividing activities in such chains by their capacity to generate 
broader economic spillovers, GVC analysis finds that activities at the beginning and end 
of the process – design and marketing – have higher barriers to entry and greater 
potential to generate dynamic rents and systemic gains than those related to production, 
where increasingly fierce competition (due to lower barriers to entry) has seen the unit 
prices decline since the mid-1980s (Kaplinsky, 2000). Furthermore, whilst there has 
been concentration amongst lead firms in developed economies, there has been 
increased competition amongst lower rung activities (UNCTAD, 2016), and as a result 
developing country producers are integrated via specialisation in low returns, low 
barrier to entry (and thus low-value added and low-wage) segments of production 
(UNCTAD, 2014). 
 
Second, chain governance places developing country firms in a vulnerable bargaining 
position as important players, known as lead firms, mostly large TNCs, overwhelmingly 
                                                   
49 Such approaches trace their roots to world systems theory (see for instance Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1986). 
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based in developed economies (UNCTAD, 2018c), wield the power to determine the 
distribution of profit and risk between the various actors in the chain (Gereffi, 1999; 
Gereffi, 2014). This happens via control and coordination of logistics, design and quality 
standards, and decisions over the integration of components (Kaplinsky, 2000). In 
practice this power differential also entails strong pressure from lead firms to keep 
labour costs low (UNCTAD, 2014). Third, ‘upgrading’ (of both technology and skills) 
to higher value-added activities in the chain is thought to be needed to capture better 
returns from GVC participation (Davis et al., 2018). Yet, outside of meso (sectoral) and 
micro (firm) dynamics, upgrading efforts are often impacted by the broader shifts in the 
global capitalist system (Bair, 2005), which, as noted above, have limited opportunities 
for industrial policy-making. Furthermore, the very policy measures often designed to 
attract lead firms to relocate parts of their production, such as the removal of restrictions 
on the repatriation of profits and the protection of investor interests, may work against 
upgrading by accommodating the needs of foreign investors at the expense of measures 
designed to encourage technology transfer, local sourcing and employment creation 
(UNCTAD, 2014; 2016). In general, meanwhile, reliance on FDI can have 
developmentally unfavourable impacts due to power differentials, limited flows of 
(greenfield) FDI which builds productive capacity development, uncertain and 
contingent balance of payments implications, and the speculative and volatile flows 
often labelled as FDI (Akyüz, 2015). 
 
Fourth, such production structures are often accompanied by the expanded import of 
intermediate goods, with the risk of specialisation only in low-wage assembly tasks and 
producing enclaves with limited linkages between export industries and the rest of the 
economy. This risks what UNCTAD (2016, p.78) calls ‘stalled industrialisation’, 
wherein the share of manufacturing in both output and employment stagnates at modest 
levels, due to the failure to develop the dynamic linkages with the rest of the economy. 
The GVC literature thus provides an important counter to the win-win arguments about 
global integration evident in the mainstream literature (as discussed in section 2.1.2) by 
highlighting the processes through which developing country manufacturing can 
become restricted to low productivity and low-wage activities, thereby reinforcing 
rather than transforming global hierarchies (Bair, 2005; Neilson, 2014; Ravenhill, 2014; 
Kiely, 2014; Smith, 2016). It is for these reasons that heterodox approaches do not 
consider GVCs to be a development strategy in and of themselves, but that participation 
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will necessitate extensive industrial policies (although of the kind now much more 
problematic in the ways outlined above) (UNCTAD, 2016). 
 
2.4.5 Financialisation 
 
The disintegration of the Bretton Woods system of global monetary regulation at the 
end of the 1970s ended both the gold standard and fixed exchange rates, and ushered in 
extensive capital account liberalisation (Wade, 2006). The latter commenced in the 
developed world in the 1980s, and was followed by financial deregulation and capital 
account opening in developing countries in the decades that followed (UNCTAD, 2015). 
Financial liberalisation was one of the five core components of IFI structural adjustment 
lending (Crisp and Kelly, 1999),50 premised on the idea that financial liberalisation and 
“competitive currencies” would spur foreign investment, and thus development 
(Williamson, 1990; Rodrik, 2007, p.16). The result was three fundamental and inter-
related modifications in patterns of finance globally: greater global liquidity (as the US 
was now able to pay for imports through Treasury bills and dollars rather than gold or 
dollars backed by gold, and so without supply-side limits); markedly increased capital 
mobility; and a shift away from long-term flows between developed and developing 
countries and upswing in short-term, speculative financial movements (Wade, 2006). 
Together such shifts also profoundly transformed patterns of global accumulation by 
giving rise to financialisation,51 the hallmark of neoliberal capitalism globally, which 
can be described as ‘the extraordinary proliferation and expansion of financial markets 
and instruments as such, both within and between countries, but also the penetration of 
financial processes and imperatives into ever more aspects of economic and social 
reproduction’ (Fine and Saad Filho, 2014, p.156) (see also Fine, 2010; Fine, 2012; Fine 
and Saad Filho, 2017).  
 
The implications of these shifts for strategies directed at structural transformation are 
three-fold. First, the productive investment which is pivotal to industrialisation efforts 
has suffered. The manufacturing sector requires long-term financing (to help firms 
increase productivity and expand), whilst large-scale financing for risky and complex 
infrastructure projects is vital to creating a wider enabling environment for structural 
                                                   
50 The other four areas were: trade liberalisation; exchange rates; tax reform; and public enterprises reform and 
privatisation (Crisp and Kelly, 1999). 
51 Of this relationship Fine suggests ‘we can view neoliberalism as a period of capitalism dominated by 
financialisation’ (Fine, 2012, p.53). 
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transformation (UNCTAD, 2016). Such funds have typically been provided by public 
financial institutions such as central banks and development banks which provide 
preferential directed credit for strategic industries and projects, in contrast with 
commercial banks often biased toward short-term lending (UNCTAD, 2016). 
Financialisation has, however, decreased investment in real productive activity and 
instead expanded speculative financial flows (Stockhammer, 2004; Fine, 2012). 
Financial market control over financial intermediation has also increased (at the expense 
of banks of all kinds), and corporate strategies are increasingly determined by 
‘shareholder value maximisation’ strategies (van der Zwan, 2014; Storm, 2018). The 
knock-on effect has been reduced state control over patterns of resource allocation 
(including over the balance between investment and consumption, sectoral destinations 
and nature of international specialisation) (Saad Filho and Ayers, 2008, p.162). 
Furthermore, central bank independence, a key component of the neoliberal financial 
agenda, places control over interest rates beyond the reach of domestic political 
institutions (Ayers and Saad Filho, 2015). New developments in the international 
development architecture are working to consolidate this finance-oriented policy agenda, 
as ODA is increasingly used to foster deepened financial market penetration of 
developing economies by de-risking investments and easing the passage of speculative 
financial flows (Mawdsley, 2018). Meanwhile, revived policy interest in public private 
partnerships (PPPs) in developing countries is reshaping the way infrastructure 
provision works in order to deliver profits in service of global finance capital on terms 
that are considered to be extremely unfavourable for developing countries (Bayliss and 
Van Waeyenberge, 2018). 
 
Second, financialisation increases macroeconomic instability as enhanced openness to 
expanded flows of cross-border finance has amplified vulnerability to sudden capital 
outflows (UNCTAD, 2014; UNCTAD, 2016). Speculative investments also increase 
fragility by raising the likelihood of financial and currency crises (Chang and Grabel, 
2004a), whilst short-term inflows favour the acquisition of financial assets, real estate 
investments or consumption credit where the risk of boom-and-bust cycles is heightened 
(UNCTAD, 2014, p.121). Whilst macroeconomic instability undermines development 
in its own terms, such flows also tend to be pro-cyclical, which, in tandem with the pro-
cyclical patterns of ODA, prompt fiscal contraction rather than expansion at times of 
economic stress (Akyüz, 2008). Third, financialisation deepens power imbalances. In 
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increasing vulnerability to external shocks it thereby increases the power and leverage 
of the IMF (especially in LICs, given limited alternative sources of finance in times of 
economic distress) to promote a fiscal austerity-driven agenda for resolving crises (Rude, 
2005).52 The threat of capital flight, meanwhile, whether real or imagined, has strong 
disciplinary effects, increasing the power of foreign investors over domestic policy 
decisions (Chang, 2006). Increased reliance on external commercial lending meanwhile 
also deepens the power of financial capital over the domestic policy domain, with the 
imperative of ‘creditworthiness’ organised around creditor preference for ‘good policies’ 
such as fiscal austerity (Soederberg, 2005b, p.943). These three-interrelated shifts 
demonstrate the ways in which the neoliberal global financial system is both hierarchical 
(with crises affecting developing economies more severely), and the ways in which its 
asymmetries are reproduced via the different institutional arrangements for managing 
and resolving crises (with the IMF as the ‘policeman’ of crisis resolution via austerity).  
 
In summary, to unpack contemporary prospects for late development these shifts at the 
level of the rule regimes and accumulation strategies characteristic of the global 
neoliberal period must be incorporated into any study of actually existing 
developmentalism.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has provided a theoretical footing to examine the core concern of the thesis: 
possibilities for national development strategies directed at structural transformation, 
employment creation and improved living standards since the neoliberal transition. The 
chapter examined dominant conceptualisations of the relationship between national 
development prospects and global political and economic forces within the existing 
development literature. Building on the work of Hunt (1989) and Hirschman (1982), the 
chapter found a common (and problematic) conceptualisation of the relationship 
between national development and global conditions in both the mainstream and 
heterodox approaches. Both the “optimistic determinism” of the mainstream literature, 
which suggests global conditions will be universally enabling of development in all 
countries and contexts, and the “pessimistic determinism” of the heterodox literature, 
                                                   
52 Indeed, in the wake of the global financial crisis (GFC), the IMF’s role in LICs has indeed increased (Van 
Waeyenberge et al., 2013). 
67 
 
which tends to see the global political economy as uniformly constraining for 
development, misdiagnose the nature of development constraints. Instead, the chapter 
argued that the influence of the global economy on national development prospects is 
not pre-determined (for good or ill), but rather the context-specific product of both a 
given nation’s development strategy and the shifts in the global capitalist system in a 
specific moment of global accumulation. The chapter then advanced that this 
relationship should be considered dynamic and relational, not pre-determined or 
universal. 
 
The alternative analytical framework of actually existing developmentalism outlined 
provides a way to explore what opportunities remain for – and what openings can be 
created by – states seeking to deploy developmental strategies today. Methodologically, 
this alternative is organised around historically informed political economy analysis of 
the interactions between global and domestic social, political and economic forces, 
predicated on an understanding that the relationship between national development and 
global conditions in the age of neoliberalism (or any other) must be understood 
dynamically and contextually, not deterministically. The state – and the social forces 
acting upon it – are a particular focus of enquiry given its role as a bridge between the 
national and global economies. The framework thus implies attention should be paid to 
the material and ideational climate in which development policy is made.  
 
Case selection, as noted in Chapter 1, has been driven by the selection of country 
experiences which go against the grain of prevailing development advice in ways 
indicative of a developmental orientation. Ethiopia and Vietnam both display state-led, 
manufacturing-oriented and gradualist economic strategies, share similar economic 
histories, and have track-records of atypical development performance. The subsequent 
chapters thus offer a historically-rooted political economy analysis of the interactions 
between domestic and global forces in the context of two rapidly growing late 
developers. 
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Chapter 3 Ethiopia 1991-2001: The emergence of defensive 
developmentalism 
 
 
This chapter uses the analytical framework elaborated in Chapter 2 to examine the 
emergence and evolution of Ethiopia’s development strategy between 1991 and 2001, 
as the new ruling coalition, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front 
(EPRDF), embarked on the transition from command to market economy. It argues that 
despite adopting several mainstream reforms, a form of what it dubs defensive 
developmentalism emerged, consisting of a heterodox approach to state, domestic and 
foreign capital, which helped to preserve a nexus of finance, industry and infrastructure 
firms in state control. The chapter explores the forces both driving and enabling the 
creation of an unorthodox developmental core in a country emerging from over a decade 
and a half of conflict as one of the very poorest in the world, and in a situation of 
considerable economic fragility. To do so, it considers the material and ideational forces 
conditioning the EPRDF’s approach to the transition to a market-oriented economy, and 
how its policy decisions and scope for implementing them was impacted by the 
neoliberal global order outlined above. It roots Ethiopia’s notable deviation from the 
mainstream development paradigm in its developmentally conducive political economy 
inherited from the previous military regime, which both enabled and propelled the 
embrace of a heterodox development strategy, and was ultimately then sustained by this 
self-same approach. Whilst this heterodox core was not yet deployed as an engine of 
marked economic transformation, the more ambitious and expansive developmental 
agenda which emerged within Ethiopia in the mid-2000s would be unthinkable without 
it. The chapter first examines the legacies of the Ethiopian revolution which overthrew 
the ancient imperial system in 1974,53 and then considers early economic challenges and 
reforms, and reviews how the EPRDF conceptualised the development challenge at this 
period. The third section discusses the core components of defensive developmentalism, 
before then moving on to consider the global and domestic challenges impacting this 
strategy.  
 
  
                                                   
53 The Derg has sometimes been called a ‘socialist militarist’ regime, but here the term military regime is preferred. 
It follows Merera Gudina (1994, p.195) in understanding the Derg as a ‘military autocracy with a socialist mask’. 
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3.1 Legacies of the Ethiopian revolution 
 
The ancient Ethiopian imperial order produced state and military structures capable of 
repelling an attempted Italian invasion at Adwa in 1896, through which Ethiopia secured 
a rare victory over European colonialism of both international and domestic significance 
(Pankhurst, 2001, p.193).54 The social basis of the Ethiopian empire combined elements 
of feudalism and non (or pre)-feudal forms of production (Rahmato, 1984).55 By the 
early 1970s approximately 85 per cent of the population were living in rural areas 
(Griffin, 1992, p.1), almost 90 per cent of whom were subject to pre-capitalist social 
relations characterised by some form of rent or tribute (Halliday and Molyneux, 1981). 
The result was a socio-economic situation characterised by extreme poverty, with the 
world’s lowest levels of life expectancy at birth in the mid-1970s (37.5 years for males 
and 40.6 for females), some of the world’s lowest levels of education (rural illiteracy 
levels of 91.5 per cent), and extremely low income per head (roughly US$ 115) (Griffin, 
1992). It also had the world’s third lowest level of calorie consumption in 1974, at 1507 
kcal per capita (FAOSTAT Database, 2019). For these reasons, it has been concluded 
that ‘[o]n the eve of the Revolution the economy of Ethiopia was perhaps the most 
backward in the world’ (Griffin, 1992, p.1). 56    
 
The profound hardships of the imperial system fuelled mounting social unrest during 
the 1970s, which culminated in the ‘popular upsurge’ that ushered in the Ethiopian 
revolution through which the country’s final emperor, Haile Selassie I (1930-1936; 
1941-1974) (Zewde, 2001, pp.217–218), was overthrown. Widespread urban tumult in 
1974 drew street protests from across the social spectrum, from  taxi drivers and teachers, 
to the intelligentsia, civil servants and broader bureaucratic class, urban workers and the 
unemployed, students, traders and Muslim communities (Ottaway, 1976; Markakis, 
1981). By September 1974, a mutinous group of non-commissioned (and some junior) 
                                                   
54 Domestically, the legacy was immense national pride and the belief that the country was ‘virtually invincible, and 
could resist any European enemy, however strong’ (Pankhurst, 2001, p.193). On the part of European powers, 
Ethiopia’s victory was said to have been ‘unthinkable for a modern European army of such size with its disciplined 
and well-equipped formations’ (Vestal, 2005, p.27). The Ethiopian empire itself also participated in the ‘Scramble 
for Africa’, as its rulers competed with European powers to acquire new territory in the region (Erlikh, 1986, p.4; 
Zewde, 2001). 
55 Rural populations were subject to corveé or forced labour under both systems, compelled to cultivate the land of 
the state or local rulers, and provide services such as animal husbandry, grinding grain, constructing buildings, taking 
custody of prisoners, providing carrying and transport services for the ruling classes (Zewde, 2001, p.87; Markakis, 
2011, pp.99–100).  
56 The burdens of such methods of surplus extraction (which led to over-cultivation and use of inferior quality land), 
produced great fragility to climatic shocks and vulnerability to famine (Kebbede, 1988). This included the so-called 
Great Ethiopian Famine or Evil Days (Kefu Qan) famine of 1888 to 1892 which followed an explosion of cattle 
disease, drought and locust invasions (Zewde, 2001, p.76).  
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army officers (Ottaway, 1976) had gained full control of the Ethiopian state (Zewde, 
2001, p.234), and came to be known as the Provisional Military Advisory Council 
(PMAC) or the Derg (meaning ‘committee’ or ‘council’). By the end of 1974, the Derg 
had adopted a socialist platform, prompted in part by its alignment with the Marxist-
Leninist All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement (MEISON). This alignment provided the 
Derg with a base in the progressive urban milieu of labour activists, left-wing 
intelligentsia and students, and helped to marginalise calls for a people’s government 
stemming from other Leftist groups (Kebbede, 1987). Against this backdrop, the Derg 
instrumentalised this socialist platform to consolidate its own power which was wielded 
with extreme brutality.57  
 
In March 1975 sweeping land reforms saw all rural land nationalised (PMAC, 1975), 
ending tenant-landlord relations, granting peasants usufruct rights, and prohibiting the 
hire of agricultural labourers, except on state farms (Kebbede, 1987). Some 5,000 
commercial farms owned by land-holding families or merchants were nationalised 
(Ottaway, 1976), the sale, lease and mortgage of rural land was outlawed, and a ceiling 
of 10 hectares (25 acres) for peasant landholdings put in place (Chole, 2004, p.193). All 
urban land and rented (‘extra’) houses were nationalised in July 1975. Cumulatively, 
such land and property reforms have been described as a ‘truly revolutionary event that 
swept away not only the political superstructure of the imperial regime but also 
destroyed its social foundations’ (Markakis, 2011, p.18). Yet whilst peasant agriculture 
remained the bedrock of the rural economy (Chole, 2004, p.193), rather than being 
liberated by the Derg’s reforms, the peasantry were deliberately squeezed.58  
 
In the modern sector, nationalisations occurred in major manufacturing, financial and 
insurance-related firms (foreign and local) (Markakis, 1981; Kebbede, 1987), and by 
the end of 1976 two-thirds of all manufacturing was under the Ministry of Industry’s 
control (Halliday and Molyneux, 1981). Nationalisations eliminated the nascent 
domestic bourgeoisie (Kebede, 2011, p.8) as well as the foreign investors attracted by 
Haile Selassie I’s industrialisation efforts (Bondestam, 1975). State enterprises thus 
                                                   
57 The “Red Terror” purges (1976-1978) have been described as ‘one of the most systematic uses of mass murder 
ever witnessed in Africa’ (de Waal, 1991, p.101). 
58 The Derg adopted a ‘surplus squeeze strategy’ (Abegaz, 1988) in rural areas to fuel industrial and military spending. 
Thus traditional obligations to landlords were replaced with state pricing and taxation schemes (G˜ıth˜ınji and Mersha, 
2007). Grain production quotas were so mercilessly enforced in some areas, for instance, that peasants were forced 
to sell livestock to buy grain at market rates (Clapham, 1992). 
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comprised the country’s largest firms, including Ethiopian Airlines, Ethiopian Shipping 
Line, Industrial Public Enterprises, Ethiopian Telecoms Authority, Ethiopian Freight 
Corporation, Electric Power and Light Authority, and the Marine Transport Authority, 
and which undertook an increasing share of public investment during the 1980s (World 
Bank, 1990).  
 
Central planning structures were introduced in 1978 alongside agricultural production 
quotas (Clapham, 1992), although full central planning was never instituted (Chole, 
2004, p.193). Instead the resulting command economy left a small role for private 
ownership (hotels, small-scale manufacturing, trade, transport and food processing) 
(Markakis, 1981). Some estimates suggest private trade accounted for around two thirds 
of total marketed domestic output at the end of the 1980s (World Bank, 1990), although 
domestic capital was also extremely small-scale. A ceiling of 0.5 million Birr in fixed 
assets per manufacturing enterprise was put in place, entrepreneurs were prevented from 
owning more than one enterprise, licensing was subject to considerable scrutiny, and 
(official) foreign exchange was strictly controlled (World Bank, 1990). In 1990, just 80 
people paid the highest rate of income tax, at 89.0 per cent, mostly licenced traders and 
owners of small construction firms (World Bank, 1990). Overall, the emergence of a 
powerful independent capitalist class was strongly supressed, and it was thought at the 
time that ‘[e]xpanding the scale of one's business … is an invitation to the state to 
nationalize it’ (Kebbede, 1987, p.14). Within the 17-year period of military rule, 
therefore, the imperial era’s feudal structures had been dismantled, foreign capital 
ousted, the space for domestic capital highly circumscribed, and the role of the state in 
industry, infrastructure and finance markedly increased.    
 
As a result of conflict, environmental degradation, rapid population growth and adverse 
external developments, economic growth was in persistent decline from 1988 onward, 
and it had rarely exceeded population growth since the mid-1950s (IDS, 1994, p.67). 
Per capita cereal production fell during 1974-1984, alongside a 67 per cent decline in 
exports (Henze, 2000, p.305). Borrowing and grants were therefore used to cover the 
current account deficit (IDS, 1994, p.68). Soviet military support fell sharply, from 
US$ 1 billion in 1989 to US$ 300 million in 1990 (Henze, 2000, p.314). Increased 
literacy rates were one of the few areas of social progress in the Derg period, with 
illiteracy rates for people 10 years or older declining from 90 per cent in 1973 to 65 per 
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cent in 1981, thanks to a major National Literacy Campaign launched in 1979 (which at 
its height had 35,000 instructors) (Griffin, 1992). Yet life expectancy was just 48 years, 
one of the shortest in the world (World Bank, 2016f), and with GNP per capita of 
US$ 110 in 1992, Ethiopia compared very poorly with the sub-Saharan regional average 
of US$ 530 (Maxwell and Lirenso, 1994, p.65). Whilst severe economic stresses 
prompted the Derg to make limited moves to introduce a mixed economy in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, (Zewde, 2001, p.264) progress was limited. 
 
3.2 From liberation to transitional government 
 
In May 1991, after a sustained civil war, the Derg was ousted by EPRDF forces, a multi-
ethnic coalition of political parties,59 founded in 1989 by the Tigray People's Liberation 
Front (TPLF), a group based in the impoverished northern region of Tigray (Young, 
1997).60 Rooted in the radical left-wing student movement of the 1960s and 1970s 
(Young, 1997), the TPLF leadership was well-versed in the Marxist-Leninist 
revolutionary movements of the era (Gill, 2010, p.65). Its library reportedly included 
readings on the Albanian revolution and Korean industrial policy (Weis, 2016, p.47), 
and for a long time after the EPRDF took power, it had to deny it was trying to emulate 
Enver Hoxha’s Albanian socialism based on self-reliance and a refusal to enter either 
the Soviet or Chinese sphere of influence (Young, 1997, p.155; Lefort, 2015). The TPLF 
rejected revolution based on mobilising an (almost non-existent) urban proletariat, 
instead committing ‘to Maoist notions of protracted people’s war based on the peasants’ 
(Tadesse, 2015b, p.259). Once its forces seized power, relying on strong support from 
this peasantry, as well as arms and military training by the Eritrean People's Liberation 
Front (EPLF) (Pankhurst, 2001, p.276; Zewde, 2001, p.261), the EPRDF formed the 
Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE), which established EPRDF (and former 
TPLF) leader Meles Zenawi as Ethiopia’s new president (Morrison, 1992).61  
 
                                                   
59 The EPRDF’s constituent parties are the Oromo People's Democratic Organisation (OPDO), the Amhara National 
Democratic Movement (ANDM), the Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Front (SEPDF) and the Tigray 
People's Liberation Front (TPLF), each representing the Oromo, Amhara, Southern Nations, Nationalities, and 
Peoples' Region (SNNPRS) and Tigray regions respectively. In the other regions the EPRDF is supported by a number 
of so-called affiliate parties (Aalen, 2006). 
60 Tigray’s marginalisation since the mid-nineteenth century and experienced multiple economic hardships such as 
recurrent droughts. The stress placed by the feudal system contributed to a major peasant rebellion (the so-called 
Woyane rebellion) in 1943 (Zewde, 2001, p.259).  
61 The TGE consisted of a president, prime minister, Council of Ministers and Council of Representatives (Morrison, 
1992, p.127).  
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In 1991, socio-economic conditions were described as placing the country on ‘edge of 
a precipice’ (Chole, 2004, p.193), and politically, the EPRDF had to deal with the 
challenge of a populous and diverse multi-ethnic nation of over 50 million people from 
more than 80 ethnic groups, speaking over 70 languages, and where ethnic tensions had 
been a long-simmering political issue (Morrison, 1992, p.125). The steep development 
challenge facing the EPRDF was that of fostering rapid and sustained economic growth 
in circumstances of widespread poverty and deprivation, extreme vulnerability to 
drought and food insecurity, weak economic infrastructure that had been devastated by 
conflict, low productivity and productive capacity, severe domestic and external 
macroeconomic constraints and at the same time as Ethiopia was – significantly – almost 
entirely lacking a domestic private sector capable of leading the process of economic 
transformation. It also took power at a time when the neoliberal development consensus 
was globally hegemonic (intellectually and institutionally), and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union made the global context inhospitable to the socialist strategies which had 
hitherto guided TPLF thinking. As a result, in 1991, Meles Zenawi announced that the 
coalition would embrace free enterprise, breaking with its past Marxist-leanings (Lefort, 
2015).  
 
3.2.1 Revolutionary democracy and transitional development strategies  
 
Political rather than economic concerns dominated early TGE efforts (Tadesse and 
Young, 2003; Chole, 2004). The EPRDF replaced upper and middle-level officials in 
late 1991, dismantling the Derg’s security apparatus and 450,000 strong armed forces 
and replacing it the EPRDF’s own army (Morrison, 1992). On the back of the experience 
of administering liberated Tigray, and the solidarity and legitimacy it had earned from 
winning the war (Arriola and Lyons, 2016, p.76), the EPRDF also set about engendering 
a much broader process of political transformation. Political decentralisation was key 
among these transformations, and the coalition came to power with a vision for 
increasing the self-determination of Ethiopia’s diverse nations, nationalities and peoples, 
specifically via a system of ethnically grounded federalism going under the label of 
‘Revolutionary Democracy’. Historic dominance by a single ethnic group was at the 
heart of the EPRDF’s diagnosis of the country’s profound economic, social and political 
problems, and as a result it divided the country into nine ethno-linguistically constituted 
regions (and two city administrations), each granted powers of ‘self-determination’ up 
to and including secession (Vaughan, 2015). The EPRDF also began to lay the 
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groundwork for a multi-party democratic system, which Dereje Feyissa (2011, p. 810) 
argues shows it did not enjoy ‘unrestrained political agency’ given that this system was 
embraced only because of its ‘strong need to gain recognition/support from Western 
countries’. Indeed, enduring scepticism about liberal democratic systems within the 
ruling coalition endures to the present, with one senior official noting during fieldwork 
interviews in 2016 that since ‘development strategies are a long-term business’ this 
meant ‘election cycle policies … are not very good for a development strategy’ (EG-13, 
see Appendix A).    
 
Early EPRDF documents (published just prior to the coalition taking power) called its 
economic project a ‘revolutionary democratic economy’ and suggested this was part of 
a broader ‘revolutionary democratic economic and political system’ (EPRDF, 1991b, 
p.5). The document Ethiopia’s Economic Policy During the Transitional Period (TGE, 
1991) helps to situate the EPRDF’s early understanding of the problem of development 
and strategies thought to be needed in light of this. This document’s significance is such 
that it has been described as showing the EPRDF had ‘a coherent approach to economic 
policy before taking power’ which it ‘intended to be used with only minor amendments 
as the basis of economic policy after the transition’ (Wells, 1998, p.391).62  
 
Four insights into the EPRDF’s early thoughts on development can be discerned from 
the document. First, the strategy recognised that Ethiopia’s development challenges are 
multiple and complex, stemming from low levels of savings and investment (in absolute 
and relative decline at the end of the Derg), rising external debts (which aggravate 
Ethiopia’s foreign exchange problem), sustained inflation, declining production which 
then further worsened the balance of payments constraint, and declining terms of trade 
for its main export (coffee). Second, these problems are seen as inter-related and 
mutually reinforcing, with lack of foreign exchange and low reserves preventing the 
import of fuel, raw materials and spare parts, thereby compromising productive activity 
and government service provision, in turn weakening government revenue collection. 
Third, these challenges are seen at risk of provoking ‘severe social problems’ such as 
falling living standards, weakened transport infrastructure, rising unemployment (TGE, 
1991, p.11). Yet despite these inter-locking challenges, Duri Mohammed, Minister of 
                                                   
62 The document notes for instance that (subject to modifications in the course of implementation and in the light of 
in-depth research), the transitional economic policy should ‘be the basis for longer term economic development’ 
(TGE, 1991, p.16).  
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Planning and Economic Development in the TGE administration noted the following 
year that ‘we are cornered, but still there are some possibilities in terms of policy choices 
and avenues that one can choose’ (Mohammed, 1992, p.39). 
 
Fourth, whilst some contingent causes of Ethiopia’s economic decline are noted, such 
as natural disasters, political problems (including conflict and mismanagement), and 
external shocks (declining terms of trade and Ethiopia’s debt burden), the fundamental 
challenge is seen to lie in Ethiopia’s economic structure. The document noted that ‘[t]he 
structure of the economy is such that it is extremely backward and dependent on the 
external sector … Because of weak linkages between sectors, especially between 
agriculture and industry, there is no coordinated development’ (TGE, 1991, pp.13–14). 
This meant it was seen that the overall ‘aim of the new economic policy is to take the 
first steps for solving the structural deficiencies as a basis for longer-term development’ 
(TGE, 1991, pp.13–14). In light of such concerns, in 1992 the then-Vice Minister of 
Planning and Economic Development, Mekonnen Manyazewel, observed that ‘the 
current economic situation of Ethiopia is really untenable, both in the macroeconomic 
sense and in the structural sense. We need to move fast’ (Manyazewal, 1992, p.202).  
 
This deeply sectoral understanding of the challenges facing the Ethiopian economy 
thereby gives rise to an early stress on the need for structural change. In this regard 
Mekonnen Manyazewel (1992, p.27) explained to an international workshop on food 
security in 1992 that living standards and food security depended on  
 
[T]he performance of the agricultural sector (which is the prime mover of 
economic growth) [and which] has to improve substantially. This depends, to a 
large extent, on increasing the productivity of peasant agriculture through 
technological change. This does not mean neglecting industrial development, 
which is critical to the diversification and long-term structural transformation of 
the economy. In fact, agricultural development will be hindered if the linkages 
between agriculture and industry are not strengthened. At present, this linkage 
is weak due to the low level of physical infrastructure development, especially 
rural infrastructure, resulting in fragmentation of rural and urban markets. Thus, 
increased investment in physical infrastructure is an important area of concern 
if integrated market and national economy are to emerge.  
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In agriculture, policy priorities stemming from this analysis included increased budget 
and manpower for the agricultural sector; expanded road-building efforts; measures to 
help small-holders to obtain fair prices; and state-led initiatives to promote wide-spread 
fertiliser use, improved seeds and extension services. Industrial policy was chiefly 
considered to need to target the development of linkages with agriculture through 
encouraging use of domestically produced raw materials. Proposals here were more 
vague, but included references to state enterprise reform and privatisation, as well as 
‘inducements’ to foreign but particularly domestic private investors, especially ‘cottage 
industries’ due to their labour-intensiveness and low-cost produce (TGE, 1991, p.30). 
Special emphasis was also placed on trade policies given the need to ‘increase foreign 
exchange earnings which is crucial for the country’s economic development’ (TGE, 
1991, pp.33, 32). The state, the document therefore argued, should promote exports, 
issue foreign exchange and demand exporters surrender all earnings (except for 
expansion, determined case-by-case) (TGE, 1991, p.33). The strategy notes that despite 
present currency overvaluation, this should only be adjusted in line with the economy’s 
performance since devaluation without real economy transformations risks inflation, 
unemployment and economic decline (TGE, 1991, p.36). Finally, the strategy pledged 
to end the Derg’s squeeze on agriculture, which it argued ‘crippled production and 
growth’ (TGE, 1991, p.36). Given this, external financing, therefore, was seen to be 
necessary to plug the resultant (and sizeable) budget deficits (thought to be likely, even 
after reductions to military and administrative spending).  
 
3.2.2 Transitional policies and challenges 
 
In February 1992 the EPRDF managed to agree a multi-donor Emergency Recovery and 
Reconstruction Project (ERRP) worth US$ 600 million (Morrison, 1992). This 
particular package had no policy conditions attached, and its funds helped the EPRDF 
offset the disastrous decline in the economy, avoid a balance of payments crisis, but 
beyond this, further lending was needed to be able to implement the EPRDF’s 
transitional policies (IDS, 1994, p.70). Structural adjustment lending commenced after 
a Policy Framework Paper (PFP) was agreed in September 1992, following extensive 
policy dialogue with the IFIs (Chole, 2004). It outlined a three-stage reform process: 
fiscal and monetary tightening; supply-side reforms and private sector growth; and 
structural reforms across state enterprises, the financial sector and civil service (Chole, 
2004, p.265). Despite the reservations noted above, the TGE agreed a 59 per cent 
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devaluation of the Birr (in US$ terms) in October 1992 (the first since 1973),63 and 
introduced a limited biweekly foreign exchange auction in May 1993 (World Bank, 
1995b, p.1). In addition, interest rates were increased; a new monetary and banking 
proclamation gave the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) greater autonomy; prices were 
deregulated (bar petroleum and pharmaceuticals); minimum producer prices (for coffee 
and other major export crops) were introduced; transport and road tariffs liberalised; 
trade policies reformed (including the elimination of export taxes bar that on coffee, and 
reducing the top import duty rate); and the tax system updated (converting sales tax into 
excise tax and introducing a tax on rental income) (Chole, 2004). In 1992, a new 
investment code, labour code and public enterprise law were all adopted, helping to 
create the legal basis for the market economy, and a 1993 proclamation formalised the 
legal basis for lease-holding among peasants and in urban areas (United Nations 2004). 
 
Beyond transitional changes, in order to free fiscal resources for infrastructure and social 
services expenditures, military spending was rapidly scaled back (to 2.3 per cent of GDP 
in 1993-1994 from an average of 9.7 per cent in the 1980s) (IMF, 1994; IDS, 1994; 
Chole, 2004, pp.267–268). In 1994, the TGE adopted the EPRDF’s flagship economic 
strategy of the 1990s, called the ‘Agricultural Development-Led Industrialisation’ 
(ADLI) (Oqubay, 2018), which built on the transitional economic policy’s concern with 
prioritising agriculture, whilst also establishing linkages between agriculture and 
industry. In line with the transitional strategy, core features of ADLI investments were 
rural extension, road infrastructure and education investments (UNDP, 2017). The 
overarching objective was to build forward linkages (such as industrial inputs) and 
backward linkages (fertiliser, consumption goods) via improved agricultural 
productivity (Lavers, 2012, p.109). 
 
International policy discourse at this time often praised Ethiopia’s market-oriented 
approach and so-called ‘liberal economic policy’ (United Nations, 2004, p.9), and after 
initial difficulties in agreeing the PFP and devaluation, by 1995 the IFIs praised the 
TGE’s ‘bold economic reforms’ (World Bank, 1995b, p.1). As a result, some have 
argued that ‘the development strategy of the 1990s was largely dictated by donors’ 
(Mascagni, 2016, p.29).  
                                                   
63 To ease the impact of devaluation on the cost of living, adjustments were made to civil service salaries and 
income tax deductions (Chole, 2004, p.267).   
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However, problematically, such interpretations focus only on what changed at this time, 
neglecting the (considerable) limits to liberalisation characterising the EPRDF’s first 
decade in power. Instead, the rest of this chapter argues that the EPRDF’s overall 
approach to transition from command to market economy entailed a heterodox policy 
core, which the regime went to considerable lengths to prevent being liberalised. As the 
following remark from Meles Zenawi in 2010 indicates, there was considerable 
defensiveness in how the EPRDF approached this period: 
 
For the first ten years after we took over, we were bewildered by the changes. 
The New World Order was very visible and especially in this part of the world. 
The prospect of an independent line appeared very bleak. So we froze the party. 
We fought a rearguard war not to privatize too much. We sent delegations across 
Africa to ask, how to handle the IMF? They said, ‘say what they want you to say 
and do what you can get away with’. We said, ‘we are a mass movement and 
cannot mislead the masses, we cannot do that’ (Meles Zenawi speaking in 2010, 
quoted in De Waal, 2015, pp. 161–162). 
 
As this quote indicates, the EPRDF experienced considerable global pressures, chiefly 
from its relations with the IFIs (and the IMF in particular), which, given its acute poverty, 
urgent need for external financing (to repay mounting external debt arrears), and 
pressing requirements for financing for reconstruction and development expenditures, 
made it extremely vulnerable to IFI pressures: institutions which elsewhere Meles 
Zenawi (2010) referred to as the ‘key enforcers of the emerging neoliberal paradigm’. 
Nevertheless, as the subsequent sections argue, the EPRDF mounted considerable 
resistance to external pressures to adopt a neoliberal development agenda, preserving 
considerable (latent) capacity for a heterodox development strategy.  
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3.3 Defensive developmentalism and resisting neoliberal reform 
 
In 1995, national elections led to the formation of the Federal Government of Ethiopia 
(FDRE)64 and a new EPRDF government with Meles Zenawi as Prime Minister. New 
aspects of the EPRDF’s economic development strategy emerged, such as expanded 
agricultural policies focused around a new seed-fertiliser-credit package (Keeley and 
Scoones, 2000, p.96). A donor-funded agricultural extension programme first instituted 
under the Derg was revived (Berhanu and Poulton, 2014), accompanied by strong 
discourse around the need for a “Green Revolution” and measures to guarantee food 
self-sufficiency (Keeley and Scoones, 2000). In 1998, an export promotion strategy was 
adopted, focused around cotton, coffee, and fruit and vegetables, as well as some light 
manufactured goods (UNCTAD, 2002: p. 36) and was accompanied by the formation 
of a new Export Promotion Agency, with reporting responsibility to the Prime Minister 
(FDRE, 1998c). One component focused on promoting high-value agricultural exports 
(such as meat and horticulture products) and labour-intensive manufacturing goods 
(textile and apparel, as well as leather and leather products), but has been described as 
‘relatively narrow in scope’ (Gebreeyesus, 2013, p.9). However, after the outbreak of 
conflict with Eritrea in 1998, more ambitious development planning took a back seat. 
Nevertheless, an important guiding vision regarding the relationship between the state 
and private sector shaped policy design and implementation through to the end of the 
1990s, and preserved a social base and economic structure conducive to the later 
elaboration of a more assertive form of developmentalism.  
 
3.3.1 State ownership of the commanding heights 
 
Under the Derg, state enterprises dominated the manufacturing sector, and between 
1987-1988 accounted for 94.1 per cent of the sector’s value added, 93.2 per cent of its 
employment, and 97.6 per cent of its (net) indirect taxes (Chole, 2004). As a result, the 
transitional economic policy’s industrial policy gave much consideration to the most 
appropriate role for the state sector in manufacturing. Despite indicating there would be 
limits to future state ownership in this sector, the transitional policy advances two 
separate rationales for the state to continue to own industrial enterprises: if enterprises 
are sizeable and strategic, such as ‘large-scale engineering and metallurgical plants, 
                                                   
64 The election was considered by international observers to be ‘administratively fair, yet uncompetitive as a result 
of the lack of opposition candidates’, and the EPRDF won 89 per cent of the 547 seats (World Bank, 1998, p.6). 
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large-scale fertilizer and pharmaceutical plants and industries which supply strategic 
raw materials to major chemical industries’ (TGE, 1991, p.27); and those it can ‘run 
profitably as a source of revenue’ (TGE, 1991, p.28). Other early documents reinforce 
this commitment to state ownership. The 7 June 1991 edition of the EPRDF’s English-
language newsletter noted that it was striving to build neither capitalism nor socialism, 
but rather a ‘mixed economy of revolutionary democracy’ (EPRDF, 1991b, p.5) defined 
by the central role of the state in the economy. This was thought to be particularly 
needed in sectors considered most important for rapid economic development via 
industrialisation: 
 
[The EPRDF] holds that industrial development which guarantees the country’s 
political and economic independence can eradicate poverty and backwardness 
and satisfy the basic needs of the people. What this means is that to affirm the 
independence of the country, sectors which play a decisive role in the rapid 
development of the economy must be under the control of the popular 
government. The industries and monetary establishments, power stations and 
mines play such a role and therefore must be owned by a popular government 
(EPRDF, 1991b, p.5). 
 
Whilst the EPRDF’s first Structural Adjustment Credit (SAC-I) commenced in July 
1993 and contained conditions related to privatisation (including all the sale of all state-
owned retail outlets) (World Bank, 1997a), privatisation only started in early 1995 
(AfDB, 2000, p.14), almost four years after the new regime had taken over with a 
purportedly market and private sector-driven strategy. In the first year, just nine 
enterprises were privatised, the largest of which was a soft-drink bottling plant (White 
Campbell and Bhatia, 1998), and as a result, Ethiopian privatisation has been said to be 
one of three cases where ‘minimal progress’ toward privatisation in sub-Saharan Africa 
made in the 1990s (Estrin and Pelletier, 2018, p.70).65  
 
Consistent data on privatisation for the 1990s is hard to come by, however, due to 
different time periods and sources of data (Ismail, 2018), complicated by the fact that 
some large enterprises were broken up into smaller units, such as nine major industrial 
                                                   
65 It was also a “late starter” in that it began privatisation early to mid-1990s (unlike a smaller group who began in 
the 1970s and a larger group who began in the 1980s). Of those starting in the 1990s Ethiopia was dubbed one of 
three so-called “slow movers” (the others being Cameroon and Sierra Leone) (Estrin and Pelletier, 2018).  
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enterprises under the Ministry of Industry which were separated out into 97 state 
enterprises in 1992 (Wells, 1998). Total enterprise numbers therefore shifted according 
divestment, restructuring and enterprise creation, both contracting and mushrooming 
(Tewodros Meheret, 2015, p.364). Given such constraints, data on the sectoral 
composition of enterprises – rather than their numbers – offers a better insight into the 
nature of the EPRDF’s approach to state ownership. The sectoral distribution of 
enterprises privatised in the 1990s demonstrates the importance of maintaining strategic 
control over the economy to the pattern of state divestment. Between 1994-1995 and 
2001-2002, some 223 enterprises were privatised, almost two thirds of which were in 
retail (Table 3.1). As of the end of 2003, just eight transactions accounted for 70 per 
cent of total proceeds (World Bank, 2004c), signalling the small-scale of the bulk of 
divestments.66  
 
Table 3.1 Ethiopia: Sectoral composition of privatised state enterprises, 1994-1995 to 2001-2002 
 
Source: Ethiopian Privatisation Authority (EPA) data, cited in Worku Gebeyehu (2005). 
 
A more disaggregated breakdown for the 1995-1998 period (when most privatisations 
took place) (Gebeyehu, 2005) is offered in Table 3.2. This shows that the sale of a single 
gold mine accounted for 26.6 per cent of privatisation proceeds (sold to a single foreign 
buyer), with no foreign buyers in distribution and other services. Again most enterprises 
were small retail outlets (which were deemed a low risk starting point given low profit 
and employee numbers), with larger non-strategic enterprises in light manufacturing, 
agro-processing, hotels and restaurants deemed only suitable for privatisation later (IMF, 
1999a).  
 
                                                   
66  Although the data is slightly different to the other sources quoted above, suggesting 214 state enterprises were 
privatised by the end of 2003 (152 of which were unbundled from just six enterprises), slightly lower than the other 
estimates for earlier periods (World Bank, 2004c). 
Number % share Domestic investors
Foreign 
owners Domestic Foreign
Manufacturing 40 17.0 31 9 77.5 22.5
Agriculture 31 13.0 15 16 48.4 51.6
Hotel and Tourism 18 8.0 17 1 94.4 5.6
Retail trade 133 60.0 133 0 100.0 0.0
Mining 1 0.4 0 1 0.0 100.0
Total 223 100.0 196 27 87.9 12.1
Privatised enterprises Transferred to Investors share %
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The result was that in 2000, the state sector’s share in total manufacturing value added 
was 76.7 per cent, and 58.3 per cent of employment (Hannson, 2004, p.18). In 2002 the 
US government noted that ‘[d]espite privatization efforts, the manufacturing sector 
remains largely state controlled’ (USITC, 2002, p.198).  Of the 163 enterprises still in 
state hands in 1999, 69.9 per cent (114 enterprises) were profitable, suggesting the 
transitional strategy’s approach to state control over production and services was carried 
through, and despite announcing plans to divest over 100 state enterprises in the next 
two or three years, the EPRDF still planned to keep all the ‘largest and most profitable 
SOEs’ (IMF, 1999a, p.63). This included strategic financial and infrastructure firms, 
such as Ethiopian Airlines, Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation, the Ethiopian 
Electrical Light and Power Corporation, the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia and the state 
insurance company. Bar the possible sale of  minority shares in the utilities companies, 
the EPRDF was clear such entities would not be privatised in the foreseeable future 
(IMF, 1999a, p.63). This cautious pace of divestment (for which Ethiopia was frequently 
castigated by its funders, see Section 3.4.1) thus reveals that the EPRDF sought to 
preserve widespread state ownership across the economy’s most strategic sectors (or the 
‘commanding heights’) in the 1990s.  
 
Beyond industry, the transitional economic policy also set out an extensive vision for 
state ownership across other sectors, such as finance, noting: ‘[m]ajor financial 
institutions that provide service to different sectors of the economy such as banks, 
insurance companies and other major financial institutions will be under state ownership 
in order to ensure they will play their proper role in the process of economic 
development’ (TGE, 1991, p.34). While a gradual divestment of state enterprises in the 
trade sector was envisioned, and domestic private capitalists set to take-over wholesale 
trade, a window was left open for the state here too since ‘[i]n order to stabilize prices 
the state may engage itself in the wholesale trade of basic goods of mass consumption. 
Such operations will be in the public interest and will be based on the principle of 
profitability’ (TGE, 1991, p.31). The EPRDF also planned to retain some tour operators 
and ‘handle the foreign exchange earned from tourism so as to ensure its proper 
utilization’ (TGE, 1991, p.31), whilst considering joint ventures with either foreign or 
domestic private investors in other services.  
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In transport, state ownership was planned to continue since ‘the private sector does not 
possess the means or the capacity to run air, sea and rail transport services’ (TGE, 1991, 
p.37). In communications ‘[s]ince posts and telecommunications provide essential 
social and economic services, they will remain under state control’ (TGE, 1991, p.37). 
Meanwhile, in mining and energy, the state, it was said, would stick to ‘major mining 
and energy activities that are vital for overall economic growth’ (TGE, 1991, p.40) and 
grant concessions or undertake joint-ventures where resources or other constraints make 
this impossible. In electricity ‘[m]ajor electric power generation activities will be under 
the state’ (TGE, 1991, p.40). Furthermore, despite outlining policies to encourage 
private construction, particularly by domestic investors, the strategy also notes that 
rather than being privatised, ‘[s]tate construction enterprises will be reorganized in order 
to be able to operate in a competitive environment on the basis of profitability’ (TGE, 
1991, p.43). Two kinds of lessons, historical and more contemporary, appear to have 
informed such thinking: 
 
In retrospect, the EPRDF seems to have paid rather careful attention to some of 
the ways in which its predecessors lost control of rent centralisation, and 
attempted to learn from and counter these experiences. Thus since 1991, the 
Ethiopian government has been slow or unwilling to divest in strategic sectors, 
and cautious about rents accruing internationally, particularly from finance and 
infrastructure. Its experience of running a parallel administration in Tigray in the 
1980s taught it valuable lessons (which were apparently re-learned during the 
period after 2005): about the economic roots needed to anchor peasant political 
compliance; and about the perils of allowing alternative systems of patronage to 
emerge (Vaughan and Gebremichael, 2011, p.20). 
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Table 3.2 Ethiopia: Detailed sectoral breakdown of privatisations, 1995-1998 
 
Source: IMF (1999a, p.58).
Proceeds collected
Total buyers Of which foreign buyers Percent of total
Industry 34 13 81.1
(excluding mining) 33 12 …
Manufacturing (including agro-processing) 31 12 53.4
Agro-processing and distilation 13 5 9.0
Distillery 1 0 0.1
Edible oil mills 3 0 0.6
Flour mills 3 0 3.0
General food processing 1 0 0.6
Meat processing 5 5 4.7
Beverages 6 4 15.6
Breweries 1 1 4.5
Soft drink makers 5 3 11.1
Chemical and by-products 3 0 4.7
Furniture and woodworks 4 0 3.1
Leather and lather goods 3 3 11.8
Metalworks 1 0 0.2
Printing equipment 1 0 0.1
Construction 2 0 1.0
Mining (Legedembi gold mine) 1 1 26.6
Services and distribution 137 0 13.1
Wholesale and retail trade 123 0 11.8
Ethiopia Retail Trade Shops 73 0 8.5
Textiles 7 0 0.5
Automotives 7 0 1.1
Shoes and other leather goods 17 0 0.7
Food and general retail 28 0 5.0
Building materials 9 0 0.9
Books and stationary 5 0 0.3
Kuraz Printing Shops 34 0 0.8
Ethiopia Household and Office Furniture 16 0 2.5
Hotels and restaurants 14 0 1.3
Agriculture and allied activities 6 4 5.9
Total 177 17 100.0
Number of enterprises sold
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Other policies were designed to ensure state dominance in sectors the transitional 
economic policy deemed ‘essential for the development of the economy’ (TGE, 1991, 
p.27). For instance, the EPRDF mandated that the state-owned Ethiopian Shipping Lines 
was used for all seaborne imports into Ethiopia (regardless of freight cost), seen by some 
investors as an indirect tax (United Nations, 2004, pp.2, 64). State enterprises were often 
dominant forces in the sectors they operated in, even where they were not monopolies 
(monopolies which included electricity generation and telecoms). For instance, whilst 
some private operators were active in cargo handling and harbour facilities and 
connected services, these were dominated by the Ethiopian Maritime and Transit 
Services Corporation during the 1990s and early 2000s (United Nations, 2004, p.22). 
The government owned three state banks in 2002, and despite the emergence of a 
number of private entrants into the sector, by 2004-2005 these banks held nearly three 
quarters of all the country’s deposits and loans (MOFED, 2006, p.59). Other estimates 
put state-owned institutions as accounting for  90 per cent of all capital in the banking 
and insurance sectors, with the state-owned Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE), the 
largest commercial bank, alone holding 80 per cent of total bank deposits (World Bank, 
2004a, p.92).67    
 
Finally, the 1995 constitution affirmed state ownership over all land and natural 
resources (FDRE, 2005). Continued state ownership over land was justified by reference 
to its role as an important social safety net for the country’s impoverished peasantry, 
with migration to urban areas considered highly problematic due to a lack of industry 
and jobs. A former advisor to Meles Zenawi during his time as TGE President, Dawit 
Yohannes, reportedly noted in 1995 that ‘[t]he peasant cannot afford the risk of 
displacement and the only reason that he is not being displaced is that the farm isn’t 
private property’ (cited in Wells, 1998, p. 281).68 Thus, instead of privatisation, the 
EPRDF opted to offer the peasantry long-term security of tenure, as well as long-term 
land leases to commercial farmers (Zenawi, 2006b). In addition to the social rationale, 
there were apparently economic and political logics to this decision. In 2006 Meles 
(2006b) warned that ‘privatisation of land would divert limited capital in the country 
                                                   
67 Notably, the World Bank observes that ‘[due] to its huge excess reserves inherited from the central planning era, 
the CBE operates independently of the NBE in the interbank credit market’ (World Bank, 2004a, p.92). 
68 Relatedly, Meles Zenawi said in 1998 that ‘[t]here is also an element of social security involved. When rains fail, 
peasants can be desperate enough to sell their property. What do we do with these people once they descend on the 
towns? We need the peasants on the land to restart the economy’ (Meles Zenawi interviewed by Holman and Wrong, 
1998). 
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from productive investment to that of acquiring land’ whilst the rise of landlordism and 
sharecropping would also undermine the EPRDF’s social support base by creating a 
‘rent-seeking political economy [which] would be very difficult to dislodge as the 
peasants would be beholden to the rent-seeking landowners and could not thus constitute 
the social basis for a developmental state’. This clearly indicates that the introduction of 
market institutions such as private property rights were considered to have far broader 
impacts than simply economic alone. Instead the EPRDF saw them as capable of 
profoundly impacting Ethiopia’s political economy, capable of altering the balance of 
social forces in fundamental respects by creating new economic elites, creating suffering 
and discontent amongst the peasantry that might weaken the relationship between the 
EPRDF and peasantry, and altering patterns of investment in the economy. Fundamental 
to such concerns, as Lavers (2012) notes, was the aspiration to preserve the peasantry 
as a supportive (and dependent) social base for the EPRDF and limit the emergence of 
a potentially powerful class of large-landowners.69 
 
3.3.2 Domestic capital 
 
Concerning the role of private capital, in 1991 the EPRDF’s English-language 
newsletter offered the following analysis of how different economic actors would be 
incorporated into its emerging market economy: 
 
The state would control the decisive sectors of the economy and a condition 
would be created whereby local and foreign capital would have a significant 
share in the economy. The production of the small producers would also be 
encouraged. The goal of such an economic policy is not socialism but a mixed 
economy of revolutionary democracy (EPRDF, 1991b, p.5). 
 
The investment laws implemented in the 1990s established the boundaries in which 
these sectors would operate: areas reserved exclusively for state investment; sectors 
where only domestic investment (state and private) was allowed; and those open to all 
investors (including foreign). The least numbers of sectors were available to the latter, 
and thus on paper at least, domestic capitalists had greater economic opportunities (see 
                                                   
69 Indeed, in 1995 a USAID Advisor in Ethiopia, Stephen Tucker, noted of opposition to this policy ‘[land] policy is 
just a continuation of the 1975 reform. It’s urban groups which are complaining about the non-sale of rural land. 
Peasants don't seem to be concerned about state-ownership’ (cited in Wells, 1998, p. 295).  
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Table 3.3). By 1998 only a few strategic utilities (postal services, except for couriers; 
electricity generation above installed capacity of 25 megawatts; and electricity 
transmission through the national grid) and transport (rail and air transportation in 
excess of 20 passengers or 2700kg capacity) were exclusively reserved for state 
investment (FDRE, 1998b).  
   
However, as the quote above indicates, the EPRDF’s vision for how different actors 
would participate in the economy was explicitly hierarchical, with the state afforded 
‘decisive’ areas of economic activity. In practice this meant that scope for private 
investment was rather more circumscribed than the list above suggests. For instance, 
despite banking and insurance being opened to domestic investors in 1994, the 
legislation set limits on the share of capital individuals could own (Chole, 2004, p.280). 
Furthermore, whilst foreign and domestic private investment were formally permitted 
in telecommunications and defence activities after 1998, such investments were only 
permitted in partnership with the government (FDRE, 1998b; UNCTAD, 2002a, p.26). 
 
The climate in which the Ethiopian private sector operated was also partially shaped by 
the lack of political affiliation between domestic capitalists and the EPRDF, with neither 
urban groups nor the business community (such as it was), forming the coalition’s social 
base. Meles Zenawi remarked during in an interview with the Financial Times in 1998 
that this had been a barrier to deeper contact between the two: 
 
Our policy is discussed at party conferences and meetings. Maybe businessmen 
are not active members of our party and we need to improve links. Recently we 
experimented with meeting the private sector and to my pleasant surprise they 
gave us ideas we hadn't had before. So we agreed that the movement should take 
the private sector seriously as a critical partner, whatever their political 
preferences (interviewed by Holman and Wrong, 1998). 
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Table 3.3 Ethiopia: Sectors reserved exclusively for domestic investors, 1998 
 
Sources: FDRE (1998a; 1998b).
Utilities and strategic services Domestic services
 Banking and insurance Hotels other than star designated 
Small-scale electricity generation (except hydro-power) and supply (up to 25 
megawatts)
Motels, pensions, tearooms, coffee shops, bars, night clubs and restaurants
(excluding international and specialised restaurants)
Small-scale air transportation (up to 20 passengers or cargo of 2,700 kg) Bakery produce and pastries (for the domestic market)
Forwarding and shipping agency services (with exceptions to be determined by the 
government)
Museums, cinemas and theatres
Radio and television broadcasting Tour and travel operators 
Printing Barber and beauty shops 
Construction companies (excluding grade one contractors) Smith workshops
Building maintenance Non-export tailoring
Vehicle repair and maintenance  
Car-hire, taxi-cabs 
Commercial road and water transport 
Customs-clearing services 
Manufacturing, processing and industry Trade and retail activities
Tanning hides and skins up to crust level Retail trade and product brokerage
Saw milling and non-export forest products Wholesale trade and distribution (excluding fuel and the domestic sale of 
Grain mills and domestic batteries Import trade
Artisanal mining Exports of raw coffee, oil seeds, pulses, hides and skins, live sheep, goats and 
cattle
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This wariness has strong ideological roots, as Weis (2014, p.274) suggests that ‘the 
formerly Marxist EPRDF has traditionally regarded Ethiopia’s small capitalist class 
with thinly veiled contempt, and firmly believes that state-led growth is the only way 
out of poverty’. The EPRDF also had a particular interpretation of the (problematic) role 
traditionally played by the private sector in Ethiopia’s past economic development. 
Given the strong conviction that economic development depended on productive private 
investment, in industry specifically, hostility was directed toward those in the private 
sector considered to be instead ‘rent-seeking’: an important trope of EPRDF 
development discourse. In 1992, Mekonnen Manyazewal (1992, p.31),  then-Vice 
Minister of Planning and Economic Development, observed that expanded private 
sector investment was ‘dependent on how fast the private sector regains its confidence 
and moves into productive investment’ noting:  
 
Past policies have forced the private sector to increasingly move into speculative 
and rent-seeking activities. The private sector used to amass hugh [sic] profits 
through arbitrage. Hence, it is important to remove distortions that make such 
activities attractive, and, thereby, give correct economic signals. Even if 
domestic investors respond on a significant scale, it is difficult to satisfy their 
demand for foreign exchange, given the current foreign exchange crisis. This 
implies that in the short-term, domestic private investment will not be able to 
generate employment and income on a scale that would make a significant 
difference .70 
 
Echoes of this view endure into the present, with one government official noting during 
fieldwork interviews in February 2016 that ‘[d]uring the command economy … [the 
private sector] was supposed to die. But traders are very creative, and domestic 
enterprise was limited to trade and the informal sector. The government owned the 
distribution channel … [but] traders take from the government shops and sell on. That 
has still an impact on the mentality and attitude. Instead of focusing on production [the 
domestic private sector is] focused on trade, imports, sales and distribution’ (interviewee 
EG-12, see Appendix A). 
                                                   
70 The role of merchant capital in propping up the Derg regime is discussed by Wells (1998). Meanwhile, of the late 
the imperial period, Duri Mohammed (1969, p.77), the Minister of  Planning and Economic Development in the TGE 
wrote of foreign capital in the 1950 to 1968 period that it was ‘mainly attracted into trade service and activities where 
large operations are possible with rather modest capital’. 
90 
  
The result was considerable frustration about the relationship on both sides. The World 
Bank (1998, p.8) noted the government rebuffed complaints by the domestic private 
sector at being excluded from economic opportunities in the 1990s as the frustration of 
‘several elements of the private sector [which] were favoured historically and are now 
facing genuine competition for the first time’. Practically speaking, prospects for 
extensive private investment in manufacturing of the kind the EPRDF wanted were 
particularly challenging given the extremely small-scale of private investments in 
manufacturing. A survey of industrial enterprises in 2002 revealed that 97.0 per cent of 
all workers were employed in small and micro enterprises. Of the handicraft and cottage 
industries which comprised this sector, 87 per cent had start-up capital of less than 250 
Birr (Ageba and Amha, 2006). Furthermore, the government was frustrated by a lack of 
investment in other priority areas, noting the domestic private sector’s unwillingness to 
‘provide certain services, such as the delivery of fertiliser, down to the peasant level’ 
(World Bank, 1998, pp.8–9).   
 
The formation of endowment-owned entities held by the EPRDF’s constituent political 
parties the mid-1990s using resources mobilised during the national liberation struggle 
(Oqubay, 2015, p.70) also shaped the evolution of Ethiopia’s market-oriented political 
economy at this time. Initial capital accrued during the military campaign against the 
Derg, investments, and contributions from the TPLF’s supporters, was divided into two 
uses: some was used to compensate families of fighters killed during the war, whilst the 
TPLF leadership decided the rest would be ‘developmentally and productively invested’ 
(informed interviewee cited in Vaughan and Gebremichael, 2011, p.37). At first, 
between 1991-1994, these firms were converted into share companies with senior party 
officials made shareholders, 71  but in mid-1995 individual shareholdings were 
‘irrevocably donated’ to newly-created endowment funds, apparently with no 
compensation for shareholders, indicative that these assets were not expected to provide 
individuals with commercial assets or vehicles for personal enrichment, but instead ‘the 
allocation and use of profits, dividends, benefits and rents seems rather to be conceived 
and managed strategically to resource the wider socio-economic and political objectives 
of “revolutionary democracy”’ (Vaughan and Gebremichael, 2011, p.36). Indeed, the 
                                                   
71 Vaughan and Gebremichael (2011, p. 35) note these included in 1991 and 1992 Guna Trading House, Meskerem 
Investment, Saba Dimensional Stones and Sur Construction; and in 1993 and 1994  such as Almeda Textile, Beruh 
Chemical, Experience Ethiopia Travel, Hiwot Mechanised Agriculture, Mega Communications, Mesfin Industrial 
Engineering, Sheba Tannery, Tesfa Livestock, and TransEthiopia Share Company. 
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status of endowment in Ethiopian civil law considers such property that of general 
interest (Oqubay, 2015, p.71). 
 
One possible source of insight into the dynamics governing the formation of these 
groups lies in an unofficial translation of a reportedly confidential EPRDF document 
from 1993 (the veracity of which is disputed, but which arguably bears enough 
similarities to other documents from the period be worth considering).72 The document 
warns that ‘[a]n economy based on foreign markets is one which satisfies the raw 
material demands of imperialism and thus becomes dependent on it’ (Ethiopian Register, 
1996, p.23). This reflects the EPRDF’s view of the link between global integration and 
national development elsewhere expressed as implying ‘the standard of living will 
improve when the country is free of foreign domination’ (EPRDF, 1991a, p.5). The 
document adds that there are specific social forces pushing for this kind of economic 
structure however, since ‘those who do not benefit from our goals and consequently 
stand as our main enemies are imperialism and the comprador class. These forces seek 
to impose on the country a dependent economy’  (Ethiopian Register, 1996, p.23). Thus 
two forces together emerge as threats to the EPRDF’s project: a historical class of 
‘oppressors’ within Ethiopian society (a comprador bourgeoisie), and foreign 
imperialist forces, indicative of the possible influence of Leninist ideas of imperialism 
and dependency theorising on the EPRDF’s development thinking in the 1990s.  
 
Whilst the document adds that such forces are presently weak due to extensive 
nationalisation under the Derg, it adds that the present global order means state 
ownership over all strategically significant areas of the economy will be hard to 
preserve.73 One solution proposed was that  ‘revolutionary democratic associations, 
organizations, and individuals who can be involved in investment’ should step-in since 
in order to ‘to redirect the economy in the direction of revolutionary democracy, a 
supplementary input is necessary’ (Ethiopian Register, 1996, p.26). The ‘endowment 
                                                   
72 Extracts from the document, which was reportedly only initially circulated only among party cadres in Amharic, 
appeared in the in Ethiopian Register in June 1996. According to Weis (2016, p.178), whilst EPRDF officials deny 
its authenticity ‘the text matches other EPRDF publications at the time, both in style and content, and the analysis 
aligns so closely with the party’s actions that there is no reason to believe it a forgery’. It is important to treat the 
document with caution, since Vaughan and Gebremichael (2011, p.32) note ‘[a]n original is not available, and the 
publisher is a vigorous diaspora critic of the ruling party’. It is, however, included here as an insight into some of the 
concerns possibly motivating the creation of endowment groups. 
73 Here the document observes that whilst ideally the state would keep ownership in finance, energy, mines and 
industry ‘this situation is not acceptable in current global economic thinking … Yet, without being widely involved, 
the government could play a decisive role in the economy by controlling the distribution of foreign currency, the 
import of fuel, the export of coffee, the regulation of transport operations etc.’ (Ethiopian Register, 1996, p.24). 
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fund-owned companies’ (also referred to as party-owned businesses) 74 helped to fill this 
gap, and act as holding companies for multiple enterprises in diverse sectors, with a 
senior management team comprising senior party leaders (Weis, 2014), though the 
EPRDF’s central committee members are not permitted to own shares in either private 
or endowment enterprises (Vaughan and Gebremichael, 2011).75 There were at least six 
sectors of the economy in which all endowment-owned firms operated at the end of the 
1990s: agriculture (4 companies); finance and trade (7 enterprises); industry and mining 
(8 companies); construction (3 companies); transport (3 companies); services (2 
enterprises), although with much data arising from the private press, it was noted its 
‘reliability cannot be fully ascertained’ (Abegaz, 1999, pp.43–44). 
 
The largest of the endowment conglomerates belonged to the TPLF, the Endowment 
Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray (EFFORT) (Vaughan and Gebremichael, 2011; 
Tesfaye, 2017). Overall, EFFORT played an important role in cement and finance, 
leading the entry of private firms into these sectors, some presence in textiles and 
garments, road transport, and edible oils, flour and cereals, a more limited presence in 
consumer goods (although another endowment has a major brewery), no role in sugar, 
and, in the early 1990s in fertiliser (Vaughan and Gebremichael, 2011). In 1995-1996 
the EFFORT-group had a 35 per cent share of the freight market (Hannson, 2004, pp.26–
27), and after it formed a cement company in 2000 it dominated the sector together with 
the state cement company for many years (World Bank, 2006a). However, this is not 
unusual globally since cement is noted for its oligopolistic nature (UNCTAD, 2018b, 
ix). Some endowment investments were also undertaken jointly, and in 1997 the four 
endowments together made founding investments in Wegagen Bank, taking 
shareholdings of 15 per cent each, which was later reduced to 5 per cent or below after 
a limit on shareholdings of single investors was introduced (Vaughan and Gebremichael, 
2011).  
 
The lack of clarity about the scale of the holdings by these entities76 has fuelled rumour 
and speculation about their domination of the non-state sectors of the Ethiopian 
                                                   
74  Political parties are not permitted to own or invest in businesses according to Ethiopian law (Tesfaye, 2017).  
75 According to Vaughan and Mesfin (2011, p.30) ‘[a]lthough many doubt the degree of adherence to this rule, 
interlocutors are adamant that it is strictly adhered to at least within the TPLF, with regular debates regarding the 
legitimacy of share-holdings by close relatives’. 
76 As Tesfaye (2017, p.134) notes, officially endowments are non-governmental public charity organisations which 
have not been audited since the mid-1990s, meaning their management structure, revenue, profits and losses are not 
public. 
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economy. The World Bank (1998, p.7) noted concerns amongst the Ethiopian domestic 
private sector and civil society in the 1990s over ‘preferential treatment … with respect 
to government contracts, government-controlled credit facilities, import and export 
licenses, and customs clearances’. International observers critical of their role suggest 
‘party-affiliated endowments have taken many of the business opportunities left for 
private engagement’ (Altenburg, 2010, p.29). The underlying motivations guiding such 
moves, according to this critical perspective, is that such enterprises are ‘a way for the 
EPRDF to keep control over the more market-oriented and privatised economy, not only 
from the government offices but also as an active owner of business corporations’ 
(Hannson, 2004, p.27). Some therefore refer to these endowment enterprise structures 
of patronage and clientelism (Chanie, 2007).77  
 
However, the World Bank (1998, p.7) also noted that its ‘mission was not able 
independently to confirm’ allegations of preferential treatment, whilst the EPRDF 
stressed their role was ‘to mobilise and utilise all available resources in the development 
process’ (Hannson, 2004, p.27). Meles also noted such enterprises had been prohibited 
from either buying government assets or bidding for government contracts, to limit the 
emergence of corruption (interviewed by Holman and Wrong (1998)). Party officials 
meanwhile, assert that profits are not used to support political activities, but are either 
reinvested or diverted to support loss-making activities elsewhere (Weis, 2014, p.275). 
Given their size in relation to domestic firms, their competitors at this time were much 
more likely to have been foreign investors (Abegaz, 1999, p.43), and indicative of their 
developmental role in terms of their capacity to be internationally competitive, a high 
proportion of EFFORT companies have International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO) certificates, compared with low levels of national registration (Vaughan and 
Gebremichael, 2011, p.34). It has also been noted that whilst navigating bureaucratic 
hurdles and accessing land might have been easier for endowment firms, their increasing 
use of private rather than state-owned bank credit suggests they also struggled to get 
sufficient financing from state institutions (Vaughan and Gebremichael, 2011, p.27). 
Most notable for the purposes of this thesis, meanwhile, is that the approach taken by 
the EPRDF for managing the transition from command to market economy helped to 
shape a political economy where most of large-scale activity by domestic investors was 
                                                   
77 Others however take the view endowments represent neo-patrimonialism which is described as a ‘system of 
personal rule held together by the distribution of economic rents to clients or cronies’ but that this is not necessarily 
bad for development (Kelsall, 2011, p.1). 
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either undertaken by the state or endowment groups aligned with the ruling coalition. 
This represents a considerably different context for economic development than that 
facing many developing countries. 
 
3.3.3 Foreign capital  
 
The transitional economic strategy noted that foreign investors should only play a role 
where the state or domestic investors were ‘unable to invest’ and consequently 
‘domestic capital should be given priority over foreign capital’ (TGE, 1991, p.29). As a 
result, during the 1990s Ethiopia’s foreign investment climate was ‘highly restrictive 
compared to many other developing countries’ (UNCTAD, 2002a, p.27). As well as 
sectoral restrictions (noted in Table 3.3),78 there were minimum capital requirements of 
US$ 500,000 for wholly foreign owned investments, and US$ 300,000 for joint ventures 
(in either cash or imported capital equipment), as well as requirements that joint ventures 
be composed of a minimum of 27 per cent local investment (UNCTAD, 2002a). The 
Ethiopian Investment Authority (EIA) (renamed the Ethiopian Investment Commission, 
EIC, in 2003) was reportedly more focused more on investment regulation than 
promotion during the 1990s (United Nations, 2004). In this regard Meles noted in 1998 
that: 
 
Foreign direct investment is critical in supplementing local efforts but cannot 
replace them. I don't believe that without creating a vibrant private sector locally, 
you can make good use of foreign investment. To the extent that we felt we 
needed a little protection here and a little protection there for local investors to 
develop, we have restricted some areas, primarily in the small business sector 
(interviewed by Holman and Wrong, 1998). 
 
Furthermore, in the sectors most attractive sectors to foreign investors, such as finance, 
the government was clear throughout the 1990s that these would remain closed. For 
domestic banks, this was said to be stalled until competitiveness had been improved, 
                                                   
78 The contested 1993 document notes that foreign investment would not be permitted in: telephone, electricity, train 
transport, small-scale industry and financial services (banking and insurance etc.). Regarding the latter it was said 
‘[i]f the major international financial institutions or banks are allowed access to this economic sector, they will twist 
the State’s arms and those of Revolutionary Democracy’ (Ethiopian Register, 1996, p.25). This broadly corresponds 
to the sectors prohibited to foreign investors by 1998, although by this time the telecommunications sector permitted 
investment in partnership with the government. It was noted that this was a necessity since ‘[g]iven the prevailing 
economic global condition, we have no choice but to give more access to foreign capital’ (Ethiopian Register, 1996, 
p.25). 
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and the NBE’s supervisory and regulatory capacity enhanced (United Nations, 2004, 
p.23). Instead, priority sectors for FDI during the 1990s and early 2000s were those 
aligned with the ADLI strategy, including food and beverages, horticulture, livestock, 
fisheries and forestry activities, cotton, as well as manufacturing (such as leather and 
textiles and garments), mining and tourism concerns (though not in an unrestricted sense, 
as Table 3.3 indicates) (United Nations, 2004, p.42). Incentives for foreign investors in 
priority sectors included exemptions from export taxes, and customs and import duties 
on capital goods, and up to 15 per cent on spare parts; income tax holidays (of one to 
five years, depending on sector and region); tax deductible R&D spending; capital 
remittance tax exemptions; and guarantees of repatriation of capital and profit and 
against expropriation (World Bank, 2004a). These were considered standard amongst 
competitor countries although foreign investors considered Ethiopia’s labour ‘biased 
toward labour’ (United Nations, 2004, p.25) and pushed the government to liberalise 
this policy area. Sectoral specificity, rather than performance-related specificity, was 
the over-riding concern of this period as the World Bank noted that there were no 
guidelines for exports, foreign exchange restrictions for imports, minimum local content 
levels in manufactured goods, or employment limits on expatriate staff (World Bank, 
2004a, p.46). 
 
Instead it appeared that the government was more interested in either encouraging close 
relations with favoured foreign investors or heavily circumscribing the sectors foreign 
investment was permitted in, rather than undertaking significant performance 
monitoring. Caution is needed in interpreting FDI data from the 1990s,79 although  
available data indicates that between 1993-1998 operational inflows were not more than 
1 per cent of GDP until 1997, when these flows doubled before then being disrupted by 
the war with Eritrea in 1998 (United Nations, 2004, p. 3). FDI inflows were also the 
lowest per capita in Africa in 1999, and were considerably more erratic than elsewhere 
on the continent, with the exception of Zimbabwe (World Bank, 2004a, p.52). However, 
there was one dominant source of FDI within the small total number of projects. Of 
operational FDI between 1992-1993 and 2000-2001, investments in agriculture, hotels 
and tourism accounted for just over a third of investment, whilst manufacturing was just 
under a third, and very limited investments recorded in other sectors such as real estate, 
                                                   
79 Due to data limitations, including difficulties in disentangling the origins of investors for projects with multiple 
investors from different countries (UNCTAD, 2002a). 
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trade, mining, and construction (Table 3.4). Much of the total was dominated by a single 
project: from the Mohammed International Development Research and Organization 
Companies (MIDROC) group owned by the Ethio-Saudi businessman Sheik 
Mohammad Hussein Al-Amoudi, for the Addis Sheraton luxury hotel project (United 
Nations, 2004).  
 
Amongst foreign investors, data provided by the Ethiopian Privatization Agency (EPA) 
in the late 1990s revealed that MIDROC was a major beneficiary of privatisation 
(Wodajo and Sebet, 2017). Some 80.3 per cent of all enterprises sold up until 2001-2002 
were to Ethiopian buyers, and 16.7 per cent to Saudi Arabian buyers, with a very small 
number (between 1.5 and 0.8 per cent) to Turkish, French and Yemeni investors 
(Gebeyehu, 2005). The biggest enterprises to be divested (as not all of them were fully 
privatised) during this period were: the Legadembi Gold Mine (receipts of US$ 172 
million), National Tobacco (US$ 15.5 million) and Gumaro and Wushwush Tea 
Production and Marketing (US$ 27 million) (United Nations, 2004, p.10). Enterprises 
in the MIDROC group bought both the majority of the gold mine (with the government 
keeping a 2 per cent share) (IMF, 1999a, p.57), and the tea company (United Nations, 
2004). Indeed, MIDROC was Ethiopia’s largest foreign investor as of the mid-2000s, 
comprising over 30 companies, 15,000 employees, with investments valued at US$1 
billion, and was active in sectors such as construction, manufacturing (leather, paper, 
corrugated sheets, bulbs, paints, beverages and soaps), real estate, natural resource 
extraction and mining (oil, gold and silver, marble), agro-industries (tea plantations and 
coffee farms), healthcare and medicines, hotels and educational establishments  (United 
Nations, 2004, p.41).  
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Table 3.4 Ethiopia: Operational FDI projects by sector, 1992-1993 to 2000-2001 
 
Source: EIA data cited in World Bank (2004a). 
  
Notably, together domestic and foreign private sectors accounted for over 60 per cent 
of gross fixed investment in 1999 (UNCTAD, 2002a, p.23), suggesting they were a key 
part of the emerging patterns of capital accumulation at this time. However, beyond the 
MIDROC group, the EPRDF’s approach to limiting foreign participation in the 
economy was distinctive in regional perspective since most businesses were owned by 
Ethiopians, making the country ‘quite unique in Sub-Saharan Africa, where European 
citizens from the former colonial powers, Indian or Arab minorities often play a 
dominant role in the private sector’ (Altenburg, 2010, p.11). Overall, therefore, foreign 
investment was not dramatically deregulated during the first phase of Ethiopian 
developmentalism, indicating that neither foreign exchange constraints, the need for 
investment, nor conditionality pressures were sufficient to convince the EPRDF to 
liberalise the investment climate to foreign capital.  
 
3.4 Grappling with challenges (domestic and global) 
 
During the articulation of this defensive form of developmentalism the EPRDF faced 
considerable pressure from the IFIs over the unorthodox content of its development 
strategy. It also faced domestic challenges, particularly within the TPLF.  
 
3.4.1 Navigating the IFIs 
 
As Sections 3.2-3.3. made clear, Ethiopia was far from ‘just another reforming country’ 
in the 1990s, begging the question of how leaders of one of the poorest countries in the 
Projects (no.) Investment (birr, million)
Share of investment 
(%)
Manufacturing 32 774 23.6
Agriculture 4 1243 37.8
Real estate 0 0 0.0
Hotel and tourism 1 1162 35.4
Education 1 6 0.2
Health 0 0 0.0
Construction 5 83 2.5
Trade 0 0 0.0
Mining and quarrying 1 3 0.1
Others 7 13 0.4
Total 51 3285 100.0
Operational projects
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world, facing considerable social and economic challenges, managed to carve out the 
policy space for an emerging form of developmentalism at a time when the neoliberal 
agenda was hegemonic across development thought, policy and practice. The main 
source of pressure to deepen economic liberalisation during the 1990s stemmed from 
the IFIs, given that the country only became an observer to the WTO in 1997, had not 
integrated into global production networks, and had a closed financial sector and capital 
account. Indeed, tensions over the EPRDF’s development strategy were evident in the 
very first loan arrangement conversations with the IMF and World Bank in 1991. 
According to a USAID official ‘sobering for the TGE has been its discovery that 
international support, particularly from the European Community, the US, and 
multinational agencies, has been far less generous, swift, sustained, and unconditional 
than expected’ (Morrison, 1992, p.136). The IFIs rejected the EPRDF’s efforts to make 
its own transitional economic policy the basis for policy dialogue on the grounds that it 
was ‘a very general document, containing few specifics and, as yet, no timetable of 
policy implementation’ (IMF, 1992, p.16). The World Bank moved to ‘withhold final 
approval of an aid package until the TGE agreed to a framework for a future structural 
adjustment programme’ (Morrison, 1992, pp.134–35) encompassing devaluation; 
banking reform; privatisation; investment, labour, contract and bankruptcy laws and 
policies. This indicates clear efforts to use Ethiopia’s economic distress and need for 
external financing to induce policy reform in line with the neoliberal development 
agenda. This pressure also helps to explain why the PFP took a year longer than expected 
to agree (Chole, 1993), and why despite the EPRDF’s concerns about devaluation, this 
was implemented in October 1992.  
 
Tactically, the EPRDF then shifted toward sluggish implementation in ‘sensitive’ areas 
such as: external trade, foreign exchange, financial reform, privatisation of enterprises 
and land, and civil service reform (Abegaz, 1999, p.39). However, this had costs. There 
was a long delay between the first (December 1993) and second (March 1996) tranches 
of an African Development Bank (AfDB) loan due to ‘delays in implementation’: 
chiefly privatisation (AfDB, 2000, ii). The conclusion of the SAC-1 credit was also 
delayed by nearly two years (from December 1994 to September 1996) which the Bank 
later attributed to the TGE’s ‘strong sense of ownership’ and need ‘to analyze 
thoroughly all issues before deciding on a specific course of action’ (World Bank, 1997a, 
p.7). Even more significantly, the EPRDF came under extreme pressure from the IMF 
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to open Ethiopia’s capital account, break up the CBE and open the banking and 
insurance sectors to foreign competition in 1997 (Wade, 2001a, p.68). At this time the 
IMF withheld funds under the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) loan 
that the EPRDF had signed in 1996 in order to remain within the Paris Club debt 
rescheduling framework (IMF, 1994, p.30). Yet the EPRDF rejected these pressures, 
concerned that interest rates would increase, shutting farmers out of credit for seeds and 
fertiliser, and had noted with considerable alarm Kenya’s recent spate of bankruptcies 
following its own financial liberalisation (Stiglitz, 2002b). Thus in the end, due to the 
ultimate termination of IMF lending during the Eritrean conflict, only one-third of the 
total funds agreed were actually drawn in two out of six tranches (IMF, 2005c, p.3).  
 
Such cautiousness and gradualism exemplified the EPRDF’s ‘rearguard war not to 
privatize too much’ (Meles Zenawi speaking in 2010, quoted in De Waal, 2015, pp. 
161–162), which, as noted above, defined the EPRDF’s defensive developmentalism, 
and became a hallmark of the EPRDF’s approach to managing IFI pressure in the 1990s. 
Its refusal to embrace a more mainstream development strategy, however, undoubtedly 
cost it funds, which contributed to a steep decline in inflows after 1993, whilst the 
conflict with Eritrea also impacted both multilateral and bilateral lending (Borchgrevink, 
2008, p.204; Feyissa, 2011, p.795) (Figure 3.1). The World Bank did remain engaged, 
although this was through project rather than structural adjustment lending (World Bank, 
2000a; World Bank, 2003b). Overall, Ethiopia’s poor compliance with donor conditions 
resulted in a low CPIA score in 2003, particularly for its “structural policies”, which 
were considered to have been ‘unsatisfactory for an extended period’ leading a Swedish 
aid official to note this hampered Ethiopia’s attractiveness to funders: ‘[f]rom the point 
of view of governance and foreign-aid preparedness this [low score] is negative in an 
aid-competitive situation’ (Hannson, 2004, p.17). 
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Figure 3.1 Ethiopia: Net ODA received (current US$ billon), 1981-2001 
 
Source: World Bank (2018). 
 
Several reasons are commonly advanced to explain the EPRDF’s capacity to resist IFI 
and donor reform pressures, and the country’s strong sense of policy ownership which 
has meant donors have ‘very limited ability to influence Ethiopian policies’ 
(Borchgrevink, 2008, p.195). These include, steadfastness in pursuing its own agenda 
the face of donor inconsistency and divisions (Borchgrevink, 2008); adroit management 
of the relations between external funders and the government, such as highly centralised 
dialogue between external funders and the Ministry of Economic Development and 
Cooperation (MEDAC) (Abegaz, 1999; Furtado and Smith, 2009); and appeal to its 
sovereignty and evident humanitarian needs as a source of leverage over funders 
(Feyissa, 2011). Key policy decisions made in closed Party structures, not the 
government departments that funders work with, is said to have helped to isolate the 
decision-making process from international pressure (Furtado and Smith, 2009), with 
the Prime Minister’s Office brokering the implementation of party-agreed decisions 
within executive branches of government (Abegaz, 1999). Finally, the overall 
effectiveness of its state institutions has also helped (Feyissa, 2011), not least by 
enhancing its international credibility, as even the World Bank (2004b, p.10) has noted 
that the ‘view from donors is that Ethiopia has dedicated and competent policy-makers 
and civil servants with a strong sense of ownership of the government’s reform agenda’. 
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It has also been suggested the EPRDF was less economically fragile than many of its 
peers, both because of large inflows of food relief and ‘more favourable economic 
conditions than most African countries which suffered from debt and macroeconomic 
crises’ (Whitfield, 2009, p.336) (see also Feyissa (2011)). 
 
Yet, in 1992, Ethiopia’s external debt was 95 per cent of GDP or US$ 8.8 billion (Degefe, 
2001, pp.380, 386) and its mounting debt arrears reached US$ 5.5 billion by 1999 
(Degefe, 2001, p.393). The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) criteria for 
determining if a country as heavily indebted includes a debt-to-export ratio of more than 
150 per cent (Thirlwall, 2006a, p.104). As Table 3.5 makes clear, Ethiopia more than 
exceeded this threshold for the majority of the 1990s.  Furthermore, in terms of the debt 
service to export ratio, the average recorded in developing countries at the peak of the 
developing world debt crisis in 1986 was nearly 30 per cent (Thirlwall, 2006a, p.104), 
and even excluding rouble-denominated debts to Russia, Ethiopia’s total debt service to 
export ratio was 82 per cent in 1991-1992 (IMF, 1996, p.4). Export earnings were 
heavily dependent on coffee exports, which averaged 58.2 per cent of commodity export 
earnings between 1995-2001 (United Nations, 2017a). Partly due to this dependence on 
coffee,80 export earnings were slightly lower in 2001 than in 1997 (falling from US$ 979 
million in 1997 to US$ 976 million in 2001) (World Bank, 2018g), shaped by the fact 
that between 1999 and 2001 world coffee prices fell to thirty-year lows (Reinert, 2007). 
Indicative of its economic aid dependence, Ethiopia also displayed what Bräutigam 
(2000) classifies as ‘high aid intensity’ (a threshold set at 10 per cent of GNP or higher), 
since ODA was 21 per cent of GNP in the early 1990s, although falling to 10 per cent 
by 1997.  
 
Table 3.5 Ethiopia: Ratio of total external debt to export of goods and services (%) 
1980 1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
139.5 1,276.3 2,036.9 1,889.3 1,788.1 1,276.6 1,224.5 968.1 983.5 
Source: World Bank (2000, p. 234). 
 
Thus on its own terms, Ethiopia’s external position was nonetheless decidedly 
precarious. Indeed, indicative of the pressures placed upon the regime by its external 
debts, Meles Zenawi described HIPC as a ‘whip to enforce unquestioning acceptance of 
                                                   
80 One important note of qualification regarding Ethiopia’s export position, meanwhile, is the large share of total 
exports Ethiopia accrued through services rather than goods at this time, particularly through Ethiopian Airlines 
(Reinert, 2007). 
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the economic orthodoxy’ adding that ‘[t]he choice which we are left with under HIPC 
is thus to either abandon all independent and rational thinking in economic policy 
making or wallow in the quagmire of unsustainable debt’ (UNECA, 1999). To fully 
appreciate the EPRDF’s capacity to resist pressure to adopt neoliberal developmental 
policies, attention to three additional factors is also important.  
 
First, the lack of unity on the part of the IFIs and bilateral donors (Borchgrevink, 2008). 
Interestingly, the EPRDF was strongly supported in the dispute by then newly-appointed 
Chief Economist to the World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz, who convinced Bank authorities 
to a three-fold increase in support for Ethiopia at the time the IMF suspended payments, 
as well as vocally championing the Ethiopian government’s position in Washington, and 
providing advice on its strategies (Stiglitz, 2002a).81 This particular rupture between the 
two dominant IFIs is of quite significant historical note, since (as noted in Chapter 2), 
many of the promises following the transition from the Washington to post-Washington 
Consensus ended in theoretical disappointment. Yet on the ground in Ethiopia, the 
disputes between advocates of “shock therapy” and “good governance” considerably 
helped Ethiopia to weather the shock of its IMF dispute.  
 
Second, whilst the EPRDF’s strategic adroitness, encompassing institutional 
arrangements and governance techniques such as donor centralisation and appeals to 
sovereignty (noted above) were undoubtedly important constituents of its ODA 
management, this literature often neglects the feedback mechanisms between the 
ideational and material content of its political and economic project and strategies for 
ensuring this was implemented. Whilst criticism the EPRDF received during the war 
with Eritrea was undoubtedly ‘deeply resented’ by the EPRDF (Feyissa, 2011, p.801) 
its refusal to adopt neoliberal reforms goes deeper than its sensitivity to foreign 
interference and the strong sense of national pride inherited from the traditions of 
independent statehood. To understand why the EPRDF pushed so strongly against the 
prevailing tide of global policy trends, also significant are the heterodox intellectual 
influences, from elements of structuralist and dependency theorising reviewed above, to 
the Marxist-Leninist ideas that formed the essence of the EPRDF’s view both of its 
social base (the peasantry) and the dangers to its project (imperialist forces, and 
                                                   
81 Wade (2001b, p.128) argues that his support for Ethiopia, which went as far as ‘advising the Ethiopian government 
on how to resist IMF demands that it open up its financial system’, contributed to Larry Summers, the then US 
Treasury Secretary, to call for Stiglitz to be disciplined.  
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domestic capitalist class), all of which contributed to scepticism about the alternative 
conceptualisations of development being offered, helping to ensure the limited traction 
of mainstream ideas within the Ethiopian policy-making domain. 82  Here a senior 
advisor to the Prime Minister noted during fieldwork interviews in February 2016: 
 
In the 1990s, on our side, we didn’t think standard economics explained the 
reality on the ground – we were prepared to talk about this in terms of analytics 
with the World Bank and IMF but they didn’t give a good enough explanation 
for liberalisation in these areas, so we sensed that these were open questions after 
all (EG-13, see Appendix A). 
 
From the historically rooted analysis of the dangers of the rent-seeking tendencies of the 
Ethiopian private sector, to scepticism about exchange rate adjustments, and the ADLI 
strategy, a strong countervailing force to orthodox development advice has been both a 
deeply contextual understanding of the challenge of development, and a commitment to 
seeing development as a profoundly structural process. Furthermore, with positions on 
key decisions reached through deeply-rooted processes of ‘democratic centralism’, 
which were first deployed by the TPLF in the 1980s (Vaughan, 2011; Lefort, 2015), the 
endurance of ideas once they are established as official positions within Ethiopia made 
such ideas all-but impossible for the international aid community to uproot, except for 
‘coaxing the government to get closer to the limits allowed by its own ideological or 
narrow organizational interests’ (Abegaz, 1999, p. 45). 
 
Relatedly, the material content the EPRDF’s chosen development path also helped to 
consolidate a political economy that was materially unconducive to the sort of ‘home-
grown’ neoliberalism discussed in Chapter 2. With the Derg regime having wiped out 
powerful domestic landholders and the emerging capitalists (largely foreign) of the 
imperial period, the domestic economic elites who might benefit from deeper 
international integration through financial liberalisation, deregulation, and greater 
privatisation were also fragmented, small and marginal. In their absence, the strategy 
adopted by the EPRDF, informed by the intellectual influences noted above, sought to 
create a market economy in such a way as to keep rival centres of economic and political 
                                                   
82 During the internal TPLF gimgema (reassessment) of 2000 (see Section3.4.2), the Meles Zenawi faction proposed 
an economic development strategy involving liberalisation in line with the Lenin’s New Economic Policy (Milkias, 
2003, p.21). 
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power to a minimum (see also Weis, 2016). As many strategic sectors of the economy, 
from finance, to transport, utilities and manufacturing thus remained in state hands, the 
largest domestic and foreign economic players were closely supportive of the EPRDF’s 
approach. The EPRDF’s ‘no go areas’ of policy reform, particularly rapid privatisation, 
financial liberalisation and capital account opening, helped to preserve this 
developmentally conducive political economy. In this context, the EPRDF coalition 
thereby emerged as the main political force, and the state the main economic force, 
meaning that the emergence of pro-liberalisation forces was decidedly circumscribed. 
Such sensitivity to the ideational and material components of the EPRDF’s development 
strategy helps to explain both why and how it adopted its staunchly ‘anti-neoliberal’ 
approach (Chang and Hauge, 2019). 
 
Third, and finally, the EPRDF could also ‘just say no’ to external funds when policy 
pressures became too much because of the nature of its macroeconomic management. 
This involved some adroit debt management strategies and hard choices about spending 
decisions. Grappling with the country’s external debt position was reportedly the chief 
concern of senior EPRDF officials upon taking power: perceived as even more urgent 
than increasing government revenues (Mascagni, 2016, p.30). This amounted to a 
willingness (and capacity) to make lower-than-desired budgetary outlays for social 
expenditure (Degefe, 2001, p.396). This indicates that the balance of social forces in 
1990s Ethiopia was such that the EPRDF had the domestic space to cut government 
spending without the risk of a politically destabilising backlash. The EPRDF also sought 
to insulate itself from the necessity to undertake unpalatable conditional lending by 
buttressing its foreign reserves with external inflows. The EPRDF increased the 
country’s international reserves in the mid-1990s, which reached 6.6  months of imports 
in mid-1995 (IMF, 1999a). This fiscal stance obviated the need for concessional inflows, 
since the EPRDF was prepared to tolerate expenditure decreases instead of policy 
lending tied to unpalatable conditions. Together, these factors enabled the EPRDF to 
refuse further Bank lending after the first SAC expired, which the World Bank  (2000a, 
p.3) attributed to its ‘unwillingness to envisage policy-conditioned credits’. This shifted 
remaining World Bank lending to revived International Development Association (IDA) 
projects in infrastructure, agriculture and social services, which had been started but 
often interrupted or stalled during the Derg period (World Bank, 2000a). 
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Relatedly, Ethiopian officials also successfully built-up independent debt analysis 
capacity and negotiation skills ahead of the HIPC discussions in 2001 which won it 
more front-loaded relief than the IFIs had originally proposed (with government 
officials arguing that this would be needed if the government was to make significant 
poverty reduction targets by the 2015 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) deadline) 
and a delayed decision-point (meaning more debt relief than the date previously 
proposed) (Martin, 2010, p.283).  Finally, the EPRDF also began to look beyond the 
IFIs and Western donors, laying the foundations for more diversified foreign economic 
relations. Indeed, during the early 1990s an ‘intensive debate about Ethiopia’s foreign 
policy was triggered by concerns that the country’s wishes did not always tally with 
Western powers’ designs’ (Ziso, 2018, p.113). China was identified as a possible source 
of development lessons, and Meles Zenawi made a first official visit to China in 1995, 
followed by a visit from Chinese President Jiang Zemin to Ethiopia in 1996 (Ziso, 2018). 
Whilst not yet of sizeable economic or political significance, these emerging relations 
helped to lay the ground-work for the later weakening the country’s reliance on Western 
support.  
 
Thus, whilst the EPRDF did not avoid all IFI pressure in the 1990s, its capacity to 
markedly deviate from this consensus view of development strategy, even amidst the 
economic fragility of the 1990s, is highly significant. This can be attributed to divisions 
between the IFIs and within the broader donor community, to the EPRDF’s adroit 
management, including of the macroeconomy, preserving space to avoid particularly 
politically sensitive reforms, but also needs to be contextualised by two further factors 
related to the substance of its defensive developmental agenda. Ideationally, the 
EPRDF’s conceptualisation of the nature of development outlined above contributed to 
permanent scepticism regarding IFI advice, whilst materially, the outcome of its 
heterodox approach to economic development meant that there was no sizeable 
domestic constituency aligned with deeper liberalisation in Ethiopia at this time. 
Together these factors enabled the EPRDF to navigate the global neoliberal order in 
such a way as to preserve most strategic sectors of the economy in state hands, and avoid 
modalities of financial integration which could generate instability and distort the 
development strategy in the ways noted in Chapter 2.   
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3.4.2 The TPLF split and emergence of assertive developmentalism 
 
As noted above, the war with Eritrea proved a major interruption to the EPRDF’s 
developmental plans, disrupting the implementation of ADLI, compounding 
disagreements with its donors (Borchgrevink, 2008), and halting investments by 
endowment-owned companies (Vaughan and Gebremichael, 2011). The war also 
reflected, and indeed intensified, deep divisions within the TPLF. In particular, the 
faction within the TPLF aligned with Meles ‘felt that the conflict seriously undermined 
economic development upon which the future of Ethiopia depended’ (Tadesse, 2015b, 
p.279). Indeed, describing what he noted was the TPLF’s descent into a ‘rent-seeking 
party’ in the mid-1990s, Meles noted that ‘[t]he stupidest event, the war with Eritrea, 
accelerated it. The war was started by idiots in Eritrea, but the response was equally 
stupid. We were more interested in protecting the interests of some groups than in the 
strategic national interest’ (Meles Zenawi speaking in 2010, quoted in De Waal, 2015, 
pp. 161–162). The Prime Minister’s group occupied the more economically reformist 
wing of the party, whilst dissidents accused Meles’s side of taking the country right-
ward and of subservience to the US (Prunier, 2015). Indeed, his opponents within the 
party reportedly had begun ‘to view Meles as an agent of the West, while his group 
tended to view the militants as traditionalists and die-hard Marxists’ (Tadesse, 2015b, 
p.279). This contributed to probably the most significant domestic transformation within 
this period: a split within the TPLF’s Central Committee. In turn, this helped to prompt 
formal recognition of a change in the regime’s development strategy since the ‘EPRDF 
post-split now finally confirmed that the transition to socialism had been abandoned’ 
(Vaughan, 2011, p.631). Summarising these events Meles Zenawi said in the mid-2000s 
  
Our economic reform programme, which was initiated in conjunction with the 
IMF and World Bank, started in the early 90s with a focus on changing the 
command economy, inherited from the past, and establishing a market economy. 
This objective was achieved by the mid 90s. While I cannot say that we had an 
alternative to the neo-liberal reforms that the IMF and World Bank wanted us to 
introduce, we have never been comfortable with it from the very beginning. Our 
initial reaction was in effect to conduct a rear-guard battle of delaying and 
preventing the introduction of reforms that would reduce the state to the 
proverbial night watchman without presenting an adequately articulated 
alternative. By the late 90s, our thinking as a ruling party was evolving in the 
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direction of elaborating an alternative development paradigm that we have called 
democratic developmentalism. This was a rather slow and painful process. 
Painful because the full articulation of the paradigm with all its policy 
implications was one of the key causes of the most serious split in the history of 
the ruling party that took place in 2000 – 2001 (Zenawi, 2006b).83 
 
As this quote illustrates, domestic political disagreements were a major factor limiting 
the emergence of more ambitious development plans at this time, despite the 
considerable efforts of the EPRDF to preserve the basis for a developmental regime.   
 
As the disputes intensified between 2000 and 2001 they were to ultimately play out to 
the advantage of the Prime Minister, given his tactical out-manoeuvring of his 
opponents and purges of dissident elements (Tadesse, 2015b; Vaughan, 2015). The 
resulting split within the TPLF kicked off a process known as “renewal” (Tadesse, 
2015b) and the removal of leading “dissident” politicians (Vaughan and Gebremichael, 
2011, p.33). This allowed the party faction led by Meles Zenawi to move forward largely 
free from intra-party opposition (Vaughan, 2015; Weis, 2016). Having strengthened the 
Prime Minister’s power over both party and state organs (Tadesse, 2015b), a major 
restructuring of state-party relations also occurred. This entailed the fusion of party and 
state through what Vaughan describes as an ‘[i]ntensive process of state-building’ (2015, 
p.302) encompassing: the creation of new powerful ministries that took over areas of 
policy-making traditionally left to party structures; efforts to ‘modernize, 
professionalize and bureaucratize the state … [through a] new emphasis on capacity 
building, education, and urban development’; and bureaucratic strengthening of 
decentralisation at the local (woreda) 84  level through innovations across budget 
management systems and communication, as well as within the civil service. 
 
Notably, after this period, both the level of assertiveness and ambition regarding the 
EPRDF’s developmental trajectory ramped up appreciably, and a range of new terms 
emerge to signal the shift to a new development model. Vaughan (2011) notes that the 
use of the term “developmental capitalism” (lematawi habt) came into use,  whilst terms 
                                                   
83  For the “renewal” (gimgema) discussions, Meles reportedly produced a ‘700 page document on Bonapartism – 
accusing leadership TPLF of corruption, and anti-democratic behaviour and slowly transforming itself into an aloof, 
antidemocratic ruling class’ (Milkias, 2003, p.20). 
84 This is equivalent to a district, and is third largest out of four administrative-level units under Ethiopia’s federal 
system (Weis, 2016). 
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such as “democratic developmentalism” (Zenawi, 2006b) and “developmental state” 
(FDRE, 2016b, p.1) tend to be more commonly deployed in English-language speeches 
and publications. A full discussion of the contours of this newly-adjusted development 
paradigm forms the basis of Chapter 4. However, for now it is worth noting that this 
shift signals the important domestic developmental constraints faced by Ethiopia in this 
first reform period. Some, for instance, have suggested the pace of privatisation was 
slow in the 1990s due to opposition from within the TPLF power-brokers in Tigray, 
without whose support Meles’ hands were tied (Milkias, 2003).85 If true, this signals 
that the consensus governing the development strategy had begun to fray, as a pace of 
reform that was evidently too slow for the IFIs seemed to be too fast for a faction within 
the TPLF. The quote from Meles Zenawi above also indicates that the defensive 
measures to preserve as strategic sectors under state control were not matched by a 
coherent plan for how to use the commanding heights to power economic transformation. 
This indicates powerful political and ideational factors constrained Ethiopia’s 
development strategies at this time, alongside the challenges of reconstruction and 
creating a market economy, as well as the conflict with Eritrea.   
 
Conclusion 
 
The trajectory of the Ethiopian transition from command to market-oriented economy 
during the 1990s was heterodox both in pace and in content. Whilst the EPRDF may 
have lacked a coherent vision for how to utilise state assets to power the country’s 
transformation, and been consumed by a war with Eritrea and internal disputes within 
the TPLF, it displayed considerable strategic adroitness in carving out sufficient space 
to resist the strong pressures emanating from the IFIs in order to defend wide-spread 
state ownership across the economy’s commanding heights. The domestic balance of 
political and economic forces both drove and enabled leaders of one of the least 
developed countries in the world to make a break with the powerful prevailing 
orthodoxy. Internal TPLF disagreements indicate, in their concern about whether 
economic reforms had already gone too far, that the EPRDF did not face considerable 
domestic pressure to adopt a faster reform trajectory at this time, including from within 
the coalition’s most powerful party. It is not that such groups were not present. Indeed, 
                                                   
85 He cites the lack of privatisation of the state-owned power company as an example of a state enterprise whose 
divestment was blocked by TPLF party structures. However, its subsequent lack of divestment suggests other reasons 
may also be at work. 
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during the 1990s, given the poor relations between the EPRDF and urban entrepreneurs 
and middle classes, and the EPRDF’s alignment with the peasantry, ‘most in the private 
sector ranged alongside the more liberal opposition groupings which supported 
privatisation of land and SOEs, fuller free-market competition, and (in some cases) a 
change of the federal arrangement’ (Vaughan and Gebremichael, 2011, p.20). However, 
given their political and economic marginalisation, such groups did not pose a major 
obstacle to the implementation a more interventionist developmental economic policy 
regime. Rather division in the TPLF held back the emergence of more ambitious 
strategies, and it is to the transformations occurring after such divisions were resolved 
that Chapter 4 now turns. 
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Chapter 4 Ethiopia 2002-2018: Consolidating an assertive 
developmentalism 
  
This chapter charts the evolution of Ethiopia’s more assertive form of developmentalism 
from 2002-2018  which has comprised a major state-led investment drive for rapid 
growth and poverty reduction, enshrined in a succession of increasingly ambitious 
national development plans. Significant transformations in the country’s economic 
performance were in evidence during 2004-2017 (Figure 4.1), as GDP grew at average 
rates of 10.7 per cent a year, and GDP per capita 7.7 per cent.86 Between 2004 and 2016 
Ethiopian GDP growth rates were higher than the average of 9.6 per cent in China, 
making it one of the fastest growing economies in the world: and the fifth fastest in the 
ten years from 2005-2014 (Lenhardt et al., 2015, p.9).87 The most recent five-year plan 
outlines a ‘national vision of becoming a low middle-income country [MIC] by 2025, 
through sustaining the rapid, broad based and inclusive economic growth, which 
accelerates economic transformation and the journey towards the country’s Renascence 
[sic]’ (FDRE, 2016b, xi). Yet whilst there was a major break with past growth volatility 
in this period, the defensive developmentalism outlined in Chapter 3 has proved critical 
to this later success. This chapter unpacks the drivers – domestic and external – that 
have propelled this noteworthy trajectory, its evolution since 2002, and discusses the 
new challenges which have emerged as the EPRDF has adapted and extended its brand 
of developmentalism to new realities and constraints.  
 
  
                                                   
86 Whilst the government strongly defends its growth figures, and they are now widely used by the IFIs, during the 
early high growth period the IFIs raised doubts about the veracity of the data (IDA and IMF, 2011, p.1). For a 
discussion of the concerns about Ethiopia’s GDP data see Alemayehu Geda and Addis Yimer (2014) and Dercon et 
al (2009). 
87 Only Qatar, Macao, Azerbaijan and Iraq have grown at higher rates between 2005-2014. 
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Figure 4.1 Ethiopia: GDP and per capita GDP growth (annual percentage), 1991-2017 
 
Source: World Bank (2018g). 
 
4.1 Recalibrating Ethiopian developmentalism and the 2005 election 
 
4.1.1 Consolidating new directions and discovering new ambitions (2002- 2005) 
 
In the wake of the TPLF split, between 2002 and 2004 a number of new policy 
documents were created, covering industrial policy, agricultural and rural development, 
democracy, institutional and capacity development, and foreign policy (interviewee EG-
1). The 2002 Industrial Development Strategy separated industry and agriculture for the 
first time, and marked a shift toward a more concerted industrial policy approach 
(Oqubay, 2018). Priority sectors included textile and garments, meat processing and 
leather, agro-processing and construction sectors, which were reportedly selected for 
their connections to the agricultural sector, their labour intensiveness, and foreign-
currency earning potential (interviewee EG-10). Notably, whilst the document noted the 
private sector was an important component of the strategy, the thinking underpinning 
this remained embedded in the distinction between a ‘rent-seeking’ versus 
‘developmental’ private sector characteristic of the first period, with one senior 
government official interviewed observing that encouragement of private capital only 
applied to those who invested to create value, adding ‘the others are not our partners’. 
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The interviewee went on to add that the state’s role was therefore to ‘dry out’ space for 
rent-seeking (EG-10).  
 
The 2002 Rural Development Strategy and Food Security Strategy also echoed the 
approach outlined in the 1990s, continuing to frame food insecurity as a matter of 
improved agricultural productivity (via increased inputs) and not a matter of emergency 
relief (Lavers, 2016). The Foreign Policy and Security Strategy white paper, said to be 
written by Meles in 2003, was in turn strongly oriented toward economic development, 
setting goals elated to mobilising investment, capital and aid and improving the terms 
of Ethiopia’s international economic integration (Tadesse, 2015a). In 2002 a second 
wave of decentralisation also occurred, devolving budgeting, expenditure and 
accounting to woredas (Vaughan, 2015).88 Of this period, a senior government official 
noted that although the idea of the ‘developmental state’ was not yet clearly articulated, 
‘the basic ingredients on the role of the state in accelerating growth’ were all present, 
alongside awareness of ‘the risk of capture’ stemming from an ‘activist state’ (EG-1). 
 
Ethiopia’s first PRSP, the three-year Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction 
Programme (SDPRP) (2002-2003 to 2004-2005) not only helped to revive a 
development planning tradition which originated in the imperial period, but it also 
importantly differed from standard PRSP packages. The IFIs noted it showed strong 
ownership and s ‘more interventionist approach than generally prevails elsewhere’ (IDA 
and IMF, 2002, p.1). At the end of the SDPRP, in 2004, economic growth rates first 
jumped to over 13 per cent. Whilst the IMF (2005b) attributed this to Ethiopia’s 
recovery from a devastating drought and food crisis during 2002-2003, government 
officials believed the revived planning approach instituted through the PRSP was as 
important. A senior government official noted of the 2003-2004 period that ‘when we 
started implementing these policies and the economy jump-started, this gives you 
confidence about the policies’, adding that success also helped to silence critics (EG-1). 
Another noted the government had begun to learn that ‘a coordinated effort can make a 
difference,’ and the government was keen to keep up the fast growth path (EG-6). This 
was then followed by the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End 
Poverty (PASDEP) (2005-2006 to 2009-2010), which added to SDPRP’s poverty and 
                                                   
88 The degree to which the woredas are tasked with delivery of centrally devised development packages has led some 
to describe this as ‘centralised decentralisation’ (for a discussion of this, including of some of the contradictory and 
mixed evidence on this question, see Vaughan, 2015). 
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rural focus an expanded emphasis on industrial and urban development (Gebreeyesus, 
2013, p.9). 
 
4.1.2 The post-2005 election turn toward public investment-driven developmentalism 
 
After these recalibrations, the expanded developmental trajectory was kicked into a new 
gear by the political turmoil of the 2005 election and its aftermath. Urban riots in 2001 
had revealed the EPRDF’s fragile support in such areas (Lavers, 2016) and the EPRDF 
lost all seats in the Addis Ababa Municipal council in 2005, whilst the opposition won 
174 seats in the national election of 2005 (to the EPRDF’s 327 seats), considerably more 
than anticipated (Prunier, 2015). Protests followed the election result, which drew a 
strong security response and resulted in deaths and the arrests of the main opposition 
leaders (Aalen and Tronvoll, 2008). The opposition was also beset by factionalism and 
disagreement during late 200589 which played to the advantage of the EPRDF which 
also managed to use the arrests to hasten the opposition’s collapse. Arfter this it 
undertook a series of local meetings to “ask forgiveness” and win back popular support 
(Vaughan, 2011, p.632).  
 
Whilst the impact of the TPLF split in 2000-2001 was arguably more significant in the 
longer-term reorientation of the EPRDF’s political and economic development 
strategies (Vaughan, 2015, p.304), the 2005 election was significant in transforming the 
political significance of Ethiopia’s economic development strategies. Not only was the 
fragility of the EPRDF’s powerbase in urban areas now an unavoidable political reality 
(Oqubay, 2015), but it had also stoked long-standing fears about the social challenges 
of urban unemployment (Lavers, 2016). Such concerns had two particularly important 
impacts. Politically, this entailed mass political mobilisation and party-building through 
recruitment, the reinvigoration of mass associations, new youth leagues, and other 
efforts to build local party leadership and presence (Vaughan, 2015).90 Economically, 
as one expert on the Ethiopian economy interviewed during fieldwork argued, since 
                                                   
89 The opposition comprised two distinct groups, the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) and the United 
Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF), each representing a different interests, both ethnic, political and economic, 
united only by the desire to remove the EPRDF from power (Prunier, 2015). The Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce 
and Ethiopian Economics Association were reportedly an important opposition base at this time (Weis, 2014, pp.274–
275).  
90 The study of vanguard capitalism by Weis (2016) provides a particularly astute analysis of how these political 
shifts impacted the contours of the ERPDF’s approach to building a market economy.  
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2005 the EPRDF has ‘invested heavily in urban areas, urban infrastructures and 
connecting rural areas’ (EA-2).  
 
The increased political significance of the EPRDF’s economic strategy (Prunier, 2015) 
is reflected in the two plans authored in the aftermath of the 2005 election: the Growth 
and Transformation Plan I (GTP I) (2010-2011 to 2014-2015) and GTP II (2015-2016 
to 2019-2020). Indicative of the heterodox nature of these strategies, a joint IMF and 
IDA report strongly criticised the first GTP for over-ambitious growth targets; lack of 
consultation with funders and donors; loose monetary policy; state dominance of finance 
and other sectors; and interventionist industrial policy (IDA and IMF, 2011, p.11).91 
This heterodox policy approach has altered the contours of Ethiopian developmentalism 
altered markedly.  
 
During 2005-2006, Ethiopia’s public investment rates increased sharply, reaching 17.6 
per cent of GDP in 2015-2016 (Table 4.1), far higher than the emerging and LIC 
economy average of 6-7 per cent of GDP from the mid-2000s to present (IMF, 2015a, 
p.6). As a result, Ethiopia now possesses one of the highest public investment rates in 
the world: the third highest globally in 2011 (World Bank, 2013b, p.14).92 During GTP 
I and GTP II, large-scale infrastructure projects and industrial installations targeted at 
both import substitution and export diversification have become major targets of such 
spending. For instance, the Ethiopian road network doubled in size between 2010 and 
2015; a railway connecting Addis Ababa to Djibouti commenced under GTP I (opening 
to freight in 2016); telecoms customers increased from 7.7 million in 2009-2010 to 39.8 
million by 2014-2015; power generation doubled from 2,000 MW in 2009-2010 to 
4,180 MW by 2014-2015 and electricity service coverage increased from 41 per cent in 
2009-2010 to 60 per cent in 2014-2015; Ethiopian Airlines increased passenger seat 
provisions from 15 billion in 2009-2010 to 32 billion in 2014-15; and 174,190 housing 
units were created during GTP I, creating 845,900 jobs (FDRE, 2016b). The road 
expansion programme alone cost over US$ 7 billion between 1997-2010 (Shiferaw, 
2017).   
                                                   
91 Instead, the report called for a ‘comprehensive structural reform agenda that deregulates trade and promotes 
business activity’ (IDA and IMF, 2011, p.11).   
92 Many of these investments are notable for their ambition, such as the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) 
(6000 MW capacity), whose cost is estimated at 15 per cent of GDP and has been financed domestically (Weis, 2016); 
the light railway in Addis Ababa was the first light railway (or metro) within sub-Saharan Africa (outside of South 
Africa) (Economist, 2015); and the modern gauge railway line to Djibouti, which aims to cut the time to shift goods 
from the capital to the port from 2-3 days to 10-12 hours (Railway Gazette, 2016). 
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In the Ethiopian context such investments are considered a pre-condition for the 
industrial take-off that has assumed new significance in the EPRDF’s development 
strategies, as former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi (2012) noted: ‘[t]he infrastructure 
activity that matters for manufacturing, is electricity, roads, railways, ports – without 
manufacturing we do not transform our economy’. These investments have not only 
helped to trigger expanded economic growth but united orthodox (IMF, 2016, p.20) and 
heterodox (Priewe, 2016, p.1) commentary around the centrality of high rates of public 
infrastructure investment to Ethiopia’s economic transformation.  
 
4.2 Heterodox development financing and implementation 
 
Financing played a major role in implementing these ambitious transformation plans. 
This entailed a strong reliance on a domestic financing nexus for channelling credit to 
priority sectors and some new approaches to managing ODA.    
 
4.2.1 The state finance-infrastructure-industry nexus 
  
The heterodox developmental nexus encompassing finance, industry and infrastructure 
which was preserved in the 1990s has proved critical to the financing and 
implementation of the public investment that forms the backbone of the EPRDF’s 
assertive developmentalism. Increased public investment has depended on fairly 
orthodox measures such as increased allocations from the government budget (achieved 
by restraining consumption spending, as well as increased ODA and domestic and 
foreign borrowing) (World Bank, 2013b), combined with a number of what a recent 
World Bank report calls ‘heterodox financing arrangements’ (Moller, 2016, p.14). 
These include: financial repression (such as the 2011 central bank directive that requires 
private commercial banks to hold 27 per cent of the value of any new loans in NBE bills 
to mobilise credit for productive investment, the so-called ’27 per cent’ directive); 
increased non-budget investments through public enterprises (aided by increased 
domestic and foreign borrowing); bond purchases by state-owned banks to finance 
public enterprise projects; negative real interest rates (to provide cheap financing for 
public investment projects); an over-valued exchange rate (to lessen the cost of imported 
inputs into public investment projects); and low international reserves (Moller, 2016; 
Priewe, 2016). Thus whilst overall ODA levels have increased markedly during this 
period (as discussed in section 4.2.2), the share of ODA in total domestic investment 
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has declined from 50 per cent during 2000-2004 to 29 per cent during 2010-2014 
(Shiferaw, 2017). This indicates the growing role of both domestic and non-
concessional borrowing in financing these investments, with lending from non-
traditional sources such as China also increasing appreciably (Section 4.2.2).  
 
The financial sector is a central anchor of Ethiopia’s state finance-infrastructure-
industry nexus that has helped to turbocharge Ethiopia’s economic transformation. The 
bank-dominated financial system remains closed to foreign investment, and the two 
largest banks remain state-owned: CBE and Development Bank of Ethiopia (DBE). This 
is distinctive in comparison with developing economies where private and foreign banks 
are typically significant players (World Bank, 2015c). In 2015-2016, the two state 
banks93 accounted for 48.9 per cent of total assets, and were considerably larger than 
the largest private bank (Table 4.2). The banking system is thus highly concentrated at 
the top and fragmented at the bottom. According to GTP II, the financial system’s role 
is to ‘provide the finance necessary for the implementation of manufacturing and other 
industry projects that will produce exportable products’ (FDRE, 2016b, p.107). Industry 
and other priority sectors such as power, rail, road and housing received 54.7 per cent 
of domestic credit in 2014-2015, followed by services at 35.4 per cent, and agriculture 
at 9.9 per cent (FDRE, 2016b, p.117). In contrast to global patterns of increased bank 
credit allocation to the private sector, in Ethiopia this declined between 2004 and 2011 
from around 19 per cent of GDP to 14 per cent (compared with the average African 
average of 23 per cent of GDP) (World Bank, 2015c). 
 
Table 4.1 Ethiopia banking sector: public and private banks by share of total banking system assets, 
2015-2016 
 
Source: NBE (2016). 
 
 
 
                                                   
93 Following the merger of the Construction and Business Bank with the CBE in 2015. 
48.9 Private banks (top three) 51.1
31.5 Awash International Bank 7.4
17.4 Dashen Bank 6.5
Wegagen Bank 5.6
Public banks
Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE)
Development Bank of Ethiopia (DBE)
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Table 4.2 Ethiopia: Investment levels (percentage of GDP), 1992-1993 to 2015-2016 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Data for 2000-2001; 2010-2011 is estimated; 2009-2010 is preliminary  
Sources: a IMF (1998a); b IMF (1999a); c IMF (2002a); d IMF (2005b); e IMF (2006a); f IMF (2007a); g  IMF (2008); h IMF (2010a); i  IMF (2012a); j IMF (2014a); k 
IMF (2015b); l IMF (2018b).
1992-93 a 1993-94 a 1994-95 a 1995-96 a 1996-97 b 1997-98 b 1998-99 c 1999-00 c 2000-01 c 2001-02 d 2002-03 e 2003-04 f
Gross domestic investment 14.2 15.1 15.7 21.0 19.1 18.2 16.3 15.3 18.0 20.5 22.7 21.4
Public investment 5.0 9.0 7.3 7.4 8.3 7.6 7.9 5.3 8.9 11.5 8.8 9.0
Private investment 9.2 6.1 8.5 13.6 10.8 10.6 8.4 9.9 9.2 9.0 14.0 12.4
2004-05 f 2005-06 g 2006-07 g 2007-08 h 2008-09 h 2009-10 i 2010-11 i 2011-12 j 2012-13 k 2013-14 l 2014-15 l 2015-16 l
Gross domestic investment 20.5 24.2 25.0 22.5 19.2 24.7 25.5 33.1 35.8 38.0 39.4 38.5
Public investment 9.1 16.7 18.2 15.1 14.1 16.0 18.6 25.0 19.1 17.0 17.6 17.2
Private investment 11.4 7.6 6.7 5.9 5.0 8.7 6.9 8.0 16.7 21.0 21.8 21.3
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During GTP II, the CBE was given a mandate to ‘provide credit for public investment 
projects in infrastructure and working capital for [the] industrial sector’ (FDRE, 2016b, 
p.116). In mid-2012, CBE assets were around 70 per cent of the total in the sector (IMF, 
2012a), and state enterprises are major recipients of lending, with 72.9 per cent of 
disbursed loans and bonds in 2013-2014 going to public enterprises (CBE, 2014).94 The 
DBE in contrast grants medium and long-term soft loans in line with the government’s 
structural transformation plans, and is the recipient the lion’s share of proceeds from the 
‘27 per cent’ directive. In 2017 its priority projects were commercial agriculture, agro-
processing, manufacturing, mining and extractive industries (DBE, 2017b), and in 2016-
2017 some 62.6 per cent of DBE loan disbursements went to the manufacturing sector 
(up from 53.9 per cent in 2015-2016), and within manufacturing, 96.4 per cent of 
disbursed loans went to private enterprises in 2016-2017 (up from 92.2 per cent in 2015-
2016) (DBE, 2017a). The DBE has provided significant support to government priority 
sectors such as cement (an import-substitution industry), 95  floriculture (an export-
oriented sector),96 and government affordable housing projects.97 As a result, Ethiopia 
has been described as ‘one of the few poor countries that have a functioning policy 
finance institution serving domestic agriculture and industry in a significant way’ 
(GRIPS, 2015, p.48). For the government, the DBE is seen as a particularly important 
instrument of government policy implementation, since, according to one senior 
government official interviewed in January 2016: 
 
The DBE is a tool of the government that can be used as it wishes. Without such 
a bank the government wouldn’t be able to intervene in who gets credit, and 
without such “commanding heights”, the government’s policies just become a 
wish – this is why it’s important that banks are kept in government hands (EG-
3). 
 
                                                   
94 In the same year, CBE accounted for 34.1 per cent of total capital in the Ethiopian banking system (NBE, 2015).   
95 The cement sector accounted for 22.6 per cent of the DBE’s outstanding loans as of 31 December 2011 (Oqubay, 
2015). 
96 The DBE provided US$ 1 million loan at 8.0 per cent interest to a foreign floriculture investor to create the Golden 
Rose rose farm in 2000, when private banks would not lend the firm, and the owner later noted they ‘would not have 
proceeded with the investment without this loan’ (Dinh et al., 2012, p.100). 
97 This is one of the post-2005 priority projects. According to one official the bank ‘has enabled the government to 
build 400,000 condominium houses using money from DBE. If this were a private bank, it would have been a higher 
rate to borrow, or not possible’ (EG-3).  
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As a result, the EPRDF has retained significant levels of control over patterns of 
resource allocation in the Ethiopian economy which have been deployed to service its 
developmental priorities.  
 
Beyond finance, the EPRDF has retained extensive state ownership over strategic 
infrastructure, industries and services during the 1990s. After 2001, privatisation efforts 
slowed down (Weis, 2016), with just ten firms privatised between 2003-2005 (World 
Bank, 2007a). Whilst some large enterprises didn’t attract significant interest from 
potential buyers (World Bank, 2003a, p.26) the political limits of privatisation also 
appeared to have been reached, with tensions with the IFIs again surfacing over this 
issue.98 As a result, in the mid-2000s public enterprises accounted for more than half of 
the country’s industrial output (IMF, 2006c, p.5), dominated medium and large 
industries (and predominantly the country’s capital intensive industries), and accounted 
for nearly 55 per cent of manufactured exports in 2000-2001 (World Bank, 2004a). In 
the endowment-owned sector, EFFORT was also reorganised in 2001 into five 
commercial business units: engineering and construction; manufacturing; service; agro-
processing; and mining (Vaughan and Mesfin Gebremichael, 2011, p. 38). One recent 
estimate suggests that endowment firms employ more than 25,000 people in more than 
twenty enterprises, with a capital outlay around US$ 1 billion (Oqubay, 2015, p.71).  
 
Furthermore, in 2005 a new Proclamation (no. 471/2005) gave individual Ministries the 
task of making the public enterprises accountable to them ‘operate as development 
catalysts’ (FDRE, 2005). Thereafter, state enterprises became vital vehicles for 
infrastructure investments. During PASDEP, excess reserves held by the CBE (34.7 per 
cent of deposits at the end of 2005) emerged as a major policy concern, coming to be 
seen as a source of domestic “savings” that could be utilised to fund higher MDG-related 
infrastructure spending (IMF, 2006b, p.17). Public enterprises in turn were seen to be 
key instruments of such investments, and the state-owned monopolies in electricity and 
telecoms – Ethiopian Electricity and Power Company (EEPCO) and Ethiopian 
Telecommunications Corporation (later renamed Ethio Telecom) – undertook 
investments to expand coverage and connectivity levels, with a significant share 
financed by government-guaranteed bond sales to CBE (IMF, 2006b). Since that time, 
                                                   
98 Meles Zenawi objected in 2003 that: ‘[t]he International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been pressing the government 
to sell all these state firms, but we have resisted these measures which would result in the collapse of our businesses’ 
(BBC, 2003). 
120 
  
the central state budget has tended to be used for road infrastructure and education 
investments, whilst state enterprises undertake investments in energy, rail, telecoms, 
industry and housing (World Bank, 2016a). In GTP I  state enterprise financing for off-
budget infrastructure and industrial development projects was set to come from 
borrowing (70 per cent) and enterprises’ own sources (30 per cent) (MOFED, 2010, 
p.41). The use of state enterprises in this way side-steps fiscal discipline-related 
constraints as SOEs are only constrained by the availability of loans (domestic or 
external) (World Bank, 2016a, viii). 
 
The result has been a steady increase in the role of off-budget state enterprise activities 
in total domestic credit (Figure 4.2). The World Bank estimates that capital expenditure 
from five of the country’s major state enterprises sharply increased in 2010-2011 to 7.7 
per cent of GDP (Table 4.3), and by 2016-2017, domestic borrowing by all state 
enterprises (through loans or bond issuance from domestic banks) was 13.5 per cent of 
GDP (IMF, 2018a). State enterprises have also contracted external debts (IMF, 2015b)99 
and were major beneficiaries of the country’s first sovereign bond in 2015. The US$ 1 
billion Eurobond mobilised funds to support industrial park development (see Section 
4.3), sugar sector, power transmission infrastructure, road network expansion and Addis 
Ababa’s Bole International Airport expansion (IMF, 2015b) – all of which were 
undertaken through its state enterprises.  
 
  
                                                   
99 Whilst neither the debts of Ethiopian Airlines or Ethio Telecom are publicly guaranteed, the latter’s debts are still 
counted in IMF estimates of overall public and publicly guaranteed debt (IMF, 2018a).  
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Figure 4.2 Ethiopia: Composition of domestic credit (percentage of total), 2007-2008 to 2015-2016 
 
 
Note: data is partial since it excludes lending from DBE in private credit 
Source: World Bank (2016e). 
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Table 4.3 Ethiopia: Capital expenditure of major SOEs (million, Birr and percentage of total), 2004-2005 to 2012-2013 
 
Source: World Bank (2016b, p. 12). 
  
Birr % Birr % Birr % Birr % Birr % Birr % Birr % Birr % Birr %
Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation 2,146 51.8 3,223 58.9 5,156 81.8 10,223 84.3 9,742 67.5 11,453 84.5 25,875 65.1 35,353 78.6 37,145 60.0
Ethio Telecom 1,449 35.0 613 11.2 454 7.2 1,603 13.2 3,842 26.6 378 2.8 747 1.9 1,084 2.4 4,079 6.6
Ethiopian Airlines 504 12.2 1,450 26.5 202 3.2 260 2.1 740 5.1 1,533 11.3 11,691 29.4 5,349 11.9 12,616 20.4
Ethiopian Shipping and Logistics Services Enterprise 13 0.3 179 3.3 400 6.3 40 0.3 105 0.7 134 1.0 628 1.6 2,152 4.8 3,379 5.5
Ethiopian Railway Corporation 0 0.0 6 0.1 90 1.4 1 0.0 1 0.0 60 0.4 803 2.0 1,039 2.3 4,644 7.5
Total 4,142 100.0 5,472 100.0 6,302 100.0 12,127 100.0 14,430 100.0 13,557 100.0 39,742 100.0 44,977 100.0 61,863 100.0
Share in GDP 3.9 4.1 3.6 4.8 4.3 3.5 7.7 6 7.2
2010-11 2011-12 2012-132004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10
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In addition to utilising long-standing state entities, new enterprises have also been 
formed and smaller entities consolidated into larger holding company-type structures.100 
For instance, in 2007, the Ethiopian Railway Corporation was formed after talks with 
foreign contractors to build a national rail network broke down, with new state 
enterprises also created in housing (to implement the government’s urban house-
building programme), and industrial zone construction (in line with the strategic priority 
for manufacturing expansion) (Weis, 2016). In distribution, in 2014, the government 
established the first warehouses in a new state-owned wholesale trading enterprise 
called ALLE in an effort to prevent traders artificially increasing prices, which it 
believed was a cause of inflation (Weis, 2016). Meanwhile, the Ethiopian Shipping and 
Logistics Enterprise (ELSE) was formed 2011,101 the Ethiopian Trading Enterprise was 
formed in 2015 (from four enterprises in trade and distribution),102 and in 2017 the 
Ethiopian Airline Holding Group, which brings together seven separate enterprises 
spanning a range of air transportation industries, beyond the national airline. 103 
Concerning the consolidation of state assets into larger entities, one senior government 
official noted that this was part of the EPRDF’s efforts ‘to build the economy’s 
commanding heights’ since, by building larger entities, it would be possible to ‘mobilise 
resources in a way to give the country a competitive advantage’ (EG-15).  
 
In the manufacturing sector, state enterprises have also been afforded a key role in 
helping resolve Ethiopia’s balance of payments constraint by undertaking import-
substitution related activities (such as sugar, fertiliser and heavy industry)104 (FDRE, 
2016b, p.31) as well as export-oriented manufacturing (and constructing the 
infrastructure to make these initiatives viable). One of the most-speculated about state 
                                                   
100 It is hard to get a decisive picture of the overall state sector, since no single body is charged with publishing 
information on, or indeed overseeing, all SOEs, which have been described as a ‘black box’ by EU officials 
(Hackenesch, 2018, p.144). Some estimates (the reliability of which is hard to ascertain) have put the cumulative 
total of what have been called the ‘big five’ Ethiopian state enterprises - Ethiopian Airlines, CBE, the Ethiopian 
Insurance Corporation, Ethio Telecom, and Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation – at around US$7.7 billion (Access 
Capital, 2011, p.59). Rising privatisation proceeds in 2017 helped ease the current account deficit by attracting foreign 
investment, whilst also providing funds to increase budget support for drought-related spending and public sector 
salary increases (IMF, 2018a) 
101 Council of Ministers Regulation no. 255/2011. It manages three major enterprises, Ethiopian Shipping Lines S.C, 
Maritime and Transit Services Enterprise, and Dry Port Enterprise, Comet Transport S.C. 
102 Proclamation no.  916/2015. These included ALLE, as well as older enterprises Ethiopian Grain Trade Enterprise, 
Ethiopian Fruit and Vegetable Sh.Co, and Procurement Service Enterprise (ETBC, 2018) 
103 Council of Ministers Regulation no. 406/2017. This includes the passenger airline Ethiopian Airlines, Ethiopian 
Airports Enterprises, Cargo Airline and Logistics Company, Ethiopian Aviation Academy, Ethiopian Inflight 
Catering Services, Ethiopia MRO Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul Services, and Ethiopian Hotel and Tourism 
Services. 
104 Following the success of state-led import-substituting industrialisation in the cement sector during GTP I (Oqubay, 
2015). 
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conglomerates of this period is the Metal and Engineering Corporation of Ethiopia 
(METEC), established in 2010, to, in the words of one senior government official, 
‘intervene in mega-projects’ where the private sector lacks the ‘interest and capacity to 
invest’ (EG-18). METEC has, for instance, acted as a primary engineering contractor 
on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), and was a broker for technology 
transfer (training and subcontracting to smaller domestic businesses), and partner in 
joint ventures with foreign companies (Weis, 2016, p. 299-300). It set up the High Tech 
Industry in 2011 to make electronic and electro-mechanical products such as 
communications radios, radar systems, TVs, mobile telephones and security cameras 
(Belete and Tadesse, 2014), and took over the Dire Dawa Railway Enterprise in 2011, 
assembling railway carriages and cargo trains with the objective of saving foreign 
currency, with further plans to export carriages to foreign markets (FDRE, 2016a). In 
2014 it established the Tatek Transformer Production Factory to reduce the country’s 
large import bill for the transformers that form the bedrock of its rapid hydroelectric 
expansion plants (Gebrehiwot, 2015). 
 
Import-substituting state investments also include the Ethiopian Sugar Corporation, 
formed in 2010 (Regulation No. 192/2010), incorporating four factories and the 
previous Ethiopian Sugar Development Agency, with the goal to meet growing 
domestic demand, create employment and generate export earnings (Kamski, 2016).  
The corporation has received support in the form of capital investments, the provision 
of land for cultivation, and government-guaranteed loans and export credits as part of 
efforts to modernise and expand existing facilities and develop sugarcane processing 
facilities (Kamski, 2016). The Ethiopian Chemical Industry Corporation (CIC) was 
formed in 2013105 with a mandate to manufacture and market fertilisers, cement, rubber 
tree products and other chemical products both domestically and for export.106 The 
Ethiopian Agricultural Business Corporation, formed in 2015 (Proclamation no. 
368/2015), incorporated five enterprises in input supply, agro-processing and equipment 
provision. These developments reflect a trend toward the formation of groupings of state 
enterprises according to their sectoral footprint. According to Weis (2016, p. 297) ‘with 
capital endowments of several billion Birr each, the newly established corporations were 
                                                   
105 Council of Ministers Regulation no. 280/2012. 
106 Incorporating the Mugher Cement Factory and others such as Adami Tulu Pesticide, Awash Melkasa 
Aluminium Sulphate, Caustic Soda, the Natural Rubber Tree Development Production Project and the Coal-Based 
Urea Complex. 
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on par with the largest of the existing parastatals and well above the reach of the private 
competition’. One government official noted that state enterprises are needed in 
infrastructure, industrial parks, water, electricity, sugar and railways because ‘here we 
can’t get private investment’ (EG-12). 
 
Beyond these major flagship industries, a 2010 study found a notable state presence in 
oilseed and pulses, garment production (six SOEs out of a total of 25 enterprises), cotton 
farming (accounting for 35 per cent of production and 40 per cent of land), coffee 
plantations, cotton yarn dying (done entirely by SOEs), pharmaceuticals, fruit and 
vegetable processing (such as marmalade and tomato juice and paste) and shoe 
production (Sutton and Kellow, 2010). State enterprises have also been used to develop 
domestic linkages, with foreign investors in joint ventures required to ensure that 30 per 
cent of inputs are made up from domestic content in goods and/or technology 
(Department of State, 2016). During a World Bank funded rural electrification project, 
implemented by EEPCO, the latter was instructed by the government ‘to use local 
materials for its projects to support development of local industries’, such as procuring 
electric meters from METEC (World Bank, 2013c, p.13). Due to the delays produced 
by this requirement, GTP targets on the installation of new connections were missed 
(and IDA financing sacrificed), 107 indicating SOEs have been used to create dynamic 
networks and linkages between and local suppliers. 
 
The state sector is also critical to the country’s export position, and between 2005-2012, 
Ethiopian Airlines was the country’s biggest export earner, contributing three times the 
export earnings of the largest commodity, coffee (World Bank, 2014a). Services 
contributed more than half the country’s exports between 2005 and 2015, the majority 
from transport and travel services (World Bank, 2018b). The state owned electricity 
company, with costs amongst the lowest in sub-Saharan Africa has set out plans to 
become a major regional electricity exporter (IMF, 2017). Meanwhile, in the export-
oriented domestic textile sector, three out of the four largest vertically-integrated 
enterprises are either state or endowment-owned (Hauge, 2018). 
 
                                                   
107 The delays produced by such conditions ultimately limited the amount of credit the government was able to 
access under this particular project (World Bank, 2013c). 
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Whilst the performance and significance of the state sector as a whole is hard to gauge 
given the paucity of data, the economy’s overall performance suggests it is unlikely to 
be a drag on growth. Instead, such investments in infrastructure from state enterprises 
have played a critical growth-supporting role, increasing electrification and telecoms 
coverage. Ethiopia’s state enterprises are now key participants in a wide-range of 
strategic economic sectors, from transport (rail; logistics; road; shipping; air travel), 
industry (sugar; chemicals; metals engineering; agricultural works; textile and garments; 
fertiliser; alcohol; pulp and paper), energy (electricity and mining), utilities (telecoms; 
postal service); trade; tourism and hospitality (hotels; tourism; spa service); construction; 
and finance (banks and insurance). At the level of individual enterprises, the national 
airline and cement sector stand out as major success stories (Oqubay, 2015). However, 
others have struggled significantly. The Ethiopian sugar sector has failed to meet 
important export targets set in the GTP I (Kamski, 2016). The performance of METEC 
is also highly controversial, with some reduction in import dependence in sectors it 
operates in between 2008-09 to 2012-13 in tyres and plastic (from 95 per cent to 85 per 
cent) and in machinery and equipment (imports fell from 94 per cent to 67 per cent) 
(FDRE, 2016b, p.21) but in 2018 a number of its contracts for flagship projects were 
put under review or cancelled, including sugar (Manek, 2018a) and fertiliser (Manek, 
2018b). 
 
In addition to the state finance-industry-infrastructure nexus, the post-2003 industrial 
policy mix also includes export promotion measures in priority manufacturing sectors 
including export targets; the retention of foreign exchange earnings and duty drawback 
bonded warehouse and voucher schemes; priority allocation of foreign exchange 
earnings in times of scarcity, targeted at priority manufacturing sectors; currency 
devaluation (notably in 2017, a departure from the trend toward overvaluation noted 
above); investment incentives and one-step service for foreign investors, particularly in 
priority sectors (discussed in more detail in Section 4.3); trade protection (including 
tariffs targeted at domestic production in automotives and other heavy manufacturing 
industries, as well as finished light manufactures such as apparel) and import and export 
bans to promote production (e.g. of cement) and value-addition (e.g. in leather); and 
sectorally specific support for institutional and technological learning for instance in 
(cement, horticulture, leather and textiles) (Oqubay, 2018; Chang and Hauge, 2019). 
Subsidies, including in the leasing of land and for the salaries of foreign experts, as well 
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as reduced interest rates for loans from the CBE and DBE for priority sectors, and tax 
exemptions are some of the most notable supporting measures offered to enterprises in 
strategic sectors (Hauge, 2018; Chang and Hauge, 2019). 
 
4.2.2 Mobilising and managing external finance 
 
In addition to increased domestic lending from within the domestic financial system, 
ODA also increased markedly (Figure 4.3) and in 2016 Ethiopia replaced Afghanistan 
as the world’s largest ODA recipient (Development Initiatives, 2018). Ethiopia was also 
the top IDA borrower in the 2016 (World Bank, 2017a) and 2018 financial years (World 
Bank, 2018c), and IDA funds how comprise 26.8 per cent of Ethiopia’s external public 
debt (as of mid-2017) (Table 4.4). As a result, increases in some common measures of 
aid dependence occurred after this time, particularly until around 2011 (Table 4.5), and 
according to country programmable aid estimates – often considered a better proxy for 
the ‘real aid’ over which developing countries can have a significant say – Ethiopia was 
the 15th most aid dependent country in the world in 2009 (Action Aid, 2011, p.20). These 
trends precipitated questions about whether previously strong policy ownership would 
hold out in the context of deepened aid dependence and the growing weight of direct 
budget support in ODA inflows (Whitfield, 2009, p.338). 
 
Table 4.4 Ethiopia: Composition of external public debt (as of end-June 2017) 
 
1 Includes external liabilities of the NBE 
Source: IMF (2017).     
 
 
 
 
  
US$ million Per cent of total
Per cent of 
GDP
Total1 24,492 100.0 3.6
18,061 73.7 22.6
Multilaterals 9,067 37.0 11.3
IDA 6,564 26.8 8.2
IMF 152 0.6 0.2
AfDB 1,684 6.9 2.1
Other multilaterals 667 2.7 0.8
Bilaterals1 8,994 36.7 11.2
Paris Club 380 1.6 0.5
Non-Paris Club1 8,614 35.2 10.8
6,431 26.3 8.0
(Of which) bond and notes holders 1,000 4.1 1.2
Private creditors
Official creditors1
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Figure 4.3 Ethiopia: Total ODA receipts (US$ billion, current values), 1991-2016 
 
Source: OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) (2018a).  
 
Yet, validating the insight that aid dependence encompasses a complex of political, 
historical, cultural and other factors (not only economic inflows) (Bräutigam, 2000), 
Ethiopia has managed to combine being one of the world’s leading recipients of ODA, 
a top IDA recipient, and one of the world’s most successful challengers to neoliberal 
development orthodoxies. Indeed, its heterodox developmentalism is conceded in a 
major recent World Bank report which acknowledges that during its period of rapid 
growth Ethiopia undertook no major orthodox structural reforms, noting that 
‘[r]emarkably, Ethiopia achieved high growth despite generally not following consensus 
view on how to achieve it’ (Moller, 2016, p.16).108 This striking reality can be attributed 
to the combination of the EPRDF’s assertive engagement with the international aid 
architecture and deepened divisions between the IFIs and bilaterals about strategies for 
engaging with the EPRDF, which have been exacerbated by successes of the EPRDF’s 
development strategies and its emergence as a “donor darling” (Hagmann and Reyntjens, 
2016, p.5). Notably, ODA inflows have also strongly helped the EPRDF achieve its 
                                                   
108 The report says of 16 policy areas that characterise fast-growing economies identified by the Growth Commission 
(the ‘current consensus’ on the kinds of development policies necessary for rapid and sustained growth), Ethiopia 
only conforms in three areas (committed, credible, and capable government; high investment rates; and 
macroeconomic stability). It also says ‘Ethiopia implemented a number of what the Growth Report cites as suboptimal 
policies, such as energy subsidies, open-ended protection of some sectors, price controls and export bans’ (Moller, 
2016, p.16). 
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heterodox developmental agenda. In 2015, Ethiopia had 7.5 per cent of all ODA to 
Africa (committed), but 11.0 per cent of all Africa’s ODA for productive activity, 
and14.4 per cent of Ethiopia’s ODA was for productive use, versus an African average 
of 9.9 per cent (OECD-DAC, 2018b).  Within the World Bank’s Country Programme 
Strategy 2013-2016, during which time IDA approved US$ 6.7 billion in new 
commitments, 44 per cent of lending was targeted at social protection initiatives,109 and 
the remainder divided between transport infrastructure, energy and mining, agriculture 
and rural development, and urban development (in order of the size of the commitment) 
reflecting strong alignment with the GTP strategy (World Bank, 2017a).  
 
Table 4.5 Ethiopia: Indicators of aid dependence, 1990-2016 
 
.. indicates missing data  
Source: OECD DAC (2018). 
 
To understand these trends, attention to four factors is important. The first lies on the 
side of those providing Ethiopia’s financing. Its high rates of poverty reduction and 
rapid growth, combined with its rising geo-political significance as a key US ally in the 
“war on terror” (Prizzon and Rogerson, 2013) (see Section 4.4), have, in this period, 
increased funders’ incentives to remain engaged (despite disagreements), and those with 
large lending programmes have been particularly keen not to see these interrupted. A 
World Bank review of its Ethiopia programmes between 1998-2006 reveals internal 
uncertainty about how to deal with Ethiopia given the EPRDF’s ‘strong belief in its 
development model’ and the Bank’s own ‘strong incentive to lend and to remain 
engaged’ (World Bank, 2008, xvii).  
                                                   
109 In contrast with mainstream social protection programmes, Ethiopia’s has a productive bias (Lavers, 2016). 
1990 2000 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
8.3 8.4 12.2 11.8 11.6 11.0 7.5 8.2 6.5 5.0 5.6
1990 2000 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
.. .. .. .. .. 34.1 20.2 23.9 17.0 12.3 14.1
1990 2000 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
74.8 41.1 34.4 42.1 34.6 29.8 22.8 27.1 19.5 16.1 20.00
1990 2000 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
51.5 .. 95.1 97.0 92.3 103.4 88.4 79.9 .. .. ..
Net ODA as percentage of GNI
Net ODA as a percentage of gross capital formation
Net ODA as a percentage of imports of goods, services and primary income
Net ODA as a percentage of central government expenditure
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Similar concerns are evident in internal IMF documents discussing the 2001 PRGF loan 
(fully disbursed by 2004). These noted that Ethiopia presented the Fund with a dilemma 
since it feared that had it imposed harsher terms, that may have ‘resulted in either failed, 
or no, Fund-supported programs’ (IMF, 2005c, p.4). In fieldwork interviews, one senior 
donor agency official noted that this desire to retain cordial relations with the 
government had weakened some donors’ ‘willingness to tackle delicate issues’, and only 
a small group still believed that ‘we have space [to pressure the government] and we 
have to use it’ (EE-4). Such enhanced leverage is well noted by government officials, 
with one remarking during interviews that ‘funders are pleased with the continuous 
achievement of the government and have adopted increasingly accommodating policies’ 
(EG-2). Such factors help to explain why, despite threats to cut funding in the wake of 
the 2005 election crackdowns, the government and some major multilateral and bilateral 
donors actually worked together to create a new funding modality, the Protection of 
Basic Services programme, to ensure the continuation of concessional flows 
(Borchgrevink, 2008; Furtado and Smith, 2009; Prizzon and Rogerson, 2013).  
 
Second the EPRDF has deployed adroit donor management techniques that have helped 
exploited deepened divisions between the IFIs in order to develop an increasingly close 
relationship with the World Bank, and an increasingly arms’ length one with the IMF. 
One government official noted that historically the ‘World Bank has been equally as 
difficult [as the IMF], but things are changing there as a result of the results of the last 
decade’ (EG-2). Indeed, past tensions, the same official suggested, had ‘taught the Bank 
a lesson’ (EG-2), prompting it to become much more accommodating and flexible. 
Management of the intellectual space in which development strategies are debated and 
constructed has been key here, as the role of analytical work has increased, with the 
official noting there had recently been ‘greater involvement in technical assistance and 
other forms of collaboration between the Bank and government’ (EG-2). According to 
another senior official, since around 2012, the number of workshops, seminars, 
consultants and other initiatives had markedly increased ‘whose idea is to influence 
policy’ through more subtle means than past policy conditionalities (EG-23). This 
reflects an attempt by the Bank to use its intellectual muscle to try and influence the 
nature of development policy-making in line with its stature as a ‘knowledge bank’ (see 
Chapter 2). 
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Yet, notably, in the Ethiopian context, analytical work and policy dialogues are by no 
means straightforward vehicles for policy influence, and the EPRDF has opted to give 
IFIs and donors the impression they have a voice in the policy process, with one senior 
government official noting ‘importance is placed on making sure partners feel listened 
to’ (EG-1). Officials in the Ministry of Finance110 have proactively responded to World 
Bank frustration that its reports were previously being ignored by becoming pro-actively 
engaged in shaping the Bank’s analytical work, both shaping the terms of reference and 
by giving feedback on draft reports (EG-2). It has also intervened in these research 
outputs to offer forceful rebuttals of misconceptions or misrepresentations of its 
approach, with one official noting that by being involved in the commissioning of 
analytical outputs ‘we want to be sure that reports also reflect our views and perspectives’ 
(EG-2). This is particularly true for how the economy is represented since one senior 
official noted that IMF ‘reports are read by members and donors, and we would like 
them to provide them with confidence [in our approach]’ (EG-1).111 This process of 
active intervention in analytical work was noted by an IFI official thus ‘[m]ost reports 
can only be released if the government is happy with them, so there is a tendency to put 
things in a favourable way. Presentation is very important’ (EI-6). Another IFI official 
noted that despite ongoing concerns about official growth figures, both IFIs now use 
government figures, adding ‘[t]he government is very keen to avoid criticism’ (EI-5).  
 
Furthermore, such strategies have provided an opening for accessing additional IDA 
loans.  A Ministry of Finance official noted in March 2016 that a recent issue of the 
World Bank’s Ethiopia Economic Update report had involved considerable 
disagreements over the Bank’s claims that state enterprises received the lion’s share of 
domestic financing and were crowding out the private sector which culminated in a joint 
report examining issues surrounding “access to finance” in Ethiopia in-depth (EG-2). 
The results reportedly showed most medium and large firms had no problem accessing 
finance, and micro and very small enterprises were able access funds through micro-
finance initiatives. However, access to finance was found to be particularly challenging 
at the higher-end of the small and lower end of medium-sized enterprises, where a 
‘missing middle’ was identified (see World Bank, 2015).  
                                                   
110 The Ministry, formerly known as MOFED (Ministry of Finance and Economic Development), is now known as  
Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation (MOFEC). 
111 Here an IFI official noted of the IMF’s Article IV reports that ‘rating agencies use and rely on the report’ which 
adds to their importance since the government ‘want[s] to go to the international capital market at some point’ (EI-
5). 
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As a result of this report, which originated in policy disagreements between the 
government and World Bank, a new Bank-funded project worth US$ 200 million 
emerged in 2016 to channel resources through DBE and other domestic financial 
institutions toward such enterprises (see World Bank, 2016f). This deftness in using the 
ODA architecture to increase ODA inflows displays considerable pragmatism, with one 
senior official noting that whilst ‘neoliberal thinking is the enemy’, this ‘doesn’t make 
us not work with particular institutions … [our] internal strength is the ability to work 
with all [partners]’ (EG-4). To find these opportunities to work with all potential 
financial institutions, government officials said it ‘decides which sectors investment is 
wanted in, and then works with donors to fill those gaps’, effectively presenting a menu 
of options (previously agreed by the government) (EG-2). 
 
Third, in common with the first period, the EPRDF has retained the space to forgo 
resources when the conditions become too onerous, with one senior official noting that 
‘we don’t get as much resource as we would otherwise get [if we complied]’ and that 
‘the cost is there and the government is ready to pay it’ (EG-1). This is forcefully 
illustrated by the near-total breakdown of the EPRDF’s relations with the IMF after 
2014. Whilst the 2001 Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PGRF) programme was 
fully disbursed, and Ethiopia reached the HIPC completion point in 2004 (IMF, 
2005b),112 the funds from the PGRF loan (along with other ODA inflows), were used to 
bolster the country’s international reserves, which had been depleted during the conflict 
with Eritrea (rather than being spent through the budget), which meant that alongside 
the drop in defence expenditure, this period in fact saw a fiscal contraction (Mahone, 
2007). This insulated Ethiopia from the need for IMF lending until 2009 when it 
contracted two Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF) loans following a serious drop in 
Ethiopia’s international reserves (to one month of imports at the end of 2008) thanks to 
high international prices for key imports such as oil, fertiliser and food, resulting in the 
balance of payments situation reaching a ‘position of immediate and serious 
vulnerability’ (IMF, 2009, p.5).  
 
Whilst these loans moderated public sector borrowing, and saw adjustment to the 
exchange rate and tax reforms, the IMF noted at the time that any future arrangements 
would need to adjust ‘the investment climate, trade and exchange liberalization, and 
                                                   
112 As well as further multilateral debt relief under the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative in 2006 (IMF, 2009). 
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financial sector development, anchored around sound fiscal and monetary policies’ 
(IMF, 2010b, p.9).113 However, no such lending programmes were sought out by the 
government, and instead the IMF’s Resident Representative in Ethiopia between 2012-
2014, Jan Mikkelsen, began to issue increasingly strong public warnings about the 
country’s development model, urging it to ‘seek help’ and ‘open up’ the economy 
(Giorgis, 2013). Such statements drew a hostile response from the government, with the 
Fund’s own internal review noting its approach had ‘exaggerated the dangers’ of 
Ethiopia’s investment strategy, diminishing its credibility and ‘triggered severe 
reactance’ from the government, adding that in Ethiopia ‘[t]he Fund is very far from 
being an influential actor’ (Acquah et al., 2014, pp.23, 24). In response, the IMF no 
longer has a Resident Representative in the country, since, in the words of one IFI 
official, the EPRDF ‘is not in listening mode’ (EI-5). On the government’s part, a major 
emphasis is now placed on avoiding the sort of macroeconomic crisis that would compel 
it to contract IMF lending (see Section 4.3).  
 
Fourth, and finally, the concessional and non-concessional lending from non-traditional 
partners has also markedly increased. Between mid-2012 and mid-2017 public and 
publicly-guaranteed external debt rose from 18.0 per cent of GDP to 30.7 per cent, and 
total debt, including domestic public debt, reached 57.0 per cent of GDP (IMF, 2017).114 
Non-Paris Club members constituted the single biggest source of external public debt 
in mid-2017, closely followed by IDA and private creditors, which together accounted 
for 88.3 per cent of the external debt, totalling US$ 21.6 billion (Table 4.4). China’s 
multi-faceted approach to political and economic cooperation with Ethiopia 
(Hackenesch, 2013) 115 has involved extensive loan facilities. Since 2006, the EPRDF 
has undertaken a total of US$ 13.1 billion in loans from Chinese creditors with US$ 10.5 
billion of that contracted since 2011 (Atkins et al., 2017). Since 2000, 33.5 per cent of 
Chinese lending has gone to the transport sector, 24.2 to communications, 19.5 to power, 
and 15.5 per cent to industry (not including mining) (Atkins et al., 2017), deviating from 
standard patterns across Africa which are primarily resource-driven (Adem, 2012). 
                                                   
113 For instance, it was said in the second and final review of the ESF that ‘Program performance has been satisfactory 
with all of the quantitative performance targets met with margins and structural benchmarks implemented’ (IMF, 
2010, Second Review p. 33).  
114 These figures include the debt of federal, regional and state enterprises that borrow externally (bar Ethiopian 
Airlines), as well as the NBE (the inclusion of borrowing by Ethio Telecom is a point of controversy between the 
Fund and government since its exclusion makes an impact on the Debt Sustainability Analysis). 
115 Other ‘non-traditional’ loans have included a US$ 650 million loan to the Indian Import-Export Bank for one of 
the GTP I’s sugar factories (Shiferaw, 2017). 
134 
  
Strategic projects supported by Chinese loans between 2012 and 2013 alone included 
power generation and distribution, railway construction, sugar manufacturing and 
telecoms (Cheru, 2016). 116  
 
Government officials note that Chinese loans and aid have a number of benefits over 
those of Western institutions, bolstering its capacity to implement its ambitious 
development strategy. Here one official noted that ‘China is used for projects where 
World Bank and the African Development Bank are not interested’ (EG-2). Furthermore, 
given that accessing Western private non-concessional financing has been challenging 
given Ethiopia’s LDC status, China is seen as an easy source of financing, particularly 
since state ownership over both construction companies and banks eases the approval 
of loans. One official noted here that the government was glad that Chinese construction 
firms push banks to fund Ethiopian projects on the EPRDF’s behalf (EG-17). 
Furthermore, when the government is interested in getting a project completed quickly, 
Chinese financing is preferred over IFI funding where feasibility, environmental and 
other studies are needed. In contrast, if China is financing a project, he noted ‘you can 
do it much faster’ (EG-2). However, on the downside, strings attached to Chinese loans 
and aid were seen as a possible downside, since ‘if we borrow from China, the 
implementer should be a Chinese firm’ (EG-17). Nevertheless, China has emerged as 
Ethiopia’s biggest trading partner, and EPRDF officials regularly go to the China 
Communist Party school in Beijing (Ziso, 2018). It is also a source of ‘heterodox policy 
comfort’ (Prizzon and Rogerson, 2013, vi) and policy inspiration (Fourie, 2015), and 
China’s trajectory is used by the EPRDF to deflect criticism of its model. One senior 
financial institution official claimed that whenever the institution stresses the need to 
give the private sector more space, it is greeted with the response that: ‘China managed 
to sustain this path, so why can’t we?’ (EI-1).  
 
The EPRDF’s capacity to mobilise foreign savings in service of its investment drive has 
been a major feature of its more assertive developmental phase. However, this has also 
brought new problems. Foreign loan repayment obligations have emerged as a major 
concern, with poor export performance a particular worry. Here, one government 
                                                   
116 By OECD definitions many of the loans Ethiopia receives from China would not count as ODA since they are 
designed to support Chinese exports and the level of concession offered it not low enough (Hackenesch, 2013). For 
instance, in telecoms a 2007 US$ 1.5 billion loan from the Export-Import Bank of China through the Chinese 
equipment vendor Zhongxing Telecom Corporation (ZTE) was followed by a US$ 1.6 billion loan in 2013 (for 
Huawei and ZTE) to expand infrastructure (Adam, 2012). 
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official noted in February 2016 that 'unless we improve [export earnings] it will be a 
challenge to repay and cover the interest,’ especially since the end of the grace period 
for many loans was looming: ‘we are still not repaying much, in two years there will be 
repayments’ (EG-17). Signalling this risk, in 2017, the IMF raised Ethiopia’s risk of 
external debt distress from ‘moderate’ to ‘high’ after the public debt-to-GDP ratio 
increased from 36.3 per cent in 2011-2012 to 54.9 per cent in 2016-2017, and the debt 
service-to-export ratio doubled between 2013-2014 and June 2017 from 10.3 per cent 
to 19.6 per cent (World Bank, 2018b).   
 
4.3 Hitting the limits: the turn toward GVCs  
 
A highly significant response by the EPRDF to  hitting against the limits of its capacity 
to undertake additional external financing in service of its developmental approach has 
been an effort to increase domestic resource mobilisation, with savings increasing from 
17.2 per cent of GDP in 2010-2011 to 24.0 per cent of GDP in 2016-2017 (UNDP, 2018) 
and tax revenues increasing 31.0 per cent per year between 2009-2010 and 2014-2015 
(FDRE, 2016b). However, a more binding constraint has been the stress on foreign 
exchange (needed both to repay mounting foreign debt obligations and meet the heavy 
import demands of the EPRDF’s model). Notably here, there has been a major 
adjustment to the EPRDF’s developmental strategy as it has undertaken a major push 
toward export diversification and integration of Ethiopia into the GVC modality of light 
manufacturing. This strategy, as well as the new constraints it has given rise to, are 
explored in turn.  
 
4.3.1 Preserving the nexus: embracing GVCs   
 
In line with the urgent need to diversify its export earnings, a major adjustment to 
Ethiopian developmentalism emerged toward the end of the first GTP, which the GTP 
II outlines as taking the form of efforts ‘to make Ethiopia a leading manufacturing hub 
in Africa’ (FDRE, 2016b, p.136). To do so, the strategy identifies that the government 
needs to ‘make an informed, proactive and selective attraction of high quality FDIs’ in 
export-oriented light manufacturing (FDRE, 2016b, p.141). The rationale given for this 
FDI focus is that: 
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[T]he base of the manufacturing sector is very narrow which in turn needs 
massive investment expansion in the sector … As domestic investors have 
limited capacity to meet all the required investment in the next few years, a 
significant part of the investment will be covered by foreign direct investment. 
(FDRE, 2016b, p.141) 
 
This comprehensive turn toward FDI in light manufacturing builds on past success in 
attracting foreign investors into the cut-flower sector, which, after 2004 emerged as a 
major export-earner, which increased from US$ 0.32 million in 2003-2004 to US$ 200 
million in 2011-2012, creating around 40,000 jobs (Oqubay, 2015). As Schäfer (2016) 
notes, the floriculture sector taught the EPRDF that decisive state interventions to 
support foreign capital in key export-oriented economic sectors could power rapid 
transformations in its foreign exchange-earning potential, a path it is now seeking to 
replicate in the manufacturing sector.   
 
In line with these plans, the country has very recently emerged as ‘one of the new 
alternatives or frontiers of apparel sourcing’ (Staritz et al., 2016, p.1). Accordingly, FDI 
inflows into Ethiopia more than quadrupled between 2011 and 2016 (Figure 4.4). In 
July 2016 the new state-owned Hawassa Industrial park was inaugurated (Mihretu, and 
Llobet, 2017), and as of April 2017 it comprised 35 factories over 1.3 million square 
metres, and 15 foreign investors including leading US apparel firm Phillips-Van Heusen 
Corporation (PVH), owner of Calvin Klein and Tommy Hilfiger, and Indian apparel 
maker Raymond Group, as well as six domestic firms (MOFEC, 2017, p.10). Between 
2000-2012 FDI inflows to Ethiopia averaged just US$ 0.3 billion, but after a sharp 
increase from 2013  (Figure 4.4), by 2016 Ethiopia became the second largest LDC 
recipient of FDI (up from the fifth position in 2015) (UNCTAD, 2017b), and second 
largest in Africa in 2017 (after Egypt), despite a small contraction (UNCTAD, 
2018d).117 After Ethiopia lifted a state of emergency in the second half of 2017, imposed 
due to growing domestic unrest (see Section 4.3.2), new Chinese and Turkish 
investments in light manufacturing and auto-motives were announced, in addition to 
PVH, Dubai firm Velocity Apparelz Companies (supplier of Levi’s, Zara and Under 
Armour) and China’s Jiangsu Sunshine Group (supplier of Giorgio Armani and Hugo 
Boss), which had already established factories in Ethiopia (UNCTAD, 2018d).  
                                                   
117 According to UNCTAD (2018d) FDI inflows into Ethiopia were markedly more resilient than other African 
economies in 2017. 
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Figure 4.4 Ethiopia: FDI inflows (US$ billion), 1990-2017 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2018e). 
 
Table 4.6 Ethiopia: Sectoral distribution of operational FDI projects (percentage of total capital), 
2011-2015 
 
Source: EIC (2016).  
 
As Table 4.6 shows, both manufacturing and construction have dominated foreign 
investment inflows in Ethiopia since 2011, and both far outstrip investments in other 
areas (apart from a one-off spike in real estate related investment in 2014), marking 
Ethiopia out from both African and LDC countries. Indeed, in these contexts, where FDI 
has been largely commodity-driven, inflows have recently exhibited a marked declining 
trend (UNCTAD, 2017b; UNCTAD, 2018d). 118  Major (non-light) manufacturing 
projects included the second largest greenfield FDI project amongst LDCs in 2016, into 
                                                   
118 Thus even the contraction in 2017 was less marked by those economies more dependent on FDI into commodity 
sectors (UNCTAD, 2018d). 
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Hotels and restaurants 0.7 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.3
Tour operation, transport and communication 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.8
Real estate, machinery and equipment rental and consultancy service 4.3 4.1 0.4 35.4 4.5
Construction contracts 3.3 9.0 13.6 5.8 29.9
Others 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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a joint venture between state-run CIC and leading Moroccan fertiliser manufacturer 
ultimately set to be worth US$ 3.7 billion (UNCTAD, 2017b). Undoubtedly such 
developments have been informed by global shifts such as rising costs of materials, 
energy, and labour in Asia, which have propelled lead firms in apparel and footwear to 
search for alternative low-cost sourcing destinations (Mihretu, and Llobet, 2017) where 
Ethiopia has a labour cost advantage (Table 4.7). However, equally significant has been 
the directional thrust imparted by government interventions through the state finance-
industry-infrastructure nexus, and GVCs have in turn been embraced to protect the 
nexus from threats posed by the intensified pressure on its balance of payments.  
 
Table 4.7 Ethiopia, China and Vietnam: Light manufacturing wages (US$/month)  
 
Source: Global Development Solutions (2011, p. 40). 
 
One step toward this light manufacturing trajectory was made in 2009, with the opening 
of the country’s first industrial park, the Chinese-owned Eastern Industrial Zone (EIZ) 
as a base for light manufacturing and construction material production, and which 
entailed high-levels of government support (Giannecchini and Taylor, 2018). 119 
However, the formation of the state-owned Industrial Parks Development Corporation 
(IPDC)120 in 2014 markedly intensified the significance of this new pillar of Ethiopian 
developmentalism. To meet what another senior official noted was Ethiopia’s need for 
a ‘massive flow of foreign investment’, and in light of growing awareness of the 
multiple and time-consuming barriers to firms entering Ethiopia he added ‘we have to 
cut this down. So it’s best to go for Industrial Park development’ (EG-10).  Indeed, a 
senior official from one of the world’s second largest apparel firms recently commented 
of the company’s decision to invest in Ethiopia, that ‘in no time in my history have I 
ever seen any one more prepared to attract the apparel sector into its economy. There 
are institutions established, there are rules put in place, and there are airports being built’ 
(Bill McGrath, PVH Chief Supply Chain Officer, quoted in Mihretu, and Llobet, 2017, 
p. 19). Indicative of the high-level of support this strategy has attracted, of the various 
                                                   
119 At present, the EIZ includes manufacturers in cement, construction equipment, steel pipes, steel bars and wire, as 
well as motor vehicles, packaging manufacture, shoes, consumer goods, agricultural machinery and gypsum 
(Giannecchini and Taylor, 2018). 
120 Proclamation no. 326/2014. 
Skilled workers Unskilled workers
China 305-399 197-278
Vietnam 154-235 78-131
Ethiopia 77–131 35–53
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government institutions involved, one senior official noted that these were ‘all 
coordinated at Prime Minister’s Office to make sure [the strategy] doesn’t fail’ (EG-23).  
 
Central to this highly interventionist approach to fostering Ethiopia’s insertion into the 
global GVC regime, the IPDC facilitates land access, infrastructure, utilities, logistics 
and customs, whilst the Ethiopian Investment Commission provides a one-stop-shop for 
foreign investors and Public-Private Dialogue Forums allow investors opportunities for 
dialogue with the Prime Minister and Cabinet (MOFEC, 2017, pp.3–9). This has been 
matched by a relatively orthodox package of incentives for foreign investors to relocate 
the parks (Table 4.8) and adjustments to the macroeconomic framework, particularly 
the 15 per cent devaluation of the Birr in October 2017 (World Bank, 2018b).  
 
Nonetheless, the overall approach remains highly heterodox, in the form of state 
ownership of land and industrial park infrastructure, with state oversight over investors 
in the parks. In contrast to the EIZ, which a senior official noted was a ‘bit costly’ for 
investors, the government-owned parks, building on the state’s ready access to land, 
were designed to be cheaper, built more rapidly and to high environmental specifications, 
with the first in this new generation of parks at Hawassa designed to become ‘the leading 
green industrial park in the world’ (EG-10).  
 
Table 4.8 Ethiopia: Major investment incentives for industrial park enterprises 
 
Source: EIC (2017). 
 
The strategy is also heavily dependent on the state-led economic interventions propelled 
by the broader state finance-infrastructure-industry nexus. In the words of one 
government official, ‘[i]f we simply wait for FDI, it won’t happen ... So we have to 
Income tax exemption (up to 10 years for enterprises with at least 80 per cent export; up to five years
expatriate personal income tax exemption) 
Customs duty exemptions (duty free capital goods and accessories import for manufacturing enterprises;
duty free spare part imports for 100 per cent export firms; duty free imports for raw materials needed for
export; export tax exemption for all products bar semi-processed hides and skins)
Low-cost access to industrial land (through industrial parks)
One-stop-shop service (for permits, licenses, registration, work permits, registration at the EIC HQ; and
services for customs clearance, duty free permits and banking services within industrial parks)
Customs facilitation (transport of materials from customs to factory through bonded warehouse and voucher
schemes)
Expatriate visa benefits (better visa terms for industrial park investors, in the form of multiple entry visas for
up to five years)
Subsidised utilities (electricity for manufacturers at US$ 0.03 per kwh)
Guarantees against expropriation, rights to own immovable property, and guaranteed remittance of funds
Right to open and operate foreign currency accounts 
Fiscal incentives
Non-fiscal incentives
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come up with different programmes, policies and incentives to make this worthwhile 
for them’ (EG-13).  Reflective of the extent of the nexus’ involvement in propelling this 
strategy, the Ministry of Finance recently summarised state support for foreign investors 
in manufacturing as including: suppliers’ credit and DBE loans; the state-funded rapid 
expansion of higher education and road upgrading and construction; railway 
developments such as the Addis-Ababa to Djibouti line (capable of carrying 7.5 million 
tonnes of cargo and 750,000 passengers per year by 2020); air connectivity through 
Ethiopian Airlines, the largest airline on the African continent (with a new cargo 
terminal consisting of 1.2 million tonne capacity); and a multimodal door-to-door cargo 
service (encompassing land transport, sea and dry port services) provided by Ethiopian 
Shipping and Logistics Service Enterprise, the largest ‘fully equipped African logistics 
enterprise’ (MOFEC, 2017, pp.3–9). Meanwhile, through EEPCO, manufacturers 
receive some of the lowest electricity prices in sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2018d), 
whilst funds from Ethiopia’s US$1 billion ten-year sovereign Eurobond have aided the 
construction of these industrial parks (IMF, 2015b).121  With the country’s prohibitive 
trade logistics costs previously a major barrier to entrance into light manufacturing 
(Dinh et al., 2012, p.116), the country’s emergence as a frontier of light manufacturing 
is almost unthinkable without these state-directed investments.  
 
The emergence of this new pillar of Ethiopian developmentalism, which is predicated 
on the reliance on foreign capital to facilitate Ethiopia’s insertion into the low-wage, 
low value-added segments of the global value chain regime, is striking for at least two 
reasons. First, the increased reliance on FDI to power Ethiopia’s growth and economic 
development is particularly notable given the EPRDF’s historic wariness about over-
reliance on foreign capital and the hitherto decidedly circumscribed role of FDI in the 
Ethiopian economy (see Chapter 3). Second, is the apparent embrace of what has 
become a quintessentially ‘neoliberal’ development strategy, predicated on accepting 
rather than challenging its comparative advantage and orienting its economic strategy 
toward creating a business climate conducive to the attraction of foreign investors. 
Indeed, the World Bank has been advising Ethiopia to embrace this modality of 
international integration since at least 2012 (Dinh et al., 2012), seeming to signal a 
                                                   
121 Noting this use of the Eurobond, one senior official laughed whilst noting that in other countries such external 
resources are used for recurrent spending such as salaries (EG-10). 
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convergence between the IFIs and EPRDF over the future of Ethiopia’s development 
strategy.  
 
However, the EPRDF has to date resisted providing the fully liberalised investment 
climate long advocated by the IFIs. Not only is Ethiopia still completely closed to 
foreign investment in retail, finance and telecoms, but it also has a highly restrictive 
investment climate in professional and transport services (World Bank, 2018b). 
Furthermore, rather than a break with its past developmentalism, the EPRDF’s GVC 
strategy is better understood as a tactic to preserve the heterodox nexus (which, as noted 
above, was also used to make the strategy viable in the first place) in light of an 
increasing pressing balance of payments constraint. To date, the transformative agenda 
has imposed heavy foreign exchange requirements (due to heavy import demands and 
growing foreign debt obligations). In tandem with poor export performance, the EPRDF 
has been faced with an increasingly looming threatening balance of payments constraint, 
which, as Schäfer (2016) is of deeply political concern, given the relationship between 
its import-intensive development model as a political survival strategy of the ruling 
coalition.    
 
Whilst some 54 per cent of the resources needed to implement GTP I were in foreign 
currency form, during GTP I the export sector failed to meet targets to increase 
merchandise export earnings from US$ 2.0 billion to US$ 6.5 billion between 2009-
2010 and 2014-2015. In 2014-2015 this stood at just US$ 3.0 billion (FDRE, 2016b, 
pp.15, 104). Contributing factors included delays in projects planned to produce 
commodities for export such as textile and sugar, and the global downturn in commodity 
prices (UNDP, 2017). Key sectors such as textiles and garments only reached 5.7 per 
cent of the planned target (FDRE, 2016b, pp.15, 104). As Table 4.9 indicates, the 
country’s current account deficit worsened appreciably, particularly from 2014 onwards, 
and after 2015 imports were more than three times exports, with reserves dropping to 
1.8 months of imports in 2016. Indicative of the pressure this constraint placed on the 
EPRDF’s development strategy, in 2017 imports of both capital and intermediate goods 
were curtailed in order to ease the country’s balance of payments position (World Bank, 
2018b).  
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Table 4.9 Ethiopia: Balance of payments (US$ BoP current million, unless otherwise stated), 2001-2016 
 
Source: World Bank  (2018g). 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Exports of goods and services 976 1064 1258 1684 1929 2198 2650 3495 3430 4644 5815 5994 6116 6386 6007 5906
Imports of goods and services 2147 2034 2604 3727 4895 5276 6905 9598 9043 9911 11651 14130 14216 18159 19812 19909
Net primary income -32 -23 -24 -29 -5 18 40 2 -37 -64 -77 -97 -131 -176 -285 -410
Net secondary income 830 856 1233 1404 1402 1274 3387 4295 3459 4905 5130 5248 5232 6223 6580 6144
Current account balance -373 -137 -136 -668 -1568 -1786 -828 -1806 -2191 -425 -783 -2985 -2999 -5727 -7511 -8269
Total reserves (includes gold, current US$) 490 966 956 1497 1043 867 1290 871 1781 2241 2837 2302 2364 3525 3835 3031
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Notably, as discussed above, the last time the EPRDF had encountered balance of 
payments problems in 2009 it contracted IMF support. Without export diversification, 
the risk of balance of payments-induced IMF lending has consequently increased. 
Indeed, according to one senior government official, the need to bolster Ethiopia’s 
export-earning capacity is considered an ‘existential matter’ since: ‘[i]f we bring about 
an increase we will survive, but if we fail … we will be dictated to by the IMF’ (EG-1). 
The necessity to move quickly, and to stave off either a marked alteration to its import-
intensive model or contract the sort of conditionality-laden lending that would 
contribute to the dismantling of the EPRDF’s developmental nexus, has thus 
conditioned the EPRDF’s forceful efforts to attract FDI into light manufacturing. As 
one senior official noted ‘[i]f we rest on domestic investors, then we could be waiting a 
very long time’ (EG-15). Whilst state-owned enterprises are seen to be able to contribute 
to resolving these problems (see Section 4.2.1), another official noted that ‘by the nature 
of things, in Ethiopia we can only do SMEs [small and medium-sized enterprises]. The 
government can do large-scale factories, but they will be few and far between’ (EG-13). 
Given the latter constraint, as well as the state sector’s poor performance in key sectors 
such as sugar,122 extensive utilisation of the state finance-infrastructure-industry nexus 
to attract FDI into light manufacturing thus forms part of efforts to sustain a decidedly 
heterodox developmentalism and avoid the disintegration of this model that emergency 
lending from the IMF would precipitate. Furthermore, the rapid increase of 
manufacturing expansion also provides a much-needed motor for large-scale job 
creation in the context of rapid urbanisation and growing social unrest. According to 
one government official ‘[a]s country we need foreign exchange and jobs to sustain 
ourselves’ (EG-21).  
 
In light of these concerns, Ethiopia’s experience with GVCs can be understood as an 
attempt to leverage its low-wage status and integrate into the international division of 
labour through embracing one facet of an orthodox development strategy, but one 
embedded in a much more heterodox development approach that comprises high levels 
of public investment and a nexus of state owned enterprises across the economy’s 
commanding heights. Thus the EPRDF has not embraced GVCs because it has 
converged with the mainstream consensus that this form of integration would be capable 
                                                   
122 Reasons for this include the remoteness of some project sites, costs and complexities of the investments, poor 
planning and lack of expertise, all of which have seen sugar become less of a priority in GTP II (Kamski, 2016). 
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of driving Ethiopia’s catch-up (the state industries discussed in Section 4.2.1 are to play 
a sizeable role here). Rather, the chief role of GVC integration is to relieve pressure 
from growing economic and political challenges.123 It is in this regard that the Ethiopian 
GVC experience should be primarily evaluated, and the opportunities and contradictions 
it affords appraised, since the firm-level prism of upgrading dominant within the GVC 
literature often neglects both attention to state agency in the emergence of GVC regimes, 
as well as the broader rationales which see GVC-oriented strategies emerge in different 
contexts. In Ethiopia’s case, these goals are to diversify exports and create jobs in order 
to relieve the economic and social pressure that might otherwise prompt the dismantling 
of its brand of developmentalism. Thus the focus on the ‘upgrading’ challenge and 
power differentials between lead firms and local actors dominant within the GVC 
literature misses the wider objectives and agency of host nation states. Nonetheless, as 
Ethiopia becomes increasingly integrated internationally through these chains it will 
undoubtedly encounter multiple new challenges and trade-offs of increased complexity.  
 
4.3.2 New constraints: rising FDI power  
 
One such pressure is the increased power of foreign investors. Noting the challenges of 
building linkages with the domestic economy, one senior official observed that Ethiopia 
is presently particularly weakly positioned to bargain with foreign investors, including 
through the application of performance requirements on FDI, noting that ‘we have to be 
careful not to deploy them prematurely. We are just starting to attract [foreign investors] 
and if we tell them “you have to source 50 per cent locally” we could scare them off’ 
(EG-1). Officials therefore felt they must adopt a ‘light approach to ensuring local 
content and technological upgrading, and technology transfer’ (EG-13). The specific 
modality of GVC integration may prove an additional challenge here. Government 
officials expressed concern that since the 1990s foreign investments had failed to deliver 
development benefits and instead had: increased demand for foreign exchange not 
boosted its supply; brought small amounts of foreign currency and old machinery; sold 
to the domestic market and not exported; failed to repay loans from state banks; and not 
delivered on technology transfer promises (EG-12). Historically, apparel sector 
investments were considered to have been largely from those ‘who found they cannot 
                                                   
123 Although with some modifications, since the government passed a PPP law (Proclamation no. 1076/2018) in 2018 
(despite previous wariness), indicating the foreign debt constraint had edged it to adopt a deeply neoliberal financing 
modality (FDRE, 2018b). 
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compete in Turkey any longer. Bankrupt firms who were not able to be a success at 
home’ (EG-10). The response was the push to attract ‘quality investors’, with industrial 
parks explicitly created for ‘those who have a track record, are globally networked and 
capable’ (EG-10). However, such investors bring their own challenges, since, in the 
words Roy Ashurst, a senior representative of one such form, PVH (Hub Leader for 
Africa and the Middle East): 
 
[W]e don’t want to buy locally produced. We want to encourage our global 
supply chain people to come here. There are too many risks when you start 
talking about second-tier suppliers in the supply chain, and you know the world 
of compliance will restrict us from doing this. This is a major, major thing. You 
have just to be so careful about who is supplying things that go into your product 
(quoted in Mihretu, and Llobet, 2017, p.43). 
 
This indicates that whilst the challenge of building linkages and learning amongst 
domestic firms – even if that is not what the GVC regime has been chiefly adopted to 
foster – may be particularly challenging given the kind of GVC regime in which 
Ethiopia is becoming embedded.  
 
Furthermore, rising political tensions within the country since late 2015, which have 
included protests in the Oromo and Amhara regions (Fiseha, 2018) and which 
culminated in the announcement of a new State of Emergency in October 2016, stand 
to further complicate efforts to establish Ethiopia’s reputation as a desirable investment 
location. Indeed, political stability is often cited by foreign investors as a critical element 
of the country’s attractiveness (Mihretu, and Llobet, 2017).124 Yet this reputation is 
threatened by protests against the government which have also spilled over into attacks 
on foreign (horticulture) firms (Al Jazeera, 2016). Signalling the impact of recent unrest 
on government concerns about Ethiopia’s desirability as a destination for foreign 
investment, a recent government report notes that this unrest ‘could spell the end of 
Ethiopia’s impressive upward economic trajectory by hitting FDI flow into the country’ 
(MOFEC, 2017, p.25). The document therefore highlights the state’s efforts ‘in 
controlling the unrest and restore peace and security’, as well as offers of compensation 
                                                   
124 PVH had a shortlist of six potential African countries which it assessed according to eight criteria: local cotton 
availability; power cost and quality; wage costs; port connectivity; general infrastructures; government pro-activeness; 
political stability; and law and order (Mihretu, and Llobet, 2017, p.20). 
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and privileges (income-tax and duty-free privileges for one year) for affected companies 
(MOFEC, 2017, pp.24, 26–7). It also detailed longer-term efforts such as ‘deepening 
the democratization process’ (MOFEC, 2017, p.27) to resolve the underlying tensions. 
Against this backdrop, in April 2018 a new Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed, was 
inaugurated whose first actions included what has been described as a ‘nationwide 
reconciliation tour’ designed to smooth relations with historically marginalised ethnic 
constituencies (Soliman, 2018). 
  
In addition to the concerns above, further complexities are likely to arise from the 
EPRDF’s increased reliance on foreign capital, specifically growing concern with 
‘investor confidence’, a motif already appearing in official reports (MOFEC, 2017, 
p.29). In addition, there was evidence in interviews carried out during fieldwork that 
foreign investors were pressing the government access protected domestic markets such 
as apparel, and seeking to not be restricted chiefly to export (EF-5). One IFI official 
noted here that the only pressure they could conceive that would force Ethiopia to 
quicken the pace of its to-date stalled WTO accession would be if major international 
exporters were to make this a condition of investing in the country (EI-6). All such 
issues signal new vulnerabilities to which increased dependence on FDI may give rise. 
 
4.3.3 Distinct advantages: Ethiopia’s trade and investment regime 
 
Ethiopia’s growing integration into global production networks has increased the 
significance of its trade and investment regime due to the dependence of EOI strategies 
on favourable terms of market access. Here, however, Ethiopia enjoys some distinct 
advantages in terms of its modality of international integration since it has not yet joined 
the WTO (WTO, 2018b),125 and since its accession commenced in January 2003 it is 
already considerably longer than the average of 10.3 years (Chemutai and Escaith, 2017). 
Services are the main stumbling block, and as of August 2018, Ethiopia had yet to 
submit an initial services offer (WTO, 2018a). One government official interviewed 
noted that the Ethiopian trade delegation had been told if they didn’t bring a services 
offer to the next Working Party meeting ‘there will be no negotiations’ (EG-30). Yet 
                                                   
125 As of August 2018, the 22 observer countries seeking membership were: Algeria, Andorra, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, 
Belarus, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanese Republic, 
Libya, Sao Tomé and Principe, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Timor-Leste and 
Uzbekistan. The Holy See is an observer that is not seeking accession (WTO, 2018b). A further small group are 
neither members nor observers, these include Eritrea, North Korea, Palestine and Turkmenistan, as well as Kiribati, 
Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Monaco, Nauru, Palau, San Marino and Tuvalu. 
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services liberalisation is a particularly sensitive policy area due to its impacts on two 
strategic sectors important to the EPRDF’s model: finance and telecoms. Defending 
these sectors from liberalisation remains a key policy priority, since one government 
official noted despite ‘big pressure to open up telecoms to foreign and domestic 
investors – [we] will not agree in the near future’ (EG-18).  Finance is tied together with 
concerns about the NBE’s monitoring capacity (EG-18) and eagerness to control 
resource allocation, with one official noting ‘[i]f we are denied the resources to 
implement [our plans], then we are a paper tiger’ (EG-15). Resistance to telecoms 
liberalisation also lies partly in the sector’s profitability, since its annual US$ 430 
million in revenues has provides funds for railway expansion (Manson, 2013).126 In 
addition to being an important ‘cash cow,’ one IFI official noted the EPRDF ‘would 
also like to control communications and the flow of information’ (EI-5). Furthermore, 
state ownership has helped contribute to expanded provision in rural areas (UNIDO, 
2016), where provision is typically more expensive and less profitable than urban 
services.  
 
Pressure on these sectors during accession negotiations has so far been considerable, 
and one official observed that current members can ‘ask us for anything under the sky’, 
especially since ‘countries that are coming later pay a higher price’ (EG-29). In this 
sense Ethiopia faces notable future challenges, since by being one of the few remaining 
observers, it stands to have some of the harshest terms applied to its membership. Indeed, 
one official noted that ‘countries including the US tell us “we don’t feel you are an LDC. 
We will be the same with you as Vietnam”’ (EG-30) (where ‘Vietnam’ was used a 
synonym for harsh treatment; see Chapter 6).127 As a result, one senior government 
official noted that however much Ethiopia has to lose from its membership, ultimately 
‘[w]e can’t be outside the WTO. So we will join, [but] not for benefits … One would’ve 
preferred to have policy space rather than playing by the rules of developed countries’ 
(EG-13). 
 
Two notable advantages allow Ethiopia to stall its WTO accession yet pursue an 
ambitious export-oriented industrialisation strategy. First, it benefits from non-
                                                   
126 Telecoms services have also been used to establish ‘woreda net’ services linking local and central authorities 
(Yakob and Mirtus, 2015). 
127 Notably, Vietnam is treated as a non-market economy in the WTO, although there was no suggestion in the 
interview that this is what was meant by this comment, the fact of it even being accorded this status can be read as 
an indicator of the harsh treatment its accession received.  
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reciprocal tariff and quota free access to the US and EU markets for a range of products 
(including apparel and leather goods) due to the African Growth and Opportunities Act 
(AGOA) and Everything but Arms (EBA) agreements. It also has duty-free, quota-free 
access to Japan, Canada, China, Turkey, Australia and New Zealand (covering all 
Ethiopian export goods), preferential access to India, as well as across Africa due to its 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) membership (EIC, 2018, 
p.5). Only 16 countries have access to EBA and the extended form of AGOA access 
that includes wearing apparel provisions, and the closest in terms of population size, 
Tanzania, has a population half the size of Ethiopia’s (see Appendix B, which also has 
a note on AGOA and EBA terms). Notably, the renewal of AGOA in 2015 was a major 
cause of PVH’s decision to expand its operations into Africa (Mihretu, and Llobet, 
2017), whilst a foreign investor in the Ethiopian leather and footwear sector noted in 
interviews that Ethiopia’s AGOA access makes it more attractive in terms of market 
access than China (EF-3).  
 
Ethiopia has recently emerged as ‘the first substantial AGOA footwear supplier to the 
United States’ (USTR, 2018, p.14), with footwear exports to the US increasing more 
than 45-fold between 2011 and 2017 from US$ 630,000 to close to US$ 30 million. The 
EBA’s non-tariff barriers and rules of origin stipulations,128 as well as the proliferation 
of other preferential EU agreements have made it more challenging for Ethiopia to take 
advantage of (Development Solutions, 2017, p.1). Yet together AGOA and EBA 
provide Ethiopia with competitive terms of (non-reciprocal) market access to two of the 
world’s most significant markets for light manufactured goods. Whilst other countries 
may have obtained similar access to the US and EU markets through bilateral or regional 
trade deals, this is likely to have entailed agreeing to terms even more restrictive than 
the WTO. Ethiopia thus has a distinctive – if not permanent – window of opportunity to 
pursue an export-oriented strategy without agreeing to the WTO’s accession terms.    
 
Second, concerning future trade negotiations, whenever the government did decide to 
join the WTO, one official noted that since Ethiopia was an ‘important ally’ of the US, 
Ethiopia had ‘leverage’ but needed to use it judiciously (EG-30). A recent US 
government evaluation of AGOA noted that ‘Ethiopia plays a key role in stabilizing the 
                                                   
128  In contrast, AGOA allows least-developed beneficiaries to make use of yarn and fabric from any country 
(including China and India) (Mihretu, and Llobet, 2017). 
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Horn of Africa Region, confronting the al-Shabaab terrorist organization in Somalia and 
helping to mitigate conflict in South Sudan’ (USTR, 2018, p.36). Signalling the 
country’s significance to Washington, in July 2015 US President Barack Obama visited 
the country, and used this visit to reaffirm Ethiopia’s status as an ally and ‘outstanding 
partner’ in the conflict (BBC, 2015). Notably here Arkebe Oqubay (2015, p.103) 
observes the EPRDF has deliberately cultivated such relations, meaning the country’s 
policy autonomy is partly an outcome of ‘the government’s foresight in crafting and 
using the country’s geopolitical significance’.  
 
Nonetheless, the EPRDF also appears to realise that multilateral trade integration will 
one day be necessary. This is reflected in evidence collected during fieldwork that the 
EPRDF is preparing the state sector for eventual accession. One official noted that ‘[w]e 
have to use the space now – between now and joining the WTO – so when we start 
liberalising, we have built manufacturing capability that can compete without some 
protection’ (EG-1). In line with this, GTP II states that the ‘the success of these public 
enterprises will be measured not just in terms of their success in the domestic market, 
but rather in terms of their competitiveness at continental and/or regional levels’ (FDRE, 
2016b, pp.147–148). This was reflected in the comments of a government official 
involved in preparing the state sector for increased competition who noted that 
‘[d]eveloping the commanding heights [means] not necessarily big only in terms of 
domestic market but helping to extend the country outwards,’ (EG-15) with enterprises 
in electricity, waterworks, and transport (such as the railway) sectors representing areas 
the government was hoping to build internationally competitive firms (EG-15). 
Indicative of regional (and global) ambitions, the IPDC aims to become an ‘innovative 
and leading eco-industrial parks developer and operator in Africa by 2025’ (UNDP, 
2017, xi) and the EEPCO is an emerging electricity exporter, currently supplying Sudan 
and Djibouti, with plans to expand to Kenya and Tanzania (World Bank, 2018b).129 In 
addition, the EPRDF has also started reviewing all existing trade and investment 
agreements130 and delaying the adoption of new ones, with one official of investment 
agreements: ‘[b]efore we were recipients only, and now we are preparing negotiating 
documents’ (EG-24).  
 
                                                   
129 The World Bank is among those funding the transmission lines to Kenya (Abebe, 2018). 
130 As of early-2016 official estimates indicated the country had 17 bilateral trade agreements in force, mostly with 
other developing countries (EG-24).   
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Thus, despite growing vulnerabilities to pressure from foreign investors as a result of its 
GVC integration, Ethiopia also enjoys rather distinct advantages, as efforts to preserve 
state control over strategic services have also (rather incidentally) preserved 
considerable policy space for industrial development in the context of a rare example of 
a current LDC pursuing a proactive industrialisation drive. As such, Ethiopia retains 
fairly distinctive scope to use industrial policy instruments such as export subsidies, 
local content and technology transfer requirements.  
 
4.4 Interpreting the Ethiopian developmental regime 
 
Ethiopia’s strong departure from the mainstream development consensus is recognised 
across both heterodox scholarship (Priewe, 2016, p.1) and by the World Bank (Moller, 
2016) and the IMF (2016, p.20). As a result, Ethiopia now often attracts the label of a 
developmental state in official documents (FDRE, 2016b); the scholarly literature 
(Fantini, 2013; Lefort, 2015; Jalata, 2015; Clapham, 2018); and from the IFIs (IMF, 
2013; World Bank, 2013a). As noted in Chapter 3, senior TPLF officials were aware of 
the Korean experience as far back as the 1980s (Weis, 2016), although the term only 
came to be used by the EPRDF to describe is strategy after the TPLF split in 2000-2001 
(Vaughan, 2015), thereafter appearing in academic writing by Meles Zenawi (Zenawi, 
2006a; 2011). Yet the term’s use in the Ethiopian context is often rather opaque and 
there is considerable ambiguity over the basis on which the comparison is being made: 
Ethiopia’s success; the sizeable role of the state in the economy; its commitment to 
industrialisation; political characteristics; specific policy choices; or its self-declared use 
of the term. Without such specificity, the label risks obscuring as much as it clarifies 
since it tends to hide or minimise (important) differences between Ethiopia and the 
historic East Asian experience.   
 
One recent nuanced discussion in Chang and Hauge (2019) argues that the EPRDF 
derives intellectual inspiration from East Asia’s developmental states, and shares with 
them strong state intervention and high-level commitment to industrialisation. Yet three 
missing ingredients are also noted: bureaucratic independence; political and societal 
harmony; and state-business alliances. Similarly Clapham (2018, p.1151) argues that 
despite the lack of signature state-business alliances, Ethiopia nonetheless ‘provides the 
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most significant attempt to implement the idea of a ‘developmental state’ in sub-Saharan 
Africa’. 
 
However, these arguments need to be qualified at two levels. First, intellectual influence 
is complicated by strong continuities between the post-2001 period and the transitional 
economic strategy of 1991, which emphasised the need for industrialisation and strong 
state intervention long before the developmental state was appropriated. Whilst new 
elements of Ethiopian development discourse have subsequently been added, including 
references to ‘market failures’ in order to justify the ‘developmental state’ approach,131 
according to one senior official, these ideas were embraced because they ‘confirmed 
what we thought anyway’ (EG-13), adding: 
 
[It was] reassuring for us to hear from them and see the analysis behind this work 
and the analytic basis for their views. But the ruling party is cohesive and 
emerged from the politics of the left, particularly of the 1960s and 1970s – which 
was well known for arguments and debates … With that intensity of debate, 
when we finally reach a conclusion that is the line that we stick to (EG-13). 
 
Of his masters’ degree dissertation,132 published under the title ‘African Development: 
Dead Ends and New Beginnings’ in 2006, Meles Zenawi said it was ‘my attempt to 
academically vindicate our already existing policies. In a sense it was an articulation of 
the policy of the EPRDF in academic terms. It was primarily intended for our own local 
consumption to see if our policies could stand up to the rigour of some academic scrutiny’ 
(quoted in Gill, 2010, p.80). Since the developmental state forms one of the main 
academic critiques of the mainstream development agenda, and, in the words of one 
senior official, the government considers that ‘neoliberal thinking is the enemy’ (EG-4), 
this mantle also helps to consolidate the EPRDF’s critique of the mainstream and 
defence of its long-standing approach. Finally, context-specificity is, as noted in Chapter 
3, an essential ingredient of the EPRDF’s approach to development. Here one official 
noted that whilst East Asia was a touchstone due to its rapid growth, their circumstances 
                                                   
131 For instance, there were dialogues with heterodox economists, such as such as Mushtaq Khan, Dani Rodrik, 
Howard Stein, and Joseph Stiglitz under the auspices of the Columbia University Initiative for Policy Dialogue Africa 
Task Force during 2006 to 2009, attended by Meles Zenawi and his senior economic advisors (Vaughan, 2011). 
132 In economics at the Erasmus University, Rotterdam, which he began in the 1990s,but which remained unfinished 
due to the war with Eritrea (de Waal, 2013). 
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and approaches were very different to Ethiopia, adding ‘we trying to redefine the 
developmental state in the case of Ethiopia’ (EG-12). 
 
Together, these factors suggest the EPRDF’s appropriation of the developmental state 
mantle might be better understood as rhetorical adaptation rather than direct inspiration 
or emulation. Not only has the emphasis on context proved an important bulwark against 
the imposition of one-size-fits-all policy prescriptions, it also suggests Ethiopia’s 
trajectory should not straightforwardly be viewed as inspired by or emulating others. 
Instead, ideas such as the developmental state have been instrumentalised as much to 
justify the EPRDF’s policies as to guide their formulation, given its evolving, pragmatic, 
but ultimately home-grown, developmental trajectory.  
 
The second qualification concerns how best to treat the undoubted differences such as 
sizeable state ownership, limited state-business alliances and significant ethnic tensions 
noted above. One problem here it that there is a strong risk of treating these differences 
as contingent rather than necessary, and in so-doing treating them as secondary to some 
supposedly higher-level similarity with the East Asian experience. Yet all three of the 
features highlighted by Chang and Hauge (2019) are fundamental to the EPRDF’s 
model, both as drivers and enablers of its approach. Indeed, a core feature of the 
EPRDF’s development strategy has been precisely its creation of balance of social 
forces considered necessary to implementing its developmental vision, comprising 
expansive state ownership and a limited role for the (rent-seeking) private sector. This 
is as essential to its economic strategy as its economic policies. In the words of one 
senior government official: 
 
[T]he task is creating a political economy where development is the dominant 
sentiment and attitude. The elite could sell out the long-term in favour of short-
term – they have land, power, everything. [But when you are] trying to build a 
developmental state, it is about trying to build an attitude, vision, objective. If 
we succeed, the external environment can be managed. If we fail internally, then 
we will be eaten up by rent-seeking behaviours and that will be the end of it … 
[the] big fear is a rent-seeking political economy where neoliberalism would 
dominate – [we] couldn’t have policy space to administer industrial policy for 
transformation then and for technological upgrading (EG-1). 
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This understanding draws on the particular fusion of the economic and political, which 
Weis (2016, p.17) has dubbed ‘vanguard capitalism’, through which the processes of 
party, state and market building are all mutually reinforcing, as the EPRDF’s 
vanguardist political logic conditions the way markets have been established and operate 
in Ethiopia. The lack of bureaucratic independence also stems from this logic, since 
strong overlaps between the ruling coalition and state administration is rooted in a 
perceived need for a ‘political vanguard’ dedicated to transforming the economy on 
behalf of a poor peasantry (Fantini, 2013). According to the former Prime Minister ‘[the] 
key task in this regard is to transform our political economy from one of pervasive rent-
seeking to one that is conducive to value-creation … This in turn is predicated on 
building the constituency of a developmental state and developing the institutions and 
policy instruments to curtail rent-seeking and promote value creation’ (Zenawi, 
2006b).133 As sections 4.1-4.3 indicated, state dominance of the commanding heights, 
the division of the domestic private sector into a developmental and rent-seeking group, 
and selective appropriation of manufacturing FDI, are as much strategies for creating a 
developmentally conducive political economy as strategies for powering economic 
transformation per se. Simply noting Ethiopia’s greater reliance on state enterprises thus 
risks missing part of fundamental fabric of the EPRDF’s variety of developmentalism.  
 
Furthermore, the fragile nature of popular support for the EPRDF’s development project, 
due to the ethnic diversity and tensions discussed in Section 4.3.2 is a further 
fundamental difference with the East Asian experience, where external threats to the 
nation state were used secure consensus around its developmental projects. However, 
again this difference is fundamental to Ethiopian developmentalism since it is precisely 
these tensions and the threat they posed to the political hegemony of the EPRDF 
following the 2005 election that prompted the turn toward mass political mobilisation 
(Fantini, 2013; Vaughan, 2015; Weis, 2016) and a development strategy predicated on 
‘development at speed’ (Schäfer, 2016, p.21). As Clapham (2018, p.1154)  notes, the 
drivers of the expanded developmental project lie in these domestic tensions since ‘the 
regime was widely perceived as controlled by people from the Tigray region from which 
its initial leadership derived, and this imposed a need to seek ‘performance legitimacy’ 
through a project of economic transformation’. This was one of central contributory 
factors to the emergence of Ethiopia’s public-investment driven growth path. This 
                                                   
133 Historically the peasantry formed the EPRDF’s focal social base (see Chapter 3). 
154 
 
difference with the East Asian experience, and all the specific vulnerabilities this entails 
(Sections 4.2.2 and 4.3.1), is such an important driver of its development trajectory that 
once again it needs to be at the centre, rather than periphery, of analysis.  
 
A final question raised by this discussion is Ethiopia’s relationship with neoliberalism, 
especially given the way the developmental state and neoliberal market-driven agenda 
are often presented as opposing development models. Despite its strong opposition to 
the latter and complex relation to the former, during the period of assertive 
developmentalism Ethiopia has emerged as one of the fastest growing countries in the 
world using a deeply unorthodox developmentalism – yet one which has both propelled 
and enabled Ethiopia to emerge as a low-cost labour pool for the extension of global 
production to new low-wage destinations in the face of rising costs in Asia. Thus at the 
same time as offering one of the world’s most successful challenges to neoliberal 
orthodoxies, and defying neoliberalism at the national level, Ethiopia has become 
constitutive of its reproduction and stabilisation globally. Nonetheless it is Ethiopia’s 
heterodox state finance-infrastructure-industry nexus and strong state intervention that 
have created the infrastructure to power Ethiopia’s emerging integration into these 
production structures. Indeed, preserving this nexus from IMF-induced dismantling also 
forms a key reason why the GVC strategy has been embraced. This therefore represents 
a hybrid form of development strategy in which the mainstream-conforming embrace 
of comparative advantage and FDI has been harnessed to enable the survival of a broader 
approach to late development which departs in almost all other respects from the 
neoliberal development consensus. This deeply contradictory relationship with 
neoliberalism also suggests that developmentalism in the current conjuncture may 
require a very different political economy than in the post-war period, where it is 
precisely the absence of powerful domestic political and economic elites aligned with 
deeper international integration that may be the most vital contributor to Ethiopia’s 
developmental approach and success to date. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has charted the evolution of the more assertive form of Ethiopian 
developmentalism which has emerged since 2002, and how it related to the foundations 
laid during the defensive moves to build a market economy in the 1990s. It thereby 
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suggested the division of Ethiopian developmentalism into two periods should be 
sensitive to these strong threads of continuity. This is strongly evidenced though the 
growing role of the state finance-industry-infrastructure nexus and decidedly 
unorthodox high rates of public investment (powered by several heterodox instruments) 
as a motor of Ethiopia’s economic transformation. Its experience also exposes the 
contradictions in the global neoliberal order, since despite forcefully rejecting the 
neoliberal development agenda, Ethiopia has emerged as a leading global recipient of 
World Bank concessional lending, thereby leveraging the international financial 
architecture in support of a deeply heterodox developmental approach.  
 
However, the very successes of this approach have contributed to an increasingly 
challenging set of global and domestic constraints. Fostering linkages between GVCs 
and the domestic economy will undoubtedly be complicated by the growing dependence 
of the EPRDF on foreign capital, which it is relying on to resolve the deepening foreign 
exchange-related constraints. However, Ethiopia’s distinct advantages in the global 
trade regime, which mean it can (for now) delay joining the WTO and remain 
competitive in highly aggressive light manufacturing sectors nonetheless provides a rare 
form of policy space in the context of a country pursuing a manufacturing-driven 
strategy in the neoliberal period. Furthermore, Ethiopia’s integration into the global 
GVC regime should be chiefly evaluated with reference to its foreign exchange and 
employment generating capacities, and thus its capacity to alleviate political and 
economic pressures, rather than through the upgrading prism which forms the main 
preoccupation of the GVC literature.134  
 
Finally, through its entanglements with the IFIs and increasing integration within GVCs, 
Ethiopia’s form of developmentalism has not only been forged and shaped by the 
constraints of the neoliberal period, but evolved to take on a highly contradictory 
relationship with neoliberalism itself. The state has sought to instrumentalise key 
features of the neoliberal global economic order such as IFI financing and the 
transnationalisation of production to help sustain its contemporary heterodox 
developmentalism, rather than internalising either a neoliberal form of capitalism or 
adopting a comprehensively neoliberal development strategy. This embodies a curious 
                                                   
134 In the Ethiopian context, meanwhile, some have argued the challenges of GVCs are not all that different to those 
faced by Korea and Taiwan in the 1950s and 1960s (Hauge, 2018). 
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convergence of interests between a decidedly anti-neoliberal government and the 
interests of global capital135 – a state of affairs which the developmental state paradigm 
and its methodological nationalism noted in Chapter 2 offers limited insight into.
                                                   
135 Indeed, the international business media now enthusiastically describes Ethiopia as the ‘last development frontier’ 
(Aglionby, 2017). 
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Chapter 5 Vietnam 1986-2000: The emergence of a contested 
developmentalism  
 
This chapter traces the emergence of a distinctive form of Vietnamese 
developmentalism during the period 1986-2000. This was a time of rapid socio-
economic development of the sort that marked Vietnam out from other transitional 
economies. Not only did the Vietnamese economy escape fiscal contraction and 
recession, it rapidly entered a high growth path, with average GDP growth rates of 6.7 
per cent a year between 1986-2000, and 8.8 per cent in the period of its most rapid 
growth, leading up to the East Asian financial crisis, from 1992-1997 (World Bank, 
2018g). These growth rates were some of the highest in the world during the 1990s, and 
were also translated into steep improvements in living standards, with the national 
poverty levels reducing from 58 per cent of the population in 1992-1993 to 37 per cent 
in 1997-1998. Such rapid reductions have been ‘rarely seen in any developing country’ 
(Glewwe and Dang, 2011, p.583). Vietnam has also been dubbed a ‘star performer’ in 
terms of its human development progress during the 1990s (Thang et al., 2015, p.1). As 
a result of these all-round development achievements, decidedly atypical during the 
neoliberal period, Vietnam has earned the status of a ‘role model for development’ 
(Thoburn, 2013).  
 
During this period of transition from centrally planned to market economy, mainstream 
scholarship has made several attempts to appropriate Vietnam’s development trajectory 
as a vindication of mainstream economic reforms. However, as this chapter argues, 
instead the Vietnamese approach was deeply heterodox in a number of respects. Due to 
a specific set of political and economic objectives and the inheritances of the socialist 
period, the ruling party sought to preserve, consolidate, and defend from external 
pressures (such as the conditionalities of the IFIs and turmoil of the regional crisis) a  
particular constellation of state-owned finance-industry-infrastructure firms (or a nexus 
thereof). This was in turn supported by high rates of public investment, ODA inflows 
and foreign capital, and a heterodox approach to trade and macroeconomic policy. This 
chapter traces the drivers and enablers of this form of developmentalism, as well as the 
pressures impacting its elaboration and the emerging concerns which propelled a shift 
in Vietnam’s development trajectory after 2000.  
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5.1 Legacies of Vietnamese socialism  
 
As French colonial rule was consolidated across Indochina in the late nineteenth century, 
the Vietnamese imperial order was ultimately defeated by the European power’s 
superior military forces. However, following the successful national liberation struggle 
launched by what is now known as the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV)136 during 
the First Indochina War (1946-1954), Vietnam was divided at the 17th parallel in 1954, 
ending colonial rule, and ushering in a period of socialist construction in North 
Vietnam.137 In the late 1950s, socialist construction took the form of attempts to create 
a Soviet-inspired centrally planned economy, reflected in an emphasis on heavy industry 
and ‘squeezing’ the agricultural surplus (Beresford and Phong, 2000), although the 
process involved ‘largely improvised responses’ to distinct problems rather than simply 
copying blueprints taken from elsewhere (Elliott, 1980, p.209). Land reforms 
commenced in the mid-1950s and encompassed land seizures and redistributive 
measures that overturned highly unequal patterns of land ownership and weakened the 
power of traditional landed classes, whilst placing land in the hands of smallholder 
cultivators (Kerkvliet and Selden, 1998). Collectivisation followed after 1959, and by 
1968 some 90 per cent of peasants belonged to cooperatives in which land and the means 
of production were collectively owned (Beresford, 1988). Producer cooperatives 
supplied food and other materials to state industry (Fforde and De Vylder, 1996, p.57), 
as well as forming an important basis for productivity improvement, irrigation 
installation, improvements to gender equality and social service provision (Beresford, 
1988). Meanwhile, by the late 1960s most industry had either been nationalised or 
collectivised and industrial production transferred to state enterprises (Beresford, 1988). 
As a result, by the late 1960s, the material basis for social differentiation through 
ownership of the means of production had been eliminated and, according to Beresford 
(1988, p.59) ‘the social classes of the old regime had ceased to exist’. This included the 
Vietnamese elite which emerged during the colonial period, comprising landowners, 
professionals (such as doctors, bankers, engineers), and intellectuals who had benefitted 
from French rule (Beresford, 1988).  
 
                                                   
136 The party was formed in 1930 by Ho Chi Minh as the Vietnam Communist Party (Dang Cong San Viet-Nam)  and 
has since undergone a succession of name changes, including the Indochinese Communist Party (Dang Cong Sang 
Dong Duong) in December 1930, the Vietnam Workers Party in 1951 (Dang Lao Dong), and in 1976 the Communist 
Party of Vietnam (Turley, 1980). For simplicity, it will be referred to as either the Party or the CPV. 
137 The north was known as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), whilst the territory south of the 17th parallel 
was known as the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). 
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To foster heavy industry, the CPV adopted an ISI strategy which relied heavily on 
commodity-aid financed capital imports from the Soviet Union, including capital inputs 
(to feed textile and steel industries) and raw materials (Fforde and De Vylder, 1996; 
Beresford and Phong, 2000). State enterprises were allocated capital and resources, 
given production targets, and required to provide all produce for sale by state trading 
monopolies (Fforde and De Vylder, 1996, p.57). Investment to support the ISI drive 
came from both domestic savings and Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) 
assistance (Gates, 1995). However, the intensified conflict with the US after 1964 and 
threat of intensified bombardment, saw the strategy adapted to meet the needs of a war 
economy. The results were two-fold: intensified import dependence, particularly for 
food (Fforde and Paine, 1987) and extensive provincial decentralisation, as less capital-
intensive forms of manufacturing were moved to remote rural areas and caves to avoid 
aerial bombardments (Kolko, 1997, p.1). Decentralisation also compensated for poor 
communication between central and provincial areas by increasing the autonomy of 
local party cadres (Beresford, 1988, p.20),138 the result of which was a ‘province-centred 
economy’ (Kolko, 1997, p.25), in which the central Politburo explicitly delegated 
difficult economic decisions to provincial cadres. 
 
In 1975, in a highly significant victory for guerrilla forces from an impoverished country 
against the reigning global economic and military superpower, the CPV defeated the 
American military after an intense and protracted conflict. Formal reunification 
followed in 1976, joining together two markedly different political and economic 
systems into the new Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), accompanied by an attempt 
to extend central planning across the whole country. However, in the context of chronic 
shortages, thanks to shrinking Soviet aid and limited budgetary resources (Beresford 
and Phong, 2000, pp.150–151), state enterprises, state officials and agricultural 
cooperatives increasingly operated ‘off plan’ (often with the tacit approval of provincial 
and central agencies), in order to resolve such scarcities. Such fence-breaking (or pha 
rao) proliferated from the late 1970s onwards, diverting resources away from the 
mechanisms of central resource allocation (Fforde and De Vylder, 1996, pp.59–60). 
Agricultural cooperative members also began to use land for own-account activities, 
where resultant profits generated cash incomes, rather than collective produce (Fforde 
                                                   
138 This represented a return to tactics used during the First Indochina War (1946-1954) which liberated Vietnam 
from colonial rule, with localised war organising allowing state operations to persist despite limited contact with the 
centre (Marr, 2013). 
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and Paine, 1987). At the end of the 1970s state enterprises began to set up their own 
retail outlets and establish direct relationships with artisans and cooperatives, bypassing 
state intermediaries (Fforde and De Vylder, 1996). Leaders of Ho Chi Minh city allowed 
local Chinese merchants to regain some economic powers previously withdrawn 
following reunification, such as the formation of mixed trading companies, which 
appeared to have the backing of some influential party figures (Kolko, 1997, p.25).139 
State agencies and political units engaged in both legal and illegal commodity trade 
(Porter, 1993, p.131), with CMEA trade dominating the formal trading system, and trade 
with China and Thailand dominating parallel informal trade (Van Arkadie and Mallon, 
2003). As a result, off-plan activity became so endemic that an official 1986 report to 
Vietnam’s National Assembly noted that less than 40 per cent of manufactured 
consumer goods were traded via the official state trading network (Gillespie, 2003, 
p.213).  
 
Whilst it is not clear whether the central state was unable or unwilling to crackdown on 
growing defiance of central orders (Fforde and De Vylder, 1996), de facto 
decentralisation did have a number of  economic benefits. First, private and direct trade 
between individuals, state enterprises, local authorities and central ministries helped to 
overcome scarcities and shortages, and thus meet workers’ welfare needs and 
production targets (Beresford and Phong, 2000). Second, the existence of parallel 
markets gave those individuals, enterprises and provincial authorities with access to 
state resources opportunities to generate very high profits (Beresford and Phong, 2000) 
since the ‘surest route to profit was exploiting the price system and inflation’ (Porter, 
1993, p.131). These contradictions are summarised by Fforde and De Vylder (1996, 
p.65): 
A state unit was meant to be producing its stipulated output according to the 
target, not finding ways of generating higher incomes by developing sidelines or 
growing food … But since the supplies through the state distribution system 
were often inadequate, fulfilment of the plan often relied on such activities 
[italics in the original]. 
 
                                                   
139 Including Nguyen Van Linh (a key Politburo member) and Vo Van Kiet (chairman of the influential State Planning 
Commission). The latter’s assistant, Nguyen Xuan Oanh, was critical in masterminding such economic experiments 
in the south, having been a former acting Prime Minister in Saigon in 1965, following an education in Harvard and 
roles within the IMF (Kolko, 1997, pp.25–26). 
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Reflecting the political and economic costs which might accrue from cracking down on 
this activity, central Party initiatives were often divided between extending the scope of 
localised fence-breaking and attempts to abolish them. This contributed to a number of 
so-called ‘policy zig zags’ during the 1980s (Beresford and Phong, 2000, ix). Central 
reforms often merely sanctioned deviations from the centrally planned economy which 
were occurring informally anyway. De facto liberalisation thanks to fence-breaking 
during 1979-1980 thereby prompted the introduction of the three-plan system in 1981 
(which allowed state enterprises the autonomy to sell and produce outside of the plan 
under certain conditions) (Fforde and De Vylder, 1996, p.59). However, some within 
the CPV were concerned that liberalisation would help to revive the southern 
bourgeoisie, and that private speculation and smuggling should be cracked down upon. 
As a result, between 1982 and 1985 a ‘recentralising reaction’ (Fforde, 2007, p.35) 
emerged as, via administrative fiat rather than violence, the CPV sought to regain 
control over distribution and circulation via increasing Hanoi’s oversight and veto over 
trading activities, curb state enterprises engaged in unplanned activities, and strengthen 
cooperativisation, with the Third Plenum of December 1982 attacking the ‘anarchy in 
markets’ (Fforde, 2007). At the 1983 Central Committee discussion about the 
alternatives provided by socialist and capitalist paths was extensive (Porter, 1993, 
pp.141–142).  
 
5.2 Doi moi: from central planning to market economy 
 
Against this backdrop of considerable political and economic fragmentation, Vietnam 
also faced considerable socio-economic turbulence and macroeconomic instability 
during the early 1980s.140 The invasion of Cambodia in 1978 (and occupation until 1989) 
prompted a worldwide economic boycott (Kolko, 1997, p.23). Chinese imports declined 
from the end of the 1970s, whilst internal problems in the Soviet Union predated the 
formal disintegration of the CMEA bloc in 1991 (Beresford and Phong, 2000). 
Scarcities again became of mounting political and economic concern, and by 1986 the 
state was supplying just 20 per cent of the fertiliser to agricultural cooperatives that it 
had just six years previously (Porter, 1993, p.134). At the end of 1986, export earnings 
                                                   
140 The data on economic growth in Vietnam in the 1980s contains considerable ambiguities. However, low but 
positive growth appears to have taken place in 1985-1989, although declines in agricultural value added and industrial 
output were seen in 1987 and 1989 respectively (Van Arkadie and Mallon, 2003, p. 176-77). Nonetheless, by the late 
1980s,  growth averaged approximately five percent per year during 1986-1989, high by the standards of other 
transition countries, and considerably easing the process of transition (Weeks, Thang, et al., 2004).  
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were less than half imports (US$ 500 million compared with US$ 1.2 billion) (Mallon 
and Irvin, 2001) and thus by the mid-1980s the country faced an unsustainable balance 
of payments position (Weeks, 1998). From 1976-1980 economic growth averaged 0.4 
per cent per annum, which meant a decline in real per capita income, given 2.3 per cent 
annual population growth (Van Arkadie and Mallon, 2003, p.176). Although some 
recovery was seen in the early 1980s, fiscal and trade deficits increased, and in the mid-
1980s inflation climbed rapidly – to more than 700 per cent at the end of 1986 (Mallon 
and Irvin, 2001). Subsidies to state enterprises and high levels of military spending put 
considerable strain on government budgets in the context of low levels of revenue 
generated and large and persistent fiscal deficits, increasing dependence on foreign aid 
(Van Arkadie and Mallon, 2003). There were also severe food shortages in the 1980s, 
resulting in widespread queues for food and food insecurity so severe that the country 
faced regular episodes of famine (Mallon and Irvin, 2001). 
 
Against this backdrop, the CPV launched the doi moi (or renovation) programme at its 
Sixth National Congress in 1986, marking the formally sanctioned transition away from 
centrally planned resource allocation and toward a market-oriented economy. This shift 
was the complex outcome of a set of different mounting pressures, since the 
‘[i]nteraction between these fence-breaking activities, the changing external 
environment and the political pressures building up in favour of changes to the planning 
system, led to a process of gradual policy reform and, ultimately, to the Party’s 
acceptance of a market-led growth strategy’ (Beresford and Phong, 2000, p.3).  
However, despite attempts to present Vietnam’s subsequent trajectory as a vindication 
of mainstream market-oriented reforms (Dollar, 2002), the rest of the chapter examines 
how in fact Vietnam’s heterodox transition created a distinctive form of 
developmentalism, diverging markedly from the neoliberal development agenda.  
 
5.2.1 Mainstream market-oriented reforms  
 
In 1987 official prices for non-essential consumer goods were brought close to market 
levels, the Dong (VND) was devalued, and the country opened to foreign investment 
(Van Arkadie and Mallon, 2003). The 1987 Land Law defined the land use rights of 
users but stipulated that land would remain state owned (Tri, 1990). In 1988, households 
became the base of agricultural production, but the sale, exchange and renting of land 
was restricted (Masina, 2006). State enterprises were given greater autonomy over 
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business operations in 1987, including over sub-contracting, investment and production 
(Kolko, 1997, p.54), and output targets were largely replaced with profit targets and 
subsidies restricted to lending by state-owed commercial banks (Van Arkadie and 
Mallon, 2003). In 1988, foreign exchange controls were liberalised (Van Arkadie and 
Mallon, 2003) and import tariffs were introduced, replacing direct contributions from 
state trading enterprises (IMF, 1998d). 
 
However, in 1989 reforms deepened with Party leaders reportedly seeing the choice 
before them as ‘renew or die’ (Riedel and Turley, 1999, p.22). Most remaining price 
controls were abolished,141 the foreign exchange rate was unified, import and export 
quotas were removed on most commodities and interest rates became positive in real 
terms (Riedel and Turley, 1999; Van Arkadie and Mallon, 2003). Price reforms in 
particular have been called a ‘remarkably forceful attack upon the very foundations of 
the old, central-planning system’ (De Vylder, 1995, p.35). In 1990, the legal basis for 
the establishment of sole proprietorships, joint-stock and limited liability companies was 
also established, and new taxes created (special sales tax, profit and turnover taxes) (Van 
Arkadie and Mallon, 2003). By the early 1990s, therefore, the Vietnamese ‘transition’ 
is considered to have been ‘substantially over’ (Masina, 2006, p.62). 
 
These changes were prompted by both the domestic socio-economic stresses outlined 
above, and considerable external pressure. During perestroika, the Soviet Union 
reportedly threatened to cut off its US$ 1.4. billion in aid and subsidised trade if Vietnam 
did not embark on economic reform (Le, 1995),142 whilst trade with CMEA countries 
rapidly collapsed with the bloc’s demise, with exports shrinking from 1.1 billion to 80 
million roubles between 1990 and 1991 (De Vylder, 1995). Given Vietnam’s 
dependence on commodity aid and trade with CMEA this represented a strongly adverse 
exogenous shock (Van Arkadie and Mallon, 2003). As a result, greater cooperation with 
the West came to be seen as essential to improved economic performance (Forsberg and 
Kokko, 2007, p.4).  
 
                                                   
141 Fixed prices only remained on electricity, coal and cement (used in major state construction projects) until 1991, 
after which only electricity prices remained regulated (Vu Tuan Anh, 1995). 
142 Events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union also prompted the repression of those calling for political pluralism 
in Vietnam (Tønnesson, 2001).  
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Vietnam’s subsequent emergence as a rare transitional success story – both avoiding 
economic collapse and quickly entering a rapid growth path – has prompted strong 
competition over the interpretation of its development strategies. The ‘complicated and 
unsmooth’ and ‘stop-and-go’ (Thanh and Anh, 2007) trajectory of Vietnamese reform 
itself compounds the divergence between orthodox and heterodox interpretations. 
However, this chapter argues that for all the change (and, at times, inconsistency) in 
Vietnam’s reform path, the CPV preserved a deeply heterodox state finance-industry-
infrastructure nexus, as an anchor of both political stability and engine of growth and 
industrialisation throughout its market-oriented transition. This developmental policy 
core helped to serve these two defining political and economic objectives of the 
transitional period, and was sustained by finance from outside the nexus, in the form of 
public investment, FDI and ODA. In this sense, the CPV used foreign savings, in the 
form of both FDI and growing ODA receipts during the late 1980s and 1990s, to 
reinforce a form of heterodox developmentalism designed to manage the emerging 
political economy of a market economy in such a way as to allow the CPV to retain 
power and power economic transformation. This nexus also aided the CPV to weather 
external shocks during the transition from central planning, and later, the challenges of 
regional financial crisis at the end of the decade. As this chapter argues, despite attempts 
to claim Vietnam’s experiences in the 1990s as a vindication for mainstream reform, the 
CPV created a form of state-led developmentalism with a deeply heterodox core. 
 
5.2.2 The political economy of heterodox developmentalism  
 
In the period after 1986, the CPV had two overriding objectives: the maintenance of 
political stability and rapid economic growth (Pincus and Thang, 2004). Concerning the 
former, the 1992 constitution reaffirmed the CPV’s monopoly over political power 
(Pincus and Thang, 2004). In terms of the economic strategy, three priorities guided the 
allocation of resources under Vietnam’s five- and ten-year socio-economic development 
plans: economic growth, industrialisation and “modernisation” (Forsberg and Kokko, 
2008). It was thought that fostering improved economic performance would consolidate 
political stability by containing pressures for political liberalisation (Gates, 1995). 
Furthermore, the CPV’s understanding of economic development was inescapably tied 
up with structural transformation since the Political Report of the 5th Central Committee 
to the 6th Party Congress in 1986 noted that Vietnam needed to ‘accumulate capital for 
speeding up industrialization and strengthening our national defense’ (CPV, 2015, 
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p.611). In 1996, meanwhile, the Political Report of the 7th Central Committee to the 8th 
Party Congress declared that, having emerged from socio-economic crisis, Vietnam was 
now ready ‘for a shift onto a new period, that of pressing ahead with the industrialization 
and modernization of the country’ (CPV, 2015, p.882) and outlined a goal to make 
Vietnam an industrialised country by 2020. 
 
In the latter regard, Vietnam’s (state-owned) manufacturing sector was more complex, 
diversified and developed in the 1980s than its status as a low-income country might 
suggest. Whilst smaller than those in Eastern Europe or China, it still accounted for 40 
per cent of national output in 1985, whilst a skilled industrial workforce had also begun 
to emerge (Beresford, 1995b, p.56). In contrast, the non-state manufacturing sector was 
extremely limited, and in 1990 comprised many small household enterprises, 
characterised by low productivity and capital shortages (Ronnas, 1998).  As Beresford 
(1995a) notes, the centrality of the state manufacturing sector was the strongest 
continuity with the centrally planned economy. State ownership over the ‘commanding 
heights’ of the economy has been closely tied with efforts to consolidate Party 
hegemony by minimising the emergence of a sizeable independent private sector, as 
well as allowing the Party to steer the course of economic development. Documents 
from the 7th National Congress in 1991 reveal the hierarchy between different sectors of 
the economy implicit within the CPV’s vision of a market economy:  
 
We should strengthen the socialist economy … enabling the State-run economy 
to exercise its leading role and, together with the collective economy, hold a 
decisive place in the national economy and control the other economic sectors. 
The development of household economy should be encouraged …  We should 
make use of private capitalist economy (small capitalists) in some branches 
while transforming them step by step through various forms of State capitalism 
(CPV, 1991, pp. 10–11). 
 
Despite the ostensible commitment to a market-oriented economy, private capitalists 
were evidently the very lowest priority in the hierarchy of sectors to be developed during 
this period, and were to be deliberately kept small and gradually brought into a system 
of emerging state capitalism (via means left unspecified). Against this backdrop, the 
state-run economy was to retain a leading economic role, followed by the collective and 
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household economies. Party Secretary General, Du Muoi, noted in the CPV Central 
Committee Political Report of 1994 that ‘[u]sing the major state enterprises as the bases, 
we will form business corporations with a significant ability to compete in the domestic 
as well as the international market’ (Muoi, 1994, p.66). The centrality of the state sector 
was again reaffirmed in 2001, with the Political Report of the 8th Party Central 
Committee to the 9th Party Congress. The report noted that ‘[t]he socialist-oriented 
market economy involves many ownership forms and economic sectors, in which the 
State economic sector assumes the leading role,’ adding that the socialist system the 
CPV sought to construct involved ‘[p]ublic ownership of the key means of production’ 
with ‘highly socialized modern productive forces’ (CPV, 2015, p.1013).  
 
In light of these political economy considerations, and the socio-economic challenges 
facing Vietnam in 1986, the Fifth Five Year Plan (1986-1990) had three main objectives. 
First, to develop food staples to meet local food needs and to achieve consumption levels 
sufficient to sustain the workforce (this included irrigation efforts, the use of new breeds 
and varieties, the development of mechanisation and expanded fertiliser use). Food 
shortages were such that officials reportedly stated at the time that: ‘[t]he stomach is our 
principal concern’ (Kolko, 1997, p.24), and the 1986 Political Report made clear: ‘[t]he 
urgent requirement for grain, foodstuffs, production materials, consumer goods, and 
export commodities determine the foremost position of agriculture’ (CPV, 2015, p. 634, 
italics in the original). The second objective was to meet domestic demand of ‘essential 
industrial products’ (CPV, 2015, p.634) such as consumer goods, building materials, 
fertiliser, pesticides and veterinary medicines via import-substitution industrialisation. 
The third was to increase and diversify export earnings to cover major imports such 
materials, machinery, spare parts and other necessary goods, with export promotion in 
agriculture and light industry concerned with ‘procuring foreign currency for the State’ 
(CPV, 1991, p.8).  
 
In this, the Fifth Five Year Plan predicted greater need for CMEA support. However, 
by 1991, documents produced for the 7th National Congress indicated that whilst efforts 
to develop the supporting infrastructure for industrialisation in ‘energy industry, 
communications and transport’ (CPV, 1991, p.9) had been successful, the CMEA 
collapse made a new pattern of export development necessary. It was said that Vietnam 
needed to ‘fundamentally renew’ trade patterns and diversify exports in order to meet 
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import needs in ‘essential commodities’ such as petrol, nitrogenous fertiliser, steel and 
cotton (CPV, 1991, p.91). Here, state-owned enterprises, particularly in the textile sector, 
were allocated the task of providing foreign currency to meet imports in the equipment 
and modern technology considered necessary for further industrial development. Thus 
the foreign exchange constraint emerged at this time as a major constraint to the CPV’s 
ambitious industrialisation plans. 
 
5.3. Forging the state finance-industry-infrastructure nexus  
 
A major component of the CPV’s approach to economic transformation in the early 
1990s related to efforts to preserve state ownership over large and strategic 
enterprises.143 State enterprise numbers had exploded, mainly provincial enterprises, 
between 1985 and 1989 from 3,000 to 12,000 (Pincus, 2012, p.6). However, the sector 
was rationalised with Decree 338-HDBT in 1991, which required all state enterprises to 
re-register or be liquidated, making re-establishment conditional on commercial 
viability (for non-strategic state enterprises) and instituting minimum legal capital 
requirements (Nguyen, 2009). By mid-1994 some 6,264 state enterprises remained. 
Those that had been either liquidated or merged tended to be small and locally managed 
state enterprises with less than 100 employees and capital under VND 500 million 
(approximately US$ 45,000) (Van Arkadie and Mallon, 2003, p.126).144 In contrast, 
privatisation was largely side-stepped, since it was deemed too politically sensitive, and 
a modality of partial divestment was created, known as ‘equitisation’ (co phan hoa) 
(Nguyen, 2009). A pilot divestment initiative was issued in 1992, but by the end of 1997, 
only 17 enterprises had been equitised (IMF, 1998b, p.4). Enterprise managers could 
initially veto divestment, many of whom stiffly opposed the process (Kolko, 1997, p.61). 
These veto rights were removed in 1996 (Van Arkadie and Mallon, 2003), and in the 
late 1990s provincial People’s Committees145 were allowed to retain equitisation funds 
for local development projects, a shift designed to try and speed up the process (Sjöholm, 
2006). Thus between the end of 1997 and March 1999, 130 state enterprises were 
                                                   
143 It is possible that Lenin’s New Economic Policy (NEP) was an inspiration here. Soviet specialists taught Party 
cadres about the NEP in 1979, causing the CPV to consider the possibility of accommodating elements of capitalism 
and market relations within the transition to socialism (Pham, 2012). In the 1980s, NEP reportedly became 
particularly important in two respects: ‘One was to develop the commodity-monetary relationship and the other was 
to use state capitalism for economic development’ (Giang, 2014).  
144 Although between 1989-1993 around 800,000 workers were dismissed from the public sector (Kolko, 1997, p.55).  
145 Provincial People’s Committees are the executive arm of the state at local level, with budgetary and administrative 
responsibilities which include implementing the state budget and approving  socioeconomic development plans (Van 
Arkadie and Mallon, 2003). 
168 
 
equitized (IMF, 1999b). Joint ventures between state enterprises and foreign investors 
were another major component of the CPV’s state sector policy in the late 1980s and 
1990s (see Section 5.4.2) 
 
The state sector’s significance to the economy endured throughout the 1990s, and some 
respects increased. The state sector’s share in GDP was 32.5 per cent in 1990 and 
increased to 39.2 per cent in 1993, growing faster than the non-state sector at 11.6 per 
cent per annum 1993 compared with  6.2 per cent in the non-state sector (World Bank, 
1995c). Excluding the share of GDP originating from state management (public 
administration, defence and social security), the share of the state sector in GDP 
remained steady throughout the rest of the decade at just over a third of total output, at 
36.5 per cent of GDP in 1994 and 36.2 per cent in 2000 (IMF, 2002c). Meanwhile, 
between 1993 and 1998 the percentage of formal employment in the public sector 
increased from 39.5 to 40.5 per cent (World Bank, 1999a). By 1998 the state sector 
accounted for 62.0 per cent of non-oil exports and 45.0 per cent of industrial production 
(IMF, 2006d), and in 2000 state enterprises contributed 55.8 per cent of the country’s 
tax revenues (UNCTAD, 2007). State enterprises tended to be capital-intensive, 
compared to other sectors, and thus their share of total employment was considerably 
lower than their share of GDP (Jenkins, 2004b). Furthermore, given very low levels of 
productivity in manufacturing in the early 1990s (due to old machinery, much dating 
from before 1975, using already-old Chinese and Soviet technologies), productivity 
growth in the state sector between 1990 and 1995 saw a reduction in the number of jobs 
by 650,000, a significant factor in the slow rate of overall employment growth during 
this period (Jenkins, 2004b). 
 
Notably, large and strategic state entities were marked to be kept in state hands. Decree 
44/1998/ND-CP (29 June 1998), which outlined the equitisation process, observed 
ongoing state control of the following sectors: 
 
[The] state will continue to hold dominant shares in “strategic” enterprises, 
comprising: public service enterprises with capital in excess of VND 10 billion 
(about [US]$0.7 million); enterprises in large-scale mineral and petroleum 
exploitation; and production of fertilizers, petrochemicals, tobacco, alcohol, and 
pharmaceutical products; aircraft repair; large-scale electricity production, 
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transmission, and distribution; post and telecommunication services; rail, sea 
and air transport; printing and publication; and investment banks and banks for 
the poor (IMF, 1999b, p.47). 
 
This statement indicates the CPV’s conceptualisation of the ‘commanding heights’ of 
the economy at this time centred around the preservation of a nexus of state finance-
industry-infrastructure firms. According to one government official ‘state-owned 
enterprises play a very critical position in the ideology of the Party and government 
which try to use them as dynamic forces’ (VG-4). The contributions of this nexus to the 
overall development strategy are discussed below.  
 
5.3.1 State banks and financial institutions  
 
 
At the heart of the CPV’s growth strategy lay the state-owned financial system. By 
retaining state dominance within the finance and banking sectors, the government 
sought to ‘direct the economy to its objectives’ (Tran, 2003, p.148). After doi moi, 
directed credit was particularly channelled toward infrastructure, public services, basic 
and strategic industries, including through many state enterprises (Weeks, Thang, et al., 
2004). The centrality of the domestic financial system to the CPV’s development 
strategy is highlighted by the following comments made by Cao Sy Kiem the Governor 
of the Central Bank (the State Bank of Vietnam, SBV) in the party’s theoretical and 
political journal in 1995: 
 
[I]n order to preserve the economic results achieved through several years of 
renovation, maintain a high economic growth rate, and keep the country from 
falling behind other countries in the region, one of the problems to which the 
government and bank [SBV] are giving attention is the problem of capital, 
particularly medium- and long-term investment capital for economic 
development. Even though the favourable international conditions have opened 
up great opportunities for mobilizing capital from abroad, domestic sources of 
capital are regarded as decisive for steady and independent economic growth … 
the amount of capital mobilized must increase in later years in order to satisfy 
the general investment needs of the country. This is the responsibility of the 
sectors, echelons, and enterprises. In this, the finance and banking sectors are 
the most important sectors (Kiem, 1995, p.42). 
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In 1991, state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) accounted for 93.3 per cent of total 
bank assets (World Bank, 1995a), a situation left largely unchanged toward the end of 
the decade, as, in 1998, four SOCBs accounted for 82 per cent of total bank assets and 
80 per cent of loans and deposits (IMF, 1999b). Whilst long-term sectorally 
disaggregated data is scarce, as of 2000, 37.1 per cent of total credit went to industry 
and construction, 26.7 per cent to agriculture, fisheries and forestry, 24.5 per cent to 
trade, transport and communication, and 11.7 per cent to other services (IMF, 2002c).  
These powerful policy levers were subject to what the IMF described as ‘official 
intervention’ (IMF, 1999b, p.27), although rather than directing “orders” to SOCBs, the 
government offered ‘“advice” to provide loans. However, it took until the end of 2003 
for the first SOCB to decline a “suggestion” to lend to a specific state enterprise 
(Kovsted et al., 2005).  
 
Although between 1996 and 1998 an average of 44.4 per cent of credit from SOCBs 
went to state enterprises (IMF, 2002c), the state sector was a privileged recipient of 
financial support in other ways. Interest rate liberalisation commenced in 1996, first 
involving deposits in domestic currency, then those in foreign currency in 1999, and for 
loans in foreign and domestic currencies in 2001 and 2002 respectively (Weeks, Thang, 
et al., 2004).146 State enterprises were permitted to roll over loans for half the length of 
the original maturity, or between 3-6 months (IMF, 1999b). Lending to state enterprises 
in foreign currencies also meant they benefitted from typically lower interest rates than 
were prevalent on domestic currency loans (World Bank, 1995a). The Development 
Assistance Fund (DAF) was formed in 2000 and provided a large-scale source of non-
SOCB lending to state enterprises. Indeed, although the share of state enterprise 
borrowing from the banking system steadily declined during the decade from 90.0 per 
cent in 1991 to 44.9 per cent in 2000 (Van Arkadie and Mallon, 2003, p.100), once DAF 
lending is included, 50 per cent of credit went to state enterprises in 2000 (IMF, 2006d). 
By 2000, lending to state enterprises through both the DAF and SOCBs represented 22 
per cent of GDP, rising to 24 per cent in 2001 (IMF, 2006d).   
 
                                                   
146 In contrast to the centrally planned financial system, real interest rates were largely positive after 1989, except 
during 1990-1991. However, after 1991, the interest rates for industry and transport were largely lower than for either 
agriculture and commerce and tourism, with those for fixed capital largely lower than for those for working capital 
(World Bank, 1995a). 
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Notably, the DAF was created in response to IMF pressure to reduce SOCB lending to 
state enterprises in the early 2000s, and which prompted the CPV to separate 
commercial and policy-based lending (Weeks, Thang, et al., 2004). The broad mandate 
of the DAF was to fund development investment credits (World Bank, 2002a) and 
manage ‘the State credit system of subsidised loans for investment, post-investment 
interest rate support and investment credit guarantees’ (World Bank, 2002b, p.107), and 
later, short-term export promotion credits  (Weeks, Thang, et al., 2004). The resources 
channelled into DAF were of considerable economic significance, and included funds 
from Social Insurance Fund, the Vietnam Postal Savings Service Company (VSPC),147 
ODA on-lending, government bonds and foreign loans, which in 2001 together totalled 
VND25 trillion (US$ 1.6 billion) (World Bank, 2002b). By 2001, with a 24 per cent 
share of domestic credit, the equivalent of 3.3. per cent of GDP, it was also the country’s 
largest financial intermediary for channelling resources toward investment activities 
(Weeks, Thang, et al., 2004). The creation of the DAF therefore helped the CPV 
circumvent IFI policy pressure to preserve the capacity to direct resources in line with 
the broader developmental project.148 
 
However, during the late 1990s, there were also signs of emerging fragmentation within 
the state banking sector. When regulations surrounding lending were liberalised in 1996, 
SOCBs could issue letters of credit to state enterprises for international trade 
transactions. Yet a number of enterprises used these new funds not for trade financing, 
but for real estate and other speculative activities, and up to 40 per cent of guaranteed 
letters of credit became bad loans by early 1997 (Kokko, 1998, p.321). In addition, 
toward the end of the decade, SOCBs and non-financial state enterprises began 
establishing joint ventures, joint stock banks and non-bank financial institutions which 
the World Bank (2002a, p.12) warned risked the ‘emergence of financial conglomerates’. 
Furthermore, as well as borrowing from the banking system, state enterprises began to 
borrow from each other, other domestic sources and externally, contributing to a system 
that has been descried as a ‘complex maze of cross-subsidization and indebtedness’ 
(Kokko, 1998, pp.320–321). State capacity to direct credit in the economy was thus 
beginning to display signs of fragmentation in the late 1990s.  
                                                   
147  VPSC was formed in 1999 to ‘mobilize savings for government development investments’ from hitherto 
underserved communities through the existing postal system (World Bank, 2002a). 
148 Bateman (2010, p.198) likewise describes Vietnam’s microfinance approach ‘heterodox local financial model’  of 
low-cost, subsidised micro-finance lending for social development and productivity improvements which eschews 
the mainstream thrust of consumption based lending and survivalist microenterprises. 
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5.3.2 State industry  
 
To understand the potential ‘directional thrust’ imparted by the state dominated financial 
system, it is important to understand the sectors in which Vietnam’s state enterprises 
were concentrated. In the mid-1990s, the World Bank (1995c, i) called the CPV’s 
approach one of ‘state enterprise led industrialization’ consisting of ‘a strategy based on 
the development of large, vertically and horizontally integrated, capital-intensive state 
enterprises, protected from foreign as well as domestic private competition and 
concentrated in selected “strategic” sectors’. An important indication of the industries 
of particular significance to the Party emerged in 1994 when the state sector began to 
be reorganised into large General Corporations (tong cong ty) (GCs). The two-tier 
structure comprised: GC-91s (the most strategic), comprising at least seven constituent 
enterprise members, capital of at least VND 1,000 billion and whose formation required 
the approval of the Prime Minister; and (smaller) GC-90s, of at least five member 
entities, legal capital of VND 100 billion, requiring approval from either Ministers or 
heads of provincial or municipal People’s Committees (Van Arkadie and Mallon, 2003). 
Together these structures came to encompass a quarter of all SOEs (1,392 enterprises), 
two thirds of state capital, and just over half of employees (Van Tho, 2009), indicating 
they tended to group together larger enterprises.  
 
The GC-91s encompassed 18 strategic umbrella corporations overseeing an average of 
31.8 member enterprises (excluding joint ventures), covering the following areas: 
utilities (electricity and telecoms); mining and natural resources (rubber, coal, petroleum, 
gems and gold); heavy industry (cement, steel, chemicals, ship building); light 
manufacturing (textiles and garments); food and agro-processing (coffee, tobacco, paper 
and food); and transport (shipping, air transport) (Marukawa, 2001; Van Arkadie and 
Mallon, 2003) (Table 5.1) These structures were said to have drawn inspiration from 
South Korean chaebols, Taiwan’s state enterprises149 and the state business groups 
established in China in the early 1990s (Cheshier, 2010; Pincus, 2015). They also had 
precedents closer to home, as they revived the enterprise unions of the centrally planned 
period (Marukawa, 2001). By capital, pre-tax profit, budget contribution and employee 
numbers, the largest industrial conglomerates were the cement corporation (VNCC), the 
                                                   
149 On the appeal of the East Asian development experience in Vietnam Greenfield (1997, p.126) notes that the ‘East 
Asian model replaces the rhetoric of the market with a strong state and a common ‘Asian culture’ which belies the 
need for democracy. This idea has gained currency in the modern imaginings of Vietnam’s elites as they remake 
themselves into an authoritarian regime presiding over a strategy of capitalist industrialization’. 
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textile and garment corporation (Vinatex), the tobacco enterprise (Vinataba), and the 
rubber enterprise (Geruco) (Appendix C).  
 
Table 5.1 Vietnam: Sectoral composition of GC-91’s  
 
Source: Adapted from Van Arkadie and Mallon (2003, p.134). 
 
Beyond forming large ‘national champions’, GCs were afforded multiple roles. They 
appeared to be designed to foster consolidation, including technology and managerial 
capacity, the achievement of economies of scale in priority sectors, a reduction in 
fragmentation (Pincus, 2015, p.40), and thus ultimately, ‘creating internationally 
competitive conglomerates’ (Gainsborough, 2003a, p.150). Yet companies in the 
conglomerate structures were not always in related fields (Gainsborough, 2003a). For 
instance, Vinacoal had a travel agent, Vinatex a financial company, Geruco an 
investment and construction company, Vinalines 15 service companies including in 
trade, labour cooperation and trade centres, and Petrovietnam, a tourist company and an 
insurance company (Marukawa, 2001). Other state entities engaged in outsourcing to 
the domestic private sector. For instance, the  Ho Chi Minh City’s Peoples Committee 
outsourced textile production within its factories to the Minh Phung Production 
Company (one of the largest private textile conglomerates), allowing it to shift into trade 
and finance (Greenfield, 1994).  
 
Whilst trends toward diversification appeared to echo the Korean chaebol structures (in 
contrast to surface tendencies toward sectoral specialisation), unlike Korea, where 
competition was highly suppressed (Chang, 1996), competition between state 
enterprises was commonplace. More than half of 212 state enterprises interviewed in 
one study experienced competition from within the same corporation (Marukawa, 
Oil and gas (Petrovietnam) Electricity (EVN)
Coal (Vinacoal) Telecommunications and post (VNPT)
Airlines (Vietnam Airlines)
Shipping (Vinalines)
Cement (VNCC) Tobacco (Vinataba)
Steel (VCS) Rubber (Geruco)
Textiles and garments (Vinatex) Coffee (Vinacaf)
Chemicals (Vinachem)
Paper (Vinapimex)
Shipbuilding (Vinashin)
Manufacturing Agriculture and agro-processing
Utilities Natural resource extraction
Food and food processing (Vinafood I and 
Vinafood II)
Viet Nam National Gem and Gold Corporation 
(Vigeo)
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2001).150 Whilst some GCs, such as Vinatex, were vertically integrated with spinning, 
weaving, apparel and textile machinery enterprises under the same corporate structure, 
this did not necessarily lead to exclusive internal sourcing, either, as internal trade within 
Vinatex was reportedly low (Marukawa, 2001). In contrast, other state enterprises 
reported to being forced to export and import solely through the GC member trading 
enterprises (Marukawa, 2001). These trends suggest considerable diversity in terms of 
industrial strategies adopted by different Vietnamese state conglomerates, as well as 
policy disorganisation about their roles and function.  
 
One factor conditioning the CPV’s approach to state industry were the social and 
political logics governing the Vietnamese state sector. In 1993, there remained strong 
legacies of the welfare functions of traditional socialist conglomerates, and a World 
Bank (1993a, p.92) report noted ‘core businesses are frequently encumbered with 
ancillary businesses of marginal relevance to their main activities and weighted down 
with extramural social tasks’. Mining companies operated hospitals and schools, power 
companies also ran guest houses, and the social obligation to maintain employment 
made it difficult to lay off surplus labourers during downturns in production (World 
Bank, 1993a). The fact that state enterprises were tasked with both productive and 
welfare-related functions, such as providing cheap fertiliser to farmers and cheap 
electricity to consumers, has been cited as one factor propelling diversification within 
the sector (Cheshier and Pincus, 2010, pp.194–195). Meanwhile, profitable 
conglomerate members were given responsibilities beyond sectoral and state budget 
contribution targets, such as cross-subsidising less efficient enterprises and providing 
social services on the government’s behalf (Van Arkadie and Mallon, 2003). The GC 
structures appeared to cement these trends, as in addition to operational and investment 
oversight, cross-subsidisation between member enterprises was a key responsibility 
(IMF, 2003b) with some GCs instructing their profitable members to undertake 
investments to create employment in underdeveloped regions (Marukawa, 2001).   
 
In terms of their role in fostering industrialisation, during the 1990s, state enterprises 
were part of the CPV’s heavy stress on ISI. Priority import-substitution sectors included 
motor vehicles, motorcycles, bicycles, cement, steel, fertiliser and sugar (IMF, 1999b). 
                                                   
150  Fierce competition was reported within the textile (Vinatex), coffee (Vinacafe) and paper (Vinapimpex) 
corporations in the 1990s, yet in chemicals (CNCC and Vinachem), this tended to be was avoided, either by dividing 
business activity according to area, or by specific product (Marukawa, 2001). 
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Vietnam’s trade policy, which was said to have been characterised by a ‘high degree of 
trade restrictiveness throughout much of the 1990s’ (IMF, 2002c, p.38) involved tariffs 
and licencing arrangements, with higher effective rates of protection in manufacturing 
than agriculture (Weeks, Thang, et al., 2004). In late 1992, the CPV instituted a range 
of prohibitions on consumer goods imports, prompted by concerns over the shifting 
composition of Vietnam’s imports following the demise of CMEA and the shift from 
limited numbers of low-quality consumer goods to a much broader range of cheap 
imports (De Vylder, 1995). Tariffs of 120 per cent were applied to some luxury goods 
in 1989, and by 1994 the maximum tariff level was 200 per cent, with some 3000 items 
regulated by import tariffs, dropping to 60 per cent for most items by 1996 (IMF, 1998d). 
Until 1998 only authorised trading companies with licences were permitted to engage 
in foreign trade, a system which was heavily tilted toward state enterprises, since by late 
1998 6,000 state enterprises were licensed to undertake foreign trade, compared with 
2,400 private firms (Weeks, Thang, et al., 2004). By 1997 there were also qualitative 
import controls on cement, petroleum products, fertiliser, sugar, steel, glass and paper 
(IMF, 1998d). Furthermore, ministries such as the Ministry of Commerce approved 
allocations of textile export quotas, at the same time as owning state enterprises (World 
Bank, 1994). Quotas and other controls were also applied to major exports and imports 
such as rice, minerals, petroleum products, fertilisers, motor vehicles, equipment and 
machinery, and second-hand goods (Mallon, 2004, p.8).151  
 
Concessional credit was another major source of support for these import-substitution 
industries. State enterprises played an important role in the priority sugar sector, which 
was very small until 1994. It expanded dramatically with the ‘One Million Ton Sugar 
Programme’ which launched in 1995 and which aimed to reduce Vietnam’s dependence 
on imported sugar by 2000, and through which US$1 billion was invested in the sector 
between 1995-2000  (CIE, 2003). Concessional credit was a major source of invested 
capital for sugar expansion (IMF, 1999b), and of the 44 mills undertaking sugar 
processing, 41 were either wholly state-owned or joint ventures with province level 
state-owned enterprises (CIE, 2003).152 Despite criticism about the inefficiency of the 
sector following these investments, plan targets were largely met, and toward the end of 
                                                   
151 In the case of rice, for example, this policy was designed to help control rice exports, since it was ‘presumed that 
by denying private traders access to the export market, it is easier to control the total amount of rice leaving the 
country’ (IFPRI, 1996, p.233). As the 1990s progressed the number of SOEs given licences to export according to 
government export quotas was steadily decreased.  
152 The other three mills were wholly foreign owned (CIE, 2003). 
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the plan Vietnam was almost self-sufficient in sugar production, thanks to a mix of 
investments, subsidies and tariff protection (CIE, 2003). 
 
Cement and steel were also dominated by the state sector,153 and state-owned steel and 
cement firms borrowed from state banks to support expanded production (IMF, 1999b). 
The state-dominated fertiliser sector also enjoyed sizeable state credits, with joint 
ventures formed for more advanced fertiliser production, supported by import bans and 
import quotas only allocated to state firms (IMF, 1999b). Motorcycles and automobiles 
were the other major ISI industries of the period, supported by import licensing for 
motorcycles and cars of less than 15 seats, which was introduced in 1998 (IMF, 1999b). 
Whilst foreign investors had a central role in the development of the import-substituting 
motorcycle sector (Fujita, 2013a), in the automobile sector several joint ventures (with 
state enterprises) were also formed (Sturgeon, 1998).  
 
Yet at the same time as the CPV focused efforts on developing ‘protected and capital-
intensive industries dominated by state-owned enterprises’ (Dinh, 2000, p.361), export 
promotion was also a key priority, and the trade regime was balanced to encourage 
exports (Weeks, Thang, et al., 2004). Tax exemptions, export credits and a duty 
drawback scheme (where duty on imported inputs could be reclaimed if used to produce 
exports) were deployed (Thanh, 2005), alongside preferential profit tax arrangements 
for exporters. Light industry was usually taxed at 35 per cent (versus 25 per cent for 
heavy industry and 45 per cent for services), but for those exporting between 50-80 per 
cent of their production, this was 25 per cent (Weeks, Thang, et al., 2004). Export-
processing zones located close to international transport facilities such as ports were 
established in order to facilitate access to land and logistics to promote exports (Hill, 
2000).  
 
State enterprises also played a critical role investing in key export-oriented sectors such 
as textile and garments, where they accounted for 34.8 per cent of garment output in 
1995, which reduced slightly to 31.7 per cent in 2001, with state textile production 
falling from 56.8 per cent of the total in the mid-1990s to 48.5 per cent in 2001 (Nadvi 
et al., 2004). Most garment and textile export quotas to the EU, Norway, Canada and 
                                                   
153 As late as 2008, VNCC enterprises produced 44 per cent of all the country’s cement, with joint ventures accounting 
for a further 21 per cent of volume (World Bank, 2010), some of the largest of which were formed as joint ventures 
with VNCC. 
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Turkey (which regulated exports through the Multi-Fiber Agreement) between 1990-
1997 for instance were allocated to state sector producers (IMF, 1998d). State 
enterprises invested in new technology using state-subsidised credit in order to improve 
fabric quality in the late 1990s, which was part of broader effort to increase the local 
content of exported garments and to prepare for attempts to break into the US export 
market, with state-owned conglomerate Vinatex investing US$ 230 million between 
1996-2000, with another US$ 830 million planned for 2001-2005 out of a total of US 
$2.3 billion planned for the sector as a whole (Nadvi et al., 2004). Estimates of Vinatex’s 
share of Vietnam’s textile and garment exports ranged from 30 to 40 per cent in the 
early 2000s (Nadvi et al., 2004),154 and some 77 per cent of the fabric export of nine 
Vinatex enterprises in 2000 was indirectly undertaken through the export of their 
garments (Nadvi and Thoburn, 2003). Outside of the state sector, in contrast, garment 
export was largely undertaken with imported fabric (Nadvi and Thoburn, 2003). 
Furthermore, Vietnam is described as having done ‘remarkably well’ in a highly 
competitive global market during the 1990s, having ‘gained market share from better 
established competitors in the demanding European, Japanese, and, more recently, US 
markets’ (Nadvi and Thoburn, 2003, p.115). 
 
This indicates the CPV undertook a balanced approach to manufacturing development 
in the 1990s, nurturing both import-substituting and export-oriented industries capacity, 
including from within the state sector. During the early 1990s, the state sector increased 
its share of industrial production from 67.6 per cent in 1990 to 71.3 per cent in 1993, 
largely due to expansion in heavy industries such as oil, steel, cement, fertiliser and tyres 
(World Bank, 1995c).155 Between 1995-1998 state industry grew at 10.2 per cent per 
year (versus 9.2 per cent for the domestic private sector), although the foreign invested 
sector grew considerably faster at 22.7 per cent a year (World Bank, 1999a). Growth in 
these sectors was driven chiefly by capital-intensive import-substituting industries such 
as sugar, steel, cement, and paper (SIDA, 2003), which had a heavy state presence. 
Notably, Vietnam achieved this industrial expansion at the same time as achieving high 
levels of both import and export growth, giving it levels of trade openness by the early 
2000s that were twice the average of PRGF-eligible countries (IMF, 2002c), at a time 
                                                   
154 This directly contravenes claims that Vietnam’s ‘large state-owned sector is evidently so inefficient and unable to 
capitalize on export market opportunities’ (Hill, 2000, p.294).  
155 Of private contributions to industrial production at this time the lion’s share was private household rather than 
private enterprises, which contributed 10.8 per cent of total private industrial production, compared with 80.6 per 
cent for private households in 1993 (World Bank, 1995c).  
178 
 
when it was also declared that ‘Vietnam's trade system … remains one of the most 
highly restrictive and interventionist [in the world]’ (IMF, 1999b, p.67).  
 
This suggests that Vietnamese developmentalism after doi moi cannot be reduced to 
blanket trade liberalisation and openness, the activities of private investors (domestic 
and foreign) and privatisation agenda. Nonetheless, the World Bank recently argued that 
the county’s manufacturing success is the product of it having ‘embraced trade 
liberalization with gusto … [and] complemented external liberalization with domestic 
reforms through deregulation and lowering the cost of doing business’ going on to add 
that ‘trade policy has arguably been the most important industrial policy for Vietnam’ 
(Eckardt et al., 2018).156 In contrast, Vietnam’s industrial policy combined elements of 
import-substitution and export promotion (Thoburn, 2013) during its most dramatic 
take-off (as outlined in Chapter 2). Thus during this first developmental phase Vietnam 
showed it to be possible to combine ‘a strong component of fostering domestic 
substitutes for imports, pursued simultaneously with export promotion’ (Weeks, Thang, 
et al., 2004, p.117). Far from embracing trade liberalisation with “gusto”, Vietnam 
followed what has been described as a “heterodox” process of international integration 
(Chaponnière and Cling, 2009, p.106). Notably, however, the balancing act between ISI 
and EOI strategies also contributed to policy divides within the CPV during the mid-
1990s, particularly over devaluation, with one group aligned with the export sector 
adopting a different position to those advocating for the prioritisation of protection for 
domestic industry (Riedel and Turley, 1999). 
 
In addition, given the extensive continuities within the state sector, the 1990s cannot be 
described as a period of  “big bang” market reform, despite accounts to this effect 
(Riedel and Turley, 1999, p.48). Where the mainstream literature does acknowledge 
Vietnam’s limited adherence to the orthodox policy package (or the persistence of so-
called ‘bad policies’) (Hill, 2000; Dollar, 2002), these are only offered as part of a 
‘puzzle’ related to Vietnam’s success in the 1990s. Ultimately it follows that only 
mainstream measures can explain its success (despite its ‘bad policies). However, 
                                                   
156 Indeed, the World Bank’s Light Manufacturing in Africa report, which attempts to appropriate Vietnam’s success 
as a vindication for a mainstream vision of foreign investment led industrialisation for Ethiopia, provides limited 
mention of the role of state-owned enterprises, instead arguing that Vietnam’s light manufacturing success is 
attributable to it having ‘leveraged the achievements of private sector manufacturers to promote national prosperity’ 
(Dinh et al., 2012, p.33). 
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Vietnam’s industrial development strategy after doi moi was decidedly heterodox: 
reliant on directed credit through the state-dominated financial system, channelled, in 
many instances, to state-owned enterprises in key (ISI and EOI) industries, with 
considerable trade protection and other forms of intervention absolutely central to 
patterns of manufacturing development during the 1990s. Attempts by mainstream 
analysts to separate Vietnam’s success from these components of its strategy 
fundamentally misreads the way the Vietnamese market economy operated during the 
1990s.   
 
5.3.3 State infrastructure  
 
The final pillar of the developmental nexus was state ownership over critical economic 
infrastructure, particularly transport, utilities, and communications. Of the major 
strategic corporations created in the mid-1990s, five were in infrastructure: Electricity 
Corporation of Viet Nam (EVN), Vinalines, Viet Nam Airline Corporation, Viet Nam 
Post and Telecommunication Corporation (VNPT), and Viet Nam Ship Building 
Corporation, which together accounted for 60.2 per cent of the legal capital in all 18 of 
the strategic GC-91s (Marukawa, 2001; Van Arkadie and Mallon, 2003). The EVN had 
a monopoly in electricity generation, transmission and distribution, and was tasked with 
implementing ambitious nationwide electrification targets (ADB, 2015a).157 Between 
1995-2004, access to electricity increased from around 50 to 93 per cent of the 
population, with tariff levels set at below-cost rates and the central government 
supporting the gap between revenue generation and investment needs through 
preferential access to credit and special tax treatment (ADB, 2015a).  
 
In telecoms, VNPT dominated the sector  for much of this period and was committed to 
universal (rural and urban) service provision, with later (state-owned) entrants, 
concentrating on profitable urban areas (Lee, 2011). After VNPT’s formal monopoly 
was ended in 1993 (Ngo, 2017b), state telecoms operator, Saigon Post and Telecoms 
(SPT) (a joint venture between VNPT and other state enterprises) was formed in 1995 
(Lee, 2011), the same year as army-owned Viettel was given a licence to provide mobile 
and internet services (Cheshier, 2010), although it only formally entered the market in 
2000 (Ngo, 2017b). Yet by the mid-2000s, despite liberalisation in the context of 
Vietnam’s bilateral trade agreement with the US (see section 6.1), state-owned VNPT 
                                                   
157 EVN alone represented 49.4 per cent of capital of GCs (Van Arkadie and Mallon, 2003). 
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retained a 90-94 per cent market share, with the rest accounted for by other state 
enterprises (Vinaphone, Mobiphone, SPT, Viettel, and others) (World Bank, 2006c). 
Senior policy-makers have explained that full state control over telecoms was needed 
‘in order to sustain the nation’s security and stability, which was primary to economic 
development’ (quoted in Ngo, 2017b, p.462). Support for the sector, particularly VNPT, 
took the form of subsidies, land allocations, preferential credit and tax exemptions, more 
generous than in less strategic industries since only oil and gas, mining, electricity and 
defence were considered by officials to be of equal significance (Ngo, 2017b). 
 
In transport, the overarching policy goal was to ‘retain in state ownership the country’s 
basic transport infrastructure and those transport enterprises which it considers of 
strategic importance’ (e.g. ports, airports and sea transport) (World Bank, 2000c, p.196), 
resulting in a slow pace of transport state enterprise divestment during the 1990s. In 
addition to the GC-91s above, a further 300 transport enterprises were supervised by the 
Ministry of Transport (MoT) during the 1990s, including the Railway Corporation, 
construction maintenance and repair enterprises, engineering and design, and freight 
transport and forwarding, only 40 of which were equitised as of the end of 1999 (World 
Bank, 2000c).158  Government priority transport investments between 1996-2010, were 
concentrated in roads (39.2 per cent of total investment), urban transport (25.4 per cent), 
and ports (15.2 per cent) (World Bank, 1999b). As of the mid-2000s, state enterprises 
were the only operators in road construction, the national railway, and ports (of 80 ports 
at the time, the major ports were operated by Vinalines, and the smaller ports 
Vinamarine) (World Bank, 2006c). The state also dominated inland waterways 
(including large barges), sea and air transport, and supporting services such as insurance 
and freight forwarding (World Bank, 1999b, xiii). Between 1995-1998, the state sector 
transported 80 per cent of all long distance transport, whereas the private sector was 
concentrated in short distance road and inland waterway transport that tended to be low 
barrier to entry and less capital intensive such as road and passenger vehicles and small 
inland waterway vessels (World Bank, 2000c).  
 
                                                   
158 The World Bank notes this was a very different approach to transportation than in neighbouring Thailand, 
Malaysia and Indonesia, none of which relied on outright state ownership or operation in maritime or air transport 
and thus international trade (World Bank, 2000c). Another 300 were also owned by Provincial Peoples’ Committees, 
such as small bus and taxi companies and cooperatives (World Bank, 1999b).   
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Between 1996-2000 three strategic growth corridors were prioritised for investment in 
road and port modernisation to support deepened international trade (World Bank, 
2000c).159  The port infrastructure posed considerable competitive challenges in the 
1990s, since Vietnam’s three major ports had the highest costs in Southeast Asia, with 
a twenty-foot container from Tokyo costing up to US$ 1,000 more than to Manila or 
Bangkok (World Bank, 2000c). Non-revenue earning state enterprises (such as road, 
inland waterways and railway track) received direct funding from the state, whilst those 
generating their own revenues were required to fund current expenditure from their own 
earnings (World Bank, 2000c). Maximum prices were set by the State Price Committee 
and practices of setting the unit prices for inputs for those bidding for public sector 
projects in transport helped to keep costs low (World Bank, 1999b).  
 
5.4 Financing the nexus 
 
5.4.1 Public investment  
 
A key plank of Vietnamese developmentalism during the 1990s was a high share of 
investment to GDP – which averaged 33.2 per cent of GDP during 1996-2000, and the 
state sector’s share of this investment increased from 49.1 to 59.1 per cent (Table 5.2). 
Such estimates were also likely to underestimate the significance of state investment, 
since private domestic investment includes those by equitised state enterprises, where 
the government held a minority share (which may be as much as 49 per cent) and as the 
FDI category includes joint ventures (may of which were with state enterprises in the 
1990s, see Section 5.4.2) (IMF, 2007b). Public investment data comprises three aspects: 
the government budget; ‘state credits’ comprising investment bonds and public lending 
via public financial institutions; and investment by state enterprises in which the state 
still retains a majority share (IMF, 2007b).160 
 
  
                                                   
159 In the north the Hanoi-Haiphong corridor in the center Da Nang and in the south the Ho Chi Minh City-Vung 
Tau (World Bank, 2000c). 
160 One of the challenges of state budget data in Vietnam (and why it can be ambiguous) relates to how state enterprise 
on-lending is treated. The GSO calls these off-budget activities, and IMF data is inconsistent in whether this is 
included or not (Abbott and Tarp, 2012). The data provided in Table 5.2 can therefore be read as offering higher 
levels than official data might suggest (see Tarp, 2018) on account of including a fuller range of flows in the definition 
of public investment. It should therefore be treated as a high-end estimate. 
182 
 
Table 5.2 Vietnam: Investment levels, 1996–2000 
 
Source: IMF (2007, p. 48). 
 
Indicative of the significance accorded to public investment by the CPV, the Central 
Committee Political Report produced in January 1994 noted that the ‘[rate of] growth 
of the entire economy’, which it sought to keep at 8 per cent per annum or above, 
depended on ‘[c]oncentrated investment earmarked from the state budget’ (Muoi, 1994, 
p.64) and set target levels of over 20 per cent of GDP. To achieve this, the report notes 
‘great efforts and appropriate policies [are needed] to encourage the entire society to 
practice thrift in production and consumption and to concentrate investing in production, 
especially material production’ (Muoi, 1994, p.64). Priority sectors for state capital 
investment are described as ‘socioeconomic infrastructure and a number of key, 
spearhead industrial establishments, and processing industries for agricultural, forestry, 
and marine products, for the manufacture of export goods, and to cater to export services’ 
(Muoi, 1994, p.64). The report’s priorities and its pledge to increase the scope of public 
investment provoked strong criticism from the World Bank for its excess ambition. The 
Bank also cautioned the CPV to remove support for the manufacturing sector, which it 
considered better left to the private sector, and instead restrict its support to a ‘small 
number of public utilities, such as power and water’ (World Bank, 1994, p.44).  
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Total investment 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
        Public investment 49.1 49.4 55.5 58.7 59.1
        Private domestic investment 24.9 22.6 23.7 24.0 22.9
        FDI 26.0 28.0 20.8 17.3 18.0
Total investment 32.1 34.6 32.4 32.8 34.2
       Public investment 15.8 17.1 18.0 19.2 20.2
       Private domestic investment 8.0 7.8 7.7 7.9 7.8
       FDI 8.3 9.7 6.7 5.7 6.2
Per cent total investment
Per cent of GDP
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Table 5.3 Vietnam: Total fiscal revenues, percentage of GDP, 1988–1996 
 
Source: IMF (1998d).
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
13.1 16.0 16.1 14.4 18.3 21.6 24.0 23.2 22.9
3.4 4.5 4.4 11.6 13.2 17.4 19.0 19.0 19.5
State enterprises 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.6 8.2 9.3 9.1 8.5 8.8
Non-agricultural private sector 1.4 1.8 1.7 1.4 1.8 2.5 2.7 2.9 3.1
Agricultural tax 1.0 1.3 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.7
Taxes on international trade 1.0 1.5 1.9 1.6 2.0 4.3 5.9 6.0 5.8
Joint-ventures and others 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.7 1.0 1.1
9.7 11.5 11.7 2.8 5.1 4.2 5.0 4.2 3.4
State enterprises 8.4 9.2 9.5 1.3 2.5 2.5 2.9 1.3 1.0
Other non-tax revenue 1.3 2.3 2.2 1.5 2.5 1.8 2.1 2.9 2.5
Net transfer from state enterprises -0.1 4.4 6.9 7.9 9.9 11.2 11.6 9.3 9.2
Tax and non-tax revenue from state enterprises 8.4 9.2 9.5 8.9 10.8 11.8 12.1 9.8 9.7
Budgetary transfers from state enterprises 8.5 4.8 2.6 1.0 0.9 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5
Memorandum items
Total domestic revenue
Tax revenue
Non-tax revenue
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Underpinning such investment levels, total domestic revenue increased steeply during 
the early 1990s, going from 14.4 per cent of GDP in 1991 to 24.0 per cent in 1994, 
before dropping slightly to 22.9 per cent in 1996 (Table 5.3). Domestic savings 
increased steeply from just 3.5 per cent of GDP in 1989 to 27.1 per cent in 2000 (Weeks, 
Thang, et al., 2004). Between 1998-2002, a current fiscal surplus of between 4 and 6 per 
cent of GDP provided an important source of resources for public investment (Weeks, 
Thang, et al., 2004, p.68). Trade taxes and rising oil revenues also supported this 
expansion (IMF, 1997). However, state enterprises were also a central lynchpin of the 
Vietnamese revenue system (Table 5.3) as the centrally planned revenue system based 
on negotiated transfers from state enterprises was replaced by one based on taxes 
(Weeks, Thang, et al., 2004). State enterprises contributed the majority of profit tax, 
two-thirds of turnover and excise taxes, and a sizeable share of trade and land taxes 
(IMF, 1998d). Indeed, Vietnam’s success in avoiding a collapse in revenue collection 
during the transition to market-oriented economy is highly atypical: 
 
This revenue performance is perhaps the most impressive evidence of the 
effective management by the government of the transition from central planning 
to market regulation, even more impressive than the rapid growth of the 
economy or export performance. It contrasts positively with the experience of 
transition countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, where state revenues 
tended to collapse in the early stage of regime change (Weeks, Thang, et al., 
2004, p.68). 
 
Investment patterns are complicated to trace since Vietnam’s budget was a secret during 
the 1990s (Pincus and Thang, 2004; Weeks, Thang, et al., 2004). A senior Ministry of 
Planning and Investment (MPI) official said of Vietnam’s public investment priorities 
that ‘in our tradition of development planning, all efforts and resources had to be 
mobilized for achieving high economic growth through investment for production and 
manufacturing, what was left would go to social infrastructure within which poverty 
reduction was a part’ (quoted in Le Thanh Forsberg and Kokko, 2008, p. 29). Available 
data suggests infrastructure and production were the central pillars of the CPV’s public 
investment strategy, in line with the developmental nexus outlined above. For instance, 
Vietnam’s investments in infrastructure, were persistently around 9 per cent of GDP 
during the late 1990s (Table 5.4), higher than the rate of GDP growth, and considerably 
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higher than other East Asian and Southeast Asian economies (whose infrastructure 
investments tend themselves to be high by global standards) (World Bank, 2006c).161 
Between 1997-2002 around 44 per cent of ‘state investment’ (encompassing 
investments made from the state budget, state credit and by state enterprises) went to 
infrastructure, which incorporates transportation, telecommunications, water, gas and 
electricity (World Bank, 2006c). Between 1996-2000,  27 per cent of public investment 
went to transport and communication, a further 31 per cent went into industry, and 18 
per cent to agriculture (SIDA, 2003).  
 
Table 5.4 Vietnam: GDP growth rates and infrastructure investments as a percentage of GDP, 1995-
2003 
 
Source: World Bank (2006c). 
 
Such investments resulted in a doubling of the road network (from 96,100 km in 1990 
to 205,782 km in 2002); full urban electrification, and rural coverage rates that increased 
from 51 to 88 per cent of households between 1996-2004; water access rate increases 
from 26 per cent in 1993 to 57 per cent in 2004 (World Bank, 2006c). In so doing, 
Vietnam reached the water and electricity access levels of richer countries in the region 
by 2002 (World Bank, 2006c). Furthermore, infrastructure and industrial development 
have been mutually reinforcing, with improvements to the road and port infrastructure 
around the Hanoi-Hai Phong transport corridor connecting Hanoi better to global 
markets by land and sea transport, and contributing to industrial and export growth 
(GRIPS, 2003a, p.31).162  
 
5.4.2 Foreign direct investment  
 
In 1988 the Foreign Investment Law opened the economy to foreign capital, before 
measures to establish domestic market-oriented institutions (such as price liberalisation, 
trade reform, privatisation and stabilisation) were undertaken, which Gates (1995, p.386) 
attributes to four factors. First, senior officials considered China’s opening to FDI 
                                                   
161 In 1998 Vietnam’s infrastructure spending was 9.8 per cent of GDP, the Philippines was 5.6, Thailand 5.3, 
Indonesia 3.1, Cambodia 2.9, China 2.6 and Lao PDR 1.7 per cent (World Bank, 2006c). 
162 Out of 70 FDI managers interviewed in one study, 90 per cent said new investments into the major industrial zones 
within the Hanoi-Hai Phong transport corridor would not have been enacted without the improvements to road and 
port infrastructure, for instance, reducing the cost and time of accessing imported inputs (GRIPS, 2003a). 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
GDP growth 9.5 9.3 8.2 5.8 4.8 6.8 6.9 7.1 7.3
Infrastructure investment 8.6 9.3 10.1 9.8 9.4 8.4 9.1 9.9 10.0
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successful and transferable to Vietnam. Second, to growing awareness that Vietnam’s 
need for investment far outstripped domestic capabilities. Third, frustration with both 
Soviet investment and regarding the small-size of Vietnamese manufacturing, as well 
as the growing gap between Vietnam and its regional neighbours. Fourth, the view that 
foreign capital could bolster the CPV’s hegemony by reducing ‘immediate pressures to 
liberalize its domestic political system’ (Gates, 1995, p.386). As a result, Vietnam 
adopted much of the Chinese law on foreign investment into its own legislation (Le, 
1995), and whereas other aspects of market-oriented reform were more politically 
contested (such as privatisation, private property rights, land ownership), the attraction 
of FDI was seen as ‘relatively easy in the context of Vietnam’s political economy’ 
(Gates, 1995, p.396). A further important factor shaping enthusiasm for FDI was 
Vietnam’s inability to access large inflows of concessional foreign financing during the 
late 1980s and early 1990s due to the Cambodian conflict and lack of normalised 
relations with the US (which were restored in the mid-1990s). Foreign capital thus 
provided a scarce source of foreign exchange and investable funds at a time of great 
economic fragility.  
 
The CPV sought to channel this foreign capital toward its development priorities. Whilst 
all sectors were opened to foreign investment in 1988 (unlike to domestic investors), 
there was particular scrutiny for projects in infrastructure (transport, ports, railway, 
airline, telecoms), international trade, and finance and banking (Table 5.5). In practice, 
these policies were said to favour ‘projects (on a positive list) that are export-oriented 
and import substituting’ whilst those outside these priority areas were ‘required to 
balance their foreign exchange outlays and earnings, effectively preventing them from 
selling their products domestically if raw materials are imported’ (IMF, 1999 p. 21). 
Due to this discretionary approvals system, in mid-1994 the government considered 
formally closing some sectors to foreign investment in order to save investors wasted 
efforts (Le, 1995). Furthermore, whilst in regional perspective Vietnam’s incentives for 
foreign investors in the 1990s were generous (IMF, 1999b), this generosity was bounded. 
Foreign investors had to pay higher prices for land, utilities and transportation than 
domestic investors throughout the 1990s, and had a higher minimum wage than local 
enterprises (Belser, 2000).163  
 
                                                   
163 However, no minimum wage at all was reportedly used in Vietnam’s Export Processing Zones (Le, 1995). 
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Table 5.5 Vietnam: Three tier FDI approvals process, 1991 
 
Source: Tang Than Trai Le (1995).  
 
Importantly, FDI was also used to strengthen state enterprises. Some two-thirds of the 
FDI commitments between 1991-1998 went to establish joint ventures (JVs) with state 
enterprises, and just 2 per cent to JVs with private enterprises (IMF, 1999b).164 In some 
sectors, JVs with state firms were mandatory until 1996, including transportation, 
airport terminals, forestry plantations, tourism, port construction and explosives, and 
only in priority industrial investments could enterprises be fully foreign-owned 
(Athukorala and Tien, 2012). Strong incentives toward the formation of JVs with state 
firms resulted from the fact that state enterprises would usually contribute land rather 
than capital (Le, 1995), and only state enterprises could use land-use rights as collateral 
to secure credit from the domestic banking system (Van Arkadie and Mallon, 2003). For 
foreign investors, these ventures also eased the burden of administrative approval and 
bureaucratic procedures (Le, 1995). This structure of foreign investment inflows lasted 
until 1998-1999 when more sectors were opened to fully-foreign owned investments as 
part of a broader shift toward more export-oriented forms of FDI less reliant on local 
partners than more domestically-oriented investments (Schaumburg-Müller, 2003, p.54). 
 
The result of this foreign investment climate was a specific pattern of sectoral FDI 
distribution. Whilst Vietnam’s export growth rates are often attributed to its rising 
                                                   
164 The data on disbursed FDI showed a slightly different pattern, with around a half of such projects comprising 
joint ventures with state enterprises (IMF, 1999b). 
Group A Group B Group C
Approval mechanism
Chairman of the Council of Ministers after initial
review by National Council for Project Evaluation
(chaired by chairman of State Planning
Commission, and comprised of government
ministers
Chairman of the Council
of Ministers after review
by SCCI and Chairman
of National Council for
Project Evaluation
SCCI (after advice from
various agencies)
Over US$ 20 million in sectors: exploitation or
processing of precious or rare mineral resources;
telecommunications, broadcasting, television, and
publishing; marine, aviation, and railway transport;
construction of sea ports, airports, railways, and
national highways; pharmaceutical products,
poisons, and explosive production; real estate ;
finance and banking; defence and security projects;
export and import business; international tourism
Any projects below US$
20 million in sectors
specified in Group A
(those over US$ 20
million)
Over US$ 40 million in heavy industry' Over US$ 30 million in
heavy industry
Over US$ 30 million in other areas
Projects requiring large land areas and significantly
affecting the environment
Project type All other projects
Over US$20 million for
all other projects
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foreign investment inflows (Hollweg, Smith, et al., 2017, p.3),165 in the 1990s, most FDI 
in Vietnam entered its priority ISI sectors, with FDI into processing and export-oriented 
industries sharply rising only after 2000 (Anh et al., 2006, p.8). Foreign invested 
enterprises accounted for just 8.5 per cent of exports in 1995 (Table 5.6), compared with 
31.3 per cent in China in the same year (Jun et al., 1997, p.23).166 Despite having higher 
ratios of FDI to GNP than China in the mid-1990s (Jun et al., 1997), Vietnam’s inflows 
tended to be more capital than labour intensive, and between 1995-2000, the share held 
by heavy industries was higher than that of light manufacturing (Table 5.7).167 As a 
result, at the end of the 1990s, the IMF (1999b, p.10) complained that Vietnam had 
followed China’s lead, having failed to ‘develop a solid export base in low-cost, labor-
intensive industries’. The capital intensive industries attracting the greater share of 
investment included automobile assembly (Toyota, Mercedes and Honda), motorbikes 
(Honda, Yamaha and Suzuki), electronics such as TVs, radio, personal computers and 
office equipment (Fujitsu, Samsung, LG, Daewoo, HP and Canon), and household 
electronics (Siemens), whilst export-oriented manufacturing FDI was present in shrimp, 
textile and garments and footwear (Schaumburg-Müller, 2003).  
 
Table 5.6 Vietnam: Export share contributed by foreign invested projects, 1991-1999 
 
Source Pham Hoang Mai (2001). 
 
The share of ISI-oriented FDI was partially the result of its trade policy, given Vietnam’s 
attractive protected domestic market, but also its infrastructure bottlenecks. In the mid-
1990s Japanese investors estimated another five years of investments in infrastructure 
would be needed for large-scale export-oriented electronics and automobile industries 
to be viable (Gates, 1995). Industrial zone and Export Processing Zone (EPZ) 
infrastructure formed part of attempts to build such an export platform, and as of mid-
1997 Vietnam had 38 special zones of both kinds across 6,200 hectares (Jun et al., 1997). 
                                                   
165  This assessment notes that ‘[Vietnam’s]consistent policy of openness and export-led growth has paid off. 
Economic reforms undertaken since the 1990s and culminating in its 2007 accession to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) enabled the country to follow the path of other East Asian economies and to leverage trade and FDI for 
economic growth and poverty reduction’ (Hollweg, Smith, et al., 2017, p.3).  
166 The share of foreign investment in total exports steadily increased between 1994-1996, from 4.0 per cent in 1994, 
to 8.1 per cent in 1995 and 10.8 per cent in 1996 (Jun et al., 1997). 
167 Here ‘light’ tended to correspond to export-oriented light manufacturing sectors (such as textiles and garments 
and footwear) and ‘heavy’ with import-substitution oriented heavy industrial sectors (such as cars and motorcycles, 
electronics and household electrical items) (Schaumburg-Müller, 2003). 
 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Share in exports 2.5 4.5 8.6 8.7 8.5 10.7 19.6 21.2 24.2
Share in imports 11.4 19.5 19.5 27.6 25.8 19.9
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However, given the use of these sites by firms producing for the domestic market, by  
1996 only 55.6 per cent of turnover in such zones was from export activities (Jun et al., 
1997). The 1997 revisions to the investment code indicated that heavier industries such 
as metallurgy, basic chemicals, production machinery, petrochemicals, fertiliser, 
electrical components, automobiles and motorbike components would be accorded the 
strongest privileges, signalling this remained a key priority (Fujita, 2000). Local content 
requirements were introduced in the same year as part of efforts to develop local supply 
chains connected to these foreign investment inflows (Fujita, 2000).  
 
Table 5.7 Vietnam: FDI by sector, percentage, 1995-2000 
 
Source: IMF (2002c). 
 
From the CPV’s side, foreign capital helped to bolster the developmental nexus in 
several key respects. Joint ventures gave the state a veto over decisions taken by foreign 
investors,168 and provided enterprises grappling with outdated technology and falling 
state subsidies with an outside injection of technology and capital (Truong and Gates, 
1996). In this way, FDI helped to stimulate an improvement in state enterprise 
performance during the 1990s (Mallon, 2004), and many JVs were incorporated into 
GC-91 structures, including in chemicals, shipping, airline, telecoms, coal, oil and gas, 
cement and steel (Van Arkadie and Mallon, 2003). Yet a number of challenges with 
FDI’s developmental contribution included a negative contribution to the trade balance, 
limited domestic linkages, subcontracting or technology transfer (especially cutting-
edge technology) (Schaumburg-Müller, 2003, p.62). Nonetheless, the selective 
approach and sectoral bias of the CPV’s FDI regime in the first development period 
                                                   
168 According to Phong Tran ‘[the] joint venture company's board of management was to make most important 
business decisions on a unanimous basis. This decision-making mechanism gives minority shareholders, normally 
Vietnamese state-owned enterprises, a veto right’ (2003, p.144).  
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Industry 34.2 45.8 46.1 41.0 40.9 46.5
Heavy industries 13.4 19.2 24.4 21.8 20.8 22.7
Export processing zones 1.4 5.4 3.1 1.9 2.4 0.7
Light industries 11.4 16.6 12.6 10.0 8.9 16.6
Food 8.0 4.6 6.0 7.3 8.7 6.4
Oil and gas 24.2 15.1 9.1 16.7 16.9 10.5
Construction 5.7 10.5 14.1 8.8 7.4 11.3
6.6 3.3 3.5 3.6 5.2 1.4
Real estate 18.5 16.9 17.0 20.9 16.7 15.3
Hotels and tourism 11.2 11.6 7.9 10.4 6.3 8.4
Office, property and apartments 7.4 5.3 9.1 10.6 10.4 6.9
5.6 4.6 8.1 5.5 9.4 10.6
Services 5.1 3.8 2.1 3.4 3.5 4.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Transport and communications
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries
190 
 
acted as a ‘stimulus to its “late” industries, and a means to increase the pace of economic 
growth and structural change’ (Gates, 1995, p.387). The means of doing so helped to 
bolster state industries through joint ventures, whilst infrastructure was considerably 
more state dominated.  
 
5.4.3 The IFIs and ODA  
 
Concessional financing also provided a critical source of support for the developmental 
nexus during the 1990s. Western ODA was limited during the 1980s to funds from 
Sweden and UNDP and it took until 1993 for the IMF and World Bank to be authorised 
by the US administration to resume lending to Vietnam (World Bank, 1993b, i). In 1994 
structural adjustment lending comprising a SAC and ESAF was agreed, but these flows 
were relatively marginal compared with private foreign flows for much of the 1990s 
(Figure 5.1). For instance, World Bank and IMF credits only amounted to 3.0 per cent 
of GDP, out of a total of 15.8 per cent for ODA and FDI combined in 1995 (Weeks, 
2001, p.33). This is often assumed to have enhanced the CPV’s policy ownership since 
‘[s]trong commercial foreign exchange inflows have helped Viet Nam minimize 
dependence on ODA’ (Mallon, 2004, p.3).  
 
Figure 5.1 Vietnam: FDI and ODA inflows (BoP current, US$ billion), 1986–2000  
 
Source: World Bank (2017c). 
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Concessional financing was a major support for infrastructure. The CPV’s approach has 
been described as one of ‘active intervention’ in ODA utilisation guided by four 
objectives: supporting public investment; improving socio-economic infrastructure in 
order to mobilise foreign and domestic private investment; supporting macro-
stabilisation; and poverty alleviation (Mai, 1996, p.84). During the 1990s ODA for 
economic infrastructure and services increased from 11.1 per cent of ODA in 1985 to 
65.3 per cent in 2000, whilst productive ODA declined from 16.0 to 5.7 percent (Table 
5.8). Between 1998-2000, large-scale infrastructure projects received an average of 
US$ 706 million per annum in ODA (UNDP, 2002), which included major national 
road-building projects, 90 per cent of which was funded by Japan, the World Bank and 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) (UNDP, 2002).  
 
This reorientation reflects two broad trends. First, the MPI (which both coordinates 
ODA at the national level and supervises the allocation of funds toward national priority 
projects) produced an “investment menu” to guide ODA according to the CPV’s 
priorities, and this “menu” was biased toward large-scale, capital-intensive loans 
(Forsberg and Kokko, 2007, p.7). Nearly three decades of conflict left Vietnam with 
severe infrastructure challenges, and ODA emerged in the 1990s as an important source 
of foreign reconstruction-oriented capital. During the first donors’ meeting at the end of 
1993, the government put forward 121 projects for which it sought external financing, 
with by far the largest outlays asked for economic infrastructure projects, which 
comprised US$ 7.55 billion out of the US$ 9.4 billion requested,  70 per cent of which 
were for transport and energy projects such as port and airport construction and 
upgrading (Mai, 1996).169  
  
                                                   
169 In contrast, agricultural projects (including irrigation and forestry), amounted to US$ 2 billion (Mai, 1996).  
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Table 5.8 Vietnam: ODA commitments by sector, 1985–2000 
 
.. indicates no data available 
Source: Wang and Balasubramanyam (2011). 
 
  
US$ % US$ % US$ % US$ % US$ % US$ %
7.9 20.4 27.2 73.3 78.5 36.8 194.0 17.0 267.2 21.3 248.7 19.7
Education 2.0 5.1 .. .. 1.0 0.5 47.0 4.1 86.2 6.9 85.9 6.8
Health and population .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 56.0 4.5 40.1 3.2
Water supply and sanitation .. .. 25.1 67.6 64.6 30.3 35.6 3.1 8.6 0.7 62.4 4.9
4.3 11.1 .. .. 35.4 16.6 567.6 49.6 572.5 45.6 825.8 65.3
Energy 2.0 5.1 .. .. 18.1 8.5 324.4 28.4 467.2 37.2 7.3 0.6
Transport and communications 2.3 6.0 .. .. 16.6 7.8 238.2 20.8 97.9 7.8 808.8 63.9
16.0 41.5 2.1 5.6 92.6 43.4 56.8 5.0 99.3 7.9 71.5 5.7
Agriculture, forestry and fishing .. .. .. .. 88.5 41.5 37.9 3.3 62.8 5.0 53.4 4.2
Industry, mining and construction 16.0 41.5 20.9 56.3 3.3 1.6 16.6 1.4 33.7 2.7 10.5 0.8
Trade and tourism .. .. .. .. 0.7 0.3 2.3 0.2 2.8 0.2 7.6 0.6
Multi-sector 0.2 0.6 4.2 11.3 1.8 0.8 21.0 1.8 123.9 9.9 32.7 2.6
7.9 20.5 2.3 6.1 1.1 0.5 60.3 5.3 28.3 2.2 6.0 0.5
Food aid 1.0 2.5 2.3 6.1 1.1 0.5 2.4 0.2 3.5 0.3 6.0 0.5
0.7 1.8 0.8 2.1 0.8 0.4 234.2 20.5 131.1 10.4 29.0 2.3
1.6 4.0 0.6 1.6 3.2 1.5 3.1 0.3 5.9 0.5 9.0 0.7
Total 38.6 100.0 37.1 100.0 213.4 100.0 1144.3 100.0 1256.6 100.0 1265.0 100.0
Humanitarian aid
2000
Social infrastructure and services
Economic infrastructure and services
Production sectors
Programme assistance
Action relating to debt
1985 1988 1991 1994 1997
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Second, there was a notable convergence between the priorities of the CPV and its 
funders. Japanese ODA to Vietnam resumed at the end of 1992, in the same year as the 
first projects by Japanese capital (Hatakeyama, 2008), and by 1995, Japan emerged as 
Vietnam’s top donor (a position it retained through the rest of the decade) (GRIPS, 
2002). Japanese aid projects were closely aligned with Vietnam’s emergence as a 
leading destination for Japanese industrial investment and trade (Forsberg, 2008, p.200), 
and its ODA flows sought to support the large-scale infrastructure viewed as critical to 
sustainable growth and broader Japanese interests in Vietnam (Hatakeyama, 2008). 
Indeed, Japan’s approach is said to be aimed at facilitating Vietnam’s ‘active and 
meaningful participation in East Asia’s dynamic production network’ (GRIPS, 2002, 
p.11), which Japanese advisors to the Vietnamese government considered pivotal to 
overcoming the challenge of late industrialisation. As a result, Japanese ODA was 
biased toward transport and power projects due to perceptions that these were critical to 
creating an ‘enabling environment for industry and business activities’ (GRIPS, 2002, 
p.16). In 2001, half of ODA provided by the Japan Bank of International Cooperation 
and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) went to transport, and a quarter to 
energy projects (UNDP, 2002). Investments connecting the capital city of Hanoi to the 
nearest port in Hai Phong, cut travel from over five hours to less than two, helping to 
encourage Japanese investment in the area (IDCJ, 2002).   
 
Beyond supporting the Vietnamese state finance-industry-infrastructure nexus directly, 
ODA helped finance the growing fiscal deficit and provided an important source of 
financing for the DAF, with 67.5 per cent of year-end credit in 2000 coming from ODA 
and on-lending, and the rest from domestic sources (Weeks, Thang, et al., 2004).  In the 
mid-1990s, as this fiscal deficit expanded and foreign debt repayments mounted, the 
CPV deliberately sought to ‘increase FDI and foreign loans and grants as a means to 
counter the negative effects of higher budgetary deficits’ (Gates, 1995, p.387). For 
instance in 1999, Japanese ODA alone was equivalent to 74.1 per cent of the country’s 
total budget deficit (IDCJ, 2002). Overall, therefore, ODA has played an important role 
in the CPV’s developmental project: supporting state infrastructure investments; 
providing foreign financing for the state-owned financial system; and financing a 
public-investment induced increase in the fiscal deficit.   
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5.5 Weathering external shocks 
 
Despite the CPV’s considerable success in creating a deeply heterodox variety of 
developmentalism in the 1990s, the path to doing so was littered with considerable 
challenges. This section explores how the CPV handled three shocks which threatened 
the formation and continuation of the state finance-industry-infrastructure nexus and 
conflicting interpretations of mainstream and heterodox perspectives regarding these 
episodes.  
 
5.5.1 1989-1991 Transition and stabilisation  
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union, Vietnam’s main trading partner and source of 
commodity aid, presented the first major challenge to elaborating a heterodox 
development strategy. Having avoided the widespread collapses in output and protracted 
recessions common to other transitional economies,170 Vietnam has been embraced as a 
vindication for mainstream adjustment strategies, described as ‘pure IMF orthodoxy, 
albeit without the IMF behind it’ (Riedel, 1997, p.196).171 This interpretation focuses 
on Vietnam’s strategies for resolving the high inflation (Table 5.9) which was a major 
challenge in this period. Mainstream interpretations have assumed inflation to have been 
rooted in public sector deficits and monetary expansion, and thereby attributing 
Vietnam’s success in reducing it to ‘fiscal adjustment and monetary restraint’ (Dollar, 
2002, p.10). Such cuts to state subsidies and state investment programmes, wage 
restraint in state enterprises and demobilisation of soldiers (Riedel and Turley, 1999), 
encapsulated in reduced current and capital expenditures between 1990 and 1991, are 
used by such scholars to explain Vietnam’s success (Table 5.10).   
 
Table 5.9 Vietnam: GDP growth and inflation (percentage per annum), 1985-1993 
 
Source: General Statistics Office data cited in Masina (2006, p.62).  
 
                                                   
170 Weeks (1998) notes that Vietnam’s transition was less costly (in terms of inflation, output loss and deteriorating 
living standards) than most other transition economies, including Eastern Europe and Russia.  
171 Although there were some links between the IMF and government officials at this time, if not predicated around 
lending (see Masina, 2006, p. 63).  
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Real GDP growth 5.7 3.4 3.3 5.1 8.0 5.1 6.0 8.6 8.1
Inflation 132.0 487.0 317.0 311.0 76.0 68.0 68.0 18.0 5.0
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However, this interpretation overlooks the fact that cuts to current and capital 
expenditures were extremely brief, and that inflation had also decreased significantly 
before 1991 when the cuts occurred (Tables 5.9 and Table 5.10). In contrast, Weeks 
(2001) highlights the stabilising role played by Vietnam’s remarkable export 
performance at the end of the 1980s, which helped to address the unsustainable balance 
of payments situation between 1985-1988 (when imports were approximately double 
exports). After 1989, the gap closed considerably, and between 1990-1992, the trade 
deficit was just 3 per cent of exports, thanks to rapid rice, marine and petroleum export 
growth (Weeks, 2001) (Table 5.11). This marked reduction in the trade deficit allowed 
Vietnam to sustain existing import levels, despite receiving no significant external 
financing at this time  (World Bank, 1993b). Vietnam’s imports were skewed heavily 
toward intermediate (52 per cent) and capital goods (38 per cent), with minimal 
consumer goods or food imports (respectively 3 per cent and 7 per cent of imports) in 
1993 (World Bank, 1995c). These transformations are consistent with a much more 
unorthodox adjustment strategy (Brudenius and Weeks, 2001) than the fiscal contraction 
focused analysis above suggests. Export growth was itself powered by diversification 
(of products and markets), easing Vietnam’s transition from historic dependence on 
CMEA trade. Oil exports provided an important source of convertible currency, and the 
first oil exported in 1987 (Le, 2005, p.51) was to Japan (Tri, 1990, p.221).172 Meanwhile, 
since state enterprises could retain dollar earnings but had to surrender rouble-
denominated earnings in the late 1980s, this added to the incentives to reorient trade 
(Van Arkadie and Mallon, 2003). 
 
Table 5.10 Vietnam: Fiscal policy indicators (percentage of GDP), 1988–1995 
 
Source: Riedel and Turley (1999, p.24). 
 
                                                   
172 Japan’s refineries had the capability to process the quality of crude oil found in Vietnam (Tri, 1990, p.221). 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Revenue 11.3 13.8 14.7 13.5 19.0 22.5 24.3 23.9
Current expenditures 14.0 15.4 14.7 11.4 14.0 18.8 17.6 17.3
Government saving -2.7 -1.6 0.0 -2.1 5.0 3.5 6.7 6.6
Capital expenditure 4.4 5.8 5.1 2.8 5.8 7.0 6.6 5.7
Primary balance -7.1 -7.2 -5.1 -1.7 -0.8 -3.5 0.1 1.1
Interest payments 0.1 0.3 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.3 1.7 1.3
Overall deficit -7.2 -7.5 -5.8 -1.5 -1.7 -4.8 -1.6 -0.5
Domestic borrowing 4.8 6.0 2.8 0.5 -0.7 1.8 1.5 1.2
External borrowing 2.4 1.5 3.0 1.0 2.4 2.7 0.1 -0.7
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The combination of export growth and increases in foreign capital inflows helped to 
appreciate the value of the Dong, in turn helping to make inflation easier to manage at 
the same time as opening the way for more expansionary monetary and fiscal policies 
(Weeks, 2001).  
 
Table 5.11 Vietnam: Foreign trade 1985–1994 (US$ million) 
 
Source: World Bank (1993b; 1995c). 
 
Ironically some of Vietnam’s export success, such as the development of oil exports, 
partially resulted from its CMEA dependence. The earliest oil exploration joint ventures 
in Vietnam were signed with the Soviet Union during the 1980s (along with other 
agreements in export crops such as rubber, coffee, tea, coconut and fruit trees) as 
Vietnam was compelled to step up exports to repay debts to the Soviet Union and obtain 
further imports (Porter, 1993, p.211).  
 
In rice, however, export success was predicated on extensive prior state investments in 
agriculture. Between 1986-1989 Vietnam went from net rice importer to exporter on 
account of rice paddy production increases of 26 per cent between 1987-1989 (Le et al., 
2015, p.103). By 1998, Vietnam was the world’s second largest rice exporter (Le et al., 
2015, p.103), and its share of the world rice market having increased from 1 per cent in 
1986 to 17 per cent in 1997 (in terms of volume) (Niimi et al., 2004, p.178). 
Interventions such as the shift from single to multiple cropping; intensified fertiliser use; 
and drainage and irrigation investments helped to fuel such productivity increases 
(World Bank, 1993b, p.136).173 Agriculture received 10.3 per cent of state investment 
in 1960, increasing to highs of 23.8 per cent in 1985 (Tri, 1990, pp.22, 76, 135, 192). 
                                                   
173 Between 1987-1992 there was an increase of 24 per cent  in the winter-spring crop, and 59 per cent in the summer-
autumn crop, and as a monsoon country, without irrigation it is only possible to produce a single wet-season paddy 
crop per year (World Bank, 1993b). 
Total export Per cent convertible Total import
Trade 
balance
1985 497 68 -903 -406
1986 494 62 -1121 -627
1987 610 71 -1184 -575
1988 733 63 -1412 -679
1989 1320 74 -1670 -350
1990 1731 73 -1772 -41
1991 2042 98 -2105 -64
1992 2475 100 -2535 -61
1993 2850 100 -3505 -655
1994 3600 100 -4500 -900
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As a result, after reunification the percentage of Vietnam’s southern rice bowl under 
irrigation increased from 44.9 per cent in 1976 to 72.6 per cent in 1980 (Pingali and Vo-
Tong Xuan, 1992, p.711). Thus whilst liberalisation, the shift to family farming, 
exchange rate adjustments and price liberalisation may all have helped make rice 
production and allocation responsive to market signals during the doi moi period (De 
Vylder, 1995; Dixon, 2003), extensive state interventions in agriculture comprised an 
important, if overlooked, pillar of Vietnamese developmentalism. 
 
The result has made rapid export growth a central plank of the CPV’s brand of 
developmentalism. The 1986-1990 Five Year Plan highlighted the importance of 
expanding export growth in the context of a worsening balance of payments situation 
which pre-dated CMEA’s collapse, with the Western embargo limiting Vietnam’s 
access to alternative sources of foreign exchange earnings. Between 1990-2000, exports 
grew at an average of 19.6 per cent, meaning exports grew from 6.6 per cent of GDP in 
1986 to 53.9 per cent in 2000 (World Bank, 2018g), and accounted for two-thirds of 
final demand during 1995-2000 (Weeks, Thang, et al., 2004). During the 1990s, the 
export basket had also shifted. In the early 1990s the three most important exports were 
crude oil, rice and marine exports, and after 1996 light manufacturing exports such as 
footwear and garments (where state enterprises played an important role) assumed new 
significance, accounting for around a quarter of the country’s exports (Table 5.12). Yet 
whilst mainstream and heterodox analysis is united by the view that Vietnam’s ‘export 
promotion has been spectacularly successful’ (Weeks, Thang, et al., 2004, p.22), export 
promotion represented not the embrace of a mainstream EOI and comparative advantage 
conforming strategy, but rather was designed to reinforce pre-existing strategies and 
institutions, and as such to sustain a heavily import-dependent ISI oriented development 
strategy. This approach to stabilisation in the context of a strong exogenous shock 
afforded the CPV the macroeconomic space to preserve and nurture its state finance-
industry-infrastructure nexus throughout the transition to market economy.   
 
5.5.2 1994-1996 The threat of ‘peaceful evolution’  
 
On account of the mainstream’s neglect of the significance of these heterodox 
characteristics and embrace of Vietnam’s trajectory as a vindication of orthodox reforms 
(Dollar, 2002, p.2), early enthusiasm about its trajectory began to turn into 
disillusionment with the pace of change in the mid-1990s, organised around the concepts 
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of “reform immobilism” or “slow-down” (Womack, 1997; see also Abrami, 2003; 
Riedel and Turley, 1999). As a result, by the late 1990s it was noted that ‘[p]essimism 
about Viet Nam’s reform process is now rampant among foreign observers’ (Riedel and 
Turley, 1999, p.9). Yet, the “slow-down” perspective reflects normative assumptions 
about the inherent desirability of deeper market-oriented reforms, and misreads the 
nature of the CPV’s developmental regime. Instead, “immobilism” instead reflected the 
CPV’s attempts to consolidate its finance-industry-infrastructure nexus in the face of 
growing intra-Party anxieties about changes hitherto introduced. Strong signals of these 
mounting concerns were present in the CPV’s Mid-Term National Congress in January 
1994 which identified ‘four dangers’: being left behind economically; deviation from 
the socialist path;174 corruption and bureaucratism; and ‘peaceful evolution’ (Riedel and 
Turley, 1999). 
 
Table 5.12 Vietnam: Exports (percentage total exports), 1992-2000 
 
Sources: IMF  (1998d; 2002c). 
 
Concern over ‘peaceful evolution’ notably reflected a number of specific anxieties 
regarding Vietnam’s deepened international integration and foreign interference. An 
article in Tap chi Cong San (The Communist Review), the Party’s theoretical and 
political journal in December 1995,175 identified two problematic aspects of Vietnam’s 
growing international integration: rising consumption expectations and new forms of 
imperialism stemming from the globalisation of production (Tap Chi Cong San, 1996). 
The end of the US commercial embargo in early 1994 (Hill, 2000, p.289) saw new 
consumer goods and services such as soft drinks, cigarettes, foreign beer, restaurants, 
                                                   
174 For instance, by the January 1995 Eighth Party Congress, disagreements over the meaning of Vietnam’s ‘socialist 
direction’ resulted in open confrontation within the Party between those with contending views over further extending 
the scope for private ownership (Riedel and Turley, 1999). 
175 Often associated with so-called ‘conservative’ positions (Corfield, 2008). 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Crude oil 30.5 28.3 21.4 19.7 18.3 15.6 13.2 18.1 24.2
Rice 12.1 12.2 10.5 9.5 11.7 9.5 10.9 8.9 4.6
Coal 1.9 2.3 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.2 1.1 0.8 0.7
Rubber 2.2 2.5 3.3 3.1 2.2 2.1 1.4 1.3 1.1
Coffee 3.5 3.7 8.1 10.9 4.6 5.4 6.3 5.1 3.5
Marine 12.2 14.3 13.6 8.3 8.9 8.6 9.2 8.4 10.2
Garments 7.7 8.0 11.7 8.3 15.7 16.4 15.5 15.1 13.1
Footwear 0.2 2.3 3.0 3.8 7.2 10.7 11.0 12.0 10.1
Electronics … … … … … 4.8 5.3 5.1 5.4
Other 29.7 26.5 26.6 34.7 29.9 25.8 26.2 25.2 27.0
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nightclubs and casinos enter Vietnam. The journal considered this ‘an insidious plot to 
gradually raise people’s needs’ (Tap Chi Cong San, 1996, p.67), since: 
 
Following the collapse of the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union, imperialism quickly effected a strategic reorientation, taking 
advantage of the internationalization and globalization process to “convert” the 
whole world to capitalism … production tends to be increasingly 
internationalized and imperialism gradually shifts to various forms of 
transnational conglomerates (Tap Chi Cong San, 1996, pp.65–66). 
 
This indicates considerable wariness about the role of foreign capital as a vector for 
Vietnam’s subordination and the enduring influence of Leninist ideas about imperialism 
in the mid-1990s. The army emerged as one major source of opposition to deeper market 
reforms (Kolko, 1997, p.139) at this time. Discussion on the Army’s radio show with 
editor Vu Dinh Vinh during August 1996 revealed the endurance of dependency 
theory’s insights, with the formation of a comprador bourgeoisie aligned with the 
interests of foreign capital a particular concern, since it was noted that ‘imperialists … 
hoped that the key to political reform in Vietnam would be private enterprise’ (Vinh, 
1996, p.83) where ‘[t]he core of their scheme … is to create local forces inside socialist 
states and let these forces push for change in the regime of their countries’ (Vinh, 1996, 
p.82). A number of ‘hostile forces’ were highlighted which closely map to the global 
vectors for the spread of neoliberalism identified in Chapter 2: 
 
To accelerate our economic development in the direction they [imperialists] 
want in order to make socialism in our country collapse quickly amid prosperity, 
they have attempted to use: investment plans under ODA … the loans and term 
payments provided by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the 
Asia Development Bank; joint ventures by various monopolistic capitalist 
companies; and criteria for most favored nation status and other trade and 
business conditions (Vinh, 1996, p.83). 
 
Indeed, in addition to rising FDI and ODA inflows, Vietnam signed a number of trade 
agreements in the 1990s in order to secure more favourable terms of market access. In 
1992 it signed a trade agreement on textiles and clothing with the EU, in 1995 Vietnam 
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both joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (committing to the 
group’s FTA terms by 2006)176 and applied for WTO membership (Thanh, 2005), and 
in 1996 entered into negotiations toward a bilateral trade agreement with the US (the 
US-Vietnam BTA).  The embrace of these agreements was encouraged by export-
oriented interests within the party-state system (which had also earlier advocated for 
currency devaluation) (Riedel and Turley, 1999). According to one government official 
interviewed during fieldwork in June 2016: 
 
[We] had no choice. At the end of the 1980s when the Soviet Union collapsed, 
we had no friends. Vietnam was isolated. So we decided to join ASEAN to 
survive in the international system. And when we joined we had to accept the 
rules: and one of the rules was to integrate and create a common market. That’s 
why we had to liberalise (VG-6). 
 
Notably, despite the trade-offs that Vietnam’s limited alternatives entailed, deeper 
global integration was far from uncontested domestically. Strong demands from the US 
government in terms of market access and tariff reductions, saw the US-Vietnam BTA 
negotiations stall (Womack, 1997), whilst discussions over revisions to the Foreign 
Investment Law in 1996 included proposals to establish party cells in all foreign 
invested enterprises, as well as double the commercial and residential rents of foreign 
owned enterprises and employees (Truong and Gates, 1996). 
 
Policy conditionalities applied by the IMF were another major global challenge in the 
1990s, but again were heavily contested by the CPV. Only two-thirds of the 1994 ESAF 
was disbursed (Tønnesson, 2001), and in 1996 the IMF refused to resume lending 
without a quickened pace of reform (Thayer, 2000b). According to the Fund (1998c, 
p.3), the disagreement centred on ‘extent and pace of structural reforms, especially with 
regard to the financial system, state enterprises and trade liberalization’. This indicates 
that the CPV’s refusal to dismantle the state finance-industry-infrastructure nexus 
formed the crux of this dispute. Instead, the 1996-2000 Five Year Plan reaffirmed the 
commitment to accelerating industrialisation and raised ambitions for growth, 
effectively shouting ‘more, faster!’ at the economy (Womack, 1997). Initial drafts of the 
                                                   
176 The ASEAN FTA (AFTA) involved tariffs of between 0-5 per cent for members, except for a small number of 
special exclusions (IMF, 1999b). 
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Political Report produced for the 1996 Congress included a target to increase the state 
sector’s contribution to GDP from 40 per cent to 60 per cent in the next five years, later 
reduced to reaffirming the state’s ‘leading role’ in the economy (Womack, 1997). But it 
was nonetheless evident that the thrust of CPV policy at the time of reform “immobilism” 
entailed strengthening not weakening the nexus: 
 
Vietnam's renewed emphasis on industrialization and modernization has shown 
movement towards the ideal of greater self-reliance: growing efforts to mobilize 
domestic capital, to create large-scale state conglomerates that can compete with 
foreign companies, and to increase the role and "value added" of local partners 
in foreign-invested enterprises and foreign-funded infrastructure projects 
(Truong and Gates, 1996, p.164). 
 
Thus against a backdrop considerable global level pressures, the CPV chose to 
strengthen rather than dismantle the heterodox core of its developmental policies. This 
signals that the CPV did not suddenly abandon some former commitment mainstream 
development reform, as the reform “immobilism” and slow-down narratives suggest. 
Rather these events signal that this heterodox core formed the basis of the CPV’s 
developmental strategy in the 1990s, which had been placed under increased stress by 
the mainstream reforms the CPV had adopted, and which the CPV thereafter sought to 
manage.  
 
5.5.3 1997-2000 The regional crisis and its aftermath  
 
Toward the end of the decade, between 1997-1998, Vietnam was hit by what have been 
describes as ‘four typhoons’: declining growth, rising peasant unrest,177 a devastating 
typhoon and the aftermath of the regional financial crisis (Thayer, 2000b). The latter 
represented a sizeable external shock, and export growth slumped in 1998, increasing 
by just 2 per cent (IMF, 1998d). FDI inflows and GDP growth both subsequently slowed, 
and both foreign and state enterprises began to lay-off workers (Sidel, 1999).  Declining 
FDI inflows in turn increased Vietnam’s dependence on ODA (Schaumburg-Müller, 
2003, p.56), and the IFIs tried to leverage the challenges posed by the crisis to push 
Vietnam into adopting a faster pace of reform. They argued that the crisis demonstrated 
                                                   
177 The largest of these protests, in Thai Binh province in 1997, had multiple causes, including resentment over 
compulsory labour, fees and tax burdens, rising unemployment, corruption, and land seizures (Abuza, 2001), and 
which reportedly prompted the CPV to increase investments in agriculture and rural areas (Sidel, 1999).  
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the need for intensified market-oriented reforms (IMF, 1999b; World Bank, 1999a), and 
the Bank joined the IMF in making further funding conditional on adopting deeper 
structural reform (Thayer, 2000b). Against this backdrop, the IFIs and donors together 
pledged US$ 2.2 billion in 1998, and made a further US$ 500 million contingent on 
measures which directly attacked the nexus: trade liberalisation; state enterprise 
restructuring; and state-owned commercial bank restructuring.  
 
However, the CPV took the money but ‘undertook no steps in 1999 to carry out this 
commitment’ (Thayer, 2000b, p.313). Vietnam’s vulnerabilities in the wake of the crisis 
were notably limited by its heterodox macroeconomic policies, specifically the limited 
convertibility of the Dong and closure to short-term capital inflows, which insulated 
Vietnam from outflows through the capital account of the balance of payments, helping 
the country weather the crisis much better than its neighbours (Masina, 2006; UNCTAD, 
2007, p.7). Relative economic strength also afforded Vietnam the space to determine 
which policy pressures to listen to, giving the IFIs ‘very limited levers with which to 
influence Vietnamese policy’ (Dixon and Kilgour, 2002, p.606). 
 
Despite the additional stress placed on the Vietnamese economy, the CPV notably 
remained ‘reluctant to undertake a decisive reform programme’ (Thanh and Ha, 2004, 
p.67). Nonetheless, there were disagreements within the Party regarding the next steps, 
with some arguing that the crisis illustrated the dangers of globalisation and the need for 
greater self-reliance, and others that further opening was essential for modernising the 
economy (Mallon, 2004, p.12). Indicative that deeper trade integration through the US-
Vietnam BTA remained an area of considerable internal disagreement, one American 
trade negotiator commented in September 1998 that ‘[t]hey haven't reached any internal 
consensus, and there are people pushing and pulling in different directions. So we have 
to wonder, does Vietnam want to wait and be cautious, or does it want to embrace 
reform?’ (Sidel, 1999, p.97). Consensus was, however, found over the need to reduce 
dependence on foreign savings and bolster domestic investment, contributing to the 
loosening of restrictions on the operation of the domestic private capital accumulation 
and the easing of regulations about establishing domestic private enterprises (Mallon, 
2004, p.12) (discussed in Section 5.5.4). 
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Other responses to the crisis are also telling. Several measures were taken to bolster the 
state sector in the light of regional tumult, including tightened trade controls (including 
quotas and licensing) in strategic sectors,178 and expanded lending to state enterprises 
through the banking system with 22 per cent credit growth in 1998 versus 11 per cent 
for other sectors, primarily on account of expanded directed long and medium term 
credit through SOCBs to priority state industries (IMF, 1999b). These measures also 
helped to address the increasing strain on Vietnam’s balance of payments, which, due 
to the heavy import demands of its development strategy, caused the trade deficit to 
increase to 15 per cent of GDP in 1996, which in the context of declining FDI inflows 
in the previous year, prompted considerable policy concern that a serious balance of 
payments crisis may be around the corner (Kokko, 1998). Currency controls (restrictions 
over access to foreign currency and letters of credit, and measures to oblige the deposit 
of foreign exchange in certain commercial banks) were also used to restrict trade, and 
the SBV controlled import license allocations, and priority for foreign exchange 
allocations was given to strategic state enterprises and export-oriented firms (Kokko, 
1998). The military, already a sizeable economic actor, also expanded its presence in 
the economy in the wake of the crisis, reviving plans for special economic defence zones 
(Sidel, 1999). Finally, a mid-1999 a stimulus package encompassing expansionary 
monetary and fiscal policies was implemented to renew Vietnam’s growth momentum, 
encompassing new infrastructure investments, financial support for state enterprises 
faced with mounting inventories, additional resources for social programmes in poverty 
reduction, wage and salary increases to increase domestic consumption and demand, 
and support for enterprises to expand exports (Thanh and Ha, 2004, p.68).  
 
5.5.4 Outcomes and new tensions 
 
Outcomes from the first developmental period should be chiefly evaluated with 
reference to the political and economic objectives outlined in section 5.2, which centred 
around securing party hegemony and rapid economic development. The CPV’s success 
in limiting the emergence of a powerful set of economic and political interests outside 
of the state sector is reflected in the very small-scale of the domestic private sector 
during the 1990s. The non-state sector’s share of industrial production was 
overwhelmingly concentrated in the household economy, rather than in larger entities 
                                                   
178 Consumer goods (cars, motorcycles, bicycles, beverages, sugar and confectionaries) and commodities (cement, 
steel, paper and glass) (Kokko, 1998, p.322). 
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such as SMEs and large-scale corporate entities (captured by the term ‘private 
enterprise’), which accounted for just 2.2 per cent of industrial production in 1999, 
unchanged from the middle of the decade (Table 5.13). Instead, state enterprises, foreign 
invested entities and household businesses provided most economic output growth 
(Mallon, 2004, p.5). The domestic private sector’s share of investment remained 
unchanged, both in terms of its share of total investment and as a share of GDP during 
the latter part of the 1990s (Section 5.4.1).  
 
Table 5.13 Vietnam: Share of industrial production by ownership, 1995-2000 
 
* Category includes joint ventures with ownership from more than sector 
Source: IMF (2002c). 
 
The CPV’s preference instead was for foreign capital, which has been attributed to 
concerns that rapid domestic private sector growth could create political and economic 
interests difficult for the CPV to contain (Mallon, 2004, p.10).179 Thus the operating 
space for private enterprises was only slowly opened up throughout the post-doi moi 
period, initially including hiring restrictions (Porter, 1993, p.149) and costly and time-
consuming processes for obtaining trade licences (Mallon, 2004). In light of these 
challenges, many owners of private firms had family members in the state sector, aiding 
them in dealing with administrative and regulatory challenges (Mallon, 2004, p.10). 
However, in line with the concern to limit foreign vulnerabilities discussed in Section 
5.5.3, the new Enterprise Law in 2000 increased in the number of SMEs registered by 
60 per cent August 2001.180 Resistance from within the state sector revolving around 
fears of increased competition was eventually overcome, according to Mallon (2004), 
by the familial connections between the state and private sector.  
                                                   
179 A similar point is made by Phong Tran (2003, p.144) who argues that: ‘The encouragement of foreign investment 
reflects both Vietnam's political preference and strategy. The domestic private sector was ideologically disfavored 
and had been constrained for several years. The Vietnamese government looked to foreign capital as a proper means 
to revitalize the ailing economy. In addition, by jointly participating in foreign investment projects through state-
owned enterprises, the Vietnamese government hoped to supervise this economic activity’.  
180 Combining new enterprises and those upgrading their status from household to private enterprises (IMF, 2002c). 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
State 50.3 49.3 48.0 45.9 43.4 42.0
Central 32.8 32.5 31.4 30.2 28.7 27.4
Local 17.5 16.7 16.6 15.7 14.7 14.6
Non-state 24.6 24.0 23.1 22.1 21.9 22.4
Cooperatives 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 …
Private 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.2 …
Household 17.6 16.1 14.7 13.8 13.0 …
Mixed* 4.2 5.0 5.5 5.5 6.1 …
25.1 26.7 28.9 32.0 34.7 35.5
(excluding oil and gas) 14.6 16.2 18.4 20.8 22.5 24.3
Foreign invested sector
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The bias toward foreign capital, however, contributed to the emergence of new pressures. 
In particular, the Japanese government and CPV began to profoundly differ over 
Vietnam’s economic policy in the late 1990s, divided between state-led approach 
(evident amongst Vietnamese officials) and a FDI-led view (evident amongst Japanese 
investors and government officials) (Table 5.14). Japanese technical advisors to the 
Vietnamese government recorded the divergence as being about the contribution of 
foreign capital to Vietnam’s development trajectory as follows: ‘Vietnamese producers 
and policy makers think that FDI firms are not making enough effort in localization and 
technology transfer. FDI firms in turn think that the Vietnamese side is making 
unreasonable demands without knowing industrial facts or global trends’ (GRIPS, 
2003b). In 2000, CPV General Secretary Le Kha Phieu made the following highly 
critical comments about the problems associated with foreign capital as follows: ‘When 
imperialism speeds up trade and services liberalization and the globalization of 
investment, the rich countries become richer, and the gap between rich and poor 
countries widens’ (quoted in Alexander, 2000).  
 
Table 5.14 Vietnam: Divergent policy perspectives on industrialisation in the early 2000s  
 
Source: GRIPS (2003b). 
 
However, in line with the zig-zag nature of Vietnam’s reform process, two trends also 
emerged to undermine the coherence of the developmental nexus at this time.  During 
1998 decentralisation of the foreign investment climate saw all provincial Peoples 
Committees granted the power to issue (some) investment licenses (below an investment 
threshold), and amend existing licences for foreign-invested projects (Vu-Thanh et al., 
2007). The effect was to weaken central oversight powers over the foreign investment 
climate (Van Arkadie and Mallon, 2003), a seemingly contradictory move given the 
concerns raised above. Yet the contributing factors appeared to lie in the nature of fiscal 
State-led view FDI-led view
Driving force of industrialisation
State should guide market; growth is too slow and 
biased without it.
Offer low cost and open business climate to 
attract critical mass of FDI. Help local firms link 
with FDI production.
Localisation policy
Foreign firms are reluctant to use domestic parts. 
Use reward and penalty to speed up local supply
Encourage natural and demand-led localisation 
(don't force it).
Upstream investment Crucial for sound growth. State must invest 
upstream if private firms don't do so.
Don't invest upstream unless inputs are 
internationally competitive.
Import-substitution industries
State must support them with protection if 
necessary; job loss and industrial damage should 
be avoided.
Set tariff reduction schedule and let market 
decide their fate; but temporarily help firms with 
realistic plans.
Export-oriented industries They produce little domestic value-added and 
contribute little to development.
Very important for Vietnam's industrialisation; 
encourage them with open FDI climate.
Trade liberalisation
Inevitable, but national interests must also be 
protected.
Speed and sequencing must be chosen 
carefully to induce each industry's effort. 
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decentralisation in Vietnam. Since the 1980s, an informal system had pertained whereby 
provinces collect revenues on behalf of the central government, but then returned all 
revenues above a (biannually) determined target. This was codified into law with the 
1996 Budget Law, increasing the incentives amongst provinces to exceed the target and 
access additional resources for infrastructure and social welfare spending (Malesky, 
2008).  
 
Furthermore, since the early 1990s provinces that received large foreign capital inflows 
had been lobbying the central government to loosen the centralised FDI approvals 
process in order to allow them to expand their budget surpluses (Vu-Thanh, 2016), and 
the 1996 law increased the incentives of provinces to beat their centrally-agreed revenue 
targets (Malesky, 2008). The eight provinces that were capable of generating these 
surpluses accounted for about 70 per cent of national revenues during the 1990s, and 
therefore had considerable economic importance (Malesky, 2008). Similarly, in 1999 
the rules governing public investment projects were loosened, giving provincial 
governments the right to decide all but the most important projects (Vu-Thanh, 2016). 
Deepening these trends, in the revisions to the Foreign Investment Law in 2000, the 
government streamlined foreign investment regulations to include automatic 
registration for export-oriented FDI projects, as well as permitting joint ventures to 
convert to fully-owned foreign enterprises and allowing foreign invested firms to use 
assets attached to land use rights as security for borrowing for the first time (Athukorala 
and Tien, 2012).  
 
Two dominant views about dececentralisation were evident during this period. For some 
it was a sign of the weakness and cause of the ‘implementability of policies’ (Fforde, 
1998, p.30), due to tensions between different levels of the state bureaucracy (central 
versus local) and between central agencies (for example between Ministries), which 
were intensified by the overlapping of roles between Party and state agencies and 
political disagreements between state and party officials (Fforde, 1998, pp.30–31). 
However, this approach ignores the role of decentralisation as a pressure valve, 
containing forces that otherwise may have threatened the party state system, and thereby 
securing political stability. Here it has been noted that: 
 
The differences in interpretation partly reflect the gap that often exists between 
the definition of objectives and policies at the national level and the pragmatic 
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accommodation of the decentralised decisions of individual actors in the 
economy, even when these are in apparent conflict with stated policies. … this 
pragmatic willingness to accept change resulting from decentralised initiatives 
is indicative of the strength of the state (Van Arkadie and Mallon, 2003, p.253). 
 
In light of these developments, by 2000 it appeared that decentralisation was beginning 
to weaken the CPV’s ability to effectively oversee foreign capital and infrastructure 
projects (risking weakening the effectiveness of the nexus), at the same time as it was 
helping to maintain political stability (and thus achieve a core aim). These dynamics 
were inseparable from Party structures, since whilst the CPV officially presides over a 
one party state where political competition is not permitted, the Party forms a site of 
competition between different groups for influence over the course of economic policy 
reform. For this reason, Vietnamese political system has been described as ‘functionally 
“pluralist”’ (Kolko, 1997, p.125). During the 1990s the traditional divisions between so-
called Party ‘hardliners and softliners’, separated in terms of their support for a socialist 
or market economy (Guo, 2004, p.398) was joined by new struggles between divergent 
groups over ‘wealth and power translated into both material gains and autonomy for 
their regions’ (Kolko, 1997, p.125).  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown that during the decade and a half following doi moi, the CPV 
managed the transition from central planning to market economy in such a way as to 
sustain a decidedly heterodox developmental core consisting of a state finance-industry-
infrastructure nexus bolstered by both domestic and foreign resources. In contrast to the 
mainstream interpretations of Vietnam’s trajectory during the 1990s, which focused on 
the changes during the transitional period, the policies used to support this nexus 
represented a decisive effort to adapt state assets from the centrally planned economy to 
the new realities of international integration in the age of neoliberalism. However, as 
the decade progressed, Vietnam also faced growing pressure on the foundations of the 
nexus from these self-same sources. Growing dependence on foreign capital was 
matched by pressure from within the party-state system to decentralise the climate 
regulating these investments. Economic strength helped to insulate Vietnam from policy 
pressures stemming from the IFIs, and Vietnam’s heterodox macroeconomic stance 
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helped it weather the regional crisis in comparatively good shape. Yet at the end of the 
1990s, Vietnam was grappling with the dilemmas surrounding deepened trade 
integration in the context of growing reliance on export expansion in the overall balance 
of its development strategy. Yet in the absence of a bilateral trade agreement with the 
US, Vietnam lacked most-favoured nation (MFN) status in the US market. Signalling 
the internal divisions about whether such a deal should be adopted or not, the text of a 
trade deal was reached in mid-1999, despite strong concerns within the party-state 
system about protected sectors such as telecoms and the aggressive timetable for 
implementing non-tariff and tariff reductions (Thayer, 2000b). Notably, however, the 
CPV then pulled out of signing this agreement at the last minute. The decision to forge 
ahead with the agreement, despite these concerns, was to be a watershed moment in the 
evolution of Vietnamese developmentalism and ushered in a new phase of 
developmentalism, as discussed in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 6 Vietnam 2001-2018: Developmentalism amidst 
deepened integration  
 
 
As noted in Chapter 5, at the turn of the twentieth century much of the (mainstream) 
academic debate on Vietnamese development was preoccupied with ideas of policy 
“inertia” and suggestions that ‘Vietnam is unable to move decisively forward due to 
immobilism in its political system’ (Thayer, 2000a, p.324). Yet a major adjustment to 
Vietnam’s development strategy occurred in July 2000, when the US-Vietnam BTA was 
signed, after which Vietnam rapidly emerged as a major global light manufacturing hub 
in textile and garments, footwear, and latterly electronics. To secure a competitive edge 
in these sectors, Vietnam transformed itself from one of the most protectionist countries 
in the world, to one of the most enthusiastic adopters of deep international integration 
through preferential trade agreements. On the face of it, this strategy, which necessitated 
trade and investment liberalisation and wide-ranging transformations to Vietnam’s 
business climate and legal institutions, appeared to represent a major threat to Vietnam’s 
hitherto highly protected state finance-industry-infrastructure nexus. However, the 
CPV’s enduring commitment to the centrality of the state sector to achieving its political 
and economic goals meant instead that the challenge of preserving the developmental 
nexus became a defining policy imperative of the second period of Vietnamese 
developmentalism. This chapter argues that whilst these defensive measures 
successfully preserved the developmental nexus, deepened international integration, 
together with tendencies toward decentralisation and fragmentation noted in the 
previous chapter, ultimately distorted the nexus in ways that have compromised its 
ability to power the broader transformation of the economy. To elucidate the impacts of 
the global economic and political order on Vietnam’s evolving developmentalism, the 
chapter first examines the drivers behind Vietnam’s deepened international integration, 
then explores strategies deployed by the CPV to preserve the nexus, before considering 
the developmental outcomes and emerging constraints. Finally it analyses the 
emergence of a notable form of ‘Viet-pessimism’ in assessments of the country’s 
performance.   
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6.1 Intensified international integration 
  
The US-Vietnam BTA was signed more than three years after negotiations commenced, 
and was a deeply contested domestic decision given the perceived threat the agreement 
posed to the CPV’s political and economic project. Running to over one hundred 
pages181 and described as ‘the most complex trade agreement in US history’ (Thayer, 
2000b, p.317), it encompassed services liberalisation (banking, insurance, telecoms and 
accounting), the strengthening of intellectual property rights, as well as investment, 
trade and goods provisions, thereby opening hitherto heavily protected areas of the 
Vietnamese economy. As signalled in the last chapter, major domestic opposition 
resulted after the first Vietnamese draft agreement was circulated in 1999 (Thayer, 
2000b; Manyin, 2001), 182  and the concerns underpinning the subsequent delays in 
signing it were summarised by an analyst for the US Congressional Research Service in 
2001 as follows: 
 
[C]onservatives fear that economic reform will undermine the “socialist 
foundations” of the country’s economic and political systems, and thereby erode 
the CPV’s legitimacy and monopoly on power. They also fear that Vietnam’s 
sovereignty will be eroded by increasing Vietnam’s economic dependence on 
the West and by increasing Vietnam’s vulnerability to regional economic 
downturns such as the 1997-99 Asian financial crisis … [C]onservatives [also] 
worry that shifting to a more market-oriented economy will force the Politburo 
to curtail subsidies to the country’s state-owned enterprises, the backbone of the 
socialist economic system (Manyin, 2001, p.18). 
 
Opponents also feared that increased competition would intensify unemployment and 
thus fuel social unrest (Manyin, 2001; Abuza, 2002), whilst the army’s recent 
investments in telecoms also made this sector a major sticking point in negotiations 
(Thayer, 2000b; Manyin, 2001). As a result of this backlash, the CPV sought to reopen 
negotiations on the text agreed in 1999, but American negotiators rejected this request 
outright (Thayer, 2000b). Thus the final agreement, which was eventually signed in mid-
2000 (and came into effect at the end of 2001), conceded much more than the Party 
                                                   
181 More than ten times longer than the agreement the US signed with China, and the service and investment 
provisions considerably more detailed (Manyin, 2001).  
182 Intensified by US criticism over the Party’s human rights record and the lack of democracy (Thayer, 2000b; 
Manyin, 2001). 
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wanted (Abuza, 2002), including the requirement for an annual review of its normal 
trading nation status, and a lack of special exceptions on account of its status as a poorer, 
developing nation (Thayer, 2000b).  
 
A centrally important reason driving the CPV to eventually sign the contested deal was 
the necessity of securing favourable access to the US market given increased emphasis 
on expanding export-oriented manufacturing in this period. This was bolstered by 
concern about employment levels, since foreign invested enterprises (such as Nike and 
Daewoo) had laid off workers in the wake of the regional crisis (Sidel, 1999),183 and 
overall employment growth in the 1990s was disappointing in comparison with the rapid 
nature of growth and poverty reduction (Jenkins, 2004a).184 Thus by the late 1990s 
employment had emerged as a major area of policy concern (Mallon, 2004), and concern 
about the BTA’s impact on this included arguments both for and against the agreement. 
According to Thayer (2015b, p.8), at the 10th Plenum of the CPV in mid-2000, the 
decision was reached that ‘in order to achieve the objective of industrializing 
and modernizing Vietnam by 2020 Vietnam had no choice but to step up the rate 
of economic growth, encourage more foreign investment, and continue regional 
and global integration’. China’s decision in 1999 to agree its own trade deal with the US 
was also an important factor. The CPV reportedly did not want to sign a deal before 
China for fear of annoying its powerful neighbour and the CPV also looked to China’s 
actions to guide its own policies (Thayer, 2000b).  
 
The signing of the BTA was therefore part of a broader readjustment of Vietnam’s 
development strategy. The five year Socio-Economic Development Plan (2001-2005) 
noted that the ‘[state] economic sector is to promote its leading role in the economy, as 
an important material force and the instrument for State orientation and macro-
regulation of the economy’ (CPV, 2015, p.1018). However, it also noted that during the 
next five-year period the Party must also: 
 
[C]reate conditions for the foreign-invested economic sector to develop 
smoothly, targeted at exports, and to link socio-economic infrastructure 
development with attracting modern technologies and multiplying job 
                                                   
183 Nike for instance, laid off 2,700 workers in 1998 (Sidel, 1999). 
184 Which has been explained by reference to the increases in labour productivity from very low levels (Jenkins, 
2004a). 
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opportunities … [and thus] improve the economic and legal environment to 
vigorously attract foreign investment capital (CPV, 2015, p.1020). 
 
This quote demonstrates that the Party saw the investment-for-exports engine as a key 
driver of economic growth in the early 2000s (with investment including state, provinces, 
and foreign capital together), signalling both state and (export-oriented) foreign capital 
were envisioned as twin-engines of Vietnam’s future development. 
 
Extensive transformations to Vietnam’s trade regime then followed. The US-Vietnam 
BTA involved tariff reductions on 250 items (Manyin, 2001), Vietnam’s AFTA tariff 
reductions (agreed as part of its ASEAN membership) also commenced in 2001 
(UNCTAD, 2007), and the CPV also removed most quantitative trade restrictions 
(Abbott et al., 2009) in this period. The BTA also involved extensive changes to the 
country’s enterprise, competition and investment laws (Abbott et al., 2009). In return, 
the tariffs for Vietnamese exports to the US were cut from a non-MFN average of 40 
per cent, to less than 3 per cent (Manyin, 2001). In the year after ratifying the agreement, 
exports to the US more than doubled, as part of a broader shift away from tea and coffee 
exports (from 36 per cent in 1996 to 3 per cent in 2007), and towards apparel and textile 
exports (from almost non-existent in the mid-1990s to just over half of exports in 2007) 
(UNCTAD, 2007). As Abbott et al. (2009) note, trade agreements in Vietnam have 
usually been followed by a dramatic upturn in exports to the partner of the agreement, 
with little evidence that this caused the reduction of exports to other destinations. For 
instance, total exports grew from US$ 4.5 billion in 2002 to US$ 7.0 billion 2004, and 
those to the US specifically from US$ 1 billion in 2002 to US$ 6.5 billion in 2005 
(Abbott et al., 2009).  
 
According to Fujita (2017b), the perceived success of this agreement in increasing 
exports, FDI (explored in detail in section 6.3.1), jobs and economic growth, helped to 
convince the CPV of the benefits of deepened integration (Fujita, 2017a, p.5). Notably, 
Vietnam’s WTO negotiations gathered speed after the BTA was implemented and 
further accelerated between 2004-2005 (Vu-Thanh, 2017), culminating in Vietnam’s 
WTO accession on 11 January 2007, after a twelve year process (Pham, 2013). The 
WTO-related tariff reductions were more pronounced in industry than agriculture 
213 
 
(Vivek and Viet Tuan Dinh, 2006),185 and the US and other WTO members also insisted 
on wide-ranging changes to Vietnam’s legal framework ahead of accession in 2005 
(Abbott et al., 2009).186 This entailed over 500 alterations or new laws and regulations 
relating to competition and non-discrimination, and a commitment to eliminate 
subsidies for state enterprises (Vu-Thanh, 2017). According to one government official 
interviewed during fieldwork in June 2016, since Vietnam joined late ‘the terms to join 
were severe’ (VG-6). This included liberalising elements of the foreign investment 
climate and strategic services such as telecoms, finance and infrastructure, where there 
had been limited FDI to date (UNCTAD, 2007) and where state enterprises were 
dominant. Tax incentives for export-oriented investment (used to attract FDI), 
preferential provision of land and credit to strategic state enterprises (such as offered to 
Vinatex to develop upstream activities) were all eliminated (Fujita, 2017a).  
 
The results were several-fold. Inflows of FDI inflows increased markedly in the run-up 
to Vietnam’s accession, and economic growth was 7.1 per cent in 2007 (World Bank, 
2018g). Even before Vietnam formally joined, FDI commitments were considerably 
boosted, and increased 47 per cent year-on-year in the first 10 months of 2006 (Vivek 
and Viet Tuan Dinh, 2006). However, rising wages in China also increased Vietnam’s 
attractiveness to investors the mid-2000s (Oh and Mah, 2017), suggesting that the WTO 
was not the only driver of these inflows. The accession also drastically changed 
prospects to support for state enterprises, across tariffs, local content requirements and 
subsidies (Abonyi, 2013, p.110), with subsidies to the textile and footwear industries 
dismantled, for instance (IMF, 2007b). The WTO accession increased competition and 
thus threatened the state sector in two senses: first, reduced tariff barriers increased 
competition from imported goods, and second, foreign investors were now more readily 
able to enter Vietnam thanks to the level playing field it had committed to create 
between all economic actors.  The end of export quotas in major export markets around 
this time also reduced the CPV’s capacity to privilege state enterprises by the allocation 
of export quotas.187 The CPV was also immediately subject to a US anti-dumping 
investigation in the state textile and garment sector (Goto et al., 2011).  
                                                   
185 This included large reductions in textile and garment tariffs, from 36.4 per cent in 2006 to 13.6 per cent in 2007 
(IMF, 2007b). 
186 New Laws on Investment and Enterprises were instituted in 2005, which placed both domestic and foreign 
investors on an equal footing, and for the first time permitted mergers and acquisitions and other non-greenfield FDI 
projects (UNCTAD, 2007). 
187 Export quotas were introduced by the EU in 1992 and ended in 2005, and introduced by the US in 2003 and 
ended in 2007 with the country’s WTO accession (Fujita, 2017a). 
214 
 
After the WTO, Vietnam joined a number of other PTAs (Table 6.1) which have entailed 
further liberalisation of its trade and investment regime. At the start of 2018 a number 
of obligations from several recently agreed trade agreements took force at once, 
including the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA), ASEAN-China FTA, 
Vietnam-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement, Vietnam-Korea FTA and the 
Vietnam-Eurasian Economic Union FTA (World Bank, 2018f). The ATIGA agreement 
reduced to zero all tariffs on automobile, motorbike, vehicle components and home 
electronic appliances, and the Vietnam-Eurasian Economic Union FTA reduced 5,535 
tariffs to zero (World Bank, 2018f). According to the World Bank (2018f, p.17), 
together ‘[these] trade agreements dramatically reduced tariffs, anchored difficult 
domestic reforms, and opened much of the economy to foreign investment’. The 
European Union-Vietnam FTA committed Vietnam to a wide range of domestic 
regulatory changes, and has been described by the European Commission as ‘the most 
ambitious and comprehensive FTA that the EU has ever concluded with a developing 
country’ (EC, 2015, p.1), with Vietnam getting just 3 years more than the EU to 
implement the agreed elimination of  99 per cent of custom duties (the EU having 7 
years and Vietnam 10 years), including in textiles, garments, footwear, electronics and 
farm produce. The commitments on state enterprises have also been described as ‘the 
most ambitious that Vietnam has ever agreed to’ (EC, 2015, p.3). A number of other 
trade agreements are also under negotiation.188 Thus as of mid-2018, Vietnam had also 
signed up to 65 investment treaties and a further 24 treaties with investment provisions 
(UNCTAD, 2018a). Evidently, therefore, Vietnam has ‘embraced’ the neoliberal trade 
regime of mega-regional FTAs (Hollweg, Sturgeon, et al., 2017, p.7), and indeed often 
emerged as a lower income testing ground for deepened commitments. 
 
  
                                                   
188 Including an impending Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) between ASEAN and six 
states with which it has FTAs, namely China, Japan, India, Korea, Australia and New Zealand which is in the 
process of being negotiated (Lim, 2017).   
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Table 6.1 Vietnam: Selected trade agreements, 2007 onwards  
 
Sources: Herr et al. (2016), SRV (2015), VCCI (2018) and World Bank (2018f). 
 
Deepened trade integration has been followed by a steep and persistent increase in 
exports (Figure 6.1), particularly after 2011, which increased almost ten-fold between 
2000 and 2017 from US$ 24.8 billion to US$ 209.8 billion.  
 
Figure 6.1 Vietnam: Exports of goods and services, 2000-2017 (US$ billion, constant 2010) 
 
Source: World Bank (2018g). 
 
  
Implementation 
begins
Agreed tariff 
cuts Timing
WTO 2007 35.5 12 years
ASEAN-China 2007 90.0 10 years
ASEAN-South Korea 2007 87.0 11 years
ASEAN-Japan 2008 88.6 16 years
Vietnam-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement 2009 92.0 16 years
ASEAN-ATIGA 2010 97.0 7 years
ASEAN-Australia and New Zealand 2010 90.0 10 years
ASEAN-India 2010 78.0 11 years
Vietnam-Chile 2014 87.8 15 years
Vietnam-South Korea 2015 89.9 15 years
Vietnam-Eurasian Economic Union 2018 87.8 10 years
European Union-Vietnam FTA (E-V FTA) 2018 99.0 10 years
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (CPTPP)
Signed 2018 90.0 Unknown
Under negotiation
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6.2 Defending the nexus  
 
Yet regardless of these transformations, Vietnam has not simply embraced the market-
determined development strategies that these patterns of global integration might imply. 
Instead, the CPV’s commitment to the state sector has involved a number of efforts to 
defend the state finance-industry-infrastructure nexus after 2001, and according to one 
of Vietnam’s senior negotiators for the US-BTA and WTO, Vietnamese trade delegates 
‘always received orders from the country’s leadership to minimize the commitments 
that can potentially negatively affect SOEs, even at the cost of having to compromise in 
other areas’ (quoted in Vu-Thanh, 2017, pp. 99–100). Indeed, during this second period, 
the state sector has remained central to the CPV’s conceptualisation of socialism: 
 
The remaining element of the earlier definition of socialism is the government’s 
determination to maintain state enterprise domination of the economy’s 
commanding heights. The rationale for this determination is very clear: the 
Communist Party wishes to retain its ability to influence the long-term structural 
changes [in the economy] … it is similar to the ‘‘nation-building’’ project of 
East Asian capitalist states. The state is viewed as representing the long-term 
interests of the whole nation, rather than short-term or particular interests, and 
goals are expressed in abstract terms such as ‘‘industrialisation’’ and 
‘‘modernisation.’’ This objective implies that the government will continue to 
provide support for state enterprises (SEs) as a central plank of the ‘‘socialist 
market economy’’ (Beresford, 2008, p.226). 
 
Demonstrating this commitment, the five-year state enterprise reform plan adopted in 
March 2001 outlined plans to equitise around 1,800 enterprises but also indicated sectors 
remaining either solely state monopolies or where state enterprises would continue to 
dominate (Table 6.2). The 2013 revised constitution likewise stressed that ‘the state 
economy plays the dominant role’ (CPV, 2013). To assist the state finance-industry-
infrastructure weather increasingly complex challenges emerging in this period, the 
CPV adopted a multi-faceted approach.  
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Table 6.2 Vietnam: Sectors for state ownership, 2001 
 
Source: IMF (2002c) .189 
 
6.2.1 Defending the nexus from pressures through trade integration   
 
In the run-up to Vietnam’s WTO accession, the CPV made sizeable investments in 
strategic sectors, including in textile and garments to develop upstream activities and 
locally-produced textiles. Decision 55/2001/QG-TTg in April 2001 (‘Decision 55’), laid 
out plans to expand exports, upgrade production, and create 4 million jobs by 2010 
(Thang, 2005). Vinatex was granted a central implementing role, and was allocated 
preferential access to capital and other support to develop its spinning, weaving and 
dyeing capacities (Fujita, 2017b). Decision 55 included approximately US$ 2.2 billion 
in support for the sector between 2001-2005, with major investments scheduled for 
cotton cultivation, supporting infrastructure for the sector, as well as preferential credit 
for priority textile and garment projects (Martin, 2007). In other sectors, exemptions and 
special provisions were sought during trade negotiations. The CPV managed to secure 
a longer phase-in period for FDI liberalisation under the US-Vietnam BTA in areas of 
telecoms such as cable communications where the army had heavily invested (Manyin, 
                                                   
189  As outlined in Government Resolution 05-NQ-TW on the Continuation of the Restructuring, Reforming, 
Developing and Improving the Efficiency of State-Owned Enterprises (issued September 24, 2001) (IMF, 2002c). 
Cigarettes
Railways
Insurance
Fertilisers Lottery
Cement
Management of watershed irrigation system
Water drainage in large cities
Road management and maintenance
Bus and coach stations
Important waterways
Production of supplies of other products and services as 
Industry, trade and services
Management and maintenance of the national railways 
and airports
State monopoliesState monopolies
Political papers and books
Current event and documentary films
Planting and protection of watershed forests
Important consumer goods and foodstuffs production
Pharmaceutical chemicals and medicines
Publication of academic books
Ferrous and non-ferrous metal production Monetary trading
Basic chemicals
Plant production products Basic communications
Technical inspection of large transport vehicles
Petrol and oil wholesale trading Construction industries
Mining of important minerals Air transport
Production of (some) mechanical and electronic products
Information technology products Ocean shipping
Military hardware and weaponry for national defense
Enterprises entrusted with special national defense tasks
Enterprises operating in strategic locations, combining 
Full or controlling state ownership Full or controlling state ownership
Food and wholesale trading Power generation
Toxic chemicals International and national communications infrastructure
Radioactive materials Flight control
Maritime control
Printing of money and value papers Radio frequency management and distribution
Infrastructure
Explosive materials National power transmission grid
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2001).190 Lagging implementation was another strategy, as overall implementation of 
the US-Vietnam BTA was slow and by 2006 telecoms liberalisation fell behind schedule 
(Toulmin and Smith, 2006). In WTO implementation, the CPV has also been said to 
have adopted an approach which involved ‘changing many “appearances” of the 
economic system but retaining the basic elements of a centrally controlled system that 
ensured political dominance over all major areas of the economy’ (Pham, 2013, pp.1, 
3).  
 
This is evident in the foreign investment climate, which has remained selectively liberal. 
The 2005 Law on Investment legislation, introduced ahead of the WTO accession, 
retained a number of prohibitions or conditions (namely, screening) (Table 6.3). Thus, 
of its investment climate during the WTO accession period it was said: ‘Viet Nam still 
does not have a liberal FDI entry regime when compared with other developing 
countries’ (UNCTAD, 2007, p.32). Restrictions remained in areas where the state 
finance-industry-infrastructure nexus was prevalent, such as: telecoms; banking and 
finance; import, export and distribution; river and sea ports; education; media; air 
terminals and seaports; goods and passenger transport; and real estate (UNCTAD, 2007). 
In contrast, in manufacturing, where the CPV was keen to attract FDI, there were no 
entry restrictions. Whilst most services were to be liberalised within 3-5 years after 
accession (such as business services, financial services, and construction and 
engineering), Vietnam managed to negotiate only partial liberalisation in telecoms, 
distribution (via an economic needs test on foreign retail outlets after the first outlet is 
opened), and transport (especially container handling, road services, freight and areas 
of air transport) (UNCTAD, 2007). Meanwhile the certification and screening process 
for FDI was said to involve ‘judging whether a proposed investment is in Viet Nam’s 
interest, even if it falls within the parameters of sector, size and permitted level of 
foreign ownership. In this respect, Viet Nam’s certification regime remains influenced 
by a planned economy approach rather than reflecting common practice in market 
economies’ (UNCTAD, 2007, p.36).  
 
  
                                                   
190 For a discussion of the evolving role of the army in productive economic activities see Thayer (2015a). 
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Table 6.3  Vietnam: Sectoral investment restrictions according to the Law on Investment, 2005 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2007). 
 
The final and most decisive approach taken by the CPV to limiting the impacts of 
deepened trade integration on the developmental nexus were measures to restructure 
and bolster state enterprises (Vu-Thanh, 2017). Chief amongst these was the 2005 
restructuring of state enterprises into State Economic Groups (SEGs), designed to both 
drive domestic innovation and secure international competitiveness (ABD, 2015), and 
which had been discussed at least as far back as 1999 (IMF, 1999b). Tran Ngoc Phuong, 
then Standing Vice Chairman, Ho Chi Minh City’s Enterprise Reform and Management 
Board, summarised the CPV’s goals for the state sector during 2001-2005, explicitly in 
light of the country’s looming WTO accession, noting the Party sought to ‘[r]eform and 
enhance efficiency of State General Corporations, and develop a number of strong 
economic Groups’, the objective of which was ultimately: 
 
[To] pool resources to manipulate core sectors of the economy, become the 
dominant force in ensuring macro-economic balance and stability, provide key 
products for the national economy and exports, make major contributions to the 
state budget, serve as the engine for economic growth, and proactively embark 
upon international economic integration (Phuong, 2003, p.3). 
 
According to one official interviewed during fieldwork these efforts were designed to 
‘create globally competitive companies’ within the state sector (VG-3). The SEGs 
embodied a new kind of structure, comprising 100 per cent state-owned holding 
companies (Beresford, 2008) that were to be profit-oriented, invest in their subsidiaries, 
and collect a share of profits in the form of dividends (Fujita, 2017b). The ultimate goal 
was to create ‘holding companies with the general corporation [or SEG] pouring capital 
into its subsidiaries which are either sole-proprietor limited liability or joint-stock 
Prohibited for all investors Conditional for all investors Conditional for foreign investors only
Projects detrimental to national defence, 
security and public interest
Sectors impacting national defence, 
security and social order
Production, publishing and distribution of cultural 
products
Banking and finance Radio and television broadcasting
Sectors impacting public health Mining and processing of minerals
Projects for treatment of important toxic wastesCulture, information, press and publishing Telecommunications and internet services
Other projects banned by law Entertainment services Public postal networks, postal and delivery services
Real estate Construction and operation of ports and airports
Mining and exploitation of natural resourcesTransport of goods and passengers
Education and training Fishing
Other sectors in accordance with law Production of tobacco
Real estate
Import, export and distribution
Education and training
Hospitals and clinics
Other sectors as per international treaties
Projects detrimental to historical and cultural 
traditions and ethics
Projects detrimental to people’s health or 
that destroy natural resources or the 
environment
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companies of which the State holds [the] controlling stake’ (Phuong, 2003, p.3). These 
holding companies were also designed to be able to incorporate private and foreign 
capital participation in constituent enterprises. As Tu-Anh Vu-Thanh (2017, p.94) notes, 
the Central Executive Committee Special Resolution 08-NQ-TW (5 February 2007) on 
major undertakings after WTO membership stated that plans to transform state 
enterprises would need to involve ‘reorganization, innovation, and enhancement of 
efficiency and competitiveness of large enterprises in important sectors in order to 
effectively perform the role as the main force in international economic integration, and 
of commercial banks and state financial institutions in order to maintain the leading role 
of the domestic financial and monetary markets.’ The CPV’s SEG strategy was 
reportedly influenced by Singapore’s state sector policies (World Bank, 2005b).  
 
In practice, by 2011 a total of 13 SEGs had been formed across finance (insurance), 
industry (textile and garments, shipbuilding, rubber, petroleum, oil and gas, chemicals, 
natural resource extraction) and infrastructure (electricity, two in telecoms, construction 
and housing) (Table 6.4).191 Some major state enterprises remained in either GC-91 or 
GC-90s structures such as in coffee, air transport, tobacco, railway, steel and paper and 
food (Smith et al., 2014). Both looming WTO accession and concern about the 
performance of the state sector in the early 2000s informed the restructuring, with state 
enterprise industrial production, job creation and budget contributions all seen to be in 
decline (Abonyi, 2013; Fujita, 2017a; Vu-Thanh, 2017). According to Tu-Anh Vu-
Thanh (2017, p.95), a former senior advisor to Prime Minister Phan Van Khai noted that: 
‘[the] establishment of large state economic groups was a reaction to the WTO. The 
state decided to take advantage of the situation to transform big state corporations into 
‘the iron fists of the state’, especially given the fact that the domestic private sector is 
still quite weak, and therefore cannot compete with powerful multinational 
corporations’. 
  
                                                   
191 By 2014 three had been converted back into GCs due to poor performance, as Table 6.4 indicates (Fujita, 
2017b). 
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Table 6.4 Vietnam: State Economic Groups 
 
Adapted from Tu-Anh Vu-Thanh (2017). 
 
One of the most important shifts occurring with the formation of SEGs was sanctioned 
diversification away from core business activities, which has seen them described as 
‘nationalised’ versions of Korea’s chaebols or Japan’s zaibatsu or keiretsu structures.192 
Yet, importantly, Vietnam’s economic groups both operate in considerably more sectors 
and with considerably more subsidiaries than those in Korea, or those in Thailand, China 
or Indonesia (OECD, 2013, p.14).193 As Tu-Anh Vu-Thanh (2017) argues, in a post-
WTO environment in which the direct provision of cheap credit to SOEs now much 
more challenging, diversification into finance enabled SEGs to continue to easily access 
funds. 194  This prompted the emergence of what have been called ‘unaccountable 
funding channels’ (Hayton, 2010, p.17). For example, after support for the textile and 
garment sector under ‘Decision 55’ was removed in 2006, the new Vietnam National 
Textile and Garment Group announced plans in mid-2007 to form a joint-stock 
commercial bank, the Industrial Development Bank, to provide financial services to the 
textile and garment sector, with a proposed US$ 63 million initial capital from several 
partners, including Vietnam Steel Corporation, Hanoi Beer-Alcohol and Beverage 
Corporation and the Vietnam International Bank (Martin, 2007).  
                                                   
192 For instance, it has been said that because of intensified international competition within Vietnam and the CPV’s 
desire to create internationally competitive companies, through the SEG reforms it ‘wanted to replicate … Japan’s 
Keiretsus and Korea’s Chaebols’ (ADB, 2014, p.10). They have also been called ‘communist versions of the chaebol’ 
(Jeffries, 2011, p.180). 
193 In Thailand, China, Indonesia and Korea comparable groups operate in much fewer industries 3.5, 2.3, 2.1 and 
1.7 two-digit industries, respectively, whilst in Vietnam this is 6.4 two-digit industries. In terms of subsidiaries, their 
numbers are twice as high as those in China, and ‘much higher in comparison with Korean chaebol in their most 
prosperous period’ (OECD, 2013, p.14). 
194 On the specifics of the financial arrangements which have followed these efforts: ‘[T]he move to highly diversified 
business groups, which include banking and finance, has created new forms of directed credit and cross-subsidies 
among the SOEs. Through a complex nexus of pyramidal and cross ownership structures, these subsidies, which are 
in principle prohibited by the WTO, have been transformed into internal transactions, and are therefore very difficult 
to detect and/or sanction’ (Vu-Thanh, 2017, p.87).  
Name (and previous name or acronym) Founded Sector
SEG status 
eventually 
terminated
Vietnam Insurance Group (formerly Bao Viet General Corporation) 2005 Insurance
Vietnam National Textile and Garment Group (formerly Vinatex) 2005 Textile and garments
Vietnam National Coal-Minerals Industries Group (formerly Vinacomin) 2005 Natural resource extraction
Vietnam Post and Telecommunications Group (formerly VNPT) 2006 Telecoms
Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Group (formerly Vinashin) 2006 Shipbuilding Yes
Vietnam Electricity Group (EVN) 2006 Electricity
Vietnam Oil and Gas Group (PVN) 2006 Oil and gas
Vietnam Rubber Group (VRG) 2006 Rubber
Viettel Telecommunications Group (Viettel) 2009 Telecoms
Vietnam Chemical Group (Vinachem) 2009 Chemicals
Vietnam Industry Construction Group (VNIC) 2010 Construction Yes
Housing and Urban Development Group (HUD) 2010 Housing Yes
Vietnam National Petroleum Group 2011 Petroleum
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In the context of reduced subsidies, equitisation proceeds also appear to have been 
targeted as a source of additional funds to help SEGs to mobilise their own capital. For 
instance, Vinatex noted it would seek to mobilise capital from foreign and local 
investors in the wake of the country’s WTO accession (Martins, 2009). At around this 
time the so-called insider equitisations that had hitherto dominated in Vietnam shifted 
toward increased foreign participation. By the end of 2005, 46 per cent of the capital in 
equitised enterprises was held by the state, 38 per cent by employees, and 15 per cent 
by so-called ‘outside shareholders’ (World Bank, 2005b), but by the end of 2006, the 
state’s share had stayed the same, that of employees had fallen to 30 per cent and that 
of outsiders increased to 24 per cent (World Bank, 2006b). This coincided both with the 
increased attractiveness of putting enterprises on the domestic stock exchange as the 
WTO accession loomed, and the government began to encourage the sale of equitised 
shares to so-called ‘external strategic investors’ who could inject long-term capital for 
investment, as well as managerial capacity (Fujita, 2017b). Indicative of similar trends, 
Gainsborough (2003b) noted of the early 2000s (in the context of small state enterprises), 
a hardened budget constraint for non-strategic enterprises at this time made the 
prospects of equitisation more appealing to enterprise managers, since it allowed them 
to access other sources of investment and capital. 
 
By the end of 2016, around 4,500 had been equitised (Truong and Weisblatt, 2017), 
although the country’s large state enterprises remained mostly outside of this divestment 
drive effort (Fujita, 2017a). By  2015 652 enterprises were wholly-owned by the state 
(Hiep, 2017), and as of the end of 2016, 2,835 enterprises in which the state owned more 
than 50 per cent of charter capital (GSO, 2017). After 2011, the pace of divestment 
slowed down (Table 6.5), however, for reasons related to poor stock exchange 
performance in the wake of the global financial crisis and political and administrative 
challenges related to the remaining larger scale state enterprises (Hiep, 2017). 
Furthermore, whilst state enterprises were transformed into joint-stock companies 
following equitisation, the state typically held a large share of the remaining ownership 
(Truong and Weisblatt, 2017, p.1) and the larger the enterprises, the larger the share 
typically under state control (Fujita, 2017a). 
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Table 6.5 Vietnam: Equitised enterprises, 1992-2015 
 
Source: Adapted from Hiep (2017). 
 
The WTO accession also required the CPV to reconstruct the financial arm of the nexus. 
The DAF which had come into effect in 2000 had allowed the CPV to continue to direct 
credit on preferential terms to priority projects including ‘state credit’ to state enterprises 
(IMF, 2006d). The WTO accession forced Vietnam to end grants to exporters and 
subsidised credit to priority sectors such as textiles and garments provided through DAF 
(World Bank, 2006b).195 In response, the CPV replaced the DAF with a new, WTO-
compatible institution, the Vietnam Development Bank (VDB) in 2006 (World Bank, 
2006b), but which also retained an explicitly policy-oriented mandate. This includes the 
requirement to ‘[mobilise] and receive funds from domestic and foreign institutions to 
implement investment credit and export credit policies of the Government’ (VDB, 2014, 
p.32). This includes facilitating strategic infrastructure development, such as social and 
economic infrastructure, agriculture, industries, education, health, environmental 
protection and renewable energy, as well as supporting strategic, important industries 
with their export-related activities (SRV, 2013, p.2). In addition, it is tasked with 
guaranteeing loans from commercial banks, 196  and providing loans for companies 
struggling to pay salaries and social insurance for unemployed workers in times of 
economic difficulties, as well as infrastructure-related resettlements, factory-building, 
and flood-prevention (VDB, 2014, p.32). 
 
As of 2018, the VDB’s charter capital is US$ 227 million (Campanaro and Dang, 2018). 
Between 2006-2016 it mobilised a total of US$ 22.5 billion, with a significant role for 
‘providing financing to infrastructure projects under the execution and management of 
SOEs and local provinces’ (ESCAP, 2017, p.22). This included lending around US$ 9 
billion for electricity production and distribution alone between 2006-2016, as well as 
US$ 600 million for the Hanoi-Hai Phong Expressway (ESCAP, 2017). In 2009, most 
                                                   
195 Although in reality these are sometimes equivalent, given state dominance in certain sectors, meaning sectoral 
industrial policy often targets state enterprises indirectly (Vu-Thanh, 2017). 
196  In accordance with the Prime Minister’s Decision 14/QD0TTG (21 January 2009).  
Date Number of SOEs equitised
1992 to mid-1996 5
Mid-1996 to mid-1998 25
Mid-1998-2011 3,946
2011-2015 508
Total 4,484
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VDB financing went into preferential loans for state enterprises, which accounted for 
between 75-80 per cent of its assets, and the total of loans from VDB to Vietnam’s state 
enterprises indirectly guaranteed by the government was estimated to amount to 
between US$ 6.5-7.5 billion (OECD, 2013). In 2011, preferential loans to state 
enterprises were reported to make up between 75-80 per cent of outstanding VDB loans 
(Binh and Quang, 2015). 
 
As well as changing the landscape of policy lending, deeper trade integration also altered 
the environment for commercial banking. Whilst the CPV had been reticent to open the 
financial sector to foreign competition, trade agreements were also more decisive in 
opening the sector up than the persistent pressure applied by the IFIs in this area since 
the 1990s (Weeks, Thang, et al., 2004). Following the US-Vietnam BTA, the CPV 
committed to allow majority US ownership banks by 2005, grant national treatment in 
the case of state-owned bank privatisation, and phase in national treatment of deposit-
taking activities after eight years (Weeks, Thang, et al., 2004). After WTO accession, 
the CPV was finally compelled to open the financial sector to foreign banks wishing to 
establish 100 per cent foreign-owned subsidiaries, and to permit foreign investment in 
domestic banks (Ogimoto, 2013). Yet foreign banks far from dominate despite these 
changes. Domestically-owned banks have remained highly significant within 
Vietnamese financial system (Ogimoto, 2013). The first wholly foreign-owned bank in 
Vietnam was opened in 2009, yet by the end of 2011, the share of foreign banks in 
commercial banking assets was 10 per cent, compared with much more considerable 
ownership by the state (World Bank, 2014b). Five state-owned commercial banks at this 
time accounted for nearly 40 per cent of assets and 48 per cent of deposits, yet with the 
state, state enterprises and state-owned commercial banks major shareholders in the 
country’s 34 joint-stock banks at this time, the scale of state ownership of total assets 
was expected to have been considerably higher (World Bank, 2014b). Furthermore, 
these figures don’t include the two state-owned policy banks, VDB and the smaller 
Vietnam Bank for Social Policies (VBSP). The result has been that state-owned and 
joint-stock banks (in which state entities are strong shareholders) are a dominant force 
(Table 6.6).  
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Table 6.6 Vietnam: Banking sector: by share of credit, chartered capital and assets (various years) 
 
 
Sources: ADB (2015b) and Tran et al. (2015). 
 
Despite equitisation efforts within the state-owned commercial banking sector after 
2011, the state retains a majority share in four commercial banks; the Vietnam Bank for 
Agriculture and Rural Development (Agribank), 197  Vietinbank, BIDV, and 
Vietcombank  (USTA, 2018). One of the chief functions of Vietinbank is to lend to state 
enterprises at commercial rates (Tran et al., 2015).  In 2016, 24.9 per cent of 
Vietinbank’s outstanding loans were to state enterprises (Vietinbank, 2017), reflecting 
a reduced but still sizeable role in lending to state enterprises, and as of 2015, its 
cumulative lending to state enterprises amounted to US$ 6.8 billion (ESCAP, 2017). 
Vietcombank, meanwhile, contributed not only credit but also equity to state enterprises, 
such as 5 per cent of charter capital to the Vietnam Infrastructure Development and 
Finance Investment Joint Stock Company for a major highways project (ESCAP, 2017). 
Finally, in addition to commercial and policy banks, Vietnam’s state enterprises can also 
access financing through the State Capital Investment Corporation (SCIC), the country’s 
sovereign wealth fund (OECD, 2013), which was formed in 2005 with a mandate to 
direct funds toward socio-economic projects in line with industrial policies, boost 
economic diversification and build strong national champions (Nguyen et al., 2012). 
 
Cumulatively, such defensive measures forcefully show that despite the arguments 
advanced that Vietnam’s WTO accession embodied a consensus around economic 
liberalisation (Manyin and Cooper, 2006, p.3), the CPV instead sought to counteract 
deepened trade and investment integration with sizeable efforts to bolster and adjust the 
developmental nexus to avoid the most damaging possible effects. 
  
  
                                                   
197 Formerly known as VBARD.  
Category of bank Credit share (2012)
Chartered 
capital share 
(2013)
Asset share 
(2013)
State-owned commercial banks 51.8 31.0 44.0
Joint-stock commercial banks 34.8 44.0 42.0
Joint venture bank, foreign banks, and foreign 
bank branches
8.5 20.0 11.0
Other 4.9 5.0 3.0
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6.2.2 Resisting reform pressure and leveraging ODA to support the nexus 
 
In addition to pressures from deepened trade integration, the CPV also faced increased 
pressure from the IMF to dismantle the state finance-industry-infrastructure nexus in the 
early 2000s. In 2001, Vietnam agreed its first structural adjustment credit since 1994, 
after volunteering198 to produce an I-PRSP, which led to a Poverty Reduction Support 
Credit- Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRSC-PRGF) programme from the 
World Bank and IMF (IMF, 2002b; World Bank, 2012). This allowed Vietnam to access 
additional concessional financing 199  in the context of stagnating FDI inflows and 
eagerness to access increased foreign capital to fuel its rapid growth path (Nørlund et 
al., 2003). The full PRSP, finalised in 2002, was distinctive when compared to standard 
packages in several respects. First, titled the Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Strategy (CPRGS), 200 it emphasised growth as an engine for poverty reduction 
and advanced a transformational, growth-oriented agenda (Conway, 2004; Ohno and 
Ohno, 2005). Second, indicative of strong ownership, it was said to have been ‘produced 
on the government’s own schedule, written by Vietnamese in the Vietnamese language, 
and only later translated into English for donor input’ (Ohno and Ohno, 2005, pp.44–
45).201 Reflecting this, the IMF (2003a, p.44) noted that the PRSC-PRGF package had 
‘several atypical features, including initially retaining a relatively large share of the 
public sector in the economy and a plan to restructure, rather than immediately privatize, 
large SOEs’.202  
 
Third, its priorities also reflected those of the wider five and ten year strategy documents 
(World Bank, 2012). The Public Investment Plan (PIP) in the CPRGS allocated between 
44.0 and 41.4 per cent of resources between 2001-2005 to industry and construction 
(depending on the level of resources mobilised, the share going to industry fell only if 
extra resources were allocated, indicating it was the overwhelming priority). Just 2.0 to 
2.9 per cent of planned public investment, in contrast, was allocated to health and social 
affairs, and 3.7 to 4.3 per cent to education and training (IEO, 2004, p.26). Overall the 
PIP was dominated by ‘[large] infrastructure projects, prestige projects in productive 
                                                   
198 This was voluntary because Vietnam was not part of the HIPC process (Nørlund et al., 2003).  
199 This included IDA soft loans as well as specific multilateral funding connected to the MDGs (Nørlund et al., 2003). 
200 This name was said to reflect the ‘Vietnamese “obsession” with growth’ (Masina, 2006, p.99), and the Vietnamese 
version of the strategy places “growth” before “poverty reduction” (World Bank, 2012).   
201 The process of preparing the document was led by MPI with approval from the Prime Minister (World Bank, 
2012). 
202 Other features of the process were highly atypical, such as the decision by the BWIs to approve the first PRGF-
PRSC tranches before the full PRSP was agreed (Conway, 2004, p.16). 
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and social sectors, and investment in state-owned enterprises’ (Pincus and Thang, 2004, 
p.44). This suggests Vietnam’s access to concessional financing through the PRSP 
process was used to bolster state industry and infrastructure, since key PIP projects 
related directly to; electricity, fertiliser, cement, oil refining, roads and steel, in either 
infrastructure or capital-intensive industries (Pincus and Thang, 2004). It has therefore 
been suggested that the CPRGS was used to reinforce existing programmes and policies, 
rather than being imposed from the outside according to standard templates (Painter, 
2005).203 
 
Yet this apparent rapprochement been the IMF and CPV was extremely short-lived. The 
second tranche of lending under the PRGF was suspended in 2002, and lending was 
formally discontinued in 2004, after just two-fifths had been disbursed (Painter, 2005; 
World Bank, 2012, p.22). Disagreements during the second review of the PRGF in June 
2002 saw the IMF warn of the need for ‘firmer implementation of the structural reform 
agenda, as well as continued discipline in macroeconomic management’ (IMF, 2003a, 
p.1). By September 2002 deadlock had emerged over new conditions related to reporting 
of the State Bank of Vietnam,204 yet the breakdown in lending relations represented 
more fundamental differences. According to one former World Bank official, Martin 
Rama (2008, p.35), there was ‘growing disagreement on the speed of policy reforms, 
especially in relation to the privatization of SOEs and SOCBs’. A comparison of 
privatisation-related conditions in IMF and World Bank concessional lending to twenty 
developing countries in the mid-2000s found Vietnam to have the highest overall 
number of conditions related to privatisation, with 9 out of 17 conditions in the second 
review of the PRGF in 2002 related to state enterprise or state-owned bank reform 
(Kovach and Lansman, 2006).205 This suggests Vietnam’s state sector was particularly 
targeted by the IFIs in this period.206 For state officials historically concerned about the 
country’s relations with the IFIs, this intensified suspicion that the institutions were ‘at 
the service of industrial countries in general, and the United States in particular’ (Rama, 
2008, p.43).  
                                                   
203 This marked it out from many PRSPs developed in Africa at this time which were more strongly focused on social 
policies and poverty targeting (Ohno and Ohno, 2005). 
204 IMF (2003a, p.23) safeguards were considered to violate state secrecy laws. 
205  The other countries were Armenia, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Georgia, Ghana, 
Honduras, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam and 
Zambia (Kovach and Lansman, 2006). 
206 Indeed, at the same time, the ADB attempted to provide a loan to Vietnam for state enterprise restructuring and 
‘pushed for expanding the scope and accelerating the pace of equitization-as-privatization—much along the lines of 
the other IFIs—but this was unacceptable to the government’ (Abonyi, 2013, pp.102–103).   
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The IMF’s uncompromising stance (Rama, 2008) prompted the CPV to break relations 
and forgo concessional financing in order to preserve the nexus. An IMF internal review 
noted its lack of influence in the country in the mid-2000s could be attributed to 
Vietnam’s absence of macroeconomic problems and a strong rate of growth (IEO, 2004), 
which archive documents discuss in the following terms: 
 
For the past couple of years, there was no immediate need for Fund resources. 
Vietnam’s foreign reserves steadily increased between 2001 and 2004 and 
continuous donor support (apart from the Fund) was acquired throughout this 
period. Consequently, the staff judged that the incentive to accelerate politically 
sensitive reforms was low and deplored other donors’ (including the World Bank) 
decision to continue with their assistance programs even when the PRGF-
supported program was suspended (IMF, 2005a, p.49). 
 
Notably, the IMF and World Bank adopted almost opposite strategies in Vietnam in the 
early 2000s, breaking with past harmony. The Bank fully disbursed the two Poverty 
Reduction Support Credit (PRSC) tranches in 2002 (World Bank, 2012) and decided 
that Vietnam had made enough headway in other areas, despite the lack of progress in 
state enterprise and state-owned commercial banking reform, for the Bank to offer 
continued support under its PRSC programme in mid-2003 (IMF, 2005a, pp.55–56). 
Between 2002-2003 IDA lending to Vietnam increased from US$ 346.1 million to 
US$ 669.0 million (OECD-DAC, 2018a) and Vietnam became the second biggest IDA 
recipient after India (Nørlund et al., 2003).  
 
This was the start of growing accommodation by the Bank toward the CPV, with the 
former calculating that this would bring it more policy influence. As part of efforts to 
build trust, from 2003 the Bank began to finally (and retrospectively) accept government 
statistics on growth, stopped publishing its own (usually lower) estimates, and toned 
down its dire warnings. In the words of one former Bank official ‘bleak scenarios might 
have worried Vietnamese authorities for some time, but exaggeration is not a solid 
foundation for credibility’ (Rama, 2008, p.43). At this time, the Bank shifted toward a 
more analytical and technical mode of engagement, deploying a ‘vast array of technical 
advisers employed to develop reports, designs, legislation and policy recommendation 
[sic]’, and organising training for both party cadres and domestic private businesses 
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(Engel, 2010, p.93). Of great significance, the Bank also made a break with policy in 
other countries and ‘accepted the government’s gradualist approach in relation to SOE 
and SOCB reform’ (Rama, 2008, pp.43–44). According to one foreign embassy official 
‘the World Bank makes a lot of recommendations for government policy but there is no 
enforcement [to make] the Vietnamese government follow its recommendations’ (VE-
3).  
 
Vietnam’s growing popularity with bilateral and multilateral funders could, according 
to one IMF official in the mid-2000s, be traced to its strong performance: ‘Vietnam’s 
success in reforming its economy and reducing poverty has made it a favourite target 
for bilateral and multilateral assistance. Everybody would like to be associated with this 
success story’ (Solheim, 2005, p.8). Indicative of the World Bank’s own desire to use 
Vietnam’s success as evidence of its own effectiveness, during discussions as part of 
the IDA15 Replenishment process in 2007, the Bank cited data on Vietnam’s marked 
poverty reduction (from 59 per cent to 20 per cent between 1993 and 2004) and noted: 
‘[as] one of the best-performing developing economies in the world, Vietnam has the 
potential to be one of the great success stories in development. Support from IDA since 
1993, which has totaled [sic] US$6 billion, has contributed to the country’s remarkable 
poverty-fighting effort’ (World Bank, 2007b, p.50). The CPV has adapted to this 
growing leverage to bolster its own agenda:  
 
Vietnam is dependent on capital inflows to feed growth, but is not a mendicant 
before the IFIs. Thus it pays the Government occasionally to be ‘difficult’ and 
to present a belligerent face. Donors as a result tread more carefully for fear of 
creating a political backlash from ‘conservative forces’. Rather than impose 
more radical demands, official pronouncements from most donors seek 
acceleration of existing directions, and renewed efforts to achieve under-shot 
targets (Painter, 2005, pp.277–278). 
 
In addition, Vietnam’s aid dependence compared favourably to other LICs in 2001, with 
ODA amounting to 4.6 per cent of GDP, 9.4 per cent of imports, 14.8 per cent of 
investment and 17.9 per cent of government expenditure (Ohno and Ohno, 2005).  
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However, this period was also marked by the growing alignment between ODA and FDI. 
Foreign investors in the export-oriented sectors were generating pressure on the 
Vietnamese government to increase investments in infrastructure, and worked in concert 
with multilateral and bilateral donors. For instance, Nike’s outsourced activities in 
Vietnam employed 200,000 workers and produced 94 million pairs of shoes in 2010, at 
a time when the firm began ‘lobbying the government to invest in infrastructure in order 
to strengthen its supply chain’ (Cowen, 2014, p.60). At the firm’s suggestion, the World 
Bank put together a large logistics financing plan in Vietnam and worked with USAID 
and shipping giants Maersk and American President Lines to facilitate government 
study missions on PPPs in ports and logistics infrastructure around Ho Chi Minh City. 
Between 2007-2013, Vietnam’s cargo-carrying capacity increased more than four-fold 
(Cowen, 2014, p.61). Notably, however, the PPP modality of infrastructure investment 
has reportedly struggled to take off in Vietnam, despite World Bank eagerness, due to 
the reluctance of the CPV to adopt an open tendering process (VG-10).  
 
The links between ODA and FDI were particularly marked in Vietnam’s relations with 
Japan. Vietnam’s centrality to Japan’s ODA strategy is demonstrated by the fact that 
after 2001 the Japanese aid budget was cut 10 per cent due to domestic economic 
problems, but levels of ODA to Vietnam increased year-on-year during the early 2000s 
(Luong, 2009). Japan had at first refused to join the multi-donor CPRGF programme 
due to the more limited emphasis on infrastructure207 but joined in 2003 after a new 
chapter exclusively focused on economic infrastructure was added (Nørlund et al., 2003). 
As a result, Japan’s support under the PRSC-3 in 2004 was US$ 837 million, more than 
either the World Bank (US$ 750 million) and EU (US$ 625 million) (Hatakeyama, 
2008). However, policy disagreements with the CPV over Vietnam’s development 
strategy were also increasing at this time (see Chapter 5). Vietnam was criticised for its 
‘state-led’ approach involving a ‘forced localization policy’ in which the state sought to 
use ‘reward and penalty to speed up local supply’. The approach advocated by the 
Japanese side was in contrast ‘FDI-led’ and aimed to ‘encourage natural and demand-
led localization (don’t force it)’ (GRIPS, 2003b) (see Table 5.14).   
 
                                                   
207 This fitted with the overall Japanese approach to Vietnam which was focused on roads, ports, bridges, 
investment and  SME promotion, and industrial plan support (Natsuda, 2009, p.115). 
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This dispute intensified in the early 2000s, as the CPV tightened local content policies 
in the motorcycle sector (Ngo, 2017a). A quantitative limit on imported motorcycle 
components was abruptly introduced in 2002, which caused two Japanese investors, 
Honda (which had formed a joint venture, known as Honda Vietnam, or HVN) and 
Yamaha Vietnam, to briefly suspend production (Fujita, 2013b). These measures ‘not 
only offended one of the oldest segments of the foreign investor community but also 
one of the country’s main sources of Overseas Development Aid’ (Abrami, 2003, p.93). 
Such was the impact of this incident on Japan-Vietnam relations that the former 
threatened to withdraw support for Vietnam’s efforts to join the WTO (Abrami, 2003). 
However, in tandem, there was also growing interest amongst Japanese investors in 
relocating to Vietnam thanks to an emergent ‘China-plus-one’ strategy (Siew-Yean, 
2003), motivated by increased wages and other costs, as well as rising political tensions 
between Japan and China (Watanabe, 2005; Wehrfritz, 2005). Vietnam’s large market 
and relatively skilled but low-cost labour, made it a high priority alternative investment 
destination but ‘the creation of a favored business environment in Vietnam was deemed 
both necessary and beneficial for Japanese MNCs in the region’ (Natsuda, 2009, p.113). 
 
As a result Japan demanded major transformations to Vietnam’s business environment, 
designed to better serve the interests of Japanese investors, which the CPV initially 
considered ‘an unacceptable form of intervention by Japan’ (Hatakeyama, 2008, p.354). 
However, given the strength of the joint forces of Japanese capital and aid, a Vietnam-
Japan Joint Initiative was put together in 2003 which ‘reflected the interests of the 
Japanese business sector involved in negotiating the agreement’ (Hatakeyama, 2008, 
p.360). The extensive and expansive 44 item list (with 125 sub-items) of improvements 
to the Vietnamese investment climate included:  tax incentives for FDI; the inclusion of 
materials produced in export-processing zones to be included in local content targets set 
by the government; simplification of regulations for firms in EPZs and industrial zones 
(IZs) to sell domestically; a dramatic reduction in export requirements; a roadmap for 
the total elimination of local content requirements; reduced personal income tax for 
high-earners; foreign investor involvement in industrial policy-making; the 
liberalisation of retail and distribution sectors; and the liberalisation of rules relating to 
the need for import-export balance (MOFA, 2003).   
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The impacts of this pressure were marked. By the end of 2003, Vietnam had dismantled 
its local content rules,208 and by November 2007, the Japanese Embassy in Vietnam 
reported that some 93 per cent of the items in the Joint Initiative had been completed 
(Natsuda, 2009). Japanese FDI more than doubled between 2003-2005, from US$ 300 
million to US$ 810 million (Hatakeyama, 2008).  Whilst preparation for Vietnam’s 
eventual WTO accession also contributed to Vietnam’s changing investment climate 
(Fujita, 2013b), the joint power of Japanese aid and capital was such that since foreign 
investors, international agencies and manufacturing associations have been described as 
especially ‘adept in organizing efforts to put pressure on the Vietnamese state. Their 
prowess limits the policy space from which Vietnam operates, complicating efforts to 
help domestic firms exploit the learning opportunities brought in by the TNCs’ (Lim, 
2017, p.2). Indeed, as Ngo (2017a) notes, Vietnam’s policies toward technology transfer 
were derailed by coordinated pressure from the Japanese embassy, JICA and the 
Japanese manufacturing association during the early 2000s which pushed for tighter 
intellectual property rules, cementing Japanese TNC dominance over core technologies.  
 
6.2.3 Macroeconomic policy and the enduring role of public investment 
 
Aside from Vietnam’s growing difficulties managing the alignment between FDI and 
ODA, state investment in the economy remained an important bedrock of Vietnamese 
developmentalism in the second period (Figure 6.2), with the state’s share of total 
investment reaching highs of 59.8 per cent in 2001, dropping to around 40 per cent after 
2009. According to (high-end) estimates of public investment as a share of GDP in the 
early-mid 2000s, this averaged just over 20 per cent of GDP (Table 6.7).209 Just under a 
third of the overall state budget was accounted for by capital investment, rising from 
28.4 per cent in 2006-2010 to 29.1 per cent between 2011-2015 (World Bank, 2017b). 
Continuing the high rates of public investment in infrastructure seen in the first period 
of developmentalism between 1995-2007 public investment in infrastructure 
(encompassing electricity and gas, water supply, transport and communications) 
amounted to an annual average of 10.0 per cent of GDP, higher than the 9.5 per cent in 
Taiwan during 1970-1990, 8.7 per cent in South Korea between 1960-1990, and 8.0 per 
cent in China between 2003-2004 (Thanh and Dapice, 2009). Infrastructure (electricity, 
                                                   
208 The local content ratio of HVN’s motorcycles did increase at this time from 52 per cent in 2001 to 83 per cent in 
2004, primarily by incorporating Vietnamese, as well as Taiwanese and Korean suppliers into its final products (Fujita, 
2013b). 
209 For a discussion of what is included in high and low end public investment data, see Chapter 5, footnote 160.   
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gas, water, roads and communications) was 42.8 per cent of state investment in 2015, 
and manufacturing investment dipped to 7.0 per cent (Table 6.9).  
 
Table 6.7 Vietnam: Investment levels, 2001-2006 
 
Source: IMF (2007b). 
 
Figure 6.2 Vietnam: State, non-state and foreign invested sectors by share of total investment, 1995-
2016
 
* Data is preliminary 
Source: GSO (2018).  
 
The Vietnamese bond market was formed in 2000, and provides resources to support 
state investment. Government and government-backed bonds dominate and were 
equivalent to 20.1 per cent of GDP in 2015, compared with 3.4 per cent for corporate 
bonds and 0.7 per cent for municipal bonds (Nguyen, 2017). Government bonds are 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Total investment 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Public 59.8 56.3 54.0 53.6 52.2 50.1
Private domestic 22.6 26.2 29.7 30.9 32.1 33.6
FDI 17.6 17.5 16.3 15.5 15.7 16.3
Total investment 35.4 37.2 37.8 38.4 40.0 40.0
Public 21.2 20.9 20.4 20.6 20.9 20.0
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issued by the Treasury, and government-backed bonds by the VDB, VBSP and state 
enterprises such as the Vietnam Expressway Corporation. Government bonds provide 
funds for capital expenditure and help to finance the fiscal deficit, with over 98 per cent 
of public debt channelled into public infrastructure (Nguyen, 2017). However, 
Vietnam’s decentralised capital spending is now amongst the highest in the developing 
world. Between 2003-2008 most government bond proceeds were channelled to 
centrally-led transport and irrigation investments, however, during 2009-2014 most 
went to locally-determined projects such as small hydro-electric works, social programs, 
water systems and rural roads (World Bank, 2017b). Until 2016, 78 per cent of bond 
investors were in the commercial banking system (World Bank, 2018g). Furthermore, 
the country’s second sovereign bond, worth US$ 1 billion and issued in January 2010, 
was channelled into state-owned oil refinery projects (US$ 700 million), the state-
owned shipbuilding corporation, Vinashin and other projects (US$ 300 million) (IMF, 
2010c).  
 
Vietnam also faced the external shock of the global financial crisis in 2008, which 
proved a major macroeconomic test (Rama and Viet Tuan Dinh, 2009), especially given 
that the crisis occurred just after Vietnam was hit by the end of an asset price bubble 
resulting from extraordinary inflows of FDI in response to its WTO accession (IMF, 
2010c). Echoing its heterodox approach to navigating the regional crisis, the CPV 
deployed unorthodox macroeconomic policy tools which supported Vietnam to weather 
the crisis better than many of its neighbours (Abbott and Tarp, 2012), and in 2009 was 
amongst the fastest growing in the world (Rama and Viet Tuan Dinh, 2009). For one 
thing, Vietnam retains capital account management capacities due to the restricted 
convertibility of the Dong and small portfolio inflows, which limited the outflow of 
capital when the external account balance weakened (Weeks, 2015). A sizeable fiscal 
stimulus package, worth 5 per cent of GDP, was put together in 2008 and 2009 and 
encompassed: support for SMEs (through corporate income tax reductions and deferrals 
and interest rate subsidies); a stimulus to private consumption (value-added and personal 
income tax reductions and deferrals); accelerated public investment (frontloading multi-
year projects in rural irrigation, infrastructure and student and teacher housing, and new 
off-budget projects in transport, education and health);210 and strengthening the social 
                                                   
210 Off-budget spending is typically how state enterprises are supported.  
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safety net (financial transfers for low-income earners, students, food support payment 
and aid for loss-making enterprises) (IMF, 2010c).  
 
An interest rate subsidy worth 4 per cent was applied to a large number of sectors (Dinh 
et al., 2013). It was largely implemented through the state-owned commercial banking 
system, which disbursed around two-thirds of the total subsidised loans (IMF, 2010c). 
The 2009 stimulus package also included a campaign to encourage Vietnamese  citizens 
to use locally produced products, aiding many state enterprises, and introduced a 
programme in 2010-2011 to curb inflation involving expenditure to stabilise prices at 
retail state enterprises, increasing the state’s share in domestic retail sales (CIEM, 2013). 
Credit guarantees to SMEs were also provided through the VDB (IMF, 2010c). Between 
2008-2009 public investment increased from 9.2 per cent of GDP to 13.6 per cent (IMF, 
2012b). Capital expenditure in particular increased in 2009, and the budget deficit 
increased to 9 per cent of GDP (up from 2.9 per cent in 2006) (Abbott and Tarp, 2012). 
This ‘sound, countercyclical fiscal policy’ (Weeks, 2015, p.35) helped to ensure growth, 
poverty reduction and employment were sustained, despite falling exports and FDI, 
which were prioritised over rising inflation, budget deficits and currency depreciation 
(Abbott and Tarp, 2012). As noted by Abbott and Tarp, Vietnam’s ‘success in coping 
with these crises contradicts its characterisation as an example of export led growth and 
highlights the role of the state, particularly in maintaining and influencing investment’ 
(2012, p.21).  
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Table 6.8 Vietnam: State investment by sector (percentage of total state investment), 2005-2016 
 
Source: GSO (2018).
2005 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016*
Average 
2005-
2016
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 7.1 6.0 5.9 5.7 5.4 6.7 6.3 6.4 6.1 6.2
Mining and quarrying 8.4 6.7 6.5 6.1 6.1 6.1 5.3 4.3 4.5 6.0
Manufacturing 9.2 9.0 9.5 9.8 12.1 10.6 7.1 7.0 7.5 9.1
Electricity, gas, stream and air conditioning supply 14.4 16.1 15.0 14.4 13.5 12.8 13.2 14.0 14.4 14.2
Water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation activities 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.7 3.2 3.5 4.2 4.1 4.6 3.9
Construction 4.2 4.5 5.1 5.3 5.8 8.2 6.3 6.3 6.0 5.7
Wholesale and retail trade; Repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 1.0 2.1 2.4 2.4 3.2 2.6 1.4 2.1 2.4 2.2
Transporation and storage 21.0 17.8 18.1 17.5 15.4 16.0 20.5 22.1 21.3 18.9
Accommodation and food service activities 0.4 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.6 1.5 0.7 0.8 0.8 1.1
Information and communication 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.3 5.4 4.1 3.1 2.6 2.4 4.4
Fiancial, banking and insurance activities 0.4 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.9 1.6 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.6
Real estate activities 1.0 2.0 2.2 2.5 2.8 3.1 1.6 2.3 2.0 2.2
Professional, scientific and technical activities 1.3 1.9 1.9 2.1 2.0 1.7 3.5 3.0 2.8 2.2
Administrative and support service activities 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.2 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.2
Activities of Communist Party, socio-politocal organizations; public 
administration and defence; compulsory security 6.8 8.5 8.0 8.6 7.5 7.2 9.7 8.8 8.5 8.2
Education and trainning 5.4 3.6 3.9 4.1 5.3 5.6 7.2 6.7 6.5 5.4
Human health and social work activities 3.4 2.8 2.7 2.9 2.8 3.4 4.0 4.0 4.3 3.4
Arts, entertainment and recreation 2.1 2.5 2.4 2.6 2.1 1.8 2.4 2.0 2.2 2.2
Other activities 2.6 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.4 2.5 1.1 1.3 1.3 2.1
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6.3 Developmental outcomes and emerging challenges  
 
This section appraises the performance of the CPV’s developmentalism in the period of 
deep international integration by reference to its GVC integration, and implications for 
its catch-up efforts. It also considers how the moves taken to defend the state finance-
industry-infrastructure nexus in the 2000s have preserved, but also distorted, it as a tool 
for powering late development.  
 
6.3.1 Vietnam in the global GVC regime 
 
Thanks to the transformations across its trade and investment regime outlined above, 
since 2001 Vietnam has emerged as a so-called ‘manufacturing powerhouse’ 
(Nakamura, 2016) in low-skilled, labour intensive forms of manufacturing. In doing so, 
it has become one of the world’s most open economies, with trade increasing from 103.2 
per cent of GDP in 2000 to 178.8 per cent in 2016, and exports from 50.0 per cent to 
93.6 per cent (Table 6.9). By 2016, Vietnam accounted for 5.5. per cent of world exports, 
an increase from 0.9 per cent in 2000, achieved via an average annual export growth 
rate of 15.4 per cent (WTO, 2017, p.121). Vietnam is now the world’s third biggest shoe 
and handbag exporter, and the fourth biggest exporter of clothes (Herr et al., 2016, pp.27, 
28), and was the 12th biggest electronics exporter at the start of 2015 (VCCI, 2017). It 
also entered the top ten textile producers for the first time in 2016 (WTO, 2017). The 
resulting transformation of Vietnam’s export structure is shown in Table 6.10. Some 
60.1 per cent of exports came from three labour-intensive manufactured products in 
2015 (the top three exports), a major shift from 2000 (when these three were 32.9 per 
cent of exports), accompanied by a steep increase in the share coming from machinery 
and electronics exports, and sharp decline in the share from fuel and oil.  
 
Table 6.9 Trade and export performance, 1990-2016 (selected years) 
 
Source: World Bank (2018g). 
 
  
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2016
Trade (% GDP) 81.3 74.7 103.2 130.7 152.2 178.8 184.7
Exports as a share of GDP (%) 36.0 32.8 50.0 63.7 72.0 89.8 93.6
Exports (2010 constant US$, billions) 4.0 9.7 24.8 57.0 83.5 157.8 179.7
Export growth rate (%, annual) 12.9 20.0 21.1 17.8 8.5 12.6 13.9
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Table 6.10 Vietnam: Top 10 exports by share of total exports, 2000- 2015 
 
Source: World Bank (2017b). 
 
Whilst these developments represented a major turning point in terms of the depth and 
intensity of Vietnam’s regional and global integration (Fujita, 2017a), the CPV’s 
reliance on exports to resolve pressing economic (and political problems) was a strong 
thread of continuity with the immediate post-doi moi period. The main shift was the 
greater role of foreign investment-driven export growth, with FDI increasing from 3.9 
per cent in 2000 to 6.1 per cent of GDP in 2016, with inflows increasing from US$ 1.3 
billion to US$ 12.6 billion (see Figure 6.3). Tax incentives and preferential access to 
land remained more generous for foreign investors in priority sectors than those granted 
to domestic firms (Berger and Bruhn, 2017, p.91), and light manufacturing was chief 
amongst these priorities. As discussed in Section 6.2.1 Vietnam’s FDI policy was far 
from an open door, however, and this conditioned a strong bias toward manufacturing 
inflows, which comprised 58.8 per cent of the US$ 293.7 billion cumulative FDI 
between 1986-2016, followed by real estate at 17.8 per cent (GSO, 2018). In contrast, 
electricity accounted for 4.4 per cent, telecoms 1.6 per cent, transport 1.5 per cent, and 
financial, banking and insurance, just 0.5 per cent of FDI in this period (GSO, 2018). 
Indicating that these flows were deepening Vietnam’s integration into the regional 
production structure, five East Asian countries – Korea, Japan, Singapore, Taiwan and 
China (including Hong Kong) – account for more than half of Vietnam’s total registered 
FDI (Oh and Mah, 2017). 
 
Trade integration was a major driver of this emerging FDI-driven export growth. The 
US BTA provided Vietnam with quota free garment access to the US market, increasing 
Vietnam’s interest for Asian textile and garment manufacturers (UNCTAD, 2007), and 
between 2000-2015 exports to the US increased from 5.1 per cent of the total to 20.0 
Product Export share (%) Product
Export share 
(%)
1 Fuel and oil 26.4 Machinery and electronics 35.4
2 Textiles and clothing 14.5 Textiles and clothing 16.8
3 Vegetable 13.6 Footwear 7.9
4 Animals and animal products 10.9 Vegetable 7.5
5 Footwear 10.4 Miscellaneous 6.7
6 Machinery and electronics 8.0 Metals 3.5
7 Plastic and rubber 2.0 Animals and animal products 3.2
8 Wood 1.8 Plastic and rubber 3.2
9 Stone and glass 1.5 Fuel and oil 3.1
10 Hides and skins 1.4 Food products 2.9
2000 2015
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per cent (World Bank, 2017d).211 Vietnam’s WTO accession was another major driver, 
prompting a US$ 1.0 billion investment from Intel for a microchip assembly plant in the 
Saigon Hi-Tech Park in 2006 (the company’s largest assembly and test factory), whilst 
Foxconn also commenced operations in Vietnam in 2007, with plans to invest up to 
US$ 5.0 billion during the next five years (UNCTAD, 2007). Thanks to these 
agreements, together with the China-plus-one strategies of foreign investors (Goto et al., 
2011, p.364) (Section 6.2.2), Vietnam became an increasingly desirable location for 
manufacturing-oriented FDI during the early to mid-2000s. Rising foreign capital 
inflows have also helped to finance persistent trade deficits during this period (Abbott 
and Tarp, 2012). 
 
Figure 6.3 Vietnam: FDI inflows (US$ billion), 2000-2016 
 
Source: World Bank (2018g). 
 
Importantly, some signs of structural transformation in the Vietnamese economy have 
also emerged. This has included a more than six-fold increase in the number of jobs in 
the foreign-invested sector between 2000-2015, with 2.3 million jobs and 4.4 per cent 
of total employment (GSO, 2018). Manufacturing employment grew at 6.7 per cent a 
year between 2000-2007, and 5.2 per cent a year between 2007-2011, higher than the 
                                                   
211 European countries are also another important market for Vietnam’s exports (with the EU accounting for around 
another fifth of exports), as well as Japan, China, Korea and Hong Kong (World Bank, 2017d). 
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average for all jobs, and higher than that for agriculture, the largest employer, where 
employment contracted by -0.3 per cent between 2000-2007 and increased by 0.4 per 
cent between 2007-2011 (Abbott et al., 2017).  Manufacturing grew at an average of 8.8 
per cent a year between 2001-2017, although this average is distorted by an exceptional 
contraction in 2010 of -21.8 per cent. For most years after 2001 manufacturing grew at 
between 10-14 per cent a year (World Bank, 2018g).212 In terms of exports, these are 
now as diversified as China’s (Mathai et al., 2016, p.47), reducing considerably 
Vietnam’s dependence on volatile natural resources and agricultural products. The 
expansion of Vietnam’s FDI-driven exports within the overall development strategy has 
therefore yielded multiple economic benefits in line with the emphasis placed on 
industrialisation.  
 
However, there are several important limitations. First, Vietnam’s increased dependence 
on FDI has intensified its vulnerability to pressure from foreign governments, such as 
Japan, through its aid relationships (see Section 6.2.2). Whereas in 2001, foreign 
invested enterprises accounted for 24.4 per cent of gross exports, this increased to a 
striking 72.5 per cent in 2017 (Table 6.11). Here Vietnam is caught between two kinds 
of pressures – the country’s own rising minimum wages which increased 12.3 per cent 
a year on average between 2006-2015 (Chi, 2017, p.11) – and the increased 
attractiveness of potentially lower cost rivals such as Cambodia, Myanmar and Ethiopia. 
According to an official trade representative from one of Vietnam’s biggest sources of 
FDI interviewed during fieldwork, if rising wages continue, in their view ‘there is no 
more incentive to be in Vietnam. So we ask the Vietnamese government to lower down 
the lowest cost [wages]’ (VE-2). Relatedly, one Korean apparel sourcing company 
manager in Vietnam interviewed in mid-2016 expected that the country had around 10 
years of competitiveness in apparel sourcing left, with their own firm looking seriously 
at Cambodia and Myanmar to relocate production (VF-2).213 
 
In addition, Vietnam is highly dependent on a handful of large investors. Samsung 
Electronics alone employs 100,000 people, contributed almost US$ 30 billion to 
                                                   
212 Some literature on structural transformation in Vietnam includes works suggesting Vietnam may be already 
experiencing deindustrialisation (Masina and Cerimele, 2018). However, the changes in Vietnam’s method for 
calculating sectoral GDP breakdowns in 2010 throws into question this analysis. Instead, others have made 
compelling cases for Vietnam’s rapid economic performance being driven by structural transformation into higher 
productivity manufacturing sector activities (Tarp, 2017; Rodrik et al., 2017; Abbott et al., 2017). 
213 A time frame also supported by the trade official (VE-2). 
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Vietnam’s exports as of 2016 (Mathai et al., 2016, p.58), and 98 per cent of all 
Vietnam’s mobile handset and component exports (Sturgeon and Zylberberg, 2017, 
p.138).  In mid-2017, Samsung reportedly made half of its top-end S8 and S8 Plus 
smartphones in Vietnam, and Intel 80 per cent of its personal computer central 
processing units (PWC and VCCI, 2017). The domestic media reported in 2017 that 
Samsung accounted for 22.7 per cent of the country’s exports in 2016 (Viet Nam News, 
2017), sparking considerable concern about Vietnam’s dependence on a single TNC. 
Indeed, in 2016 the Samsung Galaxy Note 7 smartphone experienced battery faults 
which ended production of the phone, impacting Vietnam’s export growth in the first 
quarter of 2017 (Nguyen Dieu Tu Uyen, 2017).   
 
Second, Vietnam has largely emerged as a manufacturing assembly rather than 
production hub. Some three quarters of the jobs in manufacturing are in low-value added 
assembly roles (Cunningham and Pimhidzai, 2018) and Vietnam’s dependence on 
Chinese imports has also increased. Imports from China constituted just 9.0 per cent of 
the total in 2000, rising sharply to become the country’s biggest import partner 
accounting for 29.8 per cent of the total in 2015 (World Bank, 2017d). The increase in 
Vietnam’s dollar imports from China has been the largest of any country globally 
(Mathai et al., 2016, p.52), which were concentrated in capital goods (44.0) and 
intermediate goods (38.6 per cent) in 2015 (World Bank, 2017d). Indicative of the 
import dependence of Vietnam’s exports, electronic integrated circuits have been the 
country’s top import since 2013,214 followed, in 2014, by electrical apparatus for line 
telephony or telegraphy; petroleum oils (other than crude); flat-rolled iron or non-alloy 
steel; ethylene polymers; and knitted or crocheted fabrics (United Nations, 2015, p.2). 
At the start of 2011, the Vietnamese textile and garment industry had a domestic content 
ratio of 46 per cent (Tran, 2012), and its share of domestic value-added (DVA) is the 
lowest of all major apparel exporters (including China, India, Indonesia, Thailand and 
Turkey, and only higher than Cambodia) (Frederick, 2017, p.104). Only 1 per cent of 
Vietnam’s export firms are doing original brand manufacturing (Chi, 2017, p.7).  
  
                                                   
214 Disaggregated using HS 2012 codes. 
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Table 6.11 Vietnam: Foreign invested enterprises share of total exports and imports, 2001-2017 
 
* Preliminary 
Source: Vietnam Customs and GSO (various years). 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017*
Exports 24.4 27.5 31.4 33.3 34.5 37.0 39.7 38.6 42.3 47.2 49.4 55.9 66.8 67.4 70.6 71.5 72.5
Imports 30.8 33.5 34.9 34.7 36.9 36.7 34.7 34.5 37.3 43.6 45.8 52.7 56.4 56.9 58.6 58.5 59.9
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Taking garments and footwear together, 50 to 60 per cent of exports are comprised of 
imported inputs (World Bank and MPI, 2016, p.29). The Vietnamese electronics sector 
also has one of the lowest levels of DVA in exports worldwide (Mathai et al., 2016, 
p.58). Within machinery and equipment exports, the DVA share of gross exports fell 
from 50.2 per cent in 1995 to 28.9 per cent in 2011 (OECD, 2016), which was also low 
in regional perspective. Performance in motorcycles was considerably better, with local 
content ratios of between 75 and 90 per cent across the sector in 2012 (Ngo, 2017a, p.3). 
Yet despite becoming the fourth biggest motorcycle producer in the world in 2014 (Lim, 
2017), all transportation manufactures (including motor vehicles, ships, aircraft and 
railway locomotives) only accounted for 1.9 per cent of Vietnam’s total exports in 2015 
(World Bank, 2017d). 
 
Indicating that these considerations are a major policy concern in Vietnam, an official 
government report on FDI performance during 2005-2014 expressed frustration over 
the limited involvement of domestic enterprises in GVCs and the low net export value 
of foreign invested enterprises (due to heavy dependence on imported spare parts, 
accessories and raw materials); as well as tax fraud, limited state budget contributions, 
environmental pollution and transfer pricing (GSO, 2016, p.38). Limited domestic 
linkages in Vietnam’s textile and garment sector have multiple causes, as Tran (2012) 
notes, including: the preponderance of cut, make and pack contracts, and subcontracting 
practices where those high up the value chain specify the fabrics and accessories to be 
used in production, leaving few (if any) sourcing decisions open to contractors;215 the 
capital-intensive nature of textiles and accessories investments, including waste 
treatment facilities and equipment for weaving and dyeing; and high quality standards 
in the main export destinations.  
 
Similarly in electronics, the sourcing practices of lead firms have strongly contributed 
to limited domestic sourcing. Samsung chains are particularly challenging due to the 
corporation’s vast existing network of suppliers, many located inside the same business 
group (or chaebol). This means the company steps outside this network only when 
current suppliers cannot meet its needs: a very different sourcing practice to Dell or 
                                                   
215 According to another embroidery factory owner interviewed by Tran: ‘The (corporate) buyers decide where to get 
raw materials. For example, upscale products require upscale raw materials which are imported from outside such as 
high quality Italian linen, and high quality French thread, which has consistent coloring over time’ (Tran, 2012, 
p.130). 
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Apple (KABC, 2012, p.16).216 An interview with a government official working in this 
area suggested that these methods made it especially hard for Vietnamese firms to build 
sourcing relationships with the company (VG-15), whilst another suggested a major 
barrier was the high standards of foreign firms which relegated many Vietnamese firms 
to low technology areas like packaging (VG-14). When in 2014 Samsung met 200 local 
firms to see if they could supply component parts for its mobile handsets and tablets, no 
companies were reportedly able to meet its quality requirements (Sturgeon and 
Zylberberg, 2017, p.141). One official interviewed during fieldwork noted that whilst 
government pressure on Samsung had caused them to find a local supplier for a home 
appliance factory, the contract required the firm to invest in new machinery to meet 
Samsung’s requirements, but with no guarantee of a contract beyond 3-6 months (VG-
15).  
 
A further notable problem has been the lack of a clear strategy for resolving these 
challenges. The General Statistics Office of Vietnam (GSO, 2016, p.40) has admitted 
that ‘FDI attraction has not been considered in relation with domestic enterprise 
development strategy’ and that the government has not developed ‘clear regulations on 
examination of FDI projects’. Indeed, according to one government official interviewed 
during fieldwork, Vietnamese policy-makers have been talking about the ‘supporting 
industry’ problem for the last 15 years (VA-2), but a decisive and coherent strategy has 
yet to emerge to deal with it. According to one Ministry of Industry and Trade official 
‘the goal [of investment policy] … was to get as much as possible. At the time we 
thought FDI was enough’ (VG-15). Another official interviewed echoed these 
comments, saying of industrial and economic zones that the strategy was to ‘induce 
investment. We have not paid enough attention to the kind of developments that are 
suitable to each economic zone’ (VG-14). Instead, three fragmented approaches to try 
and resolve these problems have emerged. 
 
First, since 2009 there have been some small-scale efforts to develop support packages, 
including matching foreign investors with local suppliers in the Ministry of Industry and 
Trade, with the first investment incentives for those in components manufacturing 
introduced in 2011. However, according to an official working in this field, as of mid-
2016 only one enterprise had applied for these incentives (VG-15), which didn’t receive 
                                                   
216 The Samsung Group reportedly comprises 1,000 business entities globally  (KABC, 2012, p.8). 
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much policy attention from senior government officials since it was considered an ‘SME 
issue’. Whilst attempts were being made in 2016 to rewrite the country’s support 
policies for SMEs (VG-17), the viability of making SMEs the catalyst for often capital-
intensive input industries remained unclear. Indeed, according to one official in the 
Ministry of Planning and Investment, ‘foreign enterprises have their own strategies for 
developing links. The government now has some programmes with Vietnamese SMEs 
but how to link the Vietnamese SMEs to foreign enterprises is very difficult now for 
Vietnam because you know there is a big difference in terms of the technology’ (VG-
14). Compounding these issues, according to an official working in a government think-
tank ‘there is a lack of interest from the business community [in entering value chains]. 
They are less interested in this than in the stock market and real estate, where there are 
short returns’ (VG-3).  In this vein, another government official added that ‘all rich 
people relate to land [i.e. real estate] not manufacturing. If you want to be rich, and want 
quick money, you don’t want to do long-term investment’ (VG-29).217  
 
Second, the CPV has attempted to utilise state enterprises to fill supply chain gaps, with 
mixed results. The 2001 textile and garment sector support package specified no explicit 
privileges to state enterprises, and only limited state support for the industry (Fujita, 
2017a), stressing the need for Vinatex to mobilise its own resources. Since 2009 it 
undertook investments in cotton plantations in central provinces and a joint investment 
between Vinatex and Petrovietnam to produce polyester (Tran, 2012). However, the 
US$ 53.8 million in losses incurred during the first few years of this effort caused 
Vinatex to pull out of the PV Tex Dinh Vu Joint Stock Company (PVTex) project, due 
to the challenge of competing with imported inputs in the context of tariff reductions 
(Fujita, 2017a). However, one of the largest textile factories in Vietnam, Phong Phu 
Textile, is also a Vinatex member, and has a vertically integrated production chain 
encompassing cotton production, processing, weaving, dyeing and sewing (Tran, 2012). 
The SEG structure has helped mobilise resources for these investments, using proceeds 
from garment export enterprises to fund so far uncompetitive activities in the production 
of yarns, textiles and dyeing, which has ‘enabled Vinatex to finance investments in 
projects that are not commercially viable and/or are executed inefficiently’ (Fujita, 
                                                   
217 Notably here, according to one estimate of Vietnam’s largest companies, in 2018 Vingroup, which started as a 
real estate firm (and has since expanded to form a large conglomerate with plans to invest in manufacturing such as 
electronics), became the first privately-owned firm to enter Vietnam’s top ten largest firms (by capital). Prior to this, 
all Vietnam’s largest firms had been state conglomerates or foreign firms  (Viet Nam News, 2018). 
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2017a, pp.16, 19).218 Indeed, some 91 per cent of the Vinatex group’s investments in 
fixed capital are reportedly channelled into its spinning, weaving, dyeing and raw 
materials-related activities (Fujita, 2017a). According to a state think tank official, these 
dividends were intended to renew industrial policy-making, mobilising resources to 
foster home-grown supporting industries, and to curtail the country’s dependence on 
foreign capital (VG-10). Upstream, Vinatex has also sought to open its own clothing 
outlets encouraging shoppers to ‘buy Vietnamese’ (Tran, 2012).  
 
In automotives, the state-owned Vietnam Engine and Agricultural Machinery Corp 
(VEAM),219 formed a joint venture with Japanese firm Honda (and a Thai firm) in 
1996.220 One VEAM subsidiary, the Machinery Spare Parts Joint Stock Company 1 
(Futu1), has been able to move into complex component production, meeting stringent 
Honda requirements, including parts not only for motorcycles but also automobiles and 
agricultural equipment (Lim, 2017). Together these efforts to develop forward and 
backward linkages represents a clear attempt (if not a straightforwardly successful one) 
to leverage the assets, capital and investments of the state sector to help Vietnam break 
out of an integration-induced low-value trap 
 
Third, to develop input industries, the CPV has also sought to attract more FDI into 
these sectors, further deepening and consolidating (rather than transforming) Vietnam’s 
FDI-dependence. One of the major policy attractions of the EV-FTA and (now 
abandoned) Trans-pacific Partnership (TPP) were rule of origin stipulations in textiles 
(VG-3). Whilst Vietnam’s heavy dependence on Chinese inputs contributed to fears that 
Vietnam might struggle to benefit from such provisions (VG-13), overall there was 
considerable optimism evident within interviews that these new agreements would plug 
GVC gaps by attracting FDI into input industries. Before being derailed by the US 
withdrawing its support in mid-2016, the TPP alone was enough for one foreign 
embassy official working on trade relations between their home country and Vietnam 
                                                   
218 According to some estimates, Vinatex factories accounted for 33 per cent of the sector’s exports in 2011, despite 
accounting for just over 5 per cent of the labour in the industry (Tran, 2012).   
219 Formed in 1990 with 12 factories and 7,000 workers, VEAM played a central role as a joint venture partner with 
Toyota, Susuki, Ford and Honda in the 1990s, and the later reportedly transforming itself into a ‘behemoth that 
manufactures agricultural machines, automobiles, motorbikes and other spare parts’ (Nguyen, 2016, p.2). Although 
the government announced plans to divest part of its stake in 2017 and all of it by 2020 in 2017 (VIR, 2017). Futu 1 
was VEAM subsidiary in which it held a 50 per cent capital contribution in 2016 (Nguyen, 2016).  
220 The three partners in Honda Vietnam, which received its operating license in 1996, are: Honda Motor Co. Ltd. 
(Japan, 42 per cent), Asian Honda Motors (Thailand, 28 per cent) and the state-owned Vietnam Engine and 
Agricultural Machinery Corp. (VEAM) (Vietnam, 30 per cent). (Lim, 2017).   
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to note ‘TPP is yarn forward, so many textile companies are investing in Vietnam to 
have the advantage of zero tariffs. This is already happening’ (VE-2).  Many came from 
China, which lacked zero tariffs to TPP members, giving Vietnam a new competitive 
edge against its neighbour. Thus the CPV sought to leverage trade agreements to resolve 
domestic challenges through the attraction of FDI: a pattern repeated throughout the 
second period. This specific policy toward the ‘supporting industries problem’ is 
fundamentally predicated on quick wins and a path of least resistance, and together these 
initiatives lack tightly coordinated policy interventions. However, this also involved 
trade-offs since one government official noted that it was known that trade agreements 
would increase the pressure on domestic firms, saying ‘we let international competitors 
come to our market and take the opportunities’ (VG-13). Of the potential downsides of 
such agreements, one official noted that for all the workshops on the topic ‘[w]e still 
don't have some long-term strategy to help the enterprises to deal with the commitments 
in the new FTAs … The agreements have a lot of new things and we are still in the 
beginning phase’ (VG-13). 
 
6.3.2 Fragmenting the nexus 
 
In addition to incorporating Vietnam into GVCs, the transformations of this period 
deeply impacted the state finance-industry-infrastructure nexus. The protective 
measures noted in Section 6.2.1 helped to preserve a sizeable – if declining – role for 
the state in the economy (Table 6.12), with the state sector’s contribution declining from 
38.5 per cent of GDP in 2000 to 34.7 per cent in 2009.221 The state’s contribution to 
total employment declined from 11.7 per cent in 2010 to 9.8 per cent in 2016, but was 
still more than twice that of foreign investors. The state sector’s contribution to the state 
budget declined from 21.7 per cent in 2000 to 15.9 per cent in 2007, but strongly rose 
again to 21.4 per cent in 2014, indicating its enduring contribution as a generator of 
revenue for the public sector (GSO, 2018).222  
                                                   
221 From 2010 a change in the methodology for decomposing Vietnam’s GDP by ownership makes subsequent 
comparisons impossible due to the addition of a new category called ‘products taxes and subsidies on production’ 
(GSO, 2018). After this was added it simultaneously reduced the state, non-state and foreign invested sectors 
contributions. The level for the state sector then dropped sharply to 29.3 per cent of GDP but its subsequent 
stabilisation at similar levels, which accounted for 28.8 per cent of GDP in 2016, indicates that the drop in the state 
sector’s share of GDP in 2010 reflected statistical changes rather than sizeable changes in the real economy.  
222 One important note of caution regarding assessing the state sector’s true role concerns official classifications, with 
enterprises in which the state holds a minority share classed as private, underestimating the extent of state capital 
disbursed across the economy (IMF, 2007b), particularly as notably equitisation has advanced in this period. In 
addition, the contribution reflects more than tax revenue, since until 2015 this data included dividends, profits, and 
proceeds of the sale of shares in state entities (GSO, 2018). 
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Table 6.12 Vietnam: State sector key indicators, 2000-2015 
 
* Change in methodology for calculating GDP composition in 2010 (see footnote 218) means data is not comparable before and after this date.  
** Change in method after 2015 
Sources:  Sector share of GDP: GSO (2005; 2018) and IMF (2003c); SOE contribution to state budget: GSO (various years); Employment data: GSO (2018).  
 
 
 
 
Table 6.13 Vietnam: State budget revenue (percentage of total budget), 2000 and 2002-2010  
 
Source: GSO (2018).
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average 2000-2015
Share of GDP * 38.5 38.4 38.4 39.1 39.1 37.6 36.7 35.4 35.1 34.7 29.3 29.0 29.4 29.0 28.7 28.7 33.9
Contribution to state budget** 21.7 22.3 20.2 18.9 16.9 17.1 16.6 15.9 16.4 19.0 20.1 17.5 19.4 22.8 21.4 .. 19.6
Share of employment 11.7 11.7 11.8 12.1 12.1 11.6 11.2 11.0 10.9 10.6 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.2 10.4 9.8 10.9
Number of jobs (thousands) 4,358.2 4,474.4 4,633.5 4,919.1 5,031.0 4,967.4 4,916.0 4,988.4 5,059.3 5,040.6 5,107.4 5,250.6 5,353.7 5,330.4 5,473.5 5,185.9 5,005.6
Growth rate (employment) .. 2.7 3.6 6.2 2.3 -1.3 -1.0 1.5 1.4 -0.4 1.3 2.8 2.0 -0.4 2.7 -5.3 0.5
2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Domestic revenue (Exc. oil revenue) 50.9 51.3 51.7 54.8 52.5 52.0 55.2 55.1 61.0 63.3
Revenue from state owned enterprises 21.7 20.2 18.9 16.9 17.1 16.6 15.9 16.4 19.0 20.1
Revenue from foreign invested enterprises 5.2 5.9 6.5 7.9 8.4 9.2 9.9 10.5 11.5 11.3
Revenue from non-state sector 6.4 6.3 6.8 6.9 7.4 7.9 9.9 10.4 10.8 12.5
Agricultural land use tax 2.0 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Tax on high income earners 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.3 3.1 3.2 4.7
License tax 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.8 1.8 2.2 2.3
Revenue from lottery 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Gasoline fee 2.4 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.1 2.0 1.9
Fees 3.0 2.4 2.2 2.2 1.8 1.8 1.3 1.6 1.7 1.4
Revenue from land and houses 3.1 4.4 6.9 9.1 7.8 7.3 10.7 9.2 9.4 8.5
Other revenue 1.9 3.6 2.6 4.2 2.8 2.4 1.8 1.0 1.1 0.7
Oil revenue 25.9 21.4 24.1 25.4 29.2 29.8 24.4 21.3 13.7 12.4
Custom duty revenue 20.9 25.5 22.2 18.3 16.7 15.3 19.1 21.8 23.9 23.3
Export and import duties, special consumption tax; Surtax on import 15.0 17.8 14.1 11.3 10.4 9.4 12.2 14.4 17.4 13.2
VAT on imports 5.9 7.7 8.1 6.9 6.3 5.9 7.0 7.4 6.5 10.1
Grants 2.2 1.8 1.9 1.5 1.7 2.8 1.3 1.7 1.5 1.0
249 
 
However, whilst securing the continued economic significance of the state sector, 
defensive moves also distorted the nexus in ways which have compromised its ability 
to be used for developmental ends. In particular, the weakening of the budget constraint 
resulting from permitting the purchase of financial institutions accelerated 
diversification away from core business activities, and prompted speculative shifts into 
non-core activities across real estate, securities, credit, banking and financial investment, 
and diminished specialisation (CIEM, 2013). In 2006, SEGs and GCs invested around 
VND 6,000 billion in non-core businesses, which more than doubled to VND 14,000 
billion in 2007, and reached VND 22,000 billion in 2012, the largest component of 
which was in the banking sector, with real estate increasingly important from 2009 
onwards, followed by insurance and financial companies (Vu-Thanh, 2017).  
 
These trends produced noted scandals, such in Vinashin, which defaulted on US$ 600 
million in internationally syndicated loans at the end of 2010 (Pincus, 2015), prompting 
senior leaders to be arrested, and contributing to the county’s credit rating being 
downgraded (Bland, 2012). After receiving such inflows, Vinashin formed over 150  
new subsidiaries, including a brewery, hotel, motorbike manufacturing company and 
power plant using the proceeds, which added up to a cumulative total of 445 subsidiaries 
and 20 joint ventures at the peak (Hayton, 2010, p.17; Bland, 2012; Pincus, 2015). The 
end of the country’s property boom in 2008, and the cancelation of key contracts in the 
wake of the global financial crisis in 2009, also played important roles in the severe 
problems suffered by the firm (Pincus, 2015). With 12 major state enterprise projects 
found to have contributed to the ‘substantial loss to state capital’ (Hiep, 2017), non-
performing loans contracted by state enterprises have become a major cause of criticism 
of Vietnam’s model (Pincus, 2015; Viet Sinh et al., 2016).  
 
Whilst diversification was clearly an explicit intention of the SEG project given its 
efforts to replicate the chaebol model, there are signals that these developments were, 
at least partially, unintended. Former Prime Minister Phan Van Khai reportedly said in 
2014 that ‘almost everybody realized that we must have strong economic groups capable 
of competing and creating wealth efficiently. The only unfortunate thing is that we did 
it wrong, as evidenced in many absurd investments and failures in improving quality 
and efficiency’ (quoted in Vu-Thanh, 2017, p. 97). As a result, a variety of measures 
were introduced to curb speculative activity within the state sector. In 2008 the Prime 
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Minister ordered all general corporations and conglomerates to ensure at least 70 per 
cent of capital was now invested in core businesses (Pincus and Vu-Thanh, 2008). In 
July 2012 a Prime Minister’s Decision 929/QD-TTg for restructuring state enterprises 
focused on divestment of capital from non-core businesses (MOF, 2015). Reflecting the 
limited success of these measures, these efforts were ramped up in 2013 when new 
regulations were issued to force SEGs out of non-core businesses. 223  These rules 
stipulated that Vinatex, for instance, was to divest 100 per cent of its capital from 37 
subsidiaries, including 8 in finance and banking and 11 in real estate and infrastructure 
development by 2015 (Fujita, 2017a). However, Vinatex has retained a real estate 
portfolio given its highly profitable land holdings, which includes offices and 
apartments in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City (Fujita, 2017a).  
 
Divestment by state enterprises from non-core activities in areas such as real estate, 
securities, finance banking, insurance and investment funds, amounted to VND 11,036 
billion  between 2011-2015 (MOF, 2015). More recently, the CPV appears to have had 
some success in curbing speculative activities within the state sector through the 
banking system. The SBV has sought to curb lending to construction and property 
development, by both increasing the risk weighting of the property sector to 200 per 
cent, and directly influencing the lending activities of state-owned commercial banks, 
meaning that the overall credit growth to the sector declined from 14.6 per cent in 2013 
to 4.4. per cent in 2016 (Benchavitvilai and Minh Trinh, 2017). 
 
Yet despite accelerating in the run-up to the WTO accession, diversification was far 
from new, suggesting other logics than deepened integration may be at work. 224 
Beresford (2008) notes that in the context of reduced state support during the transition 
to market economy, enterprises struggling to make core businesses successful began to 
diversify in order to survive, with industrial enterprises participating in the hotel and 
real estate boom of the early 1990s (making use of rent free access to high value urban 
land thanks to their state enterprise status) or moving into trade-related activities (on the 
back of low interest finance also acquired thanks to their state enterprise status).225 The 
                                                   
223 The restructuring was promulgated in 2013 in Prime Minister’s Decision 320/QD-TTg (8 February 2013) (Fujita, 
2017a). 
224 For a comparison with the colonial period’s state conglomerates see Sasges and Cheshier  (2012). 
225 Vinatex, meanwhile, first established a finance company in 1998 (Fujita, 2017a). 
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economic and social logic of this diversification is highlighted by Beresford (2008, 
pp.231–232): 
 
Such activities not only injected finance into languishing enterprises, they 
enabled the retention of employees well above what was required for actual 
production activities. Many enterprises in fact used their market-oriented 
businesses to provide a social safety net rather than as a way to invest in the 
activities for which the government had designated them to lead economic 
development. Indeed, one of the factors hampering SEs [state enterprises] in 
their drive to become competitive was the social welfare function carried over 
from the central planning system. In short enterprise autonomy enabled SE 
directors to pursue market-orientated activities in a situation in which their core 
activities were often unprofitable. While many managed to remain afloat by 
pursuing non-core activities and relying on credit and protection, directors had 
few incentives to make large investments in the more uncertain task of 
technological upgrading and becoming internationally competitive.  
 
In line with this long-standing trend, some of Vietnam’s largest firms (many state owned) 
responded to increased competitive pressure during 2006-2007 by diversifying into 
unrelated areas, particularly real estate, tourism and finance, with some (including a 
large agricultural products company), going as far as to leave its core business altogether, 
whereas others began using profitable activities to preserve jobs (Cheshier and Penrose, 
2007). Whilst this approach could have represented a viable means of generating finance 
to cover productive investments in core business areas (Cheshier and Penrose, 2007, 
p.37), in Vietnam the demands for profitable surplus pull in multiple directions. This 
reflects the centrality of state enterprises to the Vietnamese economy, as generators of 
employment, central contributors to the state budget, and anchors of welfare 
responsibilities not undertaken by the state (as noted above). Profitable investments thus 
allow the sector to adjust to shocks of various kinds and thereby fulfil multiple economic 
and social (and therefore political) roles. This suggests a central tension at the heart of 
state sector policy in Vietnam through which occupying and sustaining ownership of 
the commanding heights becomes more important than how these strategic assets are 
used, eroding the developmental capabilities of the nexus, given the tensions between 
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present profitability and the longer-term and risky investments required of major shifts 
in the productive structure.  
 
Ultimately, therefore, the Vietnamese strategy for the state-owned sector has been 
chiefly defensive in nature, with efforts to preserve state assets so that they can achieve 
multiple social and economic obligations. This reflects the state sector’s role as an 
anchor of political stability. In this context, autonomy with respect to investment and 
production decisions has meant the state sector has become a central site for the 
emergence of speculative activity (see Cheshier and Penrose, 2007; Cheshier and Pincus, 
2010; Cheshier, 2010; Sasges and Cheshier, 2012). Devolved autonomy makes it very 
challenging for the central state to govern and direct productive long term activity 
through state enterprises. This means that the state sector in Vietnam has important 
limitations as an industrial policy tool, especially given that multiple imperatives 
governing state sector performance mean that disciplining the sector becomes 
challenging.  
 
However, this analysis suggests the post-WTO diversification spree reflected long-
standing survival strategies, rather than wholly new trends attributable solely to state 
policies. In addition, the proliferation of speculative investments also tracked to broader 
shifts in the Vietnamese economy, including the real estate bubble which accompanied 
Vietnam’s WTO accession. Particularly, the 2006-2007 boom in banking, capital 
markets and real estate which occurred ahead of the country’s WTO accession (Thanh 
and Duong, 2009) which saw increasing numbers of FDI-led projects in urban areas 
limit access to urban land, pushing up costs (UNCTAD, 2007). Urban labour shortages, 
fuelled by rising wages since 2006 and the growth of better paid manufacturing and 
service jobs in major cities, had also seen garment firms struggle to accommodate to 
cut-throat competition in the US supply chain (Goto et al., 2011). A 2007 study found 
that several large state enterprises (or former state enterprises) in the textile and garment 
sector recently moved into real estate to help them manage these pressures (Goto et al., 
2011).  
 
Outside of the state sector, further fragmentation of the nexus has occurred thanks to the 
decentralised and uncoordinated policy context (Ohno and Ohno, 2005, p.55). One 
official working for a government think tank noted during fieldwork interviews that 
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‘[C]onsensus-based decisions here mean that it is hard for a strong leader to emerge and 
radical decisions taken. Everything has to be negotiated’ (VG-10). In the field of 
industrial policy making, one official within the Ministry of Industry and Trade noted 
that even within the Ministry itself there was a marked lack of coordination between 
different policy agendas: ‘in Vietnam the problem is that the trade sector is led by one 
group [within the Ministry], and Industry by another’, adding that ‘the WTO normally 
has a bad effect. We should not have joined so early’ (VG-15). These ambiguities exist 
both within the central government, as well as between the centre and provinces (Viet 
Sinh et al., 2016, xxix). 
  
The dynamics between the central administrative agencies and provinces have proved 
to be one major challenge in this period. Vietnam’s total number of provinces reached 
63 in 2008 (57 provinces and five city municipalities) (Malesky, 2009b, p.39; Malesky, 
2009a, p.139), a comparatively large number for its population size, with China having 
28 provinces, and India 35 (Malesky, 2009a, p.134). The trends toward fiscal, 
investment and infrastructure decentralisation noted at the end of Chapter 5 have 
intensified in this period, and produced considerable heterogeneity in terms of economic 
policies between Vietnam’s provinces (VCCI, 2016, p.2). Malesky (2008) has argued 
that in their efforts to attract FDI, provinces have sought to wrest control over key 
economic policy decisions from the centre, including through fence-breaking and the 
violation of formal state policies. Provincial fence-breaking with regard to investment 
incentives reportedly began in 2001, and became prolific by 2005, with one government 
study noting 32 out of 48 provinces surveyed between  2001 to 2005 had violated central 
investment regulations by providing extra incentives to investors, mostly in terms of 
more generous land use terms and tax breaks (Vu-Thanh et al., 2007). The result was a 
climate of internal competition for FDI inflows due to the increased pressure on 
provinces to generate their own resources thanks to reduced state subsidies, credit lines 
and increased fiscal decentralisation in the early 2000s (Vu-Thanh et al., 2007).   
 
Relatedly, decentralisation has also impacted the public investment pillar of the nexus, 
which, in Vietnam, is often criticised for being uncoordinated and wasteful (Viet Sinh 
et al., 2016). The increased export-orientation of Vietnam’s development strategy 
placed great stress on transportation and logistics (Blancas Mendivil et al., 2013), 
resulting in a proliferation of industrial infrastructure in the form of industrial parks and 
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economic zones. One international expert on the Vietnamese economy noted that, the 
use of such facilities was higher in Vietnam than elsewhere due to the difficulty of 
accessing land through other means (due to restrictions stemming from state ownership 
over land) (VA-3). As of mid-2016, there were more than 300 industrial zones (each at 
several hundred hectares) and 16 economic zones (of 100,000 hectares, and mostly 
concentrated in coastal areas) (VG-14). However, according to one official, economic 
zones are a particular policy problem because ‘performance is very poor’: attracting few 
businesses, with poor roads, and proliferating in an uncontrolled fashion due to the 
lobbying of coastal provinces to expand their numbers (VG-6). Despite efforts by the 
Prime Minister in 2015 to rationalise these facilities and prioritise just eight of these 
economic zones in terms of state investments (Viet Nam News, 2015), the same official 
added that lobbying by impacted provinces contributed to the failure of this attempt to 
rationalise the infrastructure (VG-6).  
 
The country’s port infrastructure has been impacted by similar dynamics as each coastal 
province has sought to develop its own port, whilst after Vietnam’s WTO accession, 
infrastructure lobbying efforts by provinces have become a preferred strategy for 
obtaining transfers from central state budgets as preferential transfers for industrial 
projects have become harder to secure (Thanh and Dapice, 2009). Similar resistance to 
port project rationalisation has been evident here, since provincial authorities have been 
loathe to lose access to ports due to their role as employers and generators of tax revenue 
(Pincus, 2015). The guiding logic which has emerged, therefore, is one of quantity, since 
Vietnam lacks an ‘overarching national strategy on ports and multimodal transport, 
[instead] local governments continue to exert significant influence on the issuance of 
new port development licenses, elevating the risk of approving wasteful investment 
projects and fostering demand-supply mismatches’ (Blancas Mendivil et al., 2013, p.26). 
Multiple ports in close proximity, developed by different central and provincial 
authorities, have thus emerged (Pincus, 2015), and few deep-water ports have been 
sufficiently connected with the on-land facilities and infrastructure needed to make the 
carrying of large volumes viable (Blancas Mendivil et al., 2013, p.26). The result has 
been over-capacity in an area where competitiveness depends on economics of scale, 
and two main key shipping hubs around Ho Chi Minh City and Haiphong (and the ports 
of Cai Mep-Thi Vai and Cai Lan), accounted for 97 per cent of Vietnam’s container-
handling volumes in 2011 (Blancas Mendivil et al., 2013). Like economic zone 
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infrastructure, port infrastructure has formed efforts to equalise levels of development 
between provinces and redistribute resources (Thanh and Dapice, 2009), but with the 
cost of fragmenting provision.  
 
Cumulatively such decentralisation and fragmentation between central state institutions 
and state enterprises and provinces has compromised the potential for joined-up 
industrial policy-making, contributing to the lack of coordinated and coherent strategies 
to deal with the pressing developmental issues noted above. Where state enterprises are 
concerned, Fforde (2007, p.226) suggests that the CPV’s early failures to curb fence-
breaking were due, in part, to the state’s reliance on their success. As the above 
discussion indicates, the turn toward profitability-enhancing activities is another 
survival strategy with benefits for the central state. A similar logic appears to also play 
out at the provincial level, where fence-breaking was often not disciplined where it 
succeeded in FDI attraction that contributed to employment and growth (Schmitz et al., 
2015). Thus it has been argued that ‘central leaders were hamstrung to prevent fence-
breaking due to institutional constraints and their need for the budget revenue produced 
by local actors’ (Malesky, 2008, p.98). 
 
However, despite the fragmentation, it is not clear that overall outcomes are as bad as 
sometimes suggested. For instance, Vietnam comes out well on the infrastructure 
component of the World Bank’s Logistics Performance Index, coming 47 out of 160 
countries in 2018, with a score similar to Croatia and Kuwait, and higher than India, 
Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, Argentina and the Philippines (World Bank, 2018e). 
According to one Asian government official working on trade relations with Vietnam, 
low cost labour destinations such as Myanmar and Cambodia lacked Vietnam’s 
electricity and water infrastructure, adding ‘Vietnam is not the best option [given rising 
wages], but there is no other option’ (VE-2). This indicates that Vietnam’s poor 
performance in light of such fragmentation may be overstated, some of the reasons for 
which are explored in Section 6.4.  
 
6.4 Viet-pessimism in the twenty-first century 
 
This section explores the contours of what it calls ‘Viet-pessimism’ prevalent in current 
mainstream and heterodox assessments of the country’s development trajectory. At the 
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start of the twenty-first century, academic and policy debate about Vietnam’s economy 
was beset by ‘doom and gloom predictions’ (Mallon and Irvin, 2001, p.153). For 
instance, Thayer (2000a, pp.313, 325) wrote at this time that ‘[t]he future appears bleak, 
economic stagnation at best, economic crisis at worse’. Whilst subsequently Vietnam 
has drawn comparisons with the East Asian developmental states on account of its state-
led approach and strong development outcomes (Painter, 2005; Fritz and Menocal, 2007; 
Cling et al., 2013; Evans and Heller, 2018), including nuanced assessments which 
suggest it may lack their social embeddedness and high levels of state capacity of this 
approach (Beeson and Pham, 2012), a more dominant trend in current assessments of 
Vietnam’s developmental trajectory is a revival of the pessimism noted in the early 
2000s. Both Abbott et al. (2009, p.342) and Weeks (2015) note that this professional 
gloom is a peculiarity of the academic and policy literature on Vietnam, since despite 
having experienced neither the stagnation nor collapse predicted in the early 2000s, 
pessimism has nonetheless persisted. Specifically it has consolidated around two 
opposing poles.  
 
The first centres on negative assessments of Vietnam’s supposedly poor economic 
performance or predictions of imminent collapse. These tend to be based on rates of 
economic growth, including claims that growth is now the lowest since doi moi (Nghia 
et al., 2013), eye-catching questions such as ‘why doesn’t Vietnam grow faster?’ based 
on an assessment that growth of 5-6 per cent is ‘disappointing compared to the higher 
rates recorded in the recent past’ (Pincus, 2015, p.48), or the assertion that Vietnam’s 
growth rates will fall sharply without major adjustments (Viet Sinh et al., 2016, p.87). 
There is also an emphasis on ‘bad debt, falling asset prices and corporate collapse’ 
(Pincus, 2015, p.27), reflecting the preoccupation with Vietnam’s non-performing loans 
(NPLs). These approaches attribute Vietnam’s present (or future) economic problems 
to the CPV’s poor policies related to property rights and competition (Nghia et al., 2013; 
Viet Sinh et al., 2016) or its fragmented and commercialised state (Pincus, 2015, p.27). 
Relatedly, any achievements are said to have been ‘driven mainly by one-time 
liberalization effects and external forces associated with global integration rather than 
internal strengths’ (Ohno, 2009a, p.25). Success is thereby attributed to the market-
oriented elements of the CPV’s strategy, and either (actual or projected) failures to 
Vietnam having not taken these reforms further.  
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However, these assessments are hard to take seriously given socio-economic 
achievements seen in few parts of the developing world in the last three decades (Abbott 
et al., 2009, p.342; Weeks, 2015; Tarp, 2017, p.280). Despite entering a period of slower 
growth after 2000, Vietnam has kept high average growth rates and experienced 
declining volatility (Figure 6.4) – with GDP growing at a still robust average of 6.4 per 
cent a year between 2000-2017 (compared with an average of 7.4 per cent between 
1990-1999) (World Bank, 2018g). As noted in Section 6.2.3, Vietnam was only 
moderately impacted in the wake of the global financial crisis which consumed many 
of its key export markets. Thus as Abbott et al. (2009, p.342) note ‘policy dialogue by 
both foreigners and Vietnamese has often evaluated the ongoing reform process in much 
harsher terms than the economic performance would seem to warrant’. Furthermore, the 
standards to which Vietnam is held, particularly criticism that Vietnam has failed to live 
up to China’s growth record, is, as Weeks (2015, p.31) rightly notes, equivalent to 
asking: ‘why did Viet Nam not grow faster than the fastest-growing country in the 
world?’. It is also ironic that China is used as a benchmark, when mainstream criticism 
of China, like that of Vietnam, also tends to focus on the state sector and rates of NPLs 
(Lo and Zhang, 2011). Finally, these narratives assume international integration has had 
wholly positive effects on Vietnam’s development potential, and ignore the external 
vulnerabilities and pressures emanating from the global neoliberal economic order and 
architecture, and ignore their effects not only on the country’s performance, but also its 
policy efficacy.  
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Figure 6.4 Vietnam: GDP growth (annual percentage), 1985–2017 
 
Source: World Bank (2018g). 
 
The second stand of Viet-pessimism is rooted in more heterodox analysis and 
specifically concerns the kind of structural transformation emerging in Vietnam, 
highlighting its adverse forms of incorporation into the global division of labour and 
FDI dependence (Herr et al., 2016; Gore, 2017, p.47; Masina and Cerimele, 2018). 
These works identify the chief challenges facing Vietnam as arising from the 
mainstream reforms it has adopted (rather than its failure to do so). However, there is 
also a focus on domestic policy weaknesses in this literature, although a more heterodox 
emphasis on industrial policy short-comings. Thus Masina and Cerimele’s (2018, p.9) 
observation that ‘the country never chose to (or could) implement sufficiently selective 
and stringent industrial policies to emulate the most successful Asian champions’. Gore 
(2017, p.47) emphasises ‘the ineffectiveness of the development state’. Thus there is a 
form of convergence between mainstream and heterodox approaches around the CPV’s 
policy-making failures (if not over what the content of these policies should be). The 
extreme end of this confluence includes assertions that the CPV lacks all policy 
intentionality and has no coherent developmental rationale nor even a rationale for rule 
(Gainsborough, 2018). Some here go as far as to argue the Party has an ‘inability to “do 
policy”’ and an ‘inability to manage the deployment of the relative autonomy of the 
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state to the coherent creation and allocation of resources to development’ (Fforde, 2017, 
pp.57, 52).  
 
However, there are five broad problems with these perspectives. First they fail to 
consider Vietnam’s development trajectory with reference to the political and economic 
goals of the Vietnamese party-state itself, and instead use idealised or disembodied 
policy models derived from either orthodox economics or historic heterodox 
experiences to assess the CPV’s performance. As noted in Chapter 5, the CPV had two 
broad political and economic goals at the time of doi moi, the preservation of party 
hegemony and achievements of high rates of economic growth. With reference to these 
goals, the Vietnamese party-state system appears considerably more capable and 
effective than any of the depictions above suggest, since the CPV has managed 
economic change without a political transition comparable to that in the former Soviet 
Union, and currently faces no sizeable organised domestic political opposition or 
discernible movement toward a politically pluralist multi-party democratic system. 
Vietnam’s development trajectory has thus helped to ensure the resilience of ‘a “soft 
authoritarian” one-party regime’ (Thayer, 2010, p.441) ruled by a Leninist party, with a 
formal commitment to socialism (if no longer a substantive one), and politburo (Pincus, 
2015), a Central Committee, and Leninist mass organisations. One way in which this 
has been achieved is through the preservation of what has been referred to as a pattern 
of ‘state-related accumulation’ (Cheshier, 2010), anchored around the state finance-
industry-infrastructure nexus, which has limited the emergence of rival political and 
economic interests and has aided efforts to power economic transformation. Mainstream 
analysis suggests this has had the cost of ‘[c]rowding out a genuinely private 
commercial class independent of the state or its functionaries’ (Viet Sinh et al., 2016, 
p.57). But from the perspective of the CPV itself, this outcome looks far more like a 
successfully achieved objective than a ‘cost’.  
 
Second, following the pragmatic adaptability noted in Chapter 5 which can arguably be 
seen as a sign of strength (Van Arkadie and Mallon, 2003, p.253), the CPV has in this 
second period, shown itself capable of adapting to both domestic and global forces in 
ways that have preserved its political hegemony and managed the growing complexity 
of its political economy without internal collapse. Having largely preserved the state 
finance-industry-infrastructure nexus in the context of deep global integration, this 
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indicates that neoliberalism, far from straightforwardly threatening either the party-state, 
or its developmental project (as more heterodox approaches suggest), has instead been 
leveraged by the CPV regime to bolster its developmentalism. Indeed, neither the IFIs, 
WTO, nor preferential trade regime have proved capable of forcing the CPV to ‘lock in’ 
neoliberal reforms, whilst the country’s integration into GVCs has been embraced as 
part of efforts to offset domestic stresses related to slowing growth and limited 
employment creation. Instead, the CPV has responded creatively to the contemporary 
global capitalist system in such a way as to take the elements that support its political 
and economic project, and minimise the impacts of those that do not (Woodside, 1997; 
Painter, 2005; Beeson and Pham, 2012). In terms of the achievement of its own 
objectives, therefore, the CPV’s engagement with the global neoliberal order looks far 
from weak and incoherent.  
 
Third, in terms of Vietnam’s economic performance, mainstream analysis casts the state 
sector an inefficient drag on the economy. Yet it is hard to read that from the 
performance of the economy in its own terms (unless the benchmark being levelled at it 
is the achievement of growth rates as high or higher than China). As Abbott et al., (2017, 
p.66) note, labour productivity in state-owned firms is also higher than in domestic 
private firms (thus suggesting the deployment of more capital-intensive production 
techniques), and thus it appears ‘that investments by state-owned enterprises go counter 
to Vietnam’s comparative advantage as a labour-abundant, low-wage country’. 
Furthermore, the size, technological capabilities and capital-intensiveness of large-scale 
state-owned manufacturing firms in Vietnam remains (potentially) an important asset 
for the development of upstream manufacturing activities in Vietnam’s GVCs (Gore, 
2017, p.50). 
 
Fourth, heterodox critiques of Vietnam’s economic performance relate to the patterns 
of its manufacturing development. Yet Vietnam is a ‘clear-cut development success 
enabled greatly by structural transformation’ (Rodrik et al., 2017, p.16). Manufacturing 
was responsible for just over a third of the new jobs created between 2005-2016 (Table 
6.14), and between 2005-2016 the percentage of people working in the agricultural 
sector decreased from 55.1 per cent to 44.0 per cent and those working in manufacturing 
increased from 11.8 to 16.6 per cent (GSO, 2018). Between 2000-2007 manufacturing 
grew at 11.2 per cent a year, dropping to 7.0 per cent a year between 2007-2012, but in 
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both periods was considerably higher than the rate of overall growth (7.5 per cent and 
5.9 per cent respectively) (Abbott et al., 2017). Given the multiple challenges of 
achieving structural transformation in the context of the neoliberal global order, it is 
again worth considering whether weakness, disorder, and inconsistency are the best 
ways to understand the country’s present and future development trajectory.  
 
Fifth, whilst there are some undoubted policy-making challenges in contemporary 
Vietnam, stemming from the tendencies toward decentralisation and fragmentation 
noted above, the treatment of these issues in mainstream and heterodox Viet-pessimism 
neglects to consider how these problems are not the sole result of domestic social and 
political forces, but result in part from Vietnam’s deepened international integration. 
Indeed, whilst the CPV has managed its global integration in such a way as to achieve 
core political and economic goals, its WTO accession and embrace of export-oriented 
light manufacturing through GVCs has also weakened industrial policy-making capacity. 
Trade agreements have removed the tools via which the CPV attempted to ensure 
developmental spill-overs from FDI and support state enterprises. This has meant it has 
all-but abandoned the former and sought to protect the nexus in ways that have limited 
its utility as a tool for industrial policy-making. Increased dependence on foreign capital 
has also exposed the CPV to greater policy pressure from foreign investors (and their 
relations with its donors), making efforts to ensure technology transfer and build 
linkages with the Vietnamese economy extremely challenging.  
  
Furthermore, the long-standing multiplicity of social and economic roles afforded the 
state sector rest heavily on their continued profitability (to contribute to the state budget; 
provide dividends to SEGs; cross-subsidies to loss-making endeavours; and create 
employment). In the context of deeper international integration, particularly Vietnam’s 
WTO accession, which produced booming land, real estate and financial markets, these 
transformations have increased incentives for state entities to invest in speculative 
activities, sometimes at the expense of their core responsibilities. Thus in the context of 
deepened international integration in the age of neoliberalism the challenges of both 
harnessing FDI and state enterprises toward developmental ends have both become 
increasingly complex and actively contributed to the weakening of the Vietnamese 
party-state’s industrial policy-making capacities, representing a challenge of two-fold 
complexity. Vietnam’s policy challenges and global integration are thus inseparable and 
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interrelated, and the former should not be attributed to the Vietnamese party state system 
alone. Rather it is the interactions between the two, in the context of increased need for 
highly effective and coordinated industrial policies that means Vietnam’s brand of 
developmentalism faces increased challenges. 
 
This in turn raises the question of the relationship between the Vietnamese development 
strategy and neoliberalism. Three common positions are discernible here. The first that 
in Vietnam neoliberalism is ‘present but not powerful’ (Gainsborough, 2010); the 
second that Vietnam’s strategy ‘combines elements of the developmental state model 
with elements of the [neoliberal] competition model’ (Evans and Hai, 2005, p.236); third 
that since the mid-2000s it has embarked on ‘an apparently hyper-liberal turn’ (Masina 
and Cerimele, 2018, pp.29–30). The discussion above suggests that the second 
perspective which emphasises hybridity has the most to offer. Its specific form of 
developmentalism, however, is not best captured through the developmental state prism, 
and has instead both provided the global neoliberal economic order with a dynamic 
alternative to China in the low-wage labour end of the international division of labour, 
at the same time as a heterodox set of policies toward the state sector, public investment 
and macroeconomic management have been retained that differ from both the neoliberal 
development consensus and classic developmental state experiences. In both cases this 
is rooted in its retention of a distinctly unorthodox developmentalism with state 
ownership over finance, industry and infrastructure at its core, and limited alliances 
between the state and domestic capital. Indeed, according to one government official 
‘policies favour state-owned enterprises and FDI … the private sector has not received 
support’ (VG-4).  
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Table 6.14 Vietnam: Employment by sector (thousands of jobs), 2005-2016  
 
Note: 2016 data is preliminary 
Source: GSO (2018).  
2005 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 New jobs 2005-16
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 23,563 24,279 24,363 24,357 24,399 24,409 23,259 22,315 -1,248
Mining and quarrying 257 276 279 286 268 253 238 236 -20
Manufacturing 5,031 6,646 6,973 7,102 7,267 7,415 8,083 8,867 3,835
Construction 1,980 3,108 3,221 3,272 3,309 3,313 3,432 3,800 1,820
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 4,593 5,550 5,828 6,314 6,563 6,652 6,710 6,736 2,143
Transportation and storage 1,290 1,417 1,414 1,498 1,532 1,535 1,592 1,614 324
Accommodation and food service activities 825 1,711 1,995 2,137 2,217 2,301 2,441 2,482 1,658
Information and communication 151 257 269 284 298 318 338 343 191
Financial, banking and insurance activities 186 255 301 313 335 352 365 376 190
Activities of CPV, socio-political organisations; public administration and 
defence; compulsory security
1,680 1,570 1,542 1,583 1,631 1,697 1,707 1,702 22
Education and training 1,258 1,673 1,732 1,767 1,813 1,860 1,896 1,902 644
Human health and social work activities 350 437 481 482 491 493 540 569 219
Arts, entertainment and recreation 82 232 250 256 272 286 295 305 223
Other service activities 782 687 735 732 750 764 800 848 66
Total 42,775 49,049 50,352 51,422 52,208 52,745 52,840 53,303 10,528
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter has outlined how the Vietnamese state finance-industry-infrastructure 
nexus was impacted, preserved and distorted through the process of the country’s 
deepened international integration after the implementation of the US BTA in 2002. As 
the importance of export-oriented light manufacturing has increased in significance 
within the overall balance of the country’s development strategy, FDI has become 
disarticulated from its former role supporting state entities engaged in import-
substituting industries. Instead, a two-track strategy has emerged. One the one hand, 
Vietnam’s economic policies have become increasingly oriented to finding new drivers 
of FDI and export growth, and on the other, toward preserving state control over the 
commanding heights of the economy. This increasingly complex balancing act has seen 
Vietnam transform from one of the world’s most protectionist countries to one of the 
most open, and emerge as a lower-income vanguard of deep trade and investment 
integration. Yet at the same time, the CPV has not abandoned either its ideological or 
material commitment to the state sector, producing a hybrid form of developmentalism 
consisting of orthodox and heterodox elements, which has allowed the CPV to achieve 
the twin political and economic objectives which accompanied its transition to market 
economy.  
 
This approach has three-fold implications for the country’s development trajectory and 
policy space. First it has made the CPV extremely dependent on the interests and 
inclinations of foreign capital in a sector of the economy pivotal for its capacity for 
structural transformation, at the same time as its own wages are rising and new low-
wage destinations for light manufacturing are becoming increasingly attractive. This in 
turn has increased its vulnerability to pressure through its aid relationships. Second, 
increased emphasis on light manufacturing exports has intensified the country’s reliance 
on securing favourable terms of market access through preferential bilateral and regional 
trade agreements, which has eroded both the scope to use industrial policy tools and 
protect state enterprises. Third, due to the narrowed space to nurture and protect state 
enterprises through trade protection, restrictions on foreign competition, and preferential 
access to banking sector credit, the CPV’s use of alternative mechanisms to support the 
commanding heights of the economy, has, in the context of shifts in the economy 
resulting from deepened integration, compromised its utility as a tool for powering the 
broader structural transformation of the economy. Thus in this second period, the CPV 
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has been far more successful in ‘occupying’ rather than ‘commanding’ the strategic 
heights of the economy toward productive ends.
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Chapter 7 Comparative political economy of 
developmentalism in Ethiopia and Vietnam 
 
Building on the individual country cases examined in Chapters 3-6, this chapter provides 
a comparative analysis of the actually existing forms of developmentalism which have 
emerged in Ethiopia and Vietnam since their transitions to market economy. To date, 
comparisons between the two (see Chapter 1), tend to rest on a mainstream interpretation 
of Vietnam’s development trajectory, and fail to consider whether its experience 
represents either a viable or desirable model for Ethiopia to follow (and if so, on what 
basis). For instance, the IMF (2006b, p.25) argues that Vietnam attracts considerably 
more FDI than Ethiopia because the latter’s ‘business environment remains difficult’, 
suggesting a package of reforms to streamline business registration and credit provision 
that offer an implicit narrative of the Vietnamese transition predicated on its conformity 
with neoliberal development norms. The World Bank’s 2012 Light Manufacturing 
report likewise attributes Vietnam’s manufacturing success to its FDI-incentives and 
policies ‘consistent with the traditional agenda for investment’ (Dinh et al., 2012, p.8). 
Vietnam is also mobilised in ahistorical condemnations of Ethiopia’s development 
performance. Indeed, the IMF (2014b, p.10) compares Ethiopia with four ‘Asian Tigers’ 
– Vietnam, China, Korea and Taiwan – in order to ask: ‘[beyond] differences in initial 
conditions, this raises the question of why Ethiopia so far has not been able to replicate 
the performance of the successful Asian countries’. Through such highly selective 
interpretations of its development trajectory, Vietnam has become an instrument of IFI 
pressure for greater liberalisation in Ethiopia, much as China is put to the same ends in 
Vietnam (see Chapter 6).   
 
In contrast, this chapter draws on a heterodox interpretation of Vietnam’s development 
experience. Weeks et al. (2004, p.40) noted in the early 2000s that the EPRDF’s ADLI 
strategy ‘fits well into the framework of Vietnamese success … Characterised by 
indicative planning, it seeks, like the Vietnamese strategy, to apply systematic market 
interventions to foster an integrated development process’. For Weis (2016, pp.26–27), 
the political basis for the development of the market economy in Ethiopia shares with 
both China and Vietnam ‘a socialist legacy [that] has been reinterpreted in the context 
of economic reform, resulting in a highly interventionist form of capitalism that builds 
on authoritarian domination of the political arena’. Neither study, however, considers 
267 
 
these similarities in substantive terms. This chapter thus contributes to an 
underdeveloped area of comparative analysis across three dimensions. First, the chapter 
explores the commonalities and differences in their respective forms of 
developmentalism, arguing there are striking similarities between the varieties of 
developmentalism in each. Second, extant interpretations of their trajectories within the 
development literature are considered. The section argues that differential 
interpretations of these trajectories in the mainstream literature suggest Ethiopia tests 
the limits of orthodox appropriation of heterodox trajectories, and that heterodox 
attempts to subsume Ethiopia and Vietnam within the framework of the developmental 
state obscure as much as they reveal. Third, the strategies for engaging with challenges 
stemming from the global neoliberal order are considered and it is argued that common 
strategic adroitness in navigating, resisting and instrumentalising facets of neoliberalism 
has helped secure domestic political hegemony and preserve heterodox policies, 
specifically in the state sector. However, the differential nature of the constraints each 
has experienced from the global order also highlights the variegated nature of these 
challenges.  
 
7.1 Developmentalism contextualised: political economy, ideational 
orientations and political systems  
 
To frame these three areas of enquiry, this section first provides a contextualising 
discussion of the similarities and differences across the political economies, orientating 
ideologies and political systems of Ethiopia and Vietnam. It is suggested that shared 
inheritances from the centrally planned period and the orienting ideologies of their 
ruling regimes have conditioned the similar varieties of developmentalism emerging in 
Ethiopia and Vietnam since the transition to market economy.  
 
7.1.1 Shared political economies and approaches to politics and economics 
 
In terms of their political economies, due to experiences of radical land reform 
programmes, nationalisation and the efforts to construct centrally planned economies 
prior to the transition to market economy, the domestic private sector was extremely 
small-scale and fragmented in both Ethiopia and Vietnam in the late 1980s and early 
1990s (Mallon, 2002; Chole, 2004). The political aspects of their transitions differed 
considerably, however. Ethiopia underwent regime change following the overthrow of 
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the Derg in 1991, and thus the transition to market economy was concurrent with a major 
political shift, both in terms of the ruling regime, and with the shift to a fundamentally 
different political system of ethnic federalism (see Chapter 3). In contrast, the CPV’s 
decision to shift away from the centrally planned socialist economy of reunified 
Vietnam was prompted not by domestic political transformation, but by both deepened 
economic stress and shifting external conditions, including the collapse of the Soviet 
Union (see Chapter 5). In addition, whilst the EPRDF instituted the country’s first 
system of multi-party democracy, the CPV has entirely avoided undertaking a political 
transformation alongside its economic transition.  
 
However, the significance of these differences were less marked than they might have 
been because of the shared Marxist-Leninist heritage of the TPLF (the EPRDF’s most 
influential party) and the CPV (Beresford, 1988; Young, 1997). Notably, the political 
elite in neither country underwent a wholesale ideological conversion away from the 
former commitment to socialism at the point of transition, and instead both the EPRDF 
and CPV were pressed to adopt a market-oriented approach by a mixture of domestic 
economic challenges and the profound transformations in the international order after 
the end of the Cold War. One important result of this shared inheritance has been a 
tendency within both the EPRDF and CPV to see the ruling party (or coalition) as a 
vanguard political force which should dominate state power, with the peasantry 
considered to be a key constituency (Abuza, 2001; Tadesse and Young, 2003). Another 
has been the deployment of mass associations as a tool for building a popular base 
through which to secure regime hegemony (Weis, 2016; Bui, 2016). However, notably 
in Ethiopia, whilst the TPLF had utilised mass associations in areas it administered prior 
to overthrowing the Derg, Ethiopia’s mass associations were markedly reinvigorated in 
the second developmental period, and became a crucial means of mobilising support for 
the EPRDF’s development project after the contested 2005 election revealed the 
fragility of the coalition’s domestic support base (Vaughan, 2011; Vaughan, 2015). In 
contrast, Vietnam’s vast apparatus of mass associations emerged alongside socialism 
itself in the mid-1950s (Vasavakul, 2003), so has a much earlier lineage indicating the 
CPV’s much more long-standing embeddedness within Vietnamese society.  
 
In both, however, these strategies are connected with a shared emphasis on securing the 
political hegemony of dominant ruling regimes. The EPRDF, for instance, controls all 
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government structures, both local and federal, directly through its constituent parties 
and indirectly through affiliated parties (Kefale, 2014; Mezgebe, 2015). In the 2015 
national elections, the EPRDF coalition and allied parties won a controversial 100 per 
cent of parliamentary seats (Arriola and Lyons, 2016). Vietnam, meanwhile, remains 
formally a one-party-state political system, and whilst the constitution affords the 
National Assembly supreme state power, in practice both politics and state are 
dominated by the CPV (Vu-Thanh, 2016).  
 
In each, economic strategies are fundamentally connected to the broader political 
objective of achieving party (coalition) hegemony, and each regime has had a strong 
and enduring commitment to retaining state control over the economy’s commanding 
heights, including shared influence from the mixed economy of Lenin’s New Economic 
Policy (NEP) (Milkias, 2003; Pham, 2012) (see Chapters 4 and 5). In line with this, the 
EPRDF’s (1991, p. 5) transitional economic strategy of 1991 noted ‘sectors which play 
a decisive role in the rapid development of the economy must be under the control of 
the popular government’. In this regard, the EPRDF has sought to retain control over 
the political sphere, partly through its control over the economic sphere (Vaughan and 
Gebremichael, 2011, p.20). In Vietnam, the Political Report to the Sixth Party Congress 
in 1986 noted that ‘the socialist economy with the State sector as the core must play a 
decisive role in the national economy i.e. it must account for a large proportion both in 
production and circulation, prove its superiority and, through economic integration, 
exercise its control over the other sectors’ (CPV, 2015, pp.641, 643). This preoccupation 
with the state sector has been accompanied by concern about domestic and foreign 
capital in both countries, including the potentially destabilising effects of the emergence 
of strong political links between the two and concern over foreign imperialist 
interference (see Chapters 3 and 5). Such common touchstones suggest common 
influence of Leninist ideas of imperialism and the dependency theory development 
discourses of the 1960s and 1970s. 
 
In terms of their economic strategies, both have placed a high premium on ambitious 
economic growth targets and poverty reduction efforts, which have emerged as a core 
anchor of the EPRDF and CPV’s (performance-based) legitimacy (Hiep, 2012; Pham, 
2012; Berhanu and Poulton, 2014; Clapham, 2018). Once again, ambitious growth 
targets were present much earlier in Vietnam. Documents prepared for the Eight Party 
270 
 
Congress in 1996, for instance, noted that GDP growth at an average of 8.2 per cent a 
year had exceeded the target of 5.5-6.5 per cent, and set a new goal to turn Vietnam 
‘basically into an industrialized country by 2020’ (CPV, 2015, pp.875, 890). Ethiopia’s 
accelerated growth toward the end of the SDPRP plan (2002-2003 to 2004-2005), 
reached 11.9 per cent in 2003-2004, exceeding the target of around 7 per cent a year 
(MOFED, 2006), which thereafter also helped to increase the EPRDF’s economic 
growth ambitions (see Chapter 4). As a result, the PASDEP plan adopted in 2005 set a 
target to make Ethiopia an MIC within 20-30 years (MOFED, 2006), which by the 
second GTP in 2015 had become a target to be reached by 2025 (FDRE, 2016b). In both 
places short bursts of rapid growth thus had the effect of intensifying ambitions 
regarding longer-term socio-economic transformation. In Ethiopia this was given 
further urgency after the disputed 2005 election, which has increased the political 
significance of its economic development strategy (see Chapter 4). 
 
Unusually in the neoliberal period, both regimes also conceptualise economic 
development as indisputably linked with manufacturing development. Whilst CPV 
policy under socialism emphasised industry at the expense of agriculture, the 1986-1990 
Five Year Plan sought to boost three areas: food production, exports and consumer 
goods (Anh et al., 2014), taking a more balanced approach to industry and agriculture. 
The EPRDF’s 1994 ADLI strategy also stressed the importance of agriculture and 
industry (particularly the development of linkages between them) (Gebreeyesus, 2013), 
but with the priority reversed, stressing the primacy of the agricultural sector to rural 
livelihoods (Zenawi, 2006b). With the formation of the first stand-alone industrial 
strategy in 2002, and especially after the first GTP in 2010, manufacturing, has, however 
garnered increased investment and policy attention in Ethiopia (Oqubay, 2018). Key 
references for both regimes here have been the experiences of East Asian developmental 
states (Mallon, 2004; Weis, 2016) and China (Quinn-Judge, 2006; Le, 2017; Clapham, 
2018).  
 
Together these parallels across their political goals (regime hegemony) and economic 
aims (rapid development with a manufacturing orientation) have had important 
implications for the forms of actually existing developmentalism adopted by both the 
CPV and EPRDF (as explored in Section 7.2).  
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7.1.2 Divergent party-state systems 
 
Despite such parallels, the party-state systems of Ethiopia and Vietnam are also 
substantively different. Ethiopia’s political system, forged under the umbrella of 
“revolutionary democracy”, comprises an ethnic federation of nine different ethno-
linguistically defined regional states (each with the right to secession), and a multi-party 
democracy, with national elections every five years (Oqubay, 2018). This system broke 
with the highly centralised and unitary state structures of the (late) imperial period by 
expanding regional autonomy in an effort to accommodate Ethiopia’s considerable 
ethnic diversity (Mezgebe, 2015). In contrast, Vietnam has a formally unitary state 
system (World Bank, 2015b) and the CPV also faces no multi-party elections which 
might challenge its hegemony. However, these systems operate very differently in 
practice due to the high degree of centralisation in Ethiopia and high degree of both 
formally sanctioned decentralisation and unsanctioned provincial fence-breaking in 
Vietnam. In Ethiopia the degree of policy-making latitude of the nine regions is 
decidedly bounded through central government control over the flows of federal funds 
to regions (Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003), whilst many key policy decisions are taken 
centrally within the EPRDF via deliberative processes of democratic centralism (in 
order to avoid party factionalism), which are then implemented with little regional 
variation (Bach, 2011; Kefale, 2014). In Vietnam, fiscal decentralisation, as well as 
devolved powers over investment incentives, has contributed to a climate of 
considerable fragmentation and diversity between provinces, with the effect of 
weakening central oversight and making central decisions subject to provincial lobbying 
(Mallon, 2002; Vu-Thanh, 2016). Such very differently operating state structures have 
contributed to the existence of rather different policy challenges will prevail in each (see 
Chapters 4 and 6).  
 
Despite the one-party nature of Vietnam’s state, the party itself appears subject to 
considerably greater internal division. The Politburo is amongst the most powerful 
institutions within this system (Pham, 2012), and is elected during the five-yearly 
National Party Congresses. Delegates to the Party congress are typically elected by 
cadres from party organisations, the state sector and the army, who then elect a Party 
Central Committee, which in turn elects the Politburo and the Secretary General 
(Vasavakul, 1997; Pham, 2012). This gives party cadres, provincial officials, state sector 
managers and others considerable influence. During the 1980s, and for much of the 
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1990s, intra-party disagreements were reportedly divided between so-called party 
‘hardliners and softliners’, separated in terms of their support for a socialist or market 
economy (Guo, 2004, p.398). In the present, considerable intra-party divisions are said 
to be less about ideology and more about struggles over the control of resources 
(Gainsborough, 2007; Fforde, 2016). The party is therefore considered to be a meeting 
point for the most significant competing interest groups within the Vietnamese political 
economy and, in this sense, a bearer of political pluralism (Kolko, 1997, p.125). The 
resultant consensus-based strategies for resolving these differences are a noted feature 
of Vietnam’s policy approach, and which are often said to result in cautious, piecemeal 
and contradictory policies (Van Arkadie and Mallon, 2003; Painter, 2003) (see Chapters 
5 and 6).  
 
In contrast, whilst there were major internal disagreements within the EPRDF’s 
dominant party, the TPLF, during the early 2000s (over Eritrea, the direction of 
economic change, and whether international integration and liberalisation had already 
gone too far), these resulted in the transformative split of 2000-2001 (Tadesse, 2015b, 
p.279). This split in turn opened the way for both the formal commitment to socialism 
to be dropped (Vaughan, 2011, p.631) and a more ambitious development strategy to 
emerge, since domestic divisions which had held back the trajectory of change in the 
mid-1990s were swept aside. In this regard, divisions within Ethiopia’s dominant 
coalition have not tended to manifest themselves in contradictory policy-making moves 
to appease distinct party factions, but instead policy decisions have usually been enacted 
decisively and fully once adopted (see Chapter 4).  
 
Yet whilst the EPRDF has faced (at least until the appointment of Prime Minister Abiy 
Ahmed in April 2018) a less fractious intra-party context, outside the party, it faces 
considerably more challenges to its political hegemony than the CPV. The disputed 
2005 election, which revealed the EPRDF’s vulnerability to contestation in urban areas 
(Lavers, 2012), and the ethnically-based political protests and violence since 2015 
(Fiseha, 2018), have together posed domestic existential political challenges to the 
enduring hegemony of the EPRDF. Since 2015, ethnic divisions have become an 
increasingly significant fault-line within Ethiopian politics. It is for this reason that it 
has been rightly argued that one of the most significant differences between the 
experience of Ethiopia and the classic East Asian developmental states has been political 
273 
 
fragmentation along ethnic lines (Chang and Hauge, 2019). Notably, such political 
contestation has prompted considerable adjustments in the EPRDF’s economic 
development agenda, such as toward the highly ambitious growth-oriented agenda in 
the mid-2000s. In Vietnam, major peasant protests in Vietnam in 1997 did prompt 
widespread arrests of corrupt officials abusing land-use rights allocation privileges 
(Abuza, 2001) and central policy efforts to compensate for peasant frustrations by 
increasing investments in rural areas (Sidel, 1999). However, overall, Vietnam’s 
considerably more ethnically homogenous society (Weeks, Geda, et al., 2004) has 
resulted in a much less contested political space. 
 
This particular mix of similarities in developmental and ideological orientation and 
differences in party-state systems has contributed to the emergence of markedly similar 
development strategies yet which have rather distinct challenges.   
 
7.2 Converging developmental strategies 
 
This section traces the emergence of what it argues are common forms of actually 
existing developmentalism in Ethiopia and Vietnam, shaped by the similarities across 
political economies, the orienting ideologies of their ruling regimes, and party state 
systems discussed above. Specifically, their shared commitment to industrialisation, in 
tandem with emphasis on securing regime hegemony and achieving rapid rates of 
growth, has contributed to a shared form of developmentalism comprised of three 
strategic policy pillars. The first involves the defence and expansion of state ownership 
across what are considered to be each economy’s ‘commanding heights’, encompassing 
a nexus of state finance, heavy industry and infrastructure (such as transport and utilities) 
perceived to be strategically important for rapid long-term sustainable development and 
for the continuing hegemony of the ruling party. The second entails an emphasis on high 
rates of public investment, heavily concentrated in expanding infrastructure (both social 
and economic), and underpinned by heterodox macroeconomic policies. The final 
element has been a strong push to attract and concentrate foreign investment into light 
manufacturing activities and embrace global integration through GVCs as a key motor 
for both structural transformation and export growth. Each pillar is considered in turn, 
in conjunction with the heterodox policies supporting them, with a focus on: trade and 
industrial policies; privatisation; international private capital flows; domestic financial 
274 
 
regulation; and macroeconomic policies and institutions (the core arenas of heterodox 
development policy discussed in Chapter 2).  
 
7.2.1 The state finance-industry-infrastructure nexus  
 
Due to a shared understanding of what constitute the most strategic areas of the economy, 
state ownership in Ethiopia and Vietnam has been concentrated within in a nexus of 
finance, industry and infrastructure firms (referred to as the state finance-industry-
infrastructure nexus). This nexus forms a powerful mechanism for directing economic 
activity toward priority productive and transformative economic activities. As a result, 
it provides an important counterweight to patterns of economic development in line 
existing comparative advantage in either country and in each country has been central 
to how investment and credit activities have been channelled in developmental ways. 
 
RETAINING THE NEXUS  
 
The common political and economic considerations discussed above resulted in two 
important similarities in how the EPRDF and CPV approached state sector reform in the 
1990s. First both countries adopted an approach to state sector reform typified by 
gradualism (Tekeste, 2003; UNDP, 2006). After 1994, when privatisation did occur in 
Ethiopia, it was overwhelmingly concentrated in small retail shops, hotels and medium-
scale establishments, leaving a substantial chunk of state entities in the industrial sector 
(IMF, 2005c). In Vietnam, even the term privatisation was too politically sensitive (see 
Chapter 5). This saw the CPV instead create a pilot equitisation programme in 1992 
(involving the partial sale of shares in state enterprises and formation of joint stock 
companies), but the slow pace of even this meant that by 1997 only 14 SMEs had been 
equitised (far short of a target of 150) (Van Arkadie and Mallon, 2003, pp.122–127).  
 
Second, both saw the ‘commanding heights’ in similar ways. In Ethiopia, the EPRDF’s 
vision for where state ownership should prevail in the 1990s was summarised as follows:  
 
[L]and would continue to be state-owned. Also, some degree of state ownership 
will prevail in commercial agriculture; big engineering and metal works 
industries; major enterprises producing pharmaceuticals and fertilizers; 
“strategic” raw materials for the chemical industry; some wholesale trade 
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enterprises; major financial institutions; air, rail and sea transport; telephone and 
postal services; some road establishments; mining and energy; and some 
construction enterprises (Chole, 2004, p.264). 
 
Such sectoral priorities strongly parallel the vision advanced by Vietnam’s Deputy 
Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung in early 2002, with the areas where state ownership 
was to be concentrated summarised as follows: 
 
State corporations are to be retained and strengthened in petroleum exploitation, 
processing, and wholesaling; the supply and distribution of electricity; the 
exploitation, processing and supply of coal and other important minerals; 
metallurgy; heavy manufacturing; cement production; post, telecommunications 
and electronics; airlines; maritime; railway; chemicals and chemical fertilisers; 
key consumer good and food industries; pharmaceuticals; construction; 
wholesale grain trading; banking; and insurance (Van Arkadie and Mallon, 2003, 
p.142). 
 
However, these similarities aside, their experiences of utilising the state nexus for 
transformative ends was rather different during their first reform periods. Ethiopia’s 
approach was altogether more defensive in the 1990s, and focused on preserving state 
ownership.  The effectiveness of these strategies meant that by 2004, despite accounting 
for just 15.2 per cent of manufacturing enterprises, the state sector still contributed 72.2 
per cent of manufacturing value-added, 62.0 per cent of the gross value of production, 
employed 64.2 per cent of the manufacturing workforce, and paid 62.1 per cent of the 
sector’s wages and salaries (World Bank, 2004c, pp.5, 24). As a result, foreign observers 
noted at the time that ‘the manufacturing sector remains largely state controlled’ 
(USITC, 2002, p.198). Extensive state ownership in infrastructure in the mid-2000s, 
meanwhile, encompassed telecoms, power, transportation (including the national airline 
and shipping lines), land and financial institutions, which either ‘remain[ed] under state 
monopoly or extended control’ (World Bank, 2005a, p.8).  However, these enterprises 
were not yet decisively deployed in a concerted manner toward transformative ends (see 
Chapter 3). 
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In Vietnam, in contrast, minimal equitisation was accompanied by efforts to rationalise 
the state sector (Van Arkadie and Mallon, 2003). This was followed by substantial 
restructuring, as, from 1994 onwards, the most strategic entities were grouped into GC-
90 and GC-91 structures. The latter sought to create large capital-intensive state 
corporations in key sectors which are provided in Table 7.1 as a useful way to compare 
with those recently created in Ethiopia, which are shown in Table 7.2. In manufacturing, 
state enterprises were active in both import-substituting and export-oriented activities, 
with the former in particular benefiting from the CPV’s decision to heavily encourage 
FDI into joint ventures, often attracted by the protected nature of the Vietnamese 
economy at this time (IMF, 1999b). Those in infrastructure, such as power, water, 
construction, and materials construction were also boosted by inflows of ODA toward 
the end of the 1990s (Van Arkadie and Mallon, 2003), with Japanese ODA in particular 
heavily biased toward economic infrastructure investments (Hatakeyama, 2008). Such 
factors meant that despite reduced state subsidies following the transition to market 
economy, the state sector’s overall share of official GDP actually increased after doi 
moi  (Van Arkadie and Mallon, 2003). 
 
Table 7.1 Vietnam: GC-91 Corporations (mid-1990s)  
 
Source: Van Arkadie and Mallon (2003). 
 
One reason why Vietnam’s state sector more rapidly played a more transformative 
economic role can be located in the different levels of development of the Vietnamese 
and Ethiopian state sectors at the point of transition. As Beresford (1995b, p.56) notes, 
Decision 91 State Corporations 
Member enterprises 
(including joint ventures)
Legal capital 
(billion dong)
Electricity Corporation of Vietnam 34 19332
Coal Corporation of Vietnam 51 824
Vietnam Petroleum Corporation (Petrovietnam) 21 761
Cement Corporation of Vietnam 18 2235
Vietnam National Shipping Lines (Vinalines) 36 2145
Vietnam Airline Corporation 26 1043
Vietnam Post and Telecommunications Corporation 94 4740
Vietnam Rubber Corporation 34 2700
Vietnam Steel Corporation 21 1336
Vietnam Coffee Corporation 68 276
Vietnam Tobacco Corporation 12 550
Vietnam Paper Corporation 18 1028
Vietnam Textile and Garment Corporation 55 1186
Northern Food Corporation (Vinafood 1) 32 194
Southern Food Corporation (Vinafood 2) 64 …
Vietnam National Gem and Gold Corporation 12 12
Vietnam Shipbuilding Corporation (Vinashin) 24 204
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whilst Vietnam’s state-owned industrial sector was smaller than that in Eastern Europe 
or China, it nonetheless accounted for 40 per cent of national output in 1985 due to the 
development of both a ‘wide range of industries and development of an industrially 
skilled workforce’. In contrast, between 1981-1992, the Ethiopian industrial sector 
accounted for an average of 12 per cent of GDP, and manufacturing just 7 per cent 
(Tekeste, 2003). As well as a more underdeveloped manufacturing sector, Ethiopia also 
lost around one-third of its industrial sector after the secession of Eritrea in 1993 (Wells, 
1998, p.109), including enterprises in processed food, beverages, textiles, leather goods, 
chemical products, construction materials, and metal products (IMF, 1995). In addition, 
Ethiopia’s overall development strategy under ADLI at this time placed much greater 
emphasis on agriculture and rural development than industrial transformation and urban 
development, where state enterprises might be expected to play a more significant role 
(see Chapter 3). Yet with an agricultural sector much more vulnerable to shocks, 
including the recurrent droughts which resulted in persistent food insecurity during the 
1990s (Devereux, 2000), Ethiopia experienced none of the agricultural export buoyancy 
of Vietnam’s transition. As a result, the 1990s were a period of considerably greater 
socio-economic fragility in Ethiopia. Together with the Eritrean conflict toward the end 
of the decade, and lack of consensus around the appropriate direction for economic 
transformation revealed by the 2000-2001 split within the TPLF, the EPRDF’s 
overarching approach to the state sector during the first developmental phase centred 
much more around preserving the commanding heights in state hands than putting them 
to transformative ends (and it is for this reason that this thesis labels this a period of 
defensive developmentalism).   
 
In the 2000s, particularly after the first GTP, state enterprises became an increasingly 
significant motor of the EPRDF’s developmental project (see Chapter 4), with many 
echoes of Vietnam’s approach to the state sector in the 1990s. State industries, for 
instance, play an important role in the import-substituting element of Ethiopian 
manufacturing strategy, across heavy manufacturing such as arms, buses, solar panels 
and light aircraft (Weis, 2016), sugar (Kamski, 2016), and cement (Oqubay, 2015). The 
state also owns some of the country’s largest vertically integrated textile firms, an 
important priority export-oriented manufacturing sector (Hauge, 2018). As a result, 
Ethiopia’s manufacturing is said to be over-reliant on state and foreign enterprises, given 
the very limited development of the domestic private manufacturing sector (Chang and 
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Hauge, 2019, p.18). Since the first GTP, a trend toward the formation of sectorally 
concentrated large conglomerate structures has also emerged, including in key industrial 
and infrastructure sectors such as shipping, road construction, the airline industry, 
chemicals, agri-business, distribution and construction (Table 7.2). Notably, there are 
strong echoes of Vietnam’s GC-91 structures outlined in Table 7.1, including the 
national airline, shipping firm, mining and minerals industry, chemicals, agri-business, 
and metals and engineering sectors. In neither country are these enterprises the sum-
total of the state sector, with Vietnam’s large state sugar and railway enterprise not 
turned into a GC-91, and many of Ethiopia’s notable state enterprises such as Ethio 
Telecom, the state electricity firm and railway not yet experiencing such agglomeration.  
 
The formation of these groups appears to have represented an effort to foster national 
champions capable of international competition ahead of Ethiopia’s (eventual) deeper 
international integration (see Chapter 4). Beyond these corporate structures, state 
enterprises remain key players in other strategically important sectors, such as printing 
and telecoms (Ethiopia retains one of the few remaining telecoms monopolies in Africa), 
and have been formed in other areas to support the EPRDF’s transformative vision for 
the economy such as the railway and industrial park construction. Concessional and non-
concessional inflows have helped to bolster the country’s state finance-industry-
infrastructure nexus, with many of the transformative infrastructure plans undertaken 
through state entities, helping to turn Ethiopia into an emerging light manufacturing hub 
in Africa. 
 
In Vietnam, where equitisation intensified during the late 1990s and 2000s, the state 
sector’s share of GDP reduced to around a third (see Chapter 6); not dissimilar to that 
in the 1990s. The state nonetheless retains a majority share in over 3,000 enterprises, 
approximately 40 per cent of total investment in the economy, and a ‘virtual monopoly 
(or oligopoly) in critical sectors such as fertilizer, mining, utilities, banking, construction, 
and agriculture’ (Viet Sinh et al., 2016, p.20). To bolster these investments in the light 
of impending deeper trade integration, conglomeration took on a new phase in the mid-
2000s as diversified holding company structures called SEGs were formed, whose rapid 
expansion into speculative activities proved a major policy challenge in the post-WTO 
period. Some prominent failures to deliver on ambitious core activity plans have 
included the major debt default of the state shipbuilding conglomerate (Fujita, 2017b; 
279 
 
Vu-Thanh, 2017). However, in other areas such as textiles, profitable diversification 
appears to have provided dividends to the textile holding company, Vinatex, to support 
as-yet-unprofitable upstream investments in the textile spinning, weaving and dyeing 
sub-sectors, in line with the government’s textile and garment sub-sector plans (Fujita, 
2017a).   
 
Overall, Ethiopia’s emphasis on the centrality of state enterprises to its economic 
transformation marks it out from many sub-Saharan African economies (Oqubay, 2018, 
p.9). In this regard, it shares much in common with Vietnam, including the sectoral 
concentration of state enterprises and efforts to form larger, strategically grouped 
entities. However, Ethiopia currently has fewer of these major corporations than 
Vietnam in the 1990s, which also appear to contain fewer enterprises. Notably, the 
constituent enterprises all appear to be related to the core business activities, thereby 
lacking the diversification into profitable side-lines that was a long-standing feature of 
the Vietnamese state sector (see Chapter 5), and which exploded considerably when 
Vietnam’s SEGs were formed in the mid-2000s (see Chapter 6). This signals a further 
major difference regarding their state sectors, which is that Vietnam’s acts as an anchor 
of regime stability, through employment, state budget contributions and investments in 
poorer areas, and performs many (and often competing) social, economic and political 
roles. These concerns, which aren’t currently evident in Ethiopia, have made it very 
challenging for the CPV to force state conglomerates to divest from profitable non-core 
activities.  
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Table 7.2 Ethiopia: State corporations formed (or re-established in GTP period) 
 
 
Note: The group included above the new state corporations includes some entirely new entities (ERC), some formed from splitting (not agglomerating) existing 
enterprises (such as the electricity enterprises), and other, older enterprises, re-established in this period (the date and legal capital are therefore the most recent re-
establishment) 
 
Sources: Federal Negarit Gazeta of the FDRE (various issues) and Ministry of Public Enterprises website (FDRE, 2018a). 
 
State corporations formed in GTP period Date Member enterprises
Legal capital 
(billion birr)
Ethiopia Sugar Corporation (ESC) 2010
Metahara Sugar Factory, Wonji/Sheoa Sugar Factory, Finchaa Sugar Factory, Tendaho Sugar Factory and Ethiopian Sugar 
Development Agency 42.0
Metals and Engineering Corporation (MeTEC) 2010 Nazareth Canvas Sewing and Garment Factory and Ministry of National Defense enterprises 10.0
Ethiopian Shipping and Logistics Services Enterprise (ESL) 2011 Ethiopian Shipping Lines Share Company, Martime and Transit Service Enterprise and Dry Port Service Enterprise 3.8
Chemical Industry Corporation (CIC) 2012
Mugher Cement Enterprise, Natural Rubber Tree Development, Production Project and Coal-Based Urea Complex, Awash 
Melkassa Aluminium Sulphate, Sulphuric Acid Share Company, Adami Tulu Pesticides Processing Share Company and Caustic 
Soda Share Company
21.7
Ethiopian Mineral, Petroleum Bio-fuels Corporation 2015 Ethiopian Petroleum and Natural Gas Development Enterprise and Ethiopian Mineral Development Share Company 15.3
Ethiopian Trading Businesses Corporation 2015
Ethiopian Commercial Enterprise, Procurement Service Enterprise, Ethiopian Grain Trade Enterprise, and Ethiopian Vegetables 
and Fruits Share
Company 3.8
Ethiopian Construction Design and Supervision Works Corporation (ECDSWCo) 2015
Water Works Design and Supervision Enterprise, Construction Design Enterprise Share Company and Transport Construction 
Design Share Company 1.3
Ethiopian Agricultural Businesses Corporation (EABC) 2015
Ethiopian Seed Enterprises, Agricultural Equipment and Technical Services Share Company, Agricultural Inputs Supply 
Enterprise, Natural Gum Processing and Marketing Enterprise and Agricultural Mechanization Service Enterprise 2.4
Ethiopian Construction Works Corporation (ECWC) 2015 Ethiopian Road Construction Corporation and Ethiopian Water Works Construction Enterprise 20.3
Ethiopian Airlines Holding Group 2017 Ethiopian Airlines Enterprise and Ethiopian Airports Enterprise 100.0
Other important state enterprises Date Constituent enterprises
Legal capital 
(billion birr)
Ethio Telecom (ETC) 2010 Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation 40.0
Ethiopian Railway Corporation (ERC) 2012 None 39.8
Ethiopian Electric Power 2013 Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation (elements of) 139.1
Ethiopian Electric Utility 2013 Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation (elements of) 64.7
Ethiopian Industrial Parks Development Corporation (IPDC) 2014 Ethiopian Industrial Development Zones Corporation 10.0
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Adding to the fragmentation of Vietnam’s state sector, during the 1990s studies showed 
competition between GC members, as well as across GCs in the same business areas. 
This trend so-far also seems absent in Ethiopia, and whilst further research is needed 
here, it is telling that Ethiopia’s state-owned telecoms monopoly is held by one firm 
(Ethio Telecom), yet in Vietnam three major state owned enterprises (Viettel Group, 
Mobifone and VNPT) form the bedrock of the telecoms sector. State enterprises are 
typically fully state-owned in Ethiopia, meaning the sector lacks the complex relations 
between holding groups and joint stock companies present in Vietnam, through which 
dividends from companies partially owned by the state form a mechanism for within-
SEG cross-subsidisation. Such complexity in terms of the ownership structures of state 
enterprises is further exacerbated by the autonomy of Vietnam’s state enterprise 
managers, whose lobbying from within the party-state system and unsanctioned 
deviation from central directives, has been one of the forces long-making coherent 
industrial policy-making a challenge (see Chapter 5). However, Vietnam’s state sector 
has undoubtedly faced considerably greater external shocks than Ethiopia’s, particularly 
through its WTO accession, which has exacerbated pre-existing tendencies toward 
fragmentation (see Chapter 6). This suggests that there are a number of pressures 
impacting the performance of Vietnam’s state sector within its overall developmental 
approach that originate outside the party-state system.  
 
FINANCING TRANSFORMATION  
 
Both states have also retained a heavy presence in the financial sector, including 
commercial and explicitly policy-oriented banks. Ethiopia’s state-owned banks, CBE 
and DBE, accounted for 48.9 per cent of total bank assets in 2015-2016 (see Table 4.2), 
and the former has a mandate to finance major infrastructure projects, including priority 
state enterprise projects (Shiferaw, 2017) (see Chapter 4). In Vietnam, state-owned 
commercial banks are also dominant players, accounting for 51.8 per cent of sector 
credit in 2012 (Table 6.6), where lending to state enterprises has also been a major 
feature of patterns of resource allocation (see Chapter 5 and 6). Indicative of the greater 
complexity of Vietnam’s financial sector is the proliferation of joint stock banks, 
however, which accounted for just over a third of credit in 2012, shares in which have 
been purchased by state enterprises in the post-WTO period (as noted above). This has 
created much more opaque structures of ownership and control. Vietnam’s WTO 
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accession in 2007 also compelled the CPV to liberalise the financial sector to foreign 
entrants (see Chapter 6), which the EPRDF has so far managed to avoid (see Chapter 4).  
 
There are important similarities in the orientations of the DBE and VDB (Table 7.3). 
While the DBE places more stress on agriculture and agro-processing, both banks 
similarly prioritise the chemical industry, pharmaceuticals, textiles and garments, motor 
vehicles, machinery, and extractives and metals for directed credit. Whilst the VDB is 
larger, with lending worth 7.5 per cent of GDP to DBE’s 1.7 per cent, the latter was 
higher than comparable institutions in Hungary, South Africa, India and Turkey in 2012 
(Guadagno, 2016), suggesting atypical ambition. Sovereign bond issues have also been 
used in both countries to support strategic projects. In Ethiopia for (state-owned) sugar 
and industrial park projects (Chapter 4) and in Vietnam for (state-enterprise) oil refinery, 
cargo ship building and power projects (Chapter 6).  
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Table 7.3 Development banking in Ethiopia and Vietnam* 
 
*: Neither bank provides a comprehensive sectoral breakdown of actual lending. Data also doesn’t capture the long-term impacts of the NBE’s 27 per cent rule, passed into law 
in 2011.   
Source: Adapted from Guadagno (2016). 
Institution Policy mandate Support mechanisms Priority sectors Sources of funding
Lending as a 
percentage of 
GDP (2012)
Total lending as 
a percentage of 
GFCF (2012)
Loans Agriculture Government funds 1.7 4.6
Export credit guarantees Extractives Government saving bonds
Technical support Agro-processing
Textiles and leather
Paper/packaging
Chemicals and rubber
Non-metallic materials
Metals
Motor vehicles
Electrical machinery
Pharmaceuticals
Loans Engineering Government-guaranteed bonds 7.5 30.9
Export credits Automobiles and motorbikes State budget
Settlement services Pharmacy ODA
Loan guarantees Energy
Chemicals
Electronics and ICTs
Steel and coal
Textiles and garments
Machinery and equipment
Vietnam Development 
Bank (VDB)
Borrowings from development 
finance institutions
Provision of development finance and 
technical support for priority projects in 
line with the national development 
agenda
Mobilise national and international funds 
to implement state policies related to 
investment and export financing
Development Bank of 
Ethiopia (DBE)
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POLITICAL ECONOMY IMPLICATIONS 
 
These changes have shaped the social forces of Ethiopian and Vietnamese 
developmentalism in different ways. In addition to Ethiopia’s sizeable state sector, a set 
of controversial endowment-owned enterprises have emerged out of the ruling 
coalition’s constituent parties (see Chapter 4). Together such enterprises have been said 
to severely constrain the space for domestic capital in Ethiopia (Prunier and Ficquet, 
2015a, p.13). However, the sectoral concentration of endowment entities in the cement, 
finance, cereals, edible oil and flour, textiles and garments and road transport sectors 
(Vaughan and Gebremichael, 2011) suggests they play a complementary role to state 
investments in strategic (often capital-intensive) sectors, as suggested by government 
insiders (Oqubay, 2015). In contrast, in the domestic private sector, half of the largest 
firms in a 2010 study emerged from import and export trade (Sutton and Kellow, 2010), 
which indicates that government frustration for the private sector’s ‘rent-seeking’ 
tendencies (see Chapter 4) may reflect the limitations of domestic capital as a route 
through which to finance transformative productive projects. In addition, given the 
small-scale of domestic capital in Ethiopia, there appears to be a very limited basis on 
which any sort of alliance between the state and domestic private sector could emerge 
as the foundation for structural transformation (Chang and Hauge, 2019). Thus the 
EPRDF has not proactively sought to foster a powerful domestic capitalist class as 
partners in its developmental project, but instead relied on state and endowment entities 
(and increasingly foreign investors) to power investment in areas considered of 
particular strategic import. This balancing act has notably enabled the EPRDF to achieve 
key political and economic goals of party hegemony and rapid growth with an emphasis 
on industrialisation, as outlined in Section 7.1.   
 
In Vietnam, instead of party-affiliated entities, it is the power of so-called ‘state business 
interests’ arising from within the state sector (Riedel and Turley, 1999; Fforde, 2007; 
London, 2009) that is often said to crowd-out domestic capital. Thus Riedel and Turley 
(1999, p.50) say the Vietnamese economy is shaped by ‘members and relatives, state 
agencies, ministries, people’s committees at district and province levels, and the army, 
[who] own, control, or manage a very large slice of the economy, including most of the 
firms that operate in protected sectors’. As noted in Chapter 6, whilst often cast as a 
cause of inefficiency, this is unlikely to be seen as a cost from the CPV’s side. And as 
in Ethiopia, there has been no concerted effort to build a sizeable class of domestic 
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capitalists to partner in its developmental project, and thus the domestic private sector 
accounted for just 8.2 per cent of GDP in 2016 (compared with 30.4 per cent for the 
household sector, 28.8 per cent for the state sector, and 18.6 per cent for the foreign-
invested sector) (GSO, 2018). In 2015, the average pre-tax profit of domestic private 
enterprises stood at VND 4.6 trillion, over 30 times less than in both the state sector 
(157.0 trillion) and foreign-invested sector (170.7 trillion) (GSO, 2017). Thus, like 
Ethiopia, there is also a significant mismatch between the size of the domestic private 
sector and its capacity to be an effective development partner of the state in 
implementing capital-intensive infrastructure and industry heavy five-year plans.  
 
In summary, the state sector policies of the CPV and EPRDF are decidedly heterodox 
in the ways suggested by Chang and Grabel (2004a; 2014), notably gradualist in terms 
of privatisation and utilising the sector as a potentially powerful tool of transformation 
in risky, capital-intensive areas of the economy. As a result both the EPRDF and CPV 
have resisted pressure to privatise such entities, pressure rooted in mainstream faith in 
the sector’s supposed inefficiencies. Instead, Ethiopia and Vietnam’s experiences 
illustrate that large state sectors can be compatible with rapid growth, and whilst 
correlation does not represent causation, the two case studies echo that of Taiwan, which 
had a particularly large state sector, as well as South Korea and Singapore where the 
state sector was also not insignificant and co-existed with fast growth (Chang and Grabel, 
2004a). 
 
7.2.2 Public investment and broader macroeconomic policy orientation 
 
The second important pillar of the development strategies adapted by the EPRDF and 
CPV has been high rates of public investment, which adds both economic momentum 
and helps to secure growth stability. In recent years, both have had very high overall 
levels of investment to GDP, at highs of 37.0 per cent of GDP in Ethiopia and 33.1 per 
cent of GDP in Vietnam, comparable with China and Korea in their high growth periods 
respectively (Table 7.4). In Ethiopia, public investment increased from 9.0 per cent of 
GDP in 2003-2004 (IMF, 2007a), rising to highs of 25.0 per cent in 2011-2012 (IMF, 
2014a), before dropping to (lower, but still very high levels of) 17.2 per cent in 2015-
2016 (IMF, 2018a). This shift cannot be understood apart from the ethnic divisions 
within Ethiopia discussed in Section 7.1, as, in contrast to Vietnam, rising domestic 
discontent during and after the 2005 election propelled the EPRDF to adopt a much 
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more expansive programme of investment in industry and urban areas, alongside its 
long-standing commitment to rural development. Its subsequent growth path has been 
importantly driven by such investments, and the associated policies which have come 
to support it, from heterodox financial repression in the form of negative real interest 
rates, compression of current expenditure, and an overvalued currency (to cheapen the 
cost of imported capital goods) (see Chapter 4). In addition, ODA inflows have helped 
to counter-balance Ethiopia’s historically low savings rate (Shiferaw, 2017), although 
recent increases in gross domestic savings have seen those in Ethiopia equal those in 
Korea between 1968-1979 (Table 7.4).  
 
Overall, in Ethiopia, public investment has been channelled toward social (particularly 
in health and education) and economic infrastructure (e.g. hydro-electric power,  
transmission lines, airports, telecoms, roads, and railways) (Shiferaw, 2017). Whilst the 
central budget is used for roads and education, state enterprises finance other 
infrastructure investments directly, such as energy, rail, telecoms, industry and housing 
(World Bank, 2016a). Some 57 per cent of the first GTP’s capital expenditure, for 
instance, was assigned to state enterprises in power generation, railway construction, 
and sugar, textile, fertiliser, leather and cement projects (World Bank, 2015a). By 
expanding electricity provision, rail and road connections, and industrial park 
infrastructures, public investment has played a catalytic role in diminishing the 
challenging trade logistics and poor electrification which hitherto constrained Ethiopia’s 
capacity to emerge as a major export-oriented manufacturing hub (see Chapter 4). This, 
in turn, has helped Ethiopia emerge as a leading African destination for FDI, which 
reached 5.5 per cent of GDP in 2016 (World Bank, 2018g).  
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Table 7.4 Comparison of selected economic indicators, Ethiopia, South Korea, China and Vietnam (selected high growth periods) 
 
* Break in 1972-75  ** Break in 1992  *** Break in 2009  **** Break in 2012-14 
Source: Adapted from Geiger and Goh (2012).226  
                                                   
226 Growth periods in the original source were selected on the basis of consecutive GDP per capita growth of over five percent per year (with exceptions noted above). Ethiopia II and 
Vietnam II have been added to bring the table up to date (despite the fact that GDP per capita growth in Vietnam just falls short of the 5.0 per cent threshold in the second period). Inflation 
data for Ethiopia II and Vietnam II is only available between 2011-2016.  
GDP per capita 
(average % growth 
per year)
Inflation rate 
(average % per 
year)
Exports (%GDP) Investment (GFCF % GDP) FDI (% GDP)
Gross domestic 
savings (%GDP)
Total reserves 
(months import)
Ethiopia I 2004-2010 8.6 15.1 12.9 22.9 2.0 3.2 2.5
Ethiopia II 2011-2017 7.1 14.8 11.4 37.0 3.0 20.1 2.2
Korea I 1968-1979* 7.0 14.6 22.6 26.8 0.2 21.1 na
Korea II 1982-1996** 7.3 5.2 30.9 33.1 0.3 34.3 1.8
China I 1982-1988 9.9 na 11.5 30.0 0.6 35.7 7.7
China II 1991-2010 9.6 4.8 26.0 37.0 3.9 44.1 11.1
Vietnam I 2000-2010*** 6.0 6.9 66.8 33.1 5.7 28.3 2.7
Vietnam II 2011-2017**** 4.9 7.1 87.8 24.3 5.6 27.1 2.2
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In Vietnam the picture (and data) is more mixed, but public investment has nonetheless 
been a central plank of the CPV’s development strategy. If lower-end data offered by 
Tarp (2018) is used,227 public investment was around 15 per cent of GDP in 1996, rising 
to over 20 per cent in the early 2000s, before falling steadily and levelling out just over 
10 per cent of GDP after 2011. As in Ethiopia, this supports the view that in the post-
doi moi period policy was strongly oriented toward investment-based growth, 
particularly through public investment and credit expansion (Thanh and Duong, 2009, 
p.116). Unlike Ethiopia, Vietnam’s strong tax base was one of the most striking features 
of the early transition to market economy (Weeks, Thang, et al., 2004), and with state 
enterprises major contributors to the state budget, their capacity to provide resources to 
this public investment drive played into their overall economic significance. Vietnam 
also had higher levels of domestic savings earlier in its transitional process than Ethiopia 
(Table 7.4), meaning its access to domestic resources for this investment drive was 
considerably greater.   
 
One major difference in the way public investment articulates with the overall growth 
path relates to Vietnam’s considerably greater regional and global integration, and thus 
greater vulnerability to external shocks. During the regional crisis in 1997-1998 and the 
2008-2009 collapse in global trade, public investment has played an important counter-
cyclical role (see Chapters 5 and 6). The stability of public expenditure (capital and 
current) helped to compensate for shifts in levels of FDI and exports during these crises, 
and therefore contributed to broader growth stability, by helping to sustain consistent 
revenue flows (Weeks, 2015, p.35). Furthermore, the CPV has stimulated investment in 
state-owned enterprises after each crisis to help restore growth, such as in 1998 when 
credit to state enterprises was increased at reduced interest rates (Abbott and Tarp, 2012, 
p.11). In the wake of the global crisis, inflation, currency depreciation and bigger 
government deficits were all tolerated in order to sustain growth and avoid large changes 
in employment levels (Abbott and Tarp, 2012). Public investment is thus an equally 
important pillar of high-growth developmentalism in Vietnam, but plays a slightly 
different role than in Ethiopia, where it is the main growth driver (Moller, 2016; Priewe, 
2016). Instead it plays a more stabilising role, helping to offset some of the dangers of 
the extreme trade openness and high rates of FDI to GDP, indicated in Table 7.4. This 
                                                   
227 For higher end data see Chapter 5, Table 5.2 and Chapter 6, Table 6.7, and for a discussion of these issues see 
footnote 160.  
289 
 
 
demonstrates the heterodox macroeconomic underpinnings of Vietnam’s more 
conventional policy pillars.  
 
Again unlike Ethiopia, Vietnam’s public investment and infrastructure regime have 
been significantly impacted by its WTO accession (Chapter 6). For one thing, public 
investments in infrastructure have become an increasingly important industrial policy 
tool (as direct subsidies to state enterprises have become more challenging in a post-
WTO environment) (Perkins and Vu-Thanh, 2010). In tandem, investment and 
infrastructure decisions have been progressively devolved to provincial governments 
(Malesky, 2008; Vu-Thanh, 2016). The internal competition for FDI amongst Vietnam’s 
provinces has prompted local authorities to each seek to build their own export-oriented 
infrastructure, from airports, seaports, industrial parks and export-processing zones 
(Mishra, 2011, p.59), fragmenting public infrastructure provision. In contrast, 
Ethiopia’s approach has been much more tightly focused around connecting centrally-
determined locations for state-funded industrial parks to a burgeoning logistical 
infrastructure encompassing road and rail connections to neighbouring ports, and a 
much more focused provision of industrial park projects (see Chapter 4).  
 
In terms of the broader macroeconomic picture, in Ethiopia the exchange rate is closely 
aligned with government policy and in the early 1990s was considered to be deeply 
connected with the structure of the economy (see Chapter 3). As a result, it was over-
valued for much of the post-2005 high growth path (Priewe, 2016), cheapening the costs 
of capital imports essential to its growth model. However in 2017, a 15 per cent 
devaluation occurred as part of the EPRDF’s efforts to re-orient the strategy toward 
higher export growth (IMF, 2018a). The government describes its exchange rate regime 
as a managed float with no predetermined path (NBE, 2009), whereas the IMF describe 
it as a crawl-like arrangement (IMF, 2015b). The NBE’s expansionary monetary 
policies (including NBE lending to the government) and growth (not inflation-targeting) 
orientation, has caused frequent disagreements with the IFIs (see Chapter 4). Meanwhile, 
the EPRDF’s control over public and state enterprise investments has allowed the 
EPRDF to delay import-intensive projects in order to manage the challenging balance 
of payments situation (see Chapter 4), indicating a close link between macroeconomic 
management and the state finance-industry-infrastructure nexus (alongside the 
devaluation noted above). Indeed, macroeconomic stability forms a key economic goal 
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alongside rapid growth and poverty reduction (see Chapter 4). Furthermore, the 
country’s closed capital account has helped insulate Ethiopia from shocks from the 
global economy (see also Section 7.4.4).  
 
The exchange rate regime in Vietnam is said to look ‘from the outside a bit like a fixed 
exchange rate regime over normal periods, until crises set in’ (Abbott and Tarp, 2012, 
p.16). The exchange rate has been allowed to appreciate, except in the wake of both the 
regional and global crisis, when it has devalued (Abbott and Tarp, 2012). As with the 
NBE, the SBV is not an independent central bank, but institutionally embedded within 
the country’s party-state system, and the promotion of socio-economic development is 
one of its core mandates. According to Weeks (2015, p.36), unlike elsewhere in 
Southeast Asia, this enables the CPV to coordinate monetary and fiscal policies. Its use 
of capital controls, meanwhile, also remains heterodox, despite the financial 
liberalisation which has accompanied deeper trade integration. Capital controls helped 
Vietnam weather the East Asian financial crisis better than many of its neighbours 
(Masina, 2006), demonstrating the compatibility of utilising such controls to buffer the 
effects of external volatility with rising FDI inflows (McKinley, 2003). In the wake of 
the global crisis, constraints on Dong convertibility (preventing the outflow of capital) 
and relatively small portfolio inflows, also facilitated capital account management and 
‘imparted to the external account an automatic countercyclical mechanism’ (Weeks, 
2015, p.39).  
 
Across their fiscal and monetary policy regimes, therefore, Ethiopia and Vietnam have 
deeply heterodox approaches: from their shared emphasis on public investment as a tool 
for directing the pace and pattern of economic development, to their lack of central bank 
independence, subordination of monetary and fiscal policies to overall growth-related 
objectives, capital controls and exchange rate regimes. This suggests both the value of 
– and enduring g space for – alternatives to mainstream macroeconomic policies. 
 
7.2.3 Foreign investment and integration in global value chains 
 
The final shared policy pillar of Ethiopian and Vietnamese developmentalism has been 
the last to emerge in each place, and has formed part of efforts to manage pressures 
(global and domestic) facing their pre-existing strategies. Whilst Vietnam experienced 
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a surge in FDI in the 1990s, most went into import-substituting heavy industry in 
partnership with state enterprises, and thus was used to bolster the developmental nexus 
through the challenge of transition (see Chapter 5). Particularly during the 2000s, after 
Vietnam finally signed the US-Vietnam BTA, GVC integration became a major 
component of its development strategy. This was part of the CPV’s efforts to revive 
both FDI and exports after the downturn experienced after the regional crisis, as well as 
to help create jobs at a time when employment levels were becoming a major policy 
concern. In Ethiopia, the GVC strategy likewise emerged after the former approach hit 
its limits, in its case growing balance of payments pressures stemming from its import-
intensive development model, rising foreign debt payment burdens, and poor export 
performance to date (see Chapter 4). The entrance of each country into the low-wage, 
low value added elements of the GVC regime has, despite occurring at different times 
and in response to difference pressures, been embraced in order to sustain a broader 
heterodox strategy through some very orthodox policies and industrialisation efforts.  
 
On the one hand, this embrace is somewhat surprising given shared suspicions about 
foreign capital as a vector of imperialism during the 1990s, as well as a potential source 
of threats to state enterprises. However, both have balanced these concerns with the 
needs identified above by adopting a highly selective approach to FDI attraction, heavily 
constraining the entry of FDI into (state-dominated) strategic services and infrastructure, 
and instead seeking to concentrate FDI in manufacturing (particularly in export-oriented 
manufacturing) (see Chapters 3-6). Whilst Vietnam’s developmentalism relied much 
earlier than Ethiopia on rising foreign investment inflows (being unable, until the mid-
1990s, to access large-scale concessional financing and with its large protected market 
proving a draw to regional investors), its investment climate was highly restrictive, and 
helped to funnel FDI into manufacturing and construction in the 1990s (see Chapter 5). 
These inflows, together with rapid export growth, were a key component of the early 
stabilisation and transition (Weeks, 2001). After the US-Vietnam BTA was signed a 
much more concerted push to attract FDI in light manufacturing emerged, which was 
followed in 2007 by Vietnam’s WTO accession. Increased interest from investors 
themselves, however, resulted from several factors: more favourable terms of market 
access; serious investments in infrastructure which markedly improved its road, port and 
industrial park infrastructure in the 1990s (with heavy support from Japan, and the 
World Bank); and the eagerness of investors themselves to use Vietnam as a ‘China-
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plus-one’ manufacturing base (see Chapter 6). Together such shifts helped turn a low-
wage advantage into the basis for the emergence of a major export-oriented 
manufacturing hub. 
 
In contrast, Ethiopia struggled to attract much FDI into manufacturing during the 1990s 
and early 2000s, despite high-level economic diplomacy from the country’s former 
Prime Minister. The formation of the EIZ in 2009 represented tentative increased 
interest in Ethiopia from Asian manufacturing firms. However, toward the end of the 
first GTP – as signalled by the formation of the IDPC in 2014 – a much more dedicated 
state-led push toward fostering Ethiopia’s insertion into the GVC regime emerged (see 
Chapter 4). As in Vietnam, the turn toward export-oriented FDI was a response to 
domestic economic challenges. The need to both create employment (in the context of 
a young and urbanising population) and rapidly increase the country’s export earnings 
(to resolve the increasingly pressing balance of payments constraint) has therefore seen 
Ethiopia emerge as the so-called  ‘last development frontier’ (Aglionby, 2017) and new 
rival to Vietnam in low-cost labour abundant potential manufacturing hubs. Like 
Vietnam, infrastructure mega-projects, across transport (road, ports and railways), 
industrial parks and electricity generation investments, have been critical – arguably 
even more so given the country’s land-locked status – to efforts to plug itself into a low-
wage and low-cost position in the global division of labour. Such infrastructure projects, 
as in Vietnam, have often been undertaken by state enterprises using combinations of 
public investment, ODA, and foreign and domestic borrowing (see Chapter 4).  
 
Overall, although Ethiopia and Vietnam are at very different stages of integration into 
GVCs, they have embraced a relatively orthodox approach to utilising FDI to develop 
light manufacturing, but as part of efforts to preserve a broader heterodox approach. 
Neither has banked on these networks alone to be capable of powering structural 
transformation of the economy, and thus there is countervailing industrial activity 
occurring in country through the state finance-industry-infrastructure nexus. In this 
sense there has recently emerged a markedly similar form of actually existing 
developmentalism in Ethiopia and Vietnam organised around three key policy pillars: 
the state finance-industry-infrastructure nexus; a strong role for public investment; and 
the embrace of FDI in export-oriented light manufacturing.  
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7.3 Divergent treatments in the development literature 
 
Although Ethiopia and Vietnam’s strategies markedly diverge from the neoliberal 
development template in the ways outlined above, the two countries have been subject 
to very different treatments by the mainstream development literature. In Vietnam, 
during its first period of transition to a market-oriented economy its experience was 
embraced as a vindication of mainstream reform (see Chapter 5), despite the clear 
tension involved in also admitting that Vietnam retained many ‘bad policies’ (Dollar, 
2002), and Vietnam ending the 1990s as one of the most protectionist countries in the 
world (Riedel and Turley, 1999; Hill, 2000). More recently, the emergence of a 
mainstream-informed ‘Viet-pessimism’ (see Chapter 6) has concretised  around either 
its (supposed) poor comparative performance (either with reference to China, or its own 
past), or predictions of doom regarding the future, given the so-called ‘incomplete 
nature’ of its reforms and commercialised and fragmented politics (Thanh and Dapice, 
2009; Nghia et al., 2013; Viet Sinh et al., 2016). So whilst Vietnam’s successes are 
attributed to its more-or-less conformity with the mainstream development template, all 
its problems (real and projected) are attributed to its deviation from it. In neither period 
has the mainstream given Vietnam credit for its unorthodox reforms.   
 
In contrast, mainstream scholarship has been unable to offer an analysis of Ethiopia’s 
experience that conforms with the consensus development template. The difference 
between treatments of the two countries is illustrated by two recent World Bank reports. 
Whilst the flagship World Bank and MPI report, Vietnam 2035, compares Vietnam’s 
development path with that in the Growth Commission report (CGD, 2008) and suggests 
‘Vietnam has deployed these ingredients to good effect’ (Viet Sinh et al., 2016, p.3), a 
World Bank report on Ethiopia’s economic model published in the same year said that 
Ethiopia’s experience ‘bears little resemblance to the conceived wisdom derived from 
the Growth Commission’ (Moller, 2016, p.21). Vietnam’s zig-zig reform process has 
aided such interpretations, despite weighty evidence of the enduring nature of its 
heterodox approach, and the fact that condemnations of its economic performance really 
offer no credible grounds for fatalistic critiques (see Chapter 6). In Ethiopia, both the 
‘absence of concurrent major structural reforms’ during its high growth period (Moller, 
2016, p.113) and EPRDF’s strong advocacy for its own approach to development, which 
is rooted in a staunch critique of neoliberal development advice (see Chapter 4), has 
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helped move the mainstream development literature toward an increasingly grudging 
admission of the heterodox nature of its approach to development (although one which 
is predicated on Ethiopia’s uniqueness, rather than a source of lessons for elsewhere, or 
the literature in general). A recent study building on the analysis in this report also notes 
that Ethiopia’s heterodox (for which read, bad) policies ‘only moderately held back 
growth’ (Moller and Wacker, 2017, p.198). It instead argues that the country’s more 
mainstream measures supported growth, offering a counter-factual argument that 
Ethiopia may have grown even faster had it only adopted even more mainstream reforms. 
Like Vietnam, therefore, the mainstream development community’s commitment to 
deeper market-oriented structural reform has remained unmoved by the encounter with 
Ethiopia’s heterodox developmentalism. Service sector liberalisation in particular, 
directly targeting the state finance-industry-infrastructure nexus, is the top priority 
structural reform proposed for Ethiopia to reap the taken-for-granted benefits of 
deepened reform (Moller, 2016, p.129). This forcefully exposes the limits of the 
mainstream accommodation of Ethiopia’s unorthodox strategy, since even where there 
is an apparent acknowledgement that its past performance may have been partly the 
result of heterodox strategies (as Moller (2016) appears to admit), these cannot be a 
guide to the future in Ethiopia or elsewhere. 
 
In contrast, more heterodox interpretations of both countries’ development models have 
tended to centre around efforts to fit their experiences into the developmental state 
paradigm (Pham, 2012; Routley, 2012; Fantini, 2013; Clapham, 2018; Hauge, 2018) 
(see Chapters 4 and 6). Yet in both cases, the criteria for the application of this label is 
often fuzzy, with a lack of clarity about when either country became a developmental 
state, and when they might cease to be so. This in turn begs the question of which factors, 
and in which combinations, justify the application of this label: success in some measure 
of development (regardless of the cause); the use of industrial policies; intervention in 
the economy; a developmental ideology; or political regime features, such as ‘embedded 
autonomy’ and a meritocratic bureaucracy. In Ethiopia and Vietnam, the application of 
this label is further complicated by their considerable (and specific) divergence from the 
East Asian experiences (see Chapters 4 and 6). Whilst both countries share a stronger 
commitment to manufacturing development and higher levels of state intervention to 
achieve this than many other contemporary late developers, both Ethiopia and Vietnam 
also diverge from the developmental state experiences in the substance of their strategies, 
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the political and economic relations used to implement these strategies, and the global 
context in which the trajectory has been carved out. This adds up to an altogether 
different set of policies (particularly toward the state sector and GVCs), political regime 
features (particularly the predominance of state-state enterprise relations, over the state-
business relations of the East Asian cases), and constraints and pressures (both domestic, 
and from the global neoliberal order). 
 
This suggests the developmental state literature both gives a limited guide to 
understanding the substance of these trajectories in their own terms, as well as 
inadequate analytical tools for understanding their potential for success, particularly 
given the preoccupation of the literature with the embedded autonomy of elite 
bureaucracies from a business class; a story that forms no major part of either country’s 
development strategy. Instead what we see in both countries is a distinctive form of 
twenty-first century developmentalism organised around the three pillars – state control 
over the commanding heights, high rates of public investment (heavily channelled into 
infrastructure) and foreign investment to facilitate integration into GVCs – as examined 
in Section 7.2. In each this has emerged due to similarities in their political economies, 
but with very different domestic pressures and social forces impacting the shifts in, and 
effectiveness of, these trajectories. Furthermore, the pressures each has faced from the 
global neoliberal order in implementing their strategies have markedly differed, both 
from the post-war NICs and from each other, as explored in the next section.  
 
7.4 Navigating the neoliberal global architecture 
 
Indeed, despite strong deviation from neoliberal policy norms nationally, neither 
country exists outside of neoliberalism globally, and the development trajectories of 
Ethiopia and Vietnam are fundamentally interwoven with global economic and political 
forces. In engaging with this global order to implement the heterodox policies outlined 
in Section 7.2, the EPRDF and CPV have displayed considerable strategic adroitness. 
This section considers the similarities and differences in the approaches by which each 
has engaged with the four global constraints to heterodox development strategies 
outlined in Chapter 2: IFI conditionalities; FDI and GVC integration; the global trade 
and investment regime; and financialisation. The objective of this section is to consider, 
in light of the generalised pessimism in the heterodox literature (see Chapter 2), how 
two poor and peripheral late developers have engaged with powerful global-level 
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political and economic forces to carve out the policy space for heterodox 
developmentalism in the age of neoliberalism.  
 
7.4.1 International financial institutions and ODA architecture 
 
In the context of widespread poverty, devastation following prolonged conflict and 
external shocks, both Ethiopia and Vietnam undertook structural adjustment lending 
from the IMF and World Bank in the 1990s. However, both countries also resisted 
considerable policy-related pressure for deepened liberalisation, and subsequently 
emerged as amongst the world’s largest recipients of IDA funds. Vietnam’s access to 
ODA was constrained until the mid-1990s by the US embargo (see Chapter 5). Notably, 
by the time Vietnam contracted ESAF and SAC loans in 1994, most decisive measures 
toward a market economy were complete, the country had adjusted to CMEA’s collapse 
(Weeks, 2001), and the economy was growing strongly at 8.8 per cent (World Bank, 
2018g). Increased foreign capital inflows after foreign investment was liberalised in 
1988 also helped to compensate for the absence of large-scale ODA, and FDI was of 
much greater significance during most of the 1990s (see Chapter 5). In contrast, 
Ethiopia’s early ODA inflows gave ODA greater economic significance, and the 
country was a very unattractive place for foreign investors in the 1990s (Abegaz, 1999). 
There was also no agricultural turn-around comparable to that in Vietnam capable of 
providing rapid export growth. The SAF loan from the IMF in 1992 was followed by a 
SAC loan from the World Bank in 1993 (Chole, 2004), and during the 1990s, ODA was 
equivalent to 90 per cent of budgetary expenditure and 24 per cent of GNP (Abegaz, 
1999) (see Chapter 3). Due to the conflict with Eritrea and disputed 2005 election, 
Ethiopia’s funders have also placed considerably more political pressure on the EPRDF 
than has been seen in Vietnam (see Chapters 3 and 4). 
 
Yet despite such structural differences in their relations with the international aid 
architecture, both countries have been singled out for unusually strong policy ownership 
with regard to the IFIs and bilateral donors (Whitfield, 2009; Thoburn, 2013). Three 
broad similarities are identifiable in how they have navigated this terrain. The first 
relates to ODA management strategies, specifically to tactics for managing the 
government-donor relationship. A strongly held domestic political conviction that loans 
and grants erode domestic sovereignty is evident in both countries. In 2005, Meles 
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Zenawi critiqued the ‘rent-seeking’ relationship between African states and donors, 
which he lambasted as ‘donors buying policies in return for aid’ (Embassy Addis Ababa, 
2006). Former Vietnamese Minister of Planning and Investment, Tran Xuan Gia 
similarly once described the IMF’s policy conditions as ‘painful and humiliating’ 
(World Bank, 2012, p.19). As a result of this stance, foreign governments describe 
relations with the EPRDF and CPV as occurring on an equal footing (Solheim, 2005, 
p.5; Oqubay, 2015, p.287). National policy dialogue is also limited in a number of 
respects. Central Ministries (the Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation in 
Ethiopia, and the Ministry of Planning and Investment in Vietnam) coordinate ODA 
relations, keeping strong oversight, whilst national policy deliberation in both countries 
also tends to be conducted in closed intra-party forums, limiting the capacity for foreign 
actors to influence key decisions, debates and documents (Forsberg and Kokko, 2007; 
Furtado and Smith, 2009). The IMF and IDA complained in 2011 that several months 
elapsed between the final GTP I strategy being agreed and shared with the country’s 
donors (IDA and IMF, 2011), whilst Vietnam’s PRSP was produced in Vietnamese first, 
and only later translated into English (Ohno and Ohno, 2005).  
 
Relatedly, the EPRDF and CPV have been proactive and strategic in their engagement 
with funders. Each forged an increasingly accommodating relationship with the World 
Bank during the 2000s, and are now amongst the biggest recipients of IDA funds in the 
world (see Chapters 4 and 6 and Appendix D). Ethiopia’s strategic significance as a key 
ally on the global war on terror, which the EPRDF has deliberately cultivated to its own 
advantage (Oqubay, 2015), has certainly helped it to resist reform pressures whilst also 
ensuring increases in ODA inflows. Both Ethiopia and Vietnam also share a reputation 
as effective loan recipients and development success stories, increasing funders’ 
incentives to remain engaged despite policy disagreements (Forsberg, 2008; Prizzon and 
Rogerson, 2013). This signals the complex motives which underpin the international 
financial architecture, which both regimes have successfully leveraged to support a 
heterodox development model, especially since in both countries ODA has proved an 
important source of infrastructure and productive investment financing (despite the 
latter falling out of fashion in the neoliberal period) (see Chapters 4 and 6).  
 
Finally here both regimes have also cultivated large inflows from strategic Asian 
partners. Between 2009-2012, Ethiopia was the second largest recipient of Chinese 
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infrastructure financing to the continent (after Ghana), receiving US$ 4.7 billion from 
China for infrastructure alone (Gutman et al., 2015). Japan has been one of Vietnam’s 
biggest funders in the post-doi moi period, with an ODA portfolio heavily skewed 
toward large infrastructure projects. Between 1995-2013, power projects funded by 
Japanese ODA in Vietnam alone totalled approximately US$ 11 billion (Pham, 2017). 
Whilst both regimes have found these funds come with distinct pressures, such as the 
need to use Chinese contractors with Chinese loans (see Chapter 4) and strong policy 
pressures from the alignment between the Japanese government and the country’s 
investors (Chapter 6), each has effectively leveraged these relations to secure additional 
funds in support of their heterodox development plans.   
 
The second relates to the common reasons both have objected to the reform pressures 
emanating from the IFIs. A similar objection to externally-imposed one-size-fits-all 
policies is paired with a robust preference for context-specific, nationally-determined, 
development plans and policies (see Chapter 3 and Chapter 5). Pre-existing and 
nationally-determined priorities have led both governments to provide lists of projects 
that need financing to funders. Indeed, a major source of criticism from the IMF and 
World Bank of Ethiopia’s first GTP was that the government was only interested in 
‘discuss[ing] financing with the donor community’ (IDA and IMF, 2011, p.11) – rather 
than the substance of the strategy. During annual consultative meetings between donors 
and the government in Vietnam the CPV likewise ‘submits a list of projects to be funded 
through development assistance’ (Nørlund et al., 2003, pp.41–42). As a result it has 
been described by a senior IMF official as having a ‘very clear blueprint for what 
assistance is needed, where it was needed and how it tied to their five-year plan’ 
(Solheim, 2005, p.8). This has resulted in some similar strategies for engaging in 
standardising processes such as the PRSP, which both countries managed to largely 
subordinate to pre-existing development plans and strategies. Vietnam’s CPRGS and 
Ethiopia’s PASDEP plans put forward unorthodox approaches to poverty reduction 
rooted in broad efforts to grow and transform the economy (see Chapter 4 and Chapter 
6). The PRSP was thus a gift to these two assertive regimes, demonstrating the capacity 
of both the EPRDF and CPV to repurpose a funding modality much-criticised for 
imposing neoliberal reforms on developing countries (see Chapter 2) to support more 
heterodox-oriented strategies. 
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Furthermore, the content of both of their strategies is a fundamental driver of their 
opposition to mainstream development reforms and thus IFI pressures. Indeed, it is the 
shared red lines about policy no-go areas that have caused both the EPRDF and CPV to 
forego scheduled lending rather than undertake politically and economically sensitive 
reforms. The pace of privatisation has been a particularly important factor in disputes 
over their reform trajectories with the IFIs (Abegaz, 1999; Rama, 2008), as well as more 
specific concerns such as capital controls and central bank monitoring (see Chapter 3 
and 5). It is this common emphasis on preserving the state sector that has caused the two 
regimes to test the boundaries of what is possible in terms of engaging neoliberal 
institutions in the support of a decidedly unorthodox strategy. Without this strong 
commitment to preserving the commanding heights of the economy in state hands it is 
hard to imagine either regime would have gone to such lengths to resist the imposition 
of neoliberal reforms. In addition, this approach to managing the political economy of 
the transitional period has limited the emergence of rival centres of economic and 
political power that might have formed powerful domestic constituencies pushing for 
the adoption of neoliberal reforms. Ultimately, therefore, none of the specific strategies 
by which the EPRDF and CPV have engaged with the IFIs can be appreciated outside 
of the form of developmentalism both have sought to create. This broader political 
economy context has ultimately acted as both a motivation for, and enabler of, resistance 
to the specific policy pressures emanating from the IFIs.  
 
Third, and finally, both the EPRDF and CPV have placed a high premium on 
macroeconomic stability, which both connect with regime hegemony. Due to the red 
lines above, Vietnam has opted to contract no lending with the IMF since the 2001-2002 
PRGF loan, and in Ethiopia since the 2009-2010 ESF, which, in both cases is due to 
what Fund reports admit is a lack of interest (and, crucially, need) for its funding (see 
Chapters 4 and 6).  This is notable since it also suggests the EPRDF and CPV have both 
been able to withstand the cancelation of scheduled projects politically, including the 
potential political cost of cutting imports and scheduled investment projects, as well as 
economically. Concerning the latter, it indicates each has had sufficient fiscal space and 
macroeconomic stability to sacrifice scheduled loan tranches and avoid crisis-induced 
IMF lending. As discussed in Section 7.2.2, the domestic premium placed on 
macroeconomic stability is a hallmark of their particular variety of developmentalism. 
However, the fiscal space that underpins this capacity to turn down planned-for funding 
300 
 
 
is both historically constituted and context-specific. Vietnam’s FDI inflows, rapid 
export growth, strong tax revenues and broader economic buoyancy in the 1990s helped 
to off-set macroeconomic risks which might originate from turning down ODA. 
Meanwhile, its unorthodox macroeconomic policies helped it weather the regional crisis 
better than many of its neighbours, insulating it from crisis-induced lending (see Chapter 
5). In Ethiopia, whilst ODA has been much more significant economically, aid volatility 
in the 1990s meant the EPRDF got used to doing without investible funds, and the 
EPRDF often channelled ODA inflows into foreign reserves before expanding 
investment (see Chapters 3). Meanwhile in the 2000s, a major effort to expand export 
earnings by embracing GVC integration has been motivated by the desire to secure 
alternative sources of foreign currency in order (in part) to avoid the need for future IMF 
loans (see Chapter 4).  
 
Thus in both countries macroeconomic stability is considered of fundamental 
significance to regime stability. Fforde (2017, p.45) for instance notes that only when 
‘macroeconomic instability actually or potentially threatens the regime, the Politburo 
gains authority to act’. Senior Ethiopian officials likewise consider it a matter of 
existential importance to avoid a balance of payments crisis in order to keep the IMF – 
and its associated policy conditions – at bay (see Chapter 4). This further signals the 
limited political or economic aid dependence in both Ethiopia and Vietnam, indicating 
the limits of purely statistical approaches to conceptualising this phenomenon (see 
Chapter 3). Cumulatively, therefore, these three factors show the space for 
developmentalism which can be created by regimes assertively engaging with the IFIs. 
Nevertheless, the comparative experience also yields a complex picture of institutional 
arrangements, political economy specificities, and macroeconomic management, which 
have enabled this distinctive degree of policy ownership to emerge in both countries. 
  
7.4.2 GVC integration 
 
As noted in section 7.1.3, both the EPRDF and CPV regimes have embraced their 
integration into GVCs through the attraction of sizeable FDI into the light 
manufacturing sectors. As well as a pillar of their developmentalism, the challenges 
posed by this modality of international integration are such that, whilst boosting exports 
and creating jobs, such strategies can lead to very shallow forms of structural 
301 
 
 
transformation, highly dependent on imported inputs and with limited linkages to the 
domestic economy, thereby placing great emphasis on the dynamics of upgrading as a 
route to building domestic manufacturing capacity (see Chapter 2). At very different 
stages of this process, and having rather different experiences to date, Ethiopia and 
Vietnam reveal rather different facets of the development challenge arising from the 
contemporary global production structure.  
 
Vietnam’s long-standing experience here suggests several important lessons for 
Ethiopia. The first is that dependence on FDI can be particularly problematic in 
amplifying pressure from the global aid architecture, especially when foreign capital 
and governments join forces to influence development policy via ODA channels, as 
happened with Vietnam concerning a range of investment-related policies, including 
localisation targets in the early 2000s (see Chapter 6). This suggests Ethiopia should 
therefore be wary that such new pressures may emerge given the high levels of both 
ODA and FDI entering the country. The second is that Vietnam has had to pay a rather 
high price to make its export-oriented manufacturing strategy a success through the 
embrace of bilateral and multilateral trade integration. Until Vietnam joined the WTO, 
foreign investors were subject to special corporate taxation policies, dual pricing 
(affecting airport and seaport charges, customs and utilities), local content and export 
requirements and limitations and foreign exchange balancing requirements, all of which 
were dismantled in the 2005 Law on Investment which was required as part of the 
accession process (UNCTAD, 2007, p.41). This indicates that at least until the mid-
2000s, Vietnam has been more assertive in managing its foreign investors than Ethiopia 
is at present.  
 
However, as these instruments were dismantled in the run-up to Vietnam’s WTO 
accession, in concert with parallel pressure from the country’s largest donor, Japan, and 
the rise of provincial lobbying which pushed Vietnam toward a decentralised investment 
licence approvals system, the challenge of ensuring spill-overs from FDI in Vietnam 
has markedly increased. Whilst FDI has helped to create manufacturing jobs and 
diversify the country’s exports (two important indicators of structural transformation), 
building linkages and upgrading have been considerably more challenging, and Vietnam 
remains heavily reliant on imported inputs (see Chapter 6). Low levels of value addition 
in many of Vietnam’s key exports attest to the impacts of this challenge, signalling the 
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outcome of efforts to balance a development strategy around two poles – state and 
foreign capital – has been to circumscribe the space for higher-value added 
manufacturing activities, despite achieving the original goals of providing fresh export, 
employment and foreign investment dynamism to the Vietnamese economy. Both the 
competitive pressures of the sectors and sourcing practices of lead firms, as well as 
policy disorganisation, internal competition for FDI (which result in poor oversight and 
monitoring), and constraints on Vietnam’s scope to compel investors to buy locally, has 
meant FDI attraction has increasingly become a policy end in and of itself. This indicates 
deepened integration into the global trade and production regimes together pose 
complex industrial policy challenges that are in turn likely to require coordinated 
industrial policy action. In Vietnam such coordination has been made particularly 
challenging due to the long-standing trends toward policy fragmentation (see Chapter 5) 
which were considerably intensified by the pressures of deepened international 
integration (see Chapter 6).   
 
In Ethiopia, similarly, the turn toward GVCs has represented an attempt to resolve 
domestic political and economic problems. In its case, these are chiefly concentrated 
around the need to rapidly generate exports and employment in the context of concerns 
over the economic fragility generated by its highly import-dependent rapid growth 
trajectory and the political challenge of unemployment in urban areas (as discussed in 
Chapter 4). As in Vietnam, the cost of achieving these goals may well be limits to the 
domestic value addition generated in the export-oriented manufacturing sector. Given 
Ethiopia’s status as an unproven and emerging destination for FDI in light 
manufacturing, and the ERPDF’s need for these investments to yield strong results 
quickly, officials have (to date) felt constrained in their capacity to deploy industrial 
policy tools such as local content requirements (which remain available to them due to 
the country having not yet joined the WTO) to impose performance requirements on its 
foreign investors (see Chapter 4). Furthermore, the quality investors Ethiopia has 
targeted to enter the country’s industrial parks appear to have few intentions to source 
from domestic producers, signalling considerable challenges ahead in this regard. In 
addition, the rising ethnic tensions in Ethiopia since 2015 pose a major risk to the 
country’s desirability for such investment inflows, which are partly predicated on its 
reputation for political stability. With protests having targeted the country’s foreign 
investors in the past, this represents a critical area of vulnerability in regards to the 
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EPRDF’s developmental project (see Chapter 4). All of this suggests that the EPRDF’s 
leverage over its foreign investors may be more limited in practice than it appears in 
theory, and may pose considerable challenges in terms of building backward linkages 
within the economy.  
 
Notably, however, whilst each regime has turned to GVCs to help resolve domestic 
political and economic problems connected with export and employment growth (see 
Chapters 4 and 6) neither has banked on GVCs to be capable alone of propelling 
economic catch-up. The state finance-industry-infrastructure nexus in each context thus 
forms an important alternative motor through which each regime hopes to power 
structural transformation, and the GVC regime has indeed been embraced in part to 
sustain this heterodox element of their respective development strategies. This broader 
approach is needed to understand the ways in which the global restructuring of 
production impacts both Ethiopia or Vietnam’s development strategies, and their late 
development prospects.  
 
7.4.3 Global trade and investment regime 
 
The third global channel for the transmission of neoliberalism emanates from trade and 
investment agreements. Here the two countries experiences have once again further 
diverged. Vietnam’s export-oriented manufacturing strategy grew in significance after 
it signed the most comprehensive BTA agreed by any country with the US up to that 
point (Manyin, 2001, p.17). This proved to be deeply domestically controversial, due to 
the ways in which expanded foreign competition was expected to impact the state sector 
(see Chapter 6). In an increasingly competitive global trading environment, the price to 
preserve Vietnam’s desirability as a destination for FDI in light manufacturing 
(including in new areas such as computers and electronics), has been Vietnam’s entry 
into increasing numbers of preferential and free trade agreements to enhance its terms 
of market access (see Chapter 6). What is notable here, beyond the elimination of 
subsidies to state enterprises, tariff reductions, termination of local content requirements 
and other classic industrial policy tools, is how these agreements have contributed to the 
distortion of the first pillar of the Vietnamese developmental strategy: its state 
enterprises. On the one hand, the ways in which the CPV has responded to the country’s 
WTO accession by restructuring the state sector to protect it from increased competition 
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and WTO rules which reduce the tools to provide sustained direct state support indicates 
the capacity for the Vietnamese party-state to continue to defy mainstream hopes that 
the WTO would prove a ‘lock-in’ mechanism for market-oriented reforms. Instead, a 
premium has been placed on protecting the state sector during trade agreement 
negotiations (Fujita, 2017b; Vu-Thanh, 2017), indicating considerable policy 
adaptability on the part of the CPV to global-level constraints.  
 
However, the approach taken to sustaining its export-oriented FDI sector has been 
fragmentation of its state enterprise sector, and rising speculative investment. Whilst the 
tendency for the state sector to adjust to challenging economic circumstances by 
pursuing profitable investment opportunities outside core activities pre-dated Vietnam’s 
accession to the WTO (Beresford, 2008), the political strategies pursued in the run-up 
to this accession have helped to compound such tendencies in ways which have diverted 
investments from productive activities (Vu-Thanh, 2017) (see Chapter 6). However, 
whilst the fragmentation of Vietnam’s industrial policy-making capacity is a frequent 
target for criticism (Pincus, 2015; Viet Sinh et al., 2016; Masina and Cerimele, 2018), 
the contribution of deepened international integration to domestic policy disorganisation 
is often overlooked. Yet Vietnam’s deepened integration into the global trade and 
investment regime has exacerbated an existing tendency in the Vietnamese state system 
that further complicates its capacity to provide the coordinated industrial policy 
interventions required in the challenging context of global neoliberalism. One further 
price for the continued viability of Vietnam’s FDI-led light manufacturing strategy has 
therefore been the erosion of the state’s capacity to control, rather than merely occupy, 
the commanding heights of the economy.  
 
In contrast, in Ethiopia reticence to join the WTO has been very strong, and no bilateral 
trade deals marking progress toward WTO accession have been signed to date (see 
Chapter 4). The state sector, as in Vietnam in the 1990s, remains a significant cause of 
this reluctance to decisively enter the global trade and investment regime, particularly 
in terms of telecoms and finance liberalisation (Chapter 4). However, in stark and 
important contrast to Vietnam, Ethiopia has the relatively rare distinction of being able 
to pursue an export-led manufacturing strategy outside the multilateral trading system. 
The historical dividend of UNCTAD’s GSP project has given Ethiopia non-reciprocal 
quota and duty free access to the strategic US and EU markets on account of it being an 
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African country that is also an LDC. It is ultimately the interaction between Ethiopia’s 
domestic political economy, which has conditioned the EPRDF’s reluctance to embrace 
trade agreements, and such distinctive global circumstances, that together have allowed 
the EPRDF to try and resolve the constraints of its public-investment led approach 
through export-oriented light manufacturing, without having to agree either bilateral, 
multilateral or regional trade deals of any significance. This affords Ethiopia an 
(ultimately time-limited) opportunity unavailable to Vietnam to simultaneously 
undertake the coupling of GVC-led light manufacturing, the preservation of its state 
finance-industry-infrastructure nexus oriented toward import-substituting 
industrialisation, and strategic infrastructure mega-projects, without conceding the 
policy space required by signing reciprocal trade agreements. Ethiopia thus enjoys a 
very different structural position within the global trade system to Vietnam at the time 
it was attempting to accelerate its GVC integration, which faced steep tariffs from its 
non-MFN status in the US market until the end of 2001 (see Chapter 6). This quite 
sizeable difference, with important implications for the policy space of each, strongly 
indicates the historical and context-specific nature of global constraints to national 
development trajectories.  
 
Alongside this, and mirroring Vietnam’s state enterprise restructuring efforts (see 
Section 7.2.1), the EPRDF has been attempting to prepare the state sector for eventual 
WTO accession via the formation of large state entities to oversee enterprises in similar 
sectors. However, with little of the fragmentation, conflicting social, political, and 
economic mandates, and independent power bases of state enterprise managers notable 
in Vietnam on display in Ethiopia, there is no reason to assume the same challenges 
which have faced Vietnam in deploying this approach will face Ethiopia.    
 
7.4.4 Financialisation and the global financial architecture  
 
The fourth and final channel, financialisation, has been of either muted or negligible 
impact in both places, largely because of the strong commitment in each to retaining 
strong state dominance of the banking system. Both the EPRDF and CPV consider the 
financial system a vital tool for the determination of the pattern of resource allocation 
in the economy, directing credit (including on preferential terms) to favoured sectors, 
biased toward infrastructure and industry, and often through state enterprises (see 
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Section 7.2.1). Ethiopia’s refusal to join the WTO has partly stemmed from its 
unwillingness to open the financial sector to foreign banks, which helps to channel credit 
to the productive sector. Capital controls, as discussed in Section 7.1.1, remain in place 
and were the basis of the major rupture in relations with the IMF at the end of the 1990s 
(Wade, 2001a). The strong intolerance for rent-seeking – namely economic activities 
not directed at productive ends (see Chapters 3 and 4) – conditions a policy climate in 
which it would be hard for a strong policy case for greater financial liberalisation to 
presently take hold. Together, these factors mean the power of short-term foreign capital 
to act as a disciplining mechanism over the Ethiopian policy environment is limited. 
Instead, Ethiopia retains the (not distinctively neoliberal) challenge of trying to manage 
FDI in the ways discussed above.  
 
In Vietnam, the state’s presence in the banking and broader financial system is also 
substantial (see Section 7.2.1.), and financial liberalisation has been gradual. The 
financial system has been adapted to both IFI pressures with the formation of DAF in 
1999, and in response to WTO pressures with the formation of VDB in 2006, in ways 
which indicate persistent efforts to retain policy influence over financial flows in the 
economy (see Chapters 5 and 6). However, with the run-up country’s WTO accession 
leading to a boom in speculative (rather than productive) lending, particularly in finance 
and real estate sectors, including from within the state sector (Cheshier and Pincus, 
2010), speculative lending has proliferated from within the finance-industry-
infrastructure nexus, which has been an (at least partially unintended) side-effect of 
allowing SEGs to move into the purchase of financial institutions in the run-up to the 
WTO (Vu-Thanh, 2017). Nonetheless, the recent efforts by the SBV to constrain real 
estate lending and to force state enterprises to sell non-core businesses (Chapter 6), 
indicate the persistence of a policy-logic at odds with the diversion of funds from the 
real to financial sector. With the state still retaining a controlling share in many of the 
country’s largest commercial banks (see Chapter 6), who are many of the main players 
in the speculative lending boom, the CPV therefore (at least in theory) retains the 
influence to re-subordinate lending priorities and investment decisions toward 
productive sector activities. Finally, with the CPV having retained the capacity to enact 
capital controls during major economic stress (Section 7.1.3), Vietnam’s exposure to 
the disciplinary mechanism of large-scale capital flight is also very limited. In these 
respects, therefore, both Ethiopia and Vietnam have retained a form of state control over 
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the inter-sectoral and inter-temporal allocation of resources that belies the imperatives 
of financialisation. 
 
In summary, across all four elements of the global order considered to be potential 
vectors for neoliberalism, three conclusions can be drawn. The first is that the EPRDF 
and CPV have found considerable scope to both resist IFI policy pressures and leverage 
such funds to support transformative heterodox development strategies. In this their 
experiences expose the divisions between the IMF and World Bank which regimes with 
countervailing policy visions can exploit to support unorthodox approaches to 
development. However, the highly restrictive nature of these enabling dynamics, 
particularly within their political economies, suggests that studies examining the extent 
to which IFIs are able to influence the policy regimes of developing countries should 
place primacy on the examination of the role played by domestic social forces in 
facilitating vulnerability to IFI conditionality pressure. Yet, as Vietnam’s case illustrates, 
the IMF has been considerably easier to manage than the systems of rules stemming 
from the global trade and investment regime and policy vulnerabilities emanating from 
dependence on FDI. This suggests the complexity of sustaining developmentalism in 
the era of neoliberalism markedly increases the more deeply a country integrates into 
global trade and production structures. Nevertheless, with Ethiopia enjoying a very 
different structural position with regard to the global trade regime, the chapter also 
illustrates the importantly variegated nature of global constraints to development in the 
neoliberal period. This empirical finding reinforces the necessity to understand the 
relationship between national development and global capitalism to be dynamic in 
nature, rather than fixed or pre-determined, as discussed theoretically in Chapter 2.   
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter considered how a comparative analysis of the post-transition development 
trajectories of Ethiopia and Vietnam, two of the most striking development success 
stories of the neoliberal period, can enhance our understanding of the relationship 
between national development and the global economic and political order. The chapter 
has argued that some important commonalities in their political economies at the time 
of the transition toward market-oriented economy, as well as common political and 
ideological orientations within their dominant regimes, has helped to shape similar 
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varieties of actually existing developmentalism.  This means that despite very different 
starting points and sequencing, both countries have ultimately adopted an approach to 
developmentalism in the age of neoliberalism organised around three shared pillars: 
state ownership across the commanding heights of the economy; high rates of public 
investment, large shares of which are channelled into infrastructure and industrial 
development (particularly through the state sector); and integration into global light 
manufacturing industries through GVCs. This hybrid approach has seen each embrace 
a comparative advantage-conforming pillar (the GVC) to sustain a developmental 
strategy underpinned by widespread state ownership of the economy and heterodox 
macroeconomic fundamentals.  
 
A number of distinct domestic political challenges also impact this common strategy 
differently, however. Vietnam’s highly decentralised political system and the political 
weight of both provinces and state enterprises within the overall balance of social forces 
has contributed decisively to policy fragmentation, impacting the efficacy of policies 
directed toward foreign capital, infrastructure provision and the state sector. Meanwhile, 
the growing significance of ethnic fault lines within Ethiopian politics, which both 
prompted the EPRDF’s accelerated development ambitions in the mid-2000s, and 
prompted major political changes in 2018, impact both the country’s desirability to 
foreign investors, and make the domestic consensus underpinning the country’s 
development strategy much more fragile than that in Vietnam. Despite their similar 
approaches to late development in the age of neoliberalism, their respective prospects 
for success are likely to be importantly shaped by these distinct domestic concerns. 
   
Such attention to the shared policy pillars and differential domestic constraints of these 
cases of actually existing developmentalism is important for two reasons. First, existing 
mainstream and heterodox interpretations of their trajectories tend to miss much of 
significant about their experiences. Mainstream interpretations either downplay the 
extent to which they are heterodox (in Vietnam’s case) or the extent to which their 
unorthodox characteristics are important (in Ethiopia’s case). In contrast, through efforts 
to assimilate their experiences into the developmental state paradigm, the heterodoxy 
obscures as much as it reveals about the specificities of both the EPRDF and CPV’s 
models, as well as the constraints facing them. Second, attention to the hybridity of their 
approaches offers a lens through which to explore the impacts of the neoliberal global 
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order on their developmental strategies. The chapter has therefore demonstrated that 
despite considerable challenges emanating from global political and economic forces, 
these two late developing, poor and peripheral economies have shown considerable 
creativity in engaging with these strictures. Nonetheless, growing entanglement with the 
global neoliberal order, particularly through participation in GVCs and the global trade 
and investment regime, has undeniably compromised the broader development space of 
Vietnam, indicating that deepened international integration under the neoliberal order 
gives rise to increasingly challenging trade-offs. The implications of such analysis for 
the thesis’s overarching concerns are further explored in the Conclusion, alongside 
avenues for further research.  
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has focused on the impact of the global political and economic order of 
neoliberalism on prospects for late development. First, the thesis offered a critique of 
the dominant mainstream and heterodox approaches to understanding the relationship 
between global conditions and national development prospects, developed through the 
literature review and theoretical discussion in Chapter 2. This chapter also advanced an 
alternative analytical framework organised around the idea of actually existing 
developmentalism. This was used to bridge the divide between the domestic and global 
political economy and trace the concrete impacts of global forces on contemporary late 
developers. Second, the political economy of two important examples of actually 
existing developmentalism was explored in Chapters 3-6. These chapters assessed the 
impacts of global forces on contemporary catch-up efforts in two of the most successful 
developing countries of the last two decades, Ethiopia and Vietnam. The chapters did 
so by offering a periodised account of the evolving forms of developmentalism evident 
in Ethiopia and Vietnam since the transition to market-oriented economy in 1986 and 
1991 respectively. Third, Chapter 7 provided a comparative analysis of the political 
economy of late development in the age of neoliberalism in Ethiopia and Vietnam, 
examining shared features of their strategies, interpretations of their trajectories in the 
development literature, and approaches to navigating the current global order. This 
conclusion draws together the main findings and contributions of the thesis, and briefly 
outlines some directions for further research.  
 
The overall contributions of the thesis have been three-fold. First, there are notable 
commonalities in the actually existing developmentalisms in Ethiopia and Vietnam. 
Both the EPRDF and CPV have embraced a tripartite form of developmentalism 
comprising a state finance-industry-infrastructure nexus; high levels of public 
investment and unorthodox macroeconomic and fiscal policies; and the embrace of 
foreign capital to foster participation in global value chains. These forms of 
developmentalism leverage state capital (through state enterprises), public investment 
(channelled into infrastructure development) and foreign capital (into global value 
chains) as engines of economic transformation, representing the coupling of heterodox 
industrial and macroeconomic strategies with orthodox approaches to foreign private 
capital flows. In this regard, both Ethiopia and Vietnam defy the neoliberal policy 
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agenda nationally whilst also instrumentalising key aspects of the global neoliberal 
order to bolster a heterodox developmental nexus. This specific mix of heterodox and 
orthodox elements also marks their experiences out from the East Asian developmental 
states in important and fundamental ways, suggesting the limited utility of this heuristic 
device to understand the trajectories of the two countries and applicability elsewhere. 
Their approach is also distinct from other developmental variants such as neo-
developmentalism in Latin America. 
 
These similarities matter because both countries forcefully illustrate that 
developmentalism remains possible in the age of neoliberalism, and that markedly 
heterodox strategies have been in evidence in two of the most successful developing 
economies of the period (in Vietnam since the early 1990s, and Ethiopia since the mid-
2000s). In addition, the inseparability of these two strategies from the global economic 
political order of neoliberalism indicates they are better understood as alternatives to 
neoliberalism domestically, and alternatives within neoliberalism globally. In this sense 
Ethiopia and Vietnam have carved out forms of developmentalism founded on a firm 
commitment to the structural transformation of the economy, which have emerged 
through creative engagement with the present global order, different aspects of which 
have been internalised, instrumentalised and resisted, and in different combinations and 
sequences. This very hybridity provides a strong critique of mainstream faith in the 
necessities of embracing global integration as a route to development and a forceful 
rejoinder to heterodox fatalism about prospects for developmentalism in the twenty-first 
century. It also points to the ways in which both countries help to constitute neoliberal 
accumulation globally by providing a low-wage labour force that aids its stabilisation 
and extension in the face of rising wages in China and other parts of Asia. This 
demonstrates that whilst alternatives are possible under neoliberalism, such strategies 
do not exist outside of it, and, indeed, are fundamentally interwoven with the 
contemporary global order. 
 
The second contribution of the thesis has been to highlight the social forces and 
strategies which have both driven and enabled the EPRDF and CPV to adopt forms of 
developmentalism in the contemporary conjuncture of global capitalism. Despite 
different timings, and in the context of very different country-specific challenges, the 
specific articulation of elements in each country’s development strategy has been shaped 
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by both common economic and political goals and similar social forces. Efforts to ensure 
political stability (including by limiting the emergence of alternative centres of 
economic and political power), has seen the EPRDF and CPV place a high premium on 
preserving state ownership across the commanding heights of the economy. This has 
acted as a core goal throughout the transition to market-oriented economy, and an 
enabling factor for heterodox developmentalism itself, by limiting the emergence of 
powerful domestic political and economic groups strongly aligned with neoliberal 
development policies. The strategic adroitness both regimes have evidenced in resisting 
the outside imposition of the neoliberal development agenda should be contextualised 
with reference to the absence of such a domestic constituency. This analysis suggests 
the primacy of the domestic political economy in determining the degree of policy space 
to deploy heterodox development strategies in a given context. This in turn reinforces 
the importance of historically-embedded political economy analysis to conceptualising 
possibilities for, and prospects and challenges of, contemporary alternative development 
pathways and trajectories.  
 
In addition, through their engagements with the current global order, the experiences of 
Ethiopia and Vietnam highlight the variegated nature of global constraints to 
development under neoliberalism, thus demonstrating the limited utility of deriving 
these from the analysis of global structures in isolation. Here, the specific strategies 
utilised by each regime to deal with global forces to create the policy space to implement 
heterodox varieties of developmentalism also suggests several lessons. Both have 
exploited divisions between the World Bank and IMF in order to emerge as amongst the 
largest recipients of concessional development financing in the world, whilst also 
deviating considerably from the policy principles that typically guide this lending. This 
indicates clearly that the conditionality pressures emanating from the IFIs can be subject 
to strong counter-tendencies from the national domain, suggesting that space exists for 
countries to exploit the global concessional financial architecture in service of 
alternative development strategies. In Ethiopia and Vietnam this has occurred in cases 
where the assertive management of funder relations is paired with a clear policy vision, 
an emphasis on macroeconomic stability, and where a strong development track record 
is in evidence. 
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In contrast, their experiences of the global trade regime have markedly diverged. 
Notably, Vietnam has found it necessary to join the WTO and embrace an ever-
increasing array of preferential trade agreements to secure the terms of market access 
that make its GVC strategy viable. Ethiopia, in contrast, has the rare distinction of 
enjoying quota and duty-free non-reciprocal market access to leading export markets 
outside of the WTO. Thus, whilst the global trade and investment regime has very strong 
impacts on Vietnam’s development strategies, for the immediate future it looks likely 
to have an extremely limited one in Ethiopia. The involvement of both countries in 
GVCs, meanwhile, certainly vindicates work highlighting the vulnerabilities of 
developing participants from their adverse location in these chains. However, the 
research presented here has also shown that the extent to which value chain engagement 
constrains development will be determined in part by the broader industrialisation 
strategy. This signals the need to appraise GVC participation in light of the political and 
economic objectives driving this engagement. Finally, the centrality of the financial 
sector to the developmental nexus of both regimes has acted as a strong counter-
tendency against pressure toward financial liberalisation, and thus financialisation has 
had either a muted or negligible effect on their developmental trajectories. Nevertheless, 
despite such variegation, Vietnam’s experiences also indicate that growing 
entanglement with the global neoliberal order, particularly through participation in 
GVCs and trade agreements together, does give rise to increasingly challenging trade-
offs between market access and industrial policy tools.  
 
Related to the conceptualisation of variegated development constraints has been the 
stress placed on the importance of considering how domestic political and economic 
forces shape the prospects for effective industrial policies in light of the challenges 
above. Here attention to Vietnam’s fragmented and decentralised policy making 
apparatus and Ethiopia’s specific vulnerabilities arising from domestic unrest indicates 
the important and dynamic interactions between domestic and global forces in the 
constitution of development constraints in a particular time and place. Cumulatively, 
therefore, these experiences suggest that policy advice formulated around emulation, or 
which derives policy possibilities by extrapolating from historical experiences, will be 
of limited utility. Instead, context-specific political and economy forces both drive and 
enable development pathways and possibilities and their modalities of articulation with 
global political and economic forces.  
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The third contribution of the thesis has been to the academic literatures on each country, 
and particularly the interpretations of each country’s developmental trajectories offered 
therein. The Ethiopia case study contributes to the emerging literature on the country’s 
developmentalism both by examining the hitherto understudied impacts of the global 
order on the substance of the EPRDF’s trajectory, and also highlights the important 
continuities between what the thesis calls the defensive and assertive phases of this 
strategy. Whilst much of the present literature rightly focuses on the important shifts 
occurring after the 2000-2001 TPLF split and 2005 election, Chapters 3 and 4 show the 
roots of Ethiopian developmentalism in its present form lie in (and owe a substantial 
debt to) the guiding ideas and decisions taken in the 1990s. The Vietnam case study, 
meanwhile, has highlighted how the recent pessimism which has infected both the 
mainstream and heterodox development literatures over the challenge of domestic 
policy fragmentation adopts too methodologically nationalist an interpretation of these 
constraints. Instead, Chapters 5 and 6 highlighted the need to appraise the policy 
challenges facing Vietnam in light of the impacts of the neoliberal global order on the 
functioning of its developmental nexus, as deeper integration and efforts to shield state 
enterprises from the impacts stemming from these forces has distorted its developmental 
functioning in ways that are inseparable from the global economic and political order.  
 
The results presented here also suggest several fruitful avenues for future research 
across the strategies discussed above. Comparative research on the state sectors in 
Ethiopia and Vietnam could be used to explore the similarities and differences between 
the emerging state conglomerate structures in Ethiopia and the long-standing variants in 
Vietnam (including in terms of investment, competition and degree of within-group 
coordination). As Ethiopia’s integration into the GVC regime deepens in the next few 
years, possibilities for sustained comparative work on the experiences of each country 
within this modality of international integration will also be very fruitful, including 
explorations of how differences across infrastructure provision, state oversight and 
investor profiles and decisions impact efforts to build linkages with the domestic 
economy. Such analysis will also offer opportunities to examine the relations between 
the state, labour and foreign capital. The dynamics of decentralisation also merit closer 
analysis since whilst Vietnam is a formally unitary political system and Ethiopia a 
federation, the results presented in this thesis indicate that contrary to these formal state 
properties, the Vietnamese system is considerably more decentralised than Ethiopia’s 
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centralised mechanisms for allocating investment decisions and undertaking foreign 
investment approvals. This itself points to important differences between their 
respective party-state systems which also merit closer analysis, given the powers of 
provincial officials and state enterprise managers to influence policy decisions in 
Vietnam, whilst lower-level institutions and officials appear to have considerably less 
influence over key decisions in Ethiopia. Importantly, these differences (as well as the 
variegated nature of global constraints impacting them, discussed above) help to shape 
the prospects for effective industrial policy-making and evolution of development 
constraints in each country. Such factors therefore form potentially very significant 
areas of future research to appraise the differential potential for success amongst two 
late developers now utilising a shared form of contemporary developmentalism.   
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Appendix A: Interview schedule and codes 
 
Key to interview codes 
 
 
First letter (country) 
 
E      Ethiopia 
V      Vietnam 
 
Second letter (type of interviewee)   
 
A     Academic or researcher  
D     Domestic enterprise or private sector association   
E      Foreign embassy official, bilateral donor official 
F      Foreign investor 
G      Government official, ruling party or coalition official 
I      International organisation official (IFI or UN agency) 
 
Anonymity (position and institution) 
 
To protect the anonymity of interviewees (as agreed during the process of securing consent), job titles and specific Departmental information have not 
been included, since, in both countries, when combined with organisation name and interview date would often make it possible to trace back to 
individual respondents. Therefore, two categories have been created to differentiate between interviewees differently placed in organisation hierarchies: 
official and senior official. Senior official refers to the following broad job roles (and official to anything below these): 
 
Academia:     Director/President of research institute 
Private sector (domestic or foreign):  Director/ President (or equivalent) or their Deputy  
Government:     Minister, State Minister (or equivalent); or Director of an independent government agency 
International organisation:   Country Director or Deputy Country Director  
 
In addition, officials from both bilateral donor agencies, IFIs and FDI firms in Ethiopia requested that their comments not be connected to their 
institution, so the details of their institutions have been anonymised. Contextual information has been provided where possible.   
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Category Code Position Institution Date(s)
EA-1 Expert Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research (EIAR) 31/03/2016
EA-2 Expert Ethiopian Economics Association 24/03/2016
ED-1 Senior official Addis Chamber of Commerce 18/02/2016
ED-2 Senior official Vitacon Textiles Plc 10/03/2016
ED-3 Senior official Knit to Finish Garment Factory 11/03/2016
ED-4 Senior Official Muya Textiles 17/03/2016
ED-5 Senior Official Soreti International Trading 17/02/2016
EE-1 Senior Official Bilateral donor 28/01/2016
EE-2 Official Bilateral donor 30/03/2016
EE-3 Official Bilateral donor 22/03/2016
EE-4 Official Bilateral donor 22/03/2016
EF-1 Senior Official Foreign textile and garment  firm (Asia) 04/02/2016
EF-2 Official Foreign leather goods/shoe firm (Asia) 04/02/2016
EF-3 Senior Official Foreign leather goods/shoe firm (Western) 19/02/2016
EF-3 Senior Official Foreign textile and garment firm (Europe/North America) 30/03/2016
EF-4 Official Foreign leather goods/show firm (Asia) 05/03/2016
EF-5 Official Foreign textile and garment firm (Europe/North America) 05/03/2016
EF-6 Senior Official Foreign industrial park construction firm (Asia) 05/03/2016
EF-7 Senior Official Foreign textile and garment firm (Middle East) 08/03/2016
Government EG-1 Senior Official National Planning Commission 11/01/2016; 15/01/2016; 12/02/2016; 25/03/2016; 07/03/2016
EG-2 Senior Official Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation (MOFEC) 12/01/2016; 16/03/2016; 29/03/2016
EG-3 Senior Official National Planning Commission 12/01/2016
EG-4 Senior Official Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation (MOFEC) 12/06/2016
EG-5 Official Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation (MOFEC) 13/01/2016; 21/03/2016
EG-6 Official National Planning Commission 14/01/2016
EG-7 Senior Official National Bank of Ethiopia 21/01/2016
EG-8 Senior Official Development Bank of Ethiopia 26/01/2016
EG-9 Senior Official Ministry of Agriculture 26/01/2016
EG-10 Senior Official Ministry of Industry 27/01/2016; 11/02/2016; 22/03/2016
Academia
Domestic enterprise and enterprise 
associatons
Bilateral donor or foreign government 
representative
Foreign investors
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Category Code Position Institution Date(s)
EG-11 Senior Official Ethiopian Horticulture Development Agency 09/02/2016
EG-12 Official Commercial Bank of Ethiopia 11/02/2016
EG-13 Senior Official Special Advisor to the PM 12/02/2016
EG-14 Official Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation (MOFEC) 15/02/2016
EG-15 Senior Official Ministry of Public Enterprises 15/02/2016; 04/03/2016
EG-16 Official Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation (MOFEC) 16/02/2016
EG-17 Official Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation (MOFEC) 16/02/2016
EG-18 Senior Official Ministry of Industry 18/06/2016
EG-19 Senior Official Leather Industry Development Institute 19/06/2016
EG-20 Senior Official EIC 23/02/2016
EG-21 Senior Official TIDI 24/02/2016
EG-22 Official Ministry of Industry 25/03/2016
EG-23 Senior Official Special Advisor to the PM 28/03/2016
EG-24 Official Ethiopian Investment Commission 30/03/2016
EG-25 Official Ministry of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 16/03/2016
EG-26 Senior Official Industrial Development Park Corporation 16/03/2016
EG-27 UN Coordinator Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation (MOFEC) 03/03/2016
EG-28 Official Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority (ERCA) 08/03/2016
EG-29 Official Ministry of Trade 09/03/2016; 10/03/2016
EG-30 Official Ministry of Trade 10/03/2016
EI-1 Official IFI 09/02/2016
EI-2 Senior Official UN Agency 10/02/2016
EI-3 Senior Official IFI 10/02/2016
EI-4 Official UN Agency 18/06/2016
EI-5 Official IFI 24/02/2016
EI-6 Official IFI 04/03/2016
International organisations (IFIs, UN 
agencies)
Government
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Category Code Position Institution Date
VA-1 Senior official Viet Nam Institute for Economic and Policy Research (VEPR), Vietnam National University, Hanoi 02/06/2016
VA-2 Senior official National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) 20/06/2016
VA-3 Expert Independent expert and consultant 22/06/2016
VA-4 Senior official Fulbright Economics Teaching Program 04/08/2016
VA-5 Senior official Fulbright Economics Teaching Program 05/06/2016
VD-1 Official Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry 21/06/2016
VD-2 Senior official Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry 11/06/2016
VD-3 Senior official Vietnam Textile and Apparel Association 12/06/2016
VD-4 Official Animal Husbandry Association of Vietnam 15/06/2016
VD-5 Senior official Vietnam Association of Seafood Exporters and Producers (VASEP) 16/06/2016
VE-1 Senior official KOICA 16/06/2016
VE-2 Senior official Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency 28/06/2016
VE-3 Official British Embassy 06/07/2016
VF-1 Senior official E-Land International Fashion (Shanghai) Co. 24/06/2016
VF-2 Senior official Philvovina Inc 24/06/2016
VF-3 Official Philvovina Inc 24/06/2016
VF-4 Senior official Sembcorp 16/06/2016
VF-5 Official Duanne Morris 01/08/2016
VF-6 Senior official Asuzac Foods Co. Ltd 08/06/2016
VF-7 Senior official Delphi Industry Co Ltd 09/06/2016
VF-8 Senior official Delphi Industry Co Ltd 09/06/2016
VF-9 Senior official Mtex Vietnam Co. Ltd 09/06/2016
VF-10 Senior official Dih Lhing Enterprise 09/06/2016
VG-1 Official Vietnam Institute of Economics, Vietnam Academy of Social Science 03/06/2016
VG-2 Official Institute of World Economics and Politics, Vietnam Academy of Social Science 03/06/2016
VG-3 Official Instiute for Africa and Middle East, Vietnam Academy of Social Science 07/06/2016
VG-4 Official Vietnam Institute of Economics, Vietnam Academy of Social Science 08/06/2016
VG-5 Official Vietnam Asia-Pacific Economic Center 08/06/2016
VG-6 Official Institute of World Economics and Politics, Vietnam Academy of Social Science 10/06/2018
VG-7 Official CIEM, Ministry of Planning and Investment 14/06/2016; 30/06/2016
VG-8 Official Vietnam Institute of Economics, Vietnam Academy of Social Science 17/06/2016
VG-9 Official Ministry of Industry and Trade 20/06/2016
Bilateral donor or foreign government 
representative
Foreign investors
Government (including official government 
think tanks)
Academic and researcher
Domestic enterprise and enterprise 
associatons
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Category Code Position Institution Date
VG-10 Official CIEM, Ministry of Planning and Investment 05/07/2016
VG-11 Official CIEM, Ministry of Planning and Investment 07/07/2016
VG-12 Official Centre for Analysis and Forecast, Vietnam Academy of Social Science 08/07/2016
VG-13 Official  Ministry of Industry and Trade 20/07/2016
VG-14 Official Ministry of Planning and Investment 20/07/2016
VG-15 Official Ministry of Industry and Trade 21/07/2016
VG-16 Official Ministry of Labour Invalids and Social Assistance 26/07/2016
VG-17 Official Ministry of Planning and Investment 27/07/2016
VG-18 Official Ministry of Planning and Investment 27/07/2016
VG-19 Official Commercial Bank for Investment and Development of Vietnam (BIDV) (majority state-owned) 28/07/2016
VG-20 Official Ministry of Industry and Trade 28/07/2016
VG-21 Official Ministry of Planning and Investment 02/08/2016
VG-22 Official Ministry of Planning and Investment 02/08/2016
VG-23 Official Ministry of Industry and Trade 03/08/2016
VG-24 Official HCMC Export Processing and Industrial Zones Authority 08/06/2016
VG-25 Official HCMC Export Processing and Industrial Zones Authority 08/06/2016
VG-26 Senior official HCMC Export Processing and Industrial Zones Authority 08/06/2016
VG-27 Official Ho Chi Minh City Department of Industry and Trade 08/06/2016
VG-28 Official Central Committee Economic Commission, Communist Party of Vietnam 10/06/2016
VG-29 Official Centre for EU Studies, Vietnam Academy of Social Science 16/06/2016
VG-30 Official CIEM, Ministry of Planning and Investment 17/06/2016
VG-31 Official Ministry of Planning and Investment 23/06/2016
VI-1 Official IFI 17/06/2016
VI-2 Official UN agency 12/07/2016
International organisations (IFIs, UN 
agencies)
Government (including official government 
think tanks)
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Appendix B: Countries benefiting from EBA and AGOA provisions (as 
of March 2018) 
 
 
 
Sources: EC (2018) AGOA (2018); United Nations (2017b); and WTO (2018b). 
 
Note: AGOA covers more than 1,800 products which it makes eligible for duty-free access to the US 
market, in addition to a further 5,000 products eligible under the broader GSP. Some 40 within sub-
Saharan Africa were eligible for these benefits in 2018 (USTR, 2018, p.9). EBA grants the recipient 
countries – in this case, LDCs according to U.N. classification – full duty-free and quota-free access for 
all goods, bar arms and ammunition. There were a total of 49 beneficiaries as of 2016-2017 (EC, 2018, 
p.1). 
  
Population
(thousands)
2017
Angola  29 784 Yes
Benin  11 176 Yes
Burkina Faso  19 193 Yes
Central African Republic  4 659 Yes
Chad  14 900 Yes
Comoros  814 No
Djibouti  957 Yes
Ethiopia  104 957 No
Gambia  2 101 Yes
Guinea  12 717 Yes
Guinea-Bissau  1 861 Yes
Lesotho  2 233 Yes
Liberia  4 732 Yes
Madagascar  25 571 Yes
Malawi  18 622 Yes
Mali  18 542 Yes
Mauritania  4 420 Yes
Mozambique  29 669 Yes
Niger  21 477 Yes
Rwanda  12 208 Yes
Sao Tome & Principe  204 Yes
Senegal  15 851 Yes
Sierra Leone  7 557 Yes
Tanzania  57 310 Yes
Togo  7 798 Yes
Uganda  42 863 Yes
Zambia  17 094 Yes



























Everything but 
Arms
African Growth and 
Opportunities Act
 = Includes 
‘wearing apparel 
provisions’
WTO 
membership
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Appendix C: Vietnam: Largest GC-91’s by pre-tax profit, capital, budget contribution and employees, 1999 
 
 
 
Source: adapted from Marukawa (2001, pp.135–136). 
Petrovietnam 5,587 EVN 23,610 Petrovietnam 15,176 VNPT 96,892
EVN 1,950 VNPT 14,272 EVN 2,088 Vinatex 92,852
VNPT 2,900 Petrovietnam 13,828 VNPT 1,991 Geruco 80,000
VNCC 580 VNCC 7,357 Vinataba 1,215 Vinacoal 76,091
Viet Nam Airlines 339 Vinatex 4,603 Viet Nam Airlines 774 EVN 64,700
Total 11,356 Total 63,670 Total 21,244 Total 410,535
Percentage total profit 92.7 Percentage total capital 76.5 Percentage total budget contribution of GC-91s 90.5
Percentage total 
employment 68.0
Pre-tax profit (VND, billion) Capital (VND, billion) Budget contribution (VND, billion) Number of employees
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Appendix D: Leading IDA recipients, 1994-2016 (ODA net totals, via IDA US$ million, 2015) 
 
 
Source: OECD-DAC (2018a). 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Vietnam 155.6 51.8 221.8 227.1 324.9 197.3 226.3 382.9 346.1 669.0 475.8 403.3
Pakistan 363.9 242.2 284.7 240.4 221.7 170.4 100.8 734.3 1138.1 34.8 739.6 548.8
India 960.0 560.2 792.8 686.4 742.6 614.4 748.4 845.7 1008.0 247.1 571.1 747.8
Ethiopia 194.1 85.4 150.4 62.8 71.7 172.9 151.6 601.2 621.0 292.6 520.1 262.9
Bangladesh 471.7 173.0 270.3 308.8 373.3 429.2 360.9 301.5 260.7 467.3 518.0 423.2
Tanzania 214.1 164.6 142.2 212.9 108.8 221.0 180.1 165.9 195.6 502.9 517.8 292.7
Nigeria 73.2 94.6 105.3 102.8 171.8 91.2 66.9 1.8 10.2 54.5 149.8 261.6
Ghana 213.5 261.0 275.7 283.8 314.6 251.0 234.6 219.9 124.6 288.3 314.6 338.3
Uganda 267.8 169.3 136.5 261.3 131.2 153.9 241.8 402.0 229.7 313.6 328.0 316.5
Mozambique 219.1 178.0 259.8 184.8 164.9 98.6 127.2 71.8 397.3 188.3 212.1 258.2
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total
Vietnam 332.9 692.7 511.8 1,105.6 797.6 874.8 996.4 1,074.0 1,134.8 795.4 625.4 12,623.0
Pakistan 714.3 852.5 -8.1 936.4 192.3 620.1 317.9 166.4 1,097.2 1,464.0 623.7 11,796.4
India 361.7 87.8 73.9 446.3 217.4 714.3 -225.0 -29.6 525.0 256.5 269.7 11,222.5
Ethiopia 365.7 362.0 498.8 982.6 624.3 630.5 689.7 863.0 790.5 691.6 1,185.1 10,870.5
Bangladesh 239.2 401.7 569.5 99.1 102.8 93.8 398.5 359.0 497.2 757.8 757.7 8,634.1
Tanzania 437.1 486.8 385.1 782.6 651.0 228.8 485.9 629.8 545.8 580.9 401.0 8,533.4
Nigeria 354.1 301.3 304.2 450.6 915.8 572.6 436.8 569.1 773.7 709.2 654.3 7,225.5
Ghana 273.5 229.0 249.2 233.9 299.2 374.1 331.6 286.0 281.4 518.6 284.6 6,481.0
Uganda 278.7 357.4 164.7 374.2 305.8 151.8 169.6 317.5 146.3 209.3 163.8 5,590.9
Mozambique 257.4 252.0 255.5 201.6 154.2 84.8 202.5 333.3 286.0 346.2 232.4 4,965.9
